Pacifying Leviathan: Back to basics in peace-building out of conflict by Williams, Jessie
  
PACIFYING LEVIATHAN: BACK TO BASICS 
IN PEACE-BUILDING OUT OF CONFLICT  
 
 
BY JESSIE WILLIAMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS  
SUBMITTED TO THE VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON  
IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF ARTS  
 
 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2015* 
                                               
* This date refers to the year a final copy of this work was deposited in the VUW library. 
This thesis was completed in 2010.  
1 
 
  
2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses critically on contemporary theory and practice of peace-building 
where there has been conflict. The commonality of the resumption of violence after peace 
processes in many recent examples, suggests that both theory and practice have not 
worked as intended. The thesis explores insights that might improve the odds that 
governing institutions (or, more particularly, the people who work in them) can put aside 
violence. In the terms used in this thesis: how might Leviathan be pacified? Therefore, 
the thesis deals with basics evident in all recorded (and probably pre-historic) human 
experience. For the modern states of Western Europe and North America, pacifying 
Leviathan followed centuries of conflict (including two world wars), interspersed with 
governance reforms and constitutional adjustments. The process is ongoing, but by the 
middle of the 20th century “the liberal state” clearly emerged, with features that included 
constitutions, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the market system. There 
appeared to be a widespread view after World War II that the liberal state apparatus’ 
essence could be written down in documents, transplanted into many different historical 
and cultural contexts and would work much as the model predicted i.e. was easily 
reproducible, perhaps infinitely, even in smaller and smaller versions. From 1945 to 2010, 
the numbers of states at the United Nations almost quadrupled (51 to 192). Member 193 
(South Sudan) may emerge from decades of conflict in 2011. In all that state formation, 
the optimistic view was that the new documents and institutions would provide structures 
within which political and/or ethnic competitors/combatants would engage in non-violent 
political competition.  In this thesis, “reverse-engineering” is the term given to this notion. 
Such optimism was severely dented by the experiences of many newly-independent states 
in the mid-late 20th century.  As violence escalated in new and existing states all over the 
world after the Cold War ended (taken, for convenience, as 1990), reverse-engineering  
remained at the core of the formula for peace-building after conflict.  As with the post-
colonial period, liberal peace-building since 1990 have also been repeated failures to work 
as intended, including the resumption of conflict. The most fragile states have posed the 
hardest problems, not only for the suffering citizens but for the international community 
seeking how best to help.  
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With this in mind, and accepting that each state and society is unique, this thesis sets out 
building blocks for alternative approaches.  It does not suggest there are simple answers 
in pacifying Leviathan, either generally or in relation to any particular example. If it is 
indeed possible in any place (e.g. Haiti) to reduce ongoing conflict, the argument is that 
these blocks should be amongst the foundations of theory to inform practice.  
 
The core thesis is thus that the chances of pacifying Leviathan might be significantly 
improved if domestic and international actors: 
 Adopt a conflict transformation approach to guide theory and practice; 
 Come to terms with groupism – how/why humans bond into groups and the 
potential this poses for violence and peace; 
 Understand the importance of receptivity - the notion that critical masses of  key 
actors should squarely face (often when they have become exhausted by) the 
consequences of violent competitiveness and seek alternatives;  
 Translate receptivity into learned constitutionalism – learning to govern by rules 
amongst sufficient actors; and   
 Develop international assistance guided by the above perspectives, and which, 
with the consent of the peoples concerned, find ways to stay appropriately 
engaged for the time needed to strengthen the factors that should pacify Leviathan. 
 
The thesis does not focus on future strategies of conflict-reduction – such as economic 
development to give people stakes in the society, along with disarmament of combatants. 
Many other studies explore these. Here, the exploration is of the nature of human society, 
informed by history, examples, case studies and a sweep of cross-disciplinary analysis. 
Understanding why pacifying Leviathan is so hard is the basic first step, which forms the 
bulk of this thesis. Putting such understanding into practice involves many further steps. 
Important as these might be for current and future policy and practice in peace-building, 
their full development is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some suggestions are made, 
especially in the conclusion, but elaboration will have to await further work.  
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1: Pacifying Leviathan: the search for 
new insights 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with the beginnings of peace-building out of conflict in societies 
emerging from civil war (or some similar intrastate conflict).  How the lessons of the 
immediate past combined with a willingness to manage competition in society in non-
violent ways is then articulated in a shared vision for the future during the post-conflict 
“pause” – the period immediately after a peace “settlement” (peace agreement or 
comprehensive ceasefire) and before formal state-making – is not well understood. These 
questions are important because many externally driven peace-building efforts made 
since the end of the Cold War (taken for convenience as 1990) have failed. In part, this 
may be through their reliance on liberal peace-building solutions brought in from “above” 
and “outside”.   
 
It is doubtful that conflict will be transformed without the deliberative insights and 
learning of the society in question in the crucial period post-settlement, which is before 
rushed state-making or the like when the baubles of the state may confuse the 
renegotiation of peace. The particulars of learning and agreement as the Leviathan 
pacifies will be unique to any society (and on-going). However it is reasonable to 
postulate that the chances of conflict transforming from former conditions of endemic 
conflict to ones of constructive or “positive” peace requires the mass of individuals, 
leaders, ex-combatants, victims (all of whom firstly need to reorient from violence) to 
take the time to reconcile, to agree upon new rules for controlling conflict and competition 
in society and in doing so become believers in the process, discuss the issues, strengthen 
the rules, defend them, and remember. 
 
This chapter goes on to describe more fully the difficulty in sustaining ‘peace’ in post-
conflict societies and the problems associated with liberal peace-building practices, the 
research aim, the focus of the research – pacifying leviathan, the meanings of key 
concepts, methodology, and an overview of the structure of the full report to follow. 
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II. THE DIFFICULTY IN SUSTAINING ‘PEACE’ IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 
Although overall violent conflict appears to be lessening worldwide, interstate conflict 
has been supplanted by frequent internal violence and civil wars with severe levels of 
human displacement and deliberate targeting of civilians in new and existing states all 
over the world since the end of the Cold War (Erikson and Wallensteen 2004; Human 
Security Centre 2005, 2011). Violence and war pose hard problems not only for those 
suffering from their effects but also for the international community seeking to help. In 
the period immediately following the ‘end’ of a conflict and some form of settlement, the 
challenge is to realise stable, enduring, peaceful governance. To some degree, the 
violence will have led to significant damage and, perhaps, the full collapse of governance 
structures. So, despite the ‘pause’ that peace treaties or ceasefires signal, in the aftermath 
of serious politically related violence on a wide scale, further violent outbreaks often 
occur. 
 
In such cases, it can be assumed that some assistance from the international community 
may be warranted. Haiti, Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kenya, Zimbabwe, East 
Timor and the Solomon Islands are amongst post-conflict states where there has been no 
easy transition from war to peace.  After the 2008 elections, for example, Zimbabweans 
waited while a power-sharing agreement was negotiated between Mugabe’s ZANU-PF 
and the opposition Movement for Democractic Change, who believed they had won. The 
resulting Global Political Agreement may have provided a little political and economic 
stability (Connolly 2011) but seems to be operating on borrowed time with major risks of 
a resumption of violence (Kandemiiri et al. 2010).  In BiH an internationally imposed and 
administered ‘peace’ is close to two decades old. The Serb entity continues to threaten to 
move away from the current power-sharing administrative arrangements and push 
(perhaps violently) for independence (International Crisis Group 2010). Such threats are 
destabilising and may cause the frustration felt by the other groups to spill over into 
violence (International Crisis Group 2011). These examples indicate that ‘post-conflict’ 
may connote that the conflict has ‘ended’, yet as explained by Junne and Verkoren (2005: 
1), the term is simply “shorthand for conflict situations, in which open warfare has come 
to an end”. In these ambiguous contexts, although an enduring ‘peace’ is possible, 
settlement may yet fail, and armed conflict may continue, restart, or intensify (for further 
discussion on the distinctions: von Bogdandy et al. 2005).  
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At this most general level, the issues are clearly not new. Violence has been so prevalent 
in human affairs that after-war-rebuilding (of everything) has occupied leaders and 
peoples across human history, written and unwritten.2 The issues were particularly 
evident in the 20th century as the sovereign state emerged from various conflicts 
(including two World Wars) as the dominant form of human governance. From 1945 to 
2011 the numbers of states at the United Nations (UN) almost quadrupled (from 51 to 
193). Associated documents and institutions were thought to provide structures within 
which political and/or ethnic competitors/combatants would engage in non-violent 
political competition.  Whatever hopes were held for peace flourishing in the post-war 
period, they would have been severely dented by the experiences of many newly 
independent states in the mid to late 20th century. Failures continue in the post-Cold-War 
period with observed resumptions of conflict (Berdal 2009; Call and Cousens 2008; 
Doyle and Sambanis 2006).  
 
Post-conflict peace-building as the dominant internationally driven mechanism to build 
peace in the post-Cold War period has created fragile states and institutions dependent 
upon foreign support and subject to contests over power and corruption. As Azar (1990) 
and others (Azar and Burton 1986; Collier 2000; Toft 2009) have observed these 
intractable intrastate conflicts share some characteristics in addition to weak state 
systems, including group identity-based needs and fears and the associated problems of 
group identification, where the distinction between combatants and civilians is blurred, 
and immense suffering ensues, where competition over resources is evident, and where 
settlements have been negotiated – a finding most perturbing for international 
practitioners in their efforts to assist post-conflict societies and strengthen peace.   
 
Sustained violence has produced problems and challenges for new forms of governance. 
Inevitably, there were some “winners” in some conflicts: people and institutions that 
handled the post-conflict period “better”, emerging with control over armies, resources 
or indeed, the state apparatus (e.g. in Russia). But there were also plenty of “losers”: the 
dead and the injured and their families, victims of fundamental rights abuses, displaced 
                                               
2 The oft-cited biblical reference (Isaiah 2:4) that God would preside over the ending of wars between 
peoples, who would beat swords into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks, testifies not least to the 
endurance of the issues across thousands of years. 
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civilians, destroyed economies, starving peoples, refugees, bitter communities, angry 
rivals. Most significantly, the evidence is that although violence is often reduced in the 
short term, the fighting was more accurately paused i.e. significant proportions of the 
leaderships, at least, were still fighting in the mind,3 whilst appearing to go about the 
formalities of building peaceful constitutional governance. Thus conflict re-emerged in 
many of the areas concerned in a cycle, summarised below: 
 
Figure 1: The conflict cycle 
 
Every outbreak of violence threatened and sometimes drastically reversed, peace-
building. Breaking the cycle, or at least slowing its pace to try to give time for “stabilisers” 
to work, thus emerged as a major challenge for all concerned. 
 
Post-Cold War, the world appeared well equipped and ready to help peoples meet the 
challenges. As the threat of global nuclear war rapidly declined, it seemed that the 
international community would be able to work collectively and effectively in the cause 
of peace and the protection of human dignity in other trouble spots. The United States of 
America (USA) emerged as the sole superpower, with resources and commitment to 
peace and “freedom”. The UN looked as if it was ready and able to play the full role 
                                               
3 Fighting in the mind is a term used to indicate that notwithstanding a peace process, the 
combatants/contestants still see winning at any cost as the objective but use apparently peaceful processes 
(like elections and constitutions) as tools until they no longer deliver dominance, when they are abandoned 
for violence again. Thus, they have not mentally and genuinely abandoned violence as a key tool in political 
competition.  This concept is encountered throughout this thesis from different angles. 
Peace 
process 
“Pause” 
Re/building 
governance 
Crisis 
Conflict 
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intended in its Charter, apparently unshackled from the Security Council veto threats of 
Russia (and, to a lesser extent, China). This was epitomised by Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s (1992) famous Agenda for Peace.  Also, the EU was emerging as a very 
significant regional, and potentially international, stabilising fund and force. International 
optimism had some foundation – examples of apparent initial success in international 
support included the apparent “ending” of the complex problems of Namibia (1990), 
Angola (2002), Cambodia (1993), South Africa (1994) and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) (1995). 
 
The record of failure, therefore, suggests that for these standardised external solutions to 
be effective, ongoing international presence (or even external administration) will be 
necessary to prevent the conditions of endemic conflict to supplant “peace”.  It seems 
unlikely that such an ongoing presence would be possible or even desirable in every 
instance of conflict settlement.  
III. LIBERAL-PEACE DRIVEN POST-CONFLICT STATE-BUILDING PRACTICES  
Since the end of the Cold War, the ideas associated with “liberal peace” theory have 
justified post-conflict peace-building. Briefly, liberal-peace efforts, despite variations, are 
grounded in the belief that sustainable peace is best provided for by liberal structures. 
Specifically these liberal structures require the adoption of democratically based 
government and the promotion of international trade.  Together these are thought to “form 
the basis of international co-operation and consequently the end of war” (Richmond 2007: 
27). According to the proponents of this approach, the proof is in the unique peacefulness 
of the groups of mainly western and developed states who have long-standing peaceful 
relations including low incidences of internal conflict (Diamond 1995; Doyle 1986; Paris 
2004). The creation of a liberal state, therefore, is the peace-building strategy currently 
promoted in the western-led international political climate. Western nations, along with 
financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF)), international 
organisations (UN, European Union (EU), Organisation of American States, Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and UN Development Programme) and many 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are guided by this unique peacefulness of 
liberally constituted states. The belief in the ability to “reform” people, institutions, states, 
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and relationships is part of liberal peace theory’s intellectual foundations (Mandelbaum 
2002). In this regard, the liberal peace goes beyond simply ending violence by attempting 
to repair or create liberal structures that are assumed to support peace (Richmond and 
Franks 2009a). Peace, therefore, is promoted by interventions “delivering” democracy, 
international financial controls and requirements for open markets (Paris 1997: 56). 
Despite acceptance of the idea of “sovereignty with responsibility” at the international 
level (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001; United 
Nations 2004) and the imposition of liberal democratic policies and economies, at its core 
liberal peace theory is still essentially concerned with regulating and maintaining a state-
based international system. The objective of the liberal peace is, after all, the creation of 
liberal states. The aforementioned institutions have consequently sought (and sometimes 
succeeded) to transplant the liberal-state apparatus’s essence – often written down in 
documents (usually constitutions) – into many different historical and cultural contexts 
with the hope that it would work as predicted. The strategy was assumed to be easily 
reproducible, perhaps infinitely, even in smaller and smaller versions. In this thesis, such 
transplantation efforts are called reverse-engineering. 
 
The liberal-peace theory is highly standardised: it supports intervention in the full gamut 
of post-conflict situations with the aim to introduce a reform recipe, which must be 
followed in a set order – demobilisation, constitution-making, legislation passing, 
registration of voters, elections (usually within two years of the “end” of violence”), 
funding of civil society, improving the capacity of the media and extensive state 
institution-building (Call and Cook 2003: 233; Ottaway 2003). The standard pattern has 
been remarked upon by observers of various peace-building endeavours, such as those in 
BiH and East Timor, which were remarkably similar despite the enormous differences in 
history, culture and development (Richmond and Franks 2009a). Further, the presence of 
international parties during peace negotiations has encouraged or indeed shaped 
democratic (and sometimes economic) liberalisation. Such practice is seen in the UN’s 
role in mediating in post-conflict El Salvador; the drafting of the Namibian peace 
settlement by France, Canada, Germany, Britain and the USA; the UN Security Council’s 
model for Cambodia which was adopted with minor alteration; or the Dayton Peace 
Agreement insisted upon by the international negotiators for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH). Expert advisors have also played key roles in advancing the liberal peace project, 
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for example through constitution drafting.4 In BiH and Somalia, constitutions have been 
entirely the work of outsiders but in many other societies a significant amount of foreign 
assistance has been given, such as in Iraq and East Timor (Dann and Al Ali 2006). 
International agencies like the IMF and the World Bank, as well as donor states, have also 
imposed conditions which require states to undertake specific economic and political 
reforms in exchange for aid. Thus, market-oriented reforms were imposed on BiH, 
Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda and 
among others and in BiH political conditionalities such as compliance with international 
human rights standards were included (Paris 1997; S. Woodward 2002: 185).  In some 
instances, internationals have even assumed particular governance roles, for instance on 
the board of central banks and in key governmental departments. In East Timor and 
Kosovo, international agencies have held very wide ranging roles, coming very close to 
a form of international trusteeship (Butler 2012; Chesterman 2002).5  
 
A common feature in liberal-peace-influenced peace-building post-Cold War is the 
prominence of one interpretation of “state”.  A 21st-century (or late 20th-century) state is 
one that is recognised and recognisable as such by the international community, functions 
like other states, makes decisions, upholds responsibilities, looks after its citizens, trades 
as an international entity under international law and does not conduct war, either against 
its own citizens, or against other states (and with heightened concern over terrorism, 
maintains internal security). In general, today’s developed states have characteristics that, 
given human diversity, are actually remarkably uniform: rules, processes of decision-
making, institutions, (executives, legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, police, armed 
forces), territories, peoples. This uniformity was undoubtedly a key part in producing the 
formulaic nature of liberal-peace peace-building.  
                                               
4 Other forms of assistance can be seen in the training of the media to be free or to strengthen local NGOs 
Krishna Kumar, 'International Assistance to Promote Independent Media in Transition and Post-Conflict 
Societies', Democratization, 13/4 (2006/08/01 2006), 652-67, Béatrice Pouligny, 'Civil Society and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building ‘New’ Societies ', 
Security Dialogue, 36/4 (2005), 495-510. 
5 The concept of international trusteeship predates the establishment of the UN, when the League of 
Nations’ mandate system saw selected states administer particular territories on behalf of the League 
Antony  Anghie, 'Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the 
Mandate System of the League of Nations; ' NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 34 (2001), 513-
633. 
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In the face of the problems that emerged in places as diverse as Somalia and Cambodia 
in the early 1990s, the response of the proponents of the liberal peace has been to focus 
on better integration of, and efficacy in, the cornerstones of the theory – democratisation, 
the rule of law, human rights, markets, and neoliberal development (Richmond and 
Franks 2009b), rather than on a comprehensive questioning of the soundness of the theory 
for building sustainable peace or the method of delivery in practice (reverse-engineering). 
While the apparent peace in BiH, East Timor or El Salvador may be lauded as “best 
practice” in western diplomatic capitals, chronic group mistrust, grievance and continued 
insecurity has led many to conclude that liberal-peace peace-building has failed to deliver 
appreciable benefits beyond an end to direct violence – at least in the short term (Chandler 
2000, 2004; Paris 2001; Richmond 2005; Said 2002).  Critics identify a number of 
problems with the nature and limits of liberal-peace informed post-conflict peace-
building: ontological narrowness, questionable methodologies, the token attention given 
to locals – the actual “owners” of the peace, and questionable relevance to and legitimacy 
for, substantial groups of the population in post-conflict spaces (see for example: Boege 
et al. 2008; Mac Ginty 2008; Richmond 2009b; Roberts 2011). Advocates of the liberal 
peace agree on the failure, but the result has been attempts to make it work better 
(Chesterman 2004a; Paris 2010). Its underlying assumptions still represent the core 
thinking behind most post-conflict international operations today (see for example the 
August 2011 UN plan for post-Gaddifi Libya: Martin 2011).  
 
Liberal democracy flourished in the 20th century because states saw evolving political 
ties, trade relationships and mutual avoidance of war as beneficial and productive 
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 129-32). The liberal peace as broadly conceived is a massive 
achievement, or as Levy expressed: “comes as close as anything we have to an empirical 
law in international relations” (Levy 1988b: 662). However, as Rasmussen (2003) has 
convincingly argued, the liberal peace developed as “policy” not as a “fact” as the allied 
“victors” of World War II purposely embedded liberal principles in post-war societies 
and at the international level. Expansion of the liberal order came about because of 
perceived success of liberal democracy: “democratization tends to follow war… 
democratization decreases the systemic amount of war, and…the substantive and pacific 
impact of democracy on war increases over time” (S. M. Mitchell et al. 1999: 771). 
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The international community will continue to intervene in post-conflict efforts to build 
peace because abandoning tens of millions of people is incompatible with the 
“responsibility to protect” (see: International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty 2001). Few would argue against the efforts of liberal-peace peace-building 
or for outright prescriptions of non-inference regardless of the ineffective results (Paris 
2010).  International interventions have after all sometimes been successful in ending 
violence (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). However, the commonality of the resumption of 
violence – half of all intrastate conflicts resumed within five years (Report of the 
Secretary-General 2005b: 31) – calls into question the tenacity of the liberal peace. 
Accordingly, there may be merit in looking elsewhere for ideas and evidence to guide 
decisions and actions of those who seek post-conflict stability and to build peace, not 
simply just contain the violence.   
IV. RESEARCH AIMS  
It requires little imagination to postulate that future governance arrangements must 
confront a conflict legacy that is centred on the relationships between people in society. 
The same people who were one or more of the combination of actors (combatants, 
abusers, victims, survivors, refugees, tribes, farmers, shopkeepers) are often the leaders 
of the next phases or the citizens who expect to vote, farm, produce, go to school, pay 
taxes and in myriad ways participate in the peace process and the rebuilding. In the push 
for liberalisation, it has recently been claimed that current post-conflict peace-building 
ignores the needs and interests of these very people and results in the maintenance of 
inequalities and conflicts, only including locals in the “technical moment of elections” 
(Roberts 2011: 411) or when full state sovereignty is returned (Chesterman 2007) – 
ownership being equated with participation in the former or with authority in the latter. 
There is worth, therefore, in considering modifications to the understanding of liberal-
peace theory and alternatives to current practices inspired by the liberal-peace ideas.  
There is no coherent alternative in practice to liberal peace-building. However, promising  
alternatives may be built on the basis of theories and norms emerging under the umbrella 
of “conflict transformation”. Briefly, conflict transformation holds that enduring peace 
requires that the underpinnings of actual or latent conflict must be transformed primarily 
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internally through local learning, understanding, and change.  Such a focus on people is 
overlooked when the aim is to reverse engineer a state in the liberal mould.  
 
Rather than the fast-paced, top-down, ethnocentric approach characterising the liberal 
peace, the approach of conflict transformation seeks to transform conflict into something 
that is desired in a longer timeframe. It focuses not only on the content of the conflict but 
on the context and relationships between the actors involved. As Lederach (1995b: 212) 
explains, conflict transformation provides:  
a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily “see” the setting and the people as the 
“problem” and the outside as the “answer”. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of 
transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting.  
 
Conflict transformation is therefore suited to post-conflict efforts as it is not driven by 
concerns to “solve” or “fix” undesired disputes but provides the ground to build 
something desired based on sufficient consensus, on learning and, most importantly, 
through the owners of peace with the international community in support.  
 
The research, therefore, aims to investigate the possibilities of the Leviathan pacifying 
through the learning processes of groupism, receptivity and constitutionalism rooted in 
an autochthonous understanding of the past and agreement for an imagined future.  While 
the normative claim is strongly voiced in the conflict-transformation literature, as I have 
sketched it above, in practice is underdeveloped (H. Lerner 2011). For while the rhetoric 
of “local ownership” is increasingly used in the theory and practice of post-conflict peace-
building (see recently: United Nations Development Programme 2012) it lacks 
substantive explanation and therefore implementation beyond a generalised commitment 
to “consultation” and “participation” (Donais 2009). As Hurwitz (2005: 349) explains:  
 
[local ownership] is particularly useful, inasmuch as it expresses a rhetorical commitment 
to  something that is so ill-defined and uncertain that it can be used very conveniently and 
flexibly by international actors, but also by those members of post-conflict societies that 
are ready to manipulate political processes for their own benefit. 
 
Therefore, in the place of reverse-engineering peace, learned constitutionalism could 
provide for genuine conflict transformation. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
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beginnings of the pacification process and the shape of the ‘space’ that might be needed 
for autochthonous solutions based on learning to emerge.  It is only then that there is the 
opportunity of state making (or another governance arrangement – regional perhaps or 
substate)6 as learned constitutionalism is more formally institutionalised in ways that 
work for the particular cultures, histories and peoples in question.  
 
The goal of this thesis is therefore somewhat modest: an aspirational and practical 
objective of improving the chances of success, or the converse: reducing risks of failure. 
Despite the apparent practical solidity of a verb like “building”, in context the term “post-
conflict peace-building” contains this very aspiration: envisaging a range of attempts, 
with a range of strategies, to re-establish (sometimes establish) stable, enduring, peaceful 
governance.  
V. MOVING FROM THE LIBERAL-PEACE APPROACH TO THE BUILDING BLOCKS 
OF PACIFYING LEVIATHAN 
At a very basic level, the pacification process where the Western world made peace with 
itself in the context of the threats and conditions of the times resulted in the liberal 
democratic state. Thus, we can detect an overlap between the liberal democratic state and 
the pacification processes described in this thesis although the processes will not be 
identical in every situation, nor should the liberal state be held aloft as an end-state of all 
human experience. The liberal peace, in its historical context, is a model of the Leviathan 
pacified and learned constitutionalism in particular. However, there are no inherently 
superior practices to be gleaned from the historical record. It is relevant to note that so-
called “developed” states took centuries to fight themselves to a place where they were 
receptive to the learning that was needed to achieve reasonably stable mechanisms for 
managing competition. Some developing states/societies are still fighting or struggling to 
                                               
6 While the word “state” is often used to refer to governance arrangements which may solidify post-conflict, 
it is recognised that there are valid alternatives to the nation-state model and a plethora of institutional 
design options which may be more appropriate. “In security and state terms, the world is bounded, static 
and divided into separate entities. In peace-building terms, the world is organic, social and very closely 
connected, so that problems in one area – particularly in the context of variations of the human needs and 
human security debates – constantly spill over”  Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peace 
Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Edinburgh University Press, 2009a) at 184.  
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build sustainable peace. A lesson from the history of the west might be that the 
implementation of the liberal-peace model proceeded too quickly, and that there is a need 
to slow things down and use the space provided by the “pause” of the post-conflict period 
to allow peace to be valued, owned and understood – for the focus to be on learning, not 
some artificial “endpoint” for that learning. 
 
Those emerging from civil war often have to co-exist in the short term, deferring 
controversial and potentially destabilizing decisions to some later date (as observed for 
example in Northern Ireland or Bougainville where internal group dynamics to be 
addressed first and status referenda scheduled for much later). Indeed when attention is 
pulled back from future institutional forms of governance to the immediacy of the 
“pause”, the momentous challenge for the actual owners of the peace – the mass of 
individuals, leaders, ex-combatants, victims (including those in exile abroad) – is 
revealed. For while the particulars of learning and agreement will be unique to any society 
and on-going, in the immediacy of the post-conflict period the people must tire of 
violence, genuinely learn from their own histories and take responsibility in imagining 
their own future arrangements, having wrestled with their demons and addressed the 
issues that produced breakdowns in security, economies, politics and, ultimately, 
constitutions.  
 
The search, therefore, is for new insights regarding the apparent relationship between past 
and future as it relates to forms of government.  As noted above, it is logical to postulate 
that the collective of individual and societal experiences (varied, contradictory and 
shared) will in some way shape the decision-making processes in a state. Hence, if there 
is a violent past, where for the peoples/combatants concerned the conflict is only paused 
not ended, there is more likely to be a violent future. However, there is a better chance of 
a peaceful form of governance taking hold under certain circumstances, including if 
sufficient people have: 
 tired of violence,  
 become receptive to learning,  
 learned the costs and  
 adopted broadly-accepted alternatives for political competitiveness.  
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Pacifying Leviathan is the term given to such transformations in this thesis. We do not 
yet adequately understand the factors necessary for these processes, many of which are 
autochthonous. 
 
Clearly, the ambit for this extends beyond simply procedural solutions like “local 
participation” which has been the key addendum to the liberal peace in the wake of post-
Cold War peace-building failures (United Nations Development Programme 2012). 
However, there are plenty of examples where participatory constitutional design 
processes did not have any measurable effect on the future of that society (i.e., Eritrea 
and Ethiopia) (Ginsburg et al. 2009: 215) or indeed the very activity resulted in further 
conflict (Congo-Brazzaville, Chad and Solomon Islands). Nor should the negotiation of 
a meaningful social contract, accompanied by a true mind-shift away from war, be 
confused with the mere process of writing (even the most expertly worded) constitutions 
and then holding referenda on them. Constitutions can embody a particular polity’s own 
struggles and battles, document their own lessons and attempt to project forward with 
contextually appropriate guiding rules based on learning. However, on paper many post-
conflict constitutions follow a common set of core standards especially on human rights, 
democratic accountability to the people and peaceful conduct of political and other 
competition according to clear rules. Whether these rules reflect broad-based learning is 
another matter entirely.  
 
 Accepting the problems of defining “success” in terms of any transformation process, 
some factors of transformation (see: Lederach 2000; Väyrynen 1991) will be used to 
develop the social mechanisms or building blocks of this research, as explain below in 
the methodology section: 
 Actor transformation: individuals’ and groups’ perception of conflict change; 
there is reorientation around positive governance and not just by elites, 
spoilers are sidelined;  
 Rule transformation: broad-based learning reflected in new rules, including 
(but not limited to) constitutions;  
 Issue transformation: the building of the governance processes through 
opening the agenda, changes in the cultural patterns of understanding and 
responding to conflict, rather than preserving elements of the conflict (e.g. by 
entrenching group division).  
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With these kinds of transformations, it is possible that a society would have a better 
chance of building peace and be less at threat from a relapse of violent conflict. 
 
Leviathan, as borrowed from Thomas Hobbes (1651), 7 in this thesis refers to the 
collective decision-making processes and institutions that make up a state or other 
governance arrangement. Leviathan is shaped by the past and by ambitions for the future, 
framed in written and unwritten rules for governance. No transformation in human society 
is ever without contradictions. But in the conceptualisation of this thesis, when Leviathan 
is pacified, a critical mass of leadership will have renounced violence as part of 
governance. There may be outbreaks, remnants, die-hards, spoilers (like the Real IRA in 
Northern Ireland) – but when the balance has tipped, the odds improve that the 
experiences of protracted violence will transform into positive peace (Galtung 1975: 282-
304; 1981).  This requires not just stopping immediate armed conflict (important as that 
step is), but sufficient consensus to reorient away from direct and indirect violence.  In 
addition, the true acceptance and ownership of the rules and systems that emerge from 
genuine learning are crucial.  The absence of overt violence does not mean that war is not 
continuing; it is simply less obvious – war by other means.8  In these situations, there are 
risks that the resources of immediate violence (guns) may be exchanged for other ways 
of continuing the fight, sometimes involving the resources of the state itself.  Military 
opportunity is temporarily traded for political or economic opportunity, but the means 
can be reversed relatively simply if there is a will to war in the minds and strategies of 
key parties.   
 
Three and a half centuries ago, Hobbes wrestled with the issues of his time: preserving 
peace, preventing civil conflict, formulating rules of power and government. He 
postulated a covenant that, although apparently a relationship between subjects and the 
                                               
7 This is not an argument in favour of the tough Hobbesian stance advocating absolute rule of the sovereign 
to combat the otherwise inevitable state of nature, which was influenced by Hobbes’ experience of the 
1640s English Civil War.  Hobbes is seen as the founding father of modern political philosophy and the 
Leviathan has come to symbolise a broad concept of governance and was “tamed” by classical liberal 
scholars like Locke and Kant. Immanuel Kant, 'Kant: Political Writings', in Hans Reiss (ed.), (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991a), John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1824 edn.; London: 
Printed for C. and J. Rivington 1680-1690). 
8 As others have done, this is paraphrased from Carl Von Claueswitz’s (1780-1831) dictum: “War is nothing 
but the continuation of policy by other means”. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Vom Kriege), eds Michael 
Howard, Beatrice Heuser, and Peter Paret (1832 original edn., Oxford World Classic; London Oxford 
University Press, 1993) at 28. 
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sovereign (the institutional embodiment of government), was better understood as a 
relationship among citizens who agree to the benefits of positive, peaceful governance 
and the rules that go with it (see Leviathan part II, chapter 18), because the alternative of 
constant warfare is far worse.  
 
What tips the balance? How does “sufficient consensus” emerge? The documented 
histories of centuries of conflict-reform in Western Europe suggest that, over time, 
contradictions gradually sorted themselves out to produce something reasonably coherent 
and (mostly) less violent. The results are seen in widely-agreed (A. Brown 1999; 
Carothers 2004; Dahl 1971; Lipset 1959; Lipset and Lakin 2004) processes of 
governance, often set out in constitutions and other fundamental laws that deal with 
competition for power and resources, personal and social identity, religious belief, the 
relationships between people and power and the limits of force for particular objectives. 
In such states (and putting aside the variations of social welfare provisions):  
 the state provides a framework for centralised regulation, tax collection and a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force;  
 democratic votes change governments and hence mediate political 
competition; 
 the market mostly regulates economic competition; 
 the rule of law provides trusted “referees” on the rules of the system;  
 a strong conception that the state should not violate fundamental human 
dignity underpins the legal and moral authority of government; 
 and, mostly, the people understand, implement and believe in the entire 
construction.     
This liberal state pacification process whereby the Western world made peace with itself 
under its current threats and conditions is akin to the tiring, receptivity and learning 
discussed in this thesis.  However the “developed” and “developing” nations’ framework 
is significant, to the extent that developed states took centuries to fight themselves to 
receptivity to learning, resulting in reasonably stable mechanisms of managing 
competition; some developing states are still fighting – and it might, perhaps, be possible 
to learn quicker. 
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This is not to suggest that the emerging products of every transformation will (or should) 
be a replica of the older democracies. That said, the process of transforming conflict is 
likely to demand familiar core ingredients, such as negotiation and willingness to 
compromise, and the establishment of clear rules, independently enforced. There are clear 
signs that local formulations of these ingredients can be embraced as “domestic” in state-
building out of conflict (e.g., in South Africa, post-1994). As also noted earlier, however, 
there is unlikely to be orderly, linear progression. Some parts of society may keep fighting 
in the mind, or may be exhausted but unable or unwilling to learn and rebuild, or there 
may be more violence. There is also no irreversible reform. Voters may choose leaders 
and policies to advance sectarian interests, sometimes at risk of (indeed promising) 
violence. But if internal and external understandings are informed by the building blocks 
set out in this thesis, the odds might at least improve for more stable outcomes.  
 
Determining “cause and effect” are notoriously problematic in explaining the realities of 
human activity. Throughout this thesis, I am critical of what I argue to be a prevailing 
theory, suggesting that it has contributed to the real-world failure in the sense that actual 
intervention and state-building is based on its ideas and premises. The logic is that poor 
theory misstates key problems and hence undermines the very peace it was engineered to 
buttress. Conversely, I argue that new research might assist the reconstitution of groups 
and governance after conflict. But how confident can anyone be that the previous theory 
caused current problems, or that the application of new theory will reduce those?  
 
At least some of the answers lie in the persuasiveness of the logic and evidence – 
thereafter, history and experience may provide what will no doubt still be contestable 
theses.  For all the messiness of this field, the possible sequences can be represented 
diagrammatically in an adaptation of the conflict cycle set out above in Figure 1.  
 
In the Learning Cycle in Figure 2, the violence in stage 2 (conflicting) will essentially 
drop out of the cycle if all the stages are properly completed. There will always be 
“problems” for any society and thus an ongoing need for the key phases of learning (the 
half moon) to address these. There is not a static or formulaic “end” state, for if lessons 
are forgotten the virtuous cycle may break down, and conflict may again enter the cycle. 
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Figure 2: The Learning Cycle and the Leviathan pacified.  
 
 
Pacifying Leviathan is at once theoretical and practical. The theory is significant, in the 
sense of hypotheses of why attempts might work or fail. The practicality involves the 
actual steps for the parties themselves, possibly with external support (e.g., the UN, EU, 
AU or other outside parties) to go around the cycle, in each phase, including operating 
the institutions of ongoing, stable governance.  
 
Though examples are used throughout, most of this thesis concentrates on the theory.  
While some comments are made on practical issues for the future, detailed analysis of 
policy and implementation must await another thesis. In addition, the scope of conflict 
transformation and its underpinnings are vast. Many elements have been well-articulated 
in the literature and in practice, which are not necessary to repeat. The best example is 
the detailed literature and practice of the efforts to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate 
former combatants into civil society (known as DDR measures) (see for example: Knight 
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and Ozerdem 2004; Muggah 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
2008). As the Romans found in antiquity (Flower 2004: 82-83), reconnecting former 
soldiers into civil life has always been a critical ingredient in peacetime. Hence, the 
current field of DDR is considered essential for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
Another key, underpinning assumption is that pacifying Leviathan must recognise the 
role of gender. There is abundant evidence that women are the principal victims of armed 
conflict from killing, rape and other human rights abuses; and through displacement, 
disease, malnutrition, discrimination that produce such phenomena as honour murders, 
denial of property rights etc – and that women must be a critical part of any peace process, 
including governance (see for example: Moghadam 2005; Moser and Clark 2001; 
Sørensen 1998).  Deeply-rooted patterns have to be addressed to pacify Leviathan, 
anywhere. Of course, women can be perpetrators of, and collaborators in, violence – as 
discussed in Chapter 4 on groupism. But just as this thesis does not focus on combat state-
building or DDR mechanisms, so no attempt is made to recast the wealth of literature on 
gender/violence/peace-building, including the strategies to deal with access to justice, 
stigmatisation, and security sector reform (United Nations Division for the Advancement 
of Women of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009). Along with many 
other issues of practical implementation, such issues fall into the “next steps” that must 
await further writing.  
 
The core arguments of this thesis can, therefore, be summarised simply: 
 Pacifying Leviathan requires rethinking some of the core ingredients of theory 
and practice in state-building out of conflict. 
 Much of state-building after conflict in the post-Cold War period reflected 
particular theory and practice which, essentially, tried to transplant the liberal 
state apparatus of state government, expecting it to reverse-engineer peace 
and order, from the top down, in conflict societies. The most recent focus on 
rapid (re)construction of armies and the security apparatus is an addition to, 
not a contradiction of, this theory and practice. 
 Although reverse-engineering was the obvious (and often only) option on the 
table, its premises failed to take account of the fundamentals relating to what 
people learn if there is protracted violence, what pacifying options might be 
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available, and how the risks of repeated violence and winner-takes-all politics 
might be reduced.  
 Whatever the exact causes, the results of most state-building after conflict in 
the period under particular focus (post-1990), had been (at best) a very limited 
success, measured by the yardstick of the establishment of positive peace 
before the international community somewhat disengaged. 
 
This thesis, therefore, elaborates a combination of three basic elements as part of 
a reconsideration of the fundamental issues involved: 
 groupism: the importance of groups in human conflict;  
 receptivity: the often overwhelming cost of protracted conflict and the mind 
shift away from continued violence; and  
 learned constitutionalism: the mechanisms by which the mass of individual 
and social experience might produce genuine learning in the form of rules and 
systems that are shared, obeyed, and valued (not formalities, ridiculed in their 
breach, whilst war by other means is continued). 
 External support/intervention has a critical role to play in state-building out of 
conflict. The role will vary, depending on numerous factors, including 
geopolitics, funding and local consent. The key is to reconceptualise the roles, 
informed by the theory above and by the results of current practices.   
 The arguments and insights proposed are supported by case studies in each of 
the key areas, resulting in a simple hypothesis: pacifying Leviathan requires 
going back to basics to inform better the field of state-building out of conflict. 
 
The general conceptions should also not imply that there has been no adjustment or 
learning from practitioners, academics, diplomats, aid agencies and indeed the peoples of 
various conflict states in attempt after attempt at post-conflict peace-building, especially 
in the twenty years 1990-2010.  In this busy area of international relations, aid, 
governance, and (mostly) domestic conflict, despite the prevalence of the formula- state 
model, inevitably this field is developing quickly. The UN (e.g. the Peacekeeping Best 
Practices Section (PBPS)) and others’ approaches have been changing, reacting, 
backtracking, searching for new “lessons learned” (see: Barnett 2006; Fukuyama 2005b, 
backtracking from his "end of history" thesis; Roeder and Rothchild 2005, which 
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encompasses a number of conflicting perspectives). At the heart of this research is an 
attempt to contribute to that endeavour. As noted, the goal is to assemble insights to 
inform the ambition of pacifying Leviathan.  
VI. DEFINITIONS  
The term peace is, of course, highly contested. In the literature “peace” is located along 
a continuum – ranging from a simple emphasis on the absence of war (refer to first entry 
in Oxford English Dictionary: 1989: 398) perhaps as the result of a balance of power 
deterrence to the constructivist’s positive peace (the absence of structural and cultural 
violence where positive human conditions are guaranteed) (Galtung 1975: 282-304; 
1981). This thesis favours positive peace. In other words, peaceful states are ones which 
are not just lacking significant violence between citizens, but also where citizens are not 
dying due to war or to poverty, or where factors blind people to injustice or allow them 
to rationalise it. Boulding (1978: 3) agrees, identifying positive peace as: “a condition of 
good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature 
relationships, gentleness and love”. Peace is also assumed to be a continuous process, not 
a passive state (Montville 1987). Most importantly, peace must be relevant and legitimate 
– meaning that the state of peace must be appropriate and reflect the interests and 
preferences of the people. International support is not precluded, however, as positive 
peace takes place on a number of levels. Negative peace by way of contrast is simply the 
absence of direct violence and is often, colloquially, how peace is defined by 
governments. In such situations however slavery, apartheid, and other injustices could 
exist. 
 
Conflict transformation, as noted by Miall (2004), draws on many of the familiar concepts 
of conflict resolution and rests upon the same tradition in theorising about conflict. What 
is useful about this framework is that it moves away from conflict resolution’s normative 
solutions and emphasis on containment and control (the defacto dominant practice of the 
international community in so far reverse-engineering the liberal state has done little more 
than pause overt violence), and reverse-engineering, towards an evolving and holistic 
approach. If the purpose of peace-building out of conflict including intervention by 
outsiders is “peace” then transformation is crucial. If the strategy remains resolution and 
31 
 
not transformation then efforts to build governance will continue with predictable 
problems.  
 
As these components illustrate, a society on the road to positive peace requires not just 
the cessation of armed conflict and the minimum provisions of security but sufficient 
consensus to reorient away from direct and indirect violence. There may be outbreaks, 
remnants, die-hards, spoilers (like the Real IRA in Northern Ireland) – but when the 
balance has tipped, the odds improve that the experiences of protracted violence will 
transform into positive peace. The absence of overt violence does not mean that war is 
not continuing. In these situations, there are risks that the resources of immediate violence 
(guns) may be exchanged for other ways of continuing the fight, sometimes involving the 
resources of the state itself.  Military opportunity is temporarily traded for political or 
economic opportunity, but the means can be reversed relatively simply if there is a will 
to war in the minds and strategies of key parties.   
 
Post-conflict peace-building: Peace-building, peace-building or reconstruction are not 
clearly defined terms in literature or practice – influenced more by political, ideological 
and pragmatic preferences than by analytical clarity. Peace-building in this thesis is seen 
as processes by which a society attempts to move from a situation marked by earlier 
conflict to a situation in which the legacy of that conflict is no longer a defining feature. 
There are many possible fields which are integral to this because the interlocking issues 
are part political artisan (building), part political economy and philosophy (the state), part 
public policy (governance), part foreign/international policy (internationalism, aid, 
statecraft), part strategic studies (military/police), part psychology (ambition, anger, hurt, 
causes for fighting, recovery from violence), part anthropology/sociology (order and 
disorder in human societies), part history, part current commentary on pressing issues. 
The common phrase is “post-conflict peace-building” meaning, essentially, the attempt 
to construct stable, enduring, peaceful governance after such has been severely disrupted 
by violence. In the literature, these and related terms have significant complexities. The 
very words carry the notion that there has been serious politically-relevant violence on a 
scale that has damaged governing structures. “Post” connotes that the conflict has ended. 
This thesis explores the issues associated pacifying Leviathan in the “pause” – the period 
immediately after a peace “settlement” (peace agreement or comprehensive ceasefire) and 
before formal state-making.  
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In any context, the word “conflict” might include violence on a spectrum from outright 
war to violence within communities. Peace-building discussions may occur across the 
spectrum of internal violence. For example where military action is raging at the same 
time that peace-building is underway (e.g. Afghanistan in 2010). Or there may be 
situations where the nature of conflict is not really state-related, in the sense that it is not 
significantly concerned with state governance and power (e.g. tribal rivalries in the 
Highlands of Papua New Guinea). The focus of this thesis is in situations away from the 
extremes i.e. where there has been significant and sustained political violence that has 
necessitated a peace process sequence to at least “pause” the most overt forms of armed 
violence. In that pause, the societies involved (often with international assistance) are 
hopefully attempting to transition from making war to building a government. Recent 
examples include Bougainville (as an autonomous province of Papua New Guinea) after 
1997 and autonomy in 2005; and East Timor, after 1999, and independence in 2002.  
VII. METHODOLOGY  
The concept of “reflexivity” is that it is important for writers to outline personal 
perspectives that shape their thinking – avoiding pretences of complete objectivity 
(Nightingale and Cromby 1999: 228). In this regard, the personal perspective I bring to 
this thesis is not “pacifist” as such, essentially arguing that violence is itself immoral 
under all conditions. Nor do I suggest that there are no ongoing problems of governance 
– or indeed forgetting the lessons of previous conflicts – in places where there is no 
substantial conflict. I do not see ending violence as a guarantee of human dignity and 
rights. That said my perspective (supported by much recent development literature) is that 
conflict significantly exacerbates the problems of governance and threatens the dignity of 
human beings everywhere.  And in particular, I have been intrigued by the simple idea 
that whilst the evidence of human history is that violence has been universal, there are 
circumstances in which firstly people learn that violence is not appropriate, either in 
personal terms or in governance and are able to transform relations with each other and 
issues that were divisive through new rules for managing conflict in society. Hence my 
decision to investigation the beginnings of learning and transformation in the pause 
immediately following peace settlement – a crucial period which seems to have been 
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glided over in the genuine but rushed “delivery” of the liberal peace. For while the 
literature is case studies rich and has many edited volumes on countries’ conflicts, and 
specific aspects of transition, there is  no attempt to squarely and systematically address 
the evidence on how the Leviathan is pacified during the pause of the post-
conflict period (or not as the case may be) . 
 
The work proceeds in several stages:  
 A comprehensive literature review of the liberal peace, in theory, and as 
observed in a range of instances, with particular emphasis on the gap identified 
by the lack of attention to the owners of the peace.  
 Defining the scope of the research through an exploration of the approach of 
conflict transformation and establishing an initial rendering of the building 
blocks that characterise pacifying Leviathan. This was done after a sustained 
period of reading and assessment of the complex multidisciplinary literature. 
 Exploring the building blocks as described below and illustrated in an iterative 
fashion, assisted by a series of observations taken from a range of countries’ 
experiences with paused-conflict governance 
 Drawing some conclusions including on the implications for the role and 
manner of international assistance. 
 Together with appropriate international assistance, the building blocks, given 
concrete and realistic shape, combine to form the framework of a new theory 
centring on the phenomena specific to paused-conflict governance. 
VIII. BIAS, LIMITATIONS AND CAVEATS 
Granted there is as yet no widely accepted alternative strategy to liberal peace-building 
in practice as described in this thesis. The ideas emerging under the umbrella of conflict 
transformation are essentially “untested”. 
 
This research does not seek to tell policy-makers (UN, donor states or others) what to do 
but provides the evidence of the investigation into the success and failure of pacifying 
Leviathan and learned constitutionalism. Many other issues potentially relate to post-
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conflict peace-building. However, it is not possible to account for them all. A number of 
different factors can be pinpointed in the literature (discussed in full in Chapter 2) as 
missing or crucial to the success of peace efforts. The thesis does not focus on future 
strategies of conflict-reduction – such as economic development to give people stakes in 
society – or discuss environmental obstacles. Security and stabilisation strategies such as 
the disarmament of combatants are already very thoroughly justified (Collier, 2007, 2009; 
Knight & Ozerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2010, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2008). Important as these might be for current and future policy and practice in 
peace-building, their full development is beyond the scope of this thesis. As Miall has 
observed (2004: 18) in relation to conflict transformation:  
 
Any one practitioner or theorist can tackle only a part of this enormous field. All we can do 
is to undertake a piece of work in good faith and do it well... We plant seeds, and trust that 
interdependent co-origination will take care of the rest.  
 
Despite the diagrammatic representation and the devotion of chapters to each, these 
building blocks should be thought of as a package, not a sequential progression. They are 
the basic ingredients in what might be termed a slow-cooking recipe: the longer, the 
better, but still dramatically shorter than the centuries and bloodshed it took Europe to 
pacify Leviathan. The ingredients will be illustrated through vignettes in country case 
studies. The focus is thus maintained on the building block (e.g. the way group dynamics 
operated in Rwanda) not each country’s overall experience (e.g. the entire history of the 
Cambodian conflict). In other words, the method involves theory-building by the use of 
examples, not detailed, historical, case explanation as such. Nevertheless, where possible, 
the co-occurrence of building block aspects (or their combined absence) will also be 
drawn on. For example, it is possible to observe exhaustion but not learned 
constitutionalism. A successful outcome, it will be proposed, requires the whole package. 
Outside assistance may not always be needed.  Failure would be a return to conflict or 
“negative peace” (no present conflict, but all the issues remaining essentially 
unaddressed, awaiting violence).  
 
There are also positive and negative arguments to each of these building blocks. Where 
possible case studies have been selected to illustrate both sides; where the element of the 
theory exists and where it does not.  
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The last sixty years have of course produced some examples of post-conflict peace-
building regarded as successes by most writers, including West Germany and Japan 
following WWII and Costa Rica, and more recently, post-communist Poland (Chesterman 
et al. 2005; Dobbins 2003; Dobbins et al. 2005). One common feature of West Germany, 
Japan and Poland is their underlying and stabilising sense of national identity. In the case 
of Costa Rica, its relatively benign colonial legacy was one where political parties were 
encouraged, and give-and-take politics developed. Democratic elites pulled the country 
back from the civil war of 1948 by establishing a social compact based on an inclusive, 
liberal democracy, demilitarisation, a mixed economy, a welfare state and a strong sense 
of nationhood, thus avoiding the civil war and foreign intervention experienced by many 
of its neighbours in the 1980s (Morales-Gamboa and Baranyi 2005).  
 
Other examples hold the potential for evolution from the dominant theory model to 
something akin to the learning for pacifying Leviathan deemed necessary in this thesis. 
Mozambique, for instance, is an example of exhaustion from war-weariness after a 
fifteen-year long civil war (1977-1992). There is peace – as in the absence of violence – 
but it may be too soon to be sure of the durability of the new constitutional order (Cahen 
2005). Northern Ireland is possibly transitioning from polarised power blocks to a 
willingness to work together, as discussed in detail in chapter 5. Hope exists in Kenya 
after the new Constitution of August 2010 was passed by referendum. The post-
independence political “rules of the game” appear to have encouraged politicians to 
exploit tribal differences, evidenced in rising tension and violence, particularly around 
election time (see chapter 4). Though it is again too early to be sure, it may be that the 
dramatic violence that followed the 2007 election was a tipping point for learning as 
envisaged in Figure 2, evidenced by the new constitution.9  
 
However, the vast majority of post-Cold War peace-building efforts are regarded much 
more equivocally. In addition – in places like Somalia, Zimbabwe, BiH, Cambodia – the 
                                               
9 The separation of powers in particular has been strengthened, as well as various checks on corruption and 
the devolution of power to often-marginalised regions. Full implementation of the constitution requires 
legislation to be passed over coming years. Issues will no doubt arise along the way as some political figures 
opposed the new constitution and the political class generally is notoriously self-serving. The 
Commonwealth has, however, promised legal expertise to work with Kenyan drafters on implementation, 
as a response to the Kenyan government’s request for help. See: Walter Menya and Bernard Namuane, 
'Commonwealth Offers Kenya Aid in Drafting New Laws', Saturday Nation, Tuesday 14 September 2010. 
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building blocks of the theory proposed here are insufficiently present. In a few instances, 
South Africa and Bougainville in particular, conflict transformation has arguably 
occurred through processes that appear to resemble closely the building blocks set out in 
this thesis: understanding groupism, receptivity to positive peace and learning, and new, 
widely-accepted rules of governance. 
 
For all the use of vignettes, I did not regard using detailed comparative case study analysis 
as appropriate for this research. There is always value to be extracted from comparisons, 
but the risk of extended concentration on some risked producing another formula state 
approach i.e. taking the end points of people’s learning and recommending outcomes for 
implementation in other situations.  Instead, principles and useful/not useful practices are 
extracted from a range of peace-building examples. Similarly, the technique of complex 
statistical analyses of conflict has been avoided, as this tends to leave people out and to 
look for lessons from mass statistics (e.g. on whether third party mediation helped or 
hindered the ending of conflict). As Ann Betts Fetherston (2000: 194) warns, such 
attempts even in the context of peacekeeping: “do not reflect the complexity and diversity 
or the cultures of violence of the social spaces within which these operations take place.”  
 
Instead the story of what is termed paused-conflict governance is investigated. This 
necessitates identifying the conflict transformation mechanisms in formal terms but also 
in operation. For example, one would expect to find concessions and initiatives in peace 
agreements but also in the language and actions of officials talking about things like 
“common citizenship” and “shared responsibility”, in the rhetoric of leaders on their 
country’s national day and in the behaviour of citizens and in the recognition that violent 
warfare is no longer appropriate, that fair representation is available in government as a 
means of being heard and to give visibility to shared decision-making. Obviously there 
are problems involved in making an assessment of international assistance which should 
ideally rest upon local voices. However, it is possible to present the research that 
examines how actors understand their achievements and assess this on the basis of the 
other building blocks. 
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IX. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The arguments of this thesis unfold in the following way: 
 
As we have seen, Chapter 1 provides an introduction to this research including a summary 
of the core arguments and the methodology. Key terms and concepts are defined.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses specifically on justifying the focus of this research through a review 
of the liberal peace-building theory, UN strategy and critique. It develops the big themes: 
the evolution of thinking behind the addition of peace-building into the UN’s ambit and 
the prevalence of liberal peace both in theory and practice. The optimism and hope which 
characterised the post-Cold War period, however, has mostly failed to materialise in the 
successful transformation of conflict. Finally, a gap is identified to which my research 
seeks to contribute. 
 
Chapter 3 returns to basics, explaining the conflict-transformation scholarly framework 
directing this research and the choice to favour this approach as a necessary redirection 
of conflict resolution and management.  
 
Chapter 4 addresses the first block of theory – groupism. Explanations for human nature 
(violence) are explored, favouring neither “killer ape” nor “noble savage” views. A 
middle ground – that humans are capable of inconceivable violence and genetic 
aggressiveness but also incredible sociability and cooperativeness is preferred. Next the 
salience of group identity in conflict is addressed, critiquing the myth of ancient hatreds 
and explaining how ordinary men and women get caught up in violence due to the 
excessive focus on one element of their identity, shaped by collective fears, human needs 
and leadership exhortation. Understanding group behaviour and dynamics set the scene 
for the next three chapters, as the building blocks of this theory attempt to moderate 
“negative identity” and work towards constituting groups within the state to transform 
conflict into mediated competition.  
 
Chapter 5 builds on the understanding of groupism, outlining exhaustion with conflict 
and receptivity to positive peace. Receptivity is clearly differentiated from ripeness and 
mutually hurting stalemates which are part of the mediation toolkit and concerned with 
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getting a peace deal.  In practice, exhaustion with violence has often been mistakenly 
identified (in its negative form) as making conditions ripe for settlement, thus allowing 
war by other means to continue and spoilers to flourish. Receptivity occurs at different 
rates in different groups or parts of groups. Where those that are truly peace-minded 
exceed those that are simply too aggrieved to renounce violence (or indeed benefit from 
the continuation of conflict), a platform is created for the renegotiation of the rules of 
governance based on agreed learning – the theory of the next chapter.  
 
Chapter 6 addresses the point in which learning takes root in new rules of governance. 
Learned constitutionalism is the idea that there must be clearly articulated lessons, based 
on historical experience for the generation of new rules of governance.  This learning 
must be owned by as many people in society as possible and formalised for it to cement 
and for the Leviathan to be truly pacified.  
 
Chapter 7 explores ways in which international assistance can be employed to assist the 
three building blocks of this theory and perhaps assist in short cutting the historical 
progression of the conflicting state transforming. Outside pressure and oversight by 
international referees to buttress receptivity, hold groups together and provide space for 
learning to is explored. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises the key arguments and conclusions of this research. Although 
outside the scope of this thesis, the implications for the current field of scholarship and 
practice of the theory developed in this research are introduced. 
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2: The current dominant strategy of 
liberal peace-building  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Reverse engineering the liberal state is broadly the idea and practice of peace through 
liberalisation. In the previous chapter, the overall focus of this thesis stemming from some 
described flaws in liberal peace-building theory and practice was introduced. This chapter 
focuses specifically on justifying the focus through a review of liberal peace-building 
theory, UN strategy and critique. First I review liberal peace-building’s origins in 
Enlightenment and particularly Kantian theory. Next I examine the ideological 
ascendency of the liberal internationalism in the 20th century and the belief in actively 
constructing peace through liberal peace-building.  Then I examine the manifestation (or 
persuasiveness) of this dominant view in the development of liberal peace-building at the 
UN and its focus on technical and institutional reform. This includes the UN’s own 
assessment of practice and lessons learned. Next I cover the critical literature from the 
point of view of those who seek to refine the practice of liberal peace-building, those who 
believe it needs balancing by a primary focus on local context and people, and those who 
think it is fundamentally flawed and damaging before summarising the specific literature 
as it pertains to learning.  I end this chapter with brief comments on the emerging themes 
and dilemmas highlighted in the UN and critical literature, thereby identifying a gap to 
which my research contributes. 
II. ENLIGHTENMENT ORIGINS OF THE LIBERAL PEACE 
Liberal peace theory derives from the political philosophy of the Enlightenment period 
(Hobbes 1651; Kant 1991a; Locke 1680-1690; Rousseau 1754; 1762, among others). The 
foundational elements of “liberalism” surround the core principle of individual freedom 
as defined here by Gray (1995: xii): 
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[Liberalism is] individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the 
claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers to all men the same 
moral status…; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and 
according a secondary importance to specific historical associations and cultural forms; 
and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social 
institutions and political arrangements  
 
Liberalism’s egalitarian and universalist outlook renders warfare irrational for it assumes 
that liberals will deal with conflict in peaceful ways (Doyle 1986; Schumpeter 1950). 
Liberalism’s distinctive political modus operandi is well-equipped to manage conflict. A 
premium is placed on negotiation and compromise, pluralism and diversity are 
recognised, positive contestation and competition based on agreed rules are encouraged 
and peaceful critique, protests and demonstrations are accepted. Liberalism is a political 
vision to realise and sustain fundamental human values. Liberal principles and 
institutions, therefore, have pacifying effects. Democracy and capitalism, for example, 
promote peaceful competition so that even the “losers” are able to maintain a “sense of 
justice and trust in the system required for peace to prosper” (Lidén 2006: 21-22; 
Schumpeter 1955: 68).  
 
Emblematic of the liberal peace on a grand scale is Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1991a: 93-
115). He posited a correlation between the “republican” constitution of states and their 
relatively peaceful behaviour. Kant outlined three “definitive articles” inextricably linked 
in the quest for peace and rooted in the domestic, international and cosmopolitan spheres. 
The first article emphasised civil liberties, the rule of law and legal equality, as well as 
the separation of powers and representative government through republican constitutions 
(Kant 1991a: 99).  The people’s will or “spirit” is favoured over the specifics of 
representative governmental forms and procedures (1991a: 101). Today’s liberal 
democracies (defined as those where liberalism is the dominant ideology, where the state 
exemplifies liberal ideas and where its citizens have leverage over decisions to go to war) 
have been interpreted as consistent within this definition (Danilovic and Clare 2007).10  
Teson agrees that the modern conception of Kant’s republics is a liberal democracy – that 
                                               
10 Kant believed in a very strict form of the separation of powers and therefore criticised classical Grecian 
direct democracy. He may also takes issue with certain elements of Western states’ current democratic 
models but most modern representative democracy is very much in the vein of  his republicanism Kant, 
'Kant: Political Writings',  at 101. 
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being one where the form of political organisation guarantees full respect for human 
rights. However at a minimum level, Teson explains Kant’s republicanism would be a 
government where political power is restricted by constitutional documents which 
prevent despotism (Teson 1998: 3). 
 
Like Locke, Kant believed people to be equal despite diverse goals, cultures and beliefs. 
People are also rational – able to appreciate the moral equality of others and treat them 
accordingly – and share a fundamental interest in self-preservation and material well-
being (Kant 1991b; Locke 1680-1690 chap 9, para 124). The Kantian state, therefore, 
solves the problem of governing individualised equals through maximising civil liberties 
for all – whether they are “rational devils” (those who comply with the just law with 
selfish or wicked motives) or the ethical agents he argues we should become (Doyle 1986: 
1162). Republican constitutions, Kant argues, tame aggressive interests and provide a 
liberal caution to entering war. Legislative authority comes from the people and not from 
executive power. The legitimacy of governance, therefore, holds when “law itself rules 
and depends on no particular person” (Kant 1996b: 480-81).  Republics are driven by the 
rule of law in their domestic governance and hold shared norms meaning that citizens of 
other states are recognised as morally autonomous individuals. This underpins a condition 
of mutual trust.   
 
In the second  of Kant’s definitive articles – termed pacific union by Russett and Oneal 
(2001) – Kant (1991a: 105)  theorises that “the rights of nations shall be founded on a 
federation of free states”. Through this body liberal ideas and individual rights would be 
encouraged internationally. Instead of war, disputes between states would be settled by 
soft power and the rule of law common to all. To protect, peace and security Kant 
envisaged that such a union would gradually extend “to encompass all states…thus 
leading to perpetual peace” (1991a: 104). 
 
Further peace would be served by “cosmopolitan law limited to conditions of universal 
hospitality” (Kant 1991a: 105).  In the final article Kant adds material incentives to the 
two moral commitments. Universal hospitality concerns the liberal belief that all persons 
are free and should not be treated as enemies. World citizens, therefore, would have legal 
rights under a global order to travel, trade and share ideas (Habermas 1997: 105; Kant 
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1991a). Economic interdependence, in particular, would motivate states to promote peace 
and avoid war.  
 
From these theoretical underpinnings, a number of liberal propositions are revealed: the 
notions of separate peace, liberal pacifism and domestic peace. Firstly, liberal states are 
less likely to start a conflict with other liberal states than with illiberal states (Kant 1991a: 
96).  Secondly, liberal states are also less likely to initiate conflict in contrast to illiberal 
states. And finally, liberal states are less likely to experience internal violence than 
illiberal states.  
 
In the final proposition, the late 20th-century focus on intra-state war saw Kant’s thesis 
extended to democratic politics (Bellamy and Williams 2010; Rawls 1999: 23). Kant 
believed in gradual progress towards an ideal state of peace and commercial interaction 
which would occur as part of the natural course of development. Kantian scholars also 
infer from his writings (1979, 1991b, 1996b, 1996a) that civil violence is less likely within 
democracies than in places which do not protect individual rights and liberties. While 
Kant conceded that revolutionary practices may facilitate progress and express the will of 
the people, he favoured gradual non-violent processes of domestic reform (E. Ellis 2005: 
33-34; Kant 1979: 165,67).  Citizens in free republics would also be reluctant to use force 
to pursue their own means even domestically. Kant emphasised the self-contradictory 
nature of rebelling against the government (Kant: 463). Instead as Habermas (1997) 
argues the public sphere the right of citizens to express their views and criticism is 
championed  
 
Kant’s definitive articles form a triumvirate. Pacific union and cosmopolitan law are 
requirements of the liberal peace. However, they are ultimately reliant upon and indeed 
generated by the presence and diffusion of republican states. Thus the first article effects 
of others, highlighting the importance of thoroughly understanding Kant's reasoning 
behind domestic sources of the liberal peace. Kant’s liberal peace also implies an idea of 
positive peace as defined in the previous chapter, with its emphasis on liberal standards 
of justice.   
 
Democracy, trade and cosmopolitan values based on individualism developed directly 
from Kantian theory. Richmond (2006) terms this the “constitutional peace”.  The liberal 
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peace conceptualisation is also comprised of at least three other strands of Enlightenment 
discourse. In addition to the “constitutional peace”, the “institutional peace”, “victor’s 
peace”, and “civil peace” have evolved over centuries in Western imagination and 
emerged from debates in international theory and different historical contexts (Oliver 
Richmond 2006: 294). The “institutional peace” is grounded upon idealist, liberal 
internationalist attempts to bind political entities by agreement within normative and legal 
arrangements which regulate behaviour – from the Treaty of Westphalia to the 
establishment of the UN and beyond.  The constitutional and institutional peace have 
clashed with the realist “victor’s peace” which rests on military victory and domination, 
being influenced in the 20th-century by Europe’s WWII experience with fascism.  Lastly 
– the civil peace – emphasises participation, human rights and civil society as conditions 
for peace (see also: Richmond and Franks 2009b: 5-6). The latter represents the liberal 
peace’s emancipatory possibility but is conceived around the individual, property rights 
and the market. In the next section, attention turns to the legacy of the “institutional 
peace” in the rise of liberal internationalism in the 20th century before addressing how 
this theory has directly shaped the development of liberal peace-building at the UN. 
III. THE ASCENDENCY OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
AND THE SEARCH FOR STATE MODELS FOR PEACE 
Liberal internationalism at its most basic level combines liberal beliefs with 
“internationalism” – defined by McGrew (2002: 286) as concern for “the promotion of 
transnational or global solidarity and international governance”.  Therefore democracy, 
international economic integration and international governance are, together, seen as 
creating the conditions for the realisation of the perpetual peace (Doyle 1997; Russett and 
Oneal 2001). The challenge for liberal internationalism in the 20th century was to find a 
theoretical model through which to create the perpetual peace which eventually took the 
form of liberal peace-building. 
i)  Early 20th-century liberal internationalism  
Liberal internationalism evolved throughout the 20th-century experience. In the early 
decades, the concern was state independence and building an international legal order to 
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reinforce state sovereignty and non-intervention. Following WWI liberal thinkers saw the 
need to construct peace through what Woof called “consciously devised machinery” 
(1916: 127).  Woodrow Wilson was perhaps the first statesman to adopt the liberal peace 
thesis (Paris 2004). He called for the regulation of the international system to deal with 
disputes and global force capable of mobilisation if conflict resolution failed. Open trade, 
national self-determination and progressive international change were part of this world 
view. While Wilson believed that a stable and peaceful international order was to be built 
around liberal democratic states, he acknowledged that the architecture of a liberal order 
needed to be universal and open in scope and membership. Such thinking provided the 
foundation for the League of Nations – created to promote cooperation, peace and 
security. The devastation of WWII a mere two decades later renewed the emphasis on 
open trade and cooperation between states. The UN was created to resolve conflict 
through negotiation and agreement. The international order that evolved in subsequent 
decades was Western-centred embodying the hallmarks of liberal internationalism – 
openness, state sovereignty, rule-based relations and institutionalised in the UN and other 
multilateral organisations. Western states have dominated the development of the 
international system since the 1800s and formed the basis of most theories of international 
relations in general and of peace and security in particular (Chan 2010). In the context of 
a weakened Europe and the powerful Soviet Union, the USA assumed responsibility for 
organising and operating the system and the liberal hegemonic order took shape. The 
American systems of currency, technology, markets and alliances became fused into the 
wider liberal order. 
ii) Search for state models to deal with conflict 
In the Post-WWII context, liberal efforts to construct peace through state models began 
in earnest. Decolonisation afforded an opportunity for political and economic liberties to 
spread. Rothermund’s (2006) comprehensive history of decolonisation shows that the 
rapid change in world views on colonisation, along with the demands of the colonised 
people and their leaders and the UN’s rush for independence were unstoppable (often 
armed) tides. The pace of decolonisation processes in places like Uganda, Somalia and 
the Congo meant the legacy of colonisation was “thin administration” that did not have a 
chance to cement governance.  Decolonisation, particularly in much of Africa, was less 
concerned with capacity or the development of individual colonies to meet the European 
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definition of statehood, than a rapid change in international views on the legitimacy of 
colonialism and self-determination. Colonial administrations in these countries had not 
only mostly failed to foster an indigenous experience of liberal government, but they were 
also comparatively “thin” in infrastructural terms while being paradoxically strongly 
authoritarian (R. H. Jackson 1987; Kirk-Greene 1980). The internal apparatus, political 
system and political economy were designed to protect the interests of foreign actors and, 
therefore, alien to the administered society. Only occasionally were local elites involved; 
such as the favoured Tutsi in Rwanda, the Kikuyu in Kenya and Hawiye in Somalia.   
 
The independent state models that surfaced at first appeared to provide citizens with the 
best opportunity for better living standards.  However as Jackson (1987, 1990; 2004a) 
explains many were “quasi-states” because while they had juridical statehood they lacked 
“empirical statehood”. The resulting collapse of the post-colonial state experience (some 
post-Cold War) in many third-world countries and the associated violence and hardship 
for citizens saw the emergence of further theory explaining the failure.  On the one hand, 
theory originating in the West took responsibility for a development model for third-
world countries under the auspices of the democratic and capitalist world (Rostow 1971). 
Modernisation theory in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, espoused a belief in the 
natural evolution of “backward” economies towards self-perpetuating market democracy 
(D. Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Rowstow 1960). This was later dismissed as inherently 
flawed (Brugger and Hannan 1983; Roxborough 1988). Law and development literature 
in the 1960s upheld the raison d'être that law matters in development – law being a 
malleable and manipulative instrument to promote economic development, democracy 
and human rights (see Douglas 1962; Seidman 1972).  This, too, quickly fell out of favour 
even amongst previous proponents (see Gardener 1980; Merryman 1977; Trubek and 
Galanter 1974) because local cultural variations were overlooked (Friedman 1969: 28).  
Trubek and Galanter (1974: 1080) concluded that such efforts in social engineering 
deepened inequality, curbed participation, restricted individual freedom, and hampered 
efforts to increase material well-being.  
 
The USA, buoyed by success in rebuilding post-war Japan and Germany, turned to nation-
building theories of national integration and consolidation to modernise the fragile states 
of Latin America, Africa and Asia. Koonings and Krujit (2002) explain such endeavours 
as the attempt to construct both the physical infrastructure and institutions of an effective 
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state while simultaneously seeking to instil a sense of national identity within local 
populations. Latin America of the 1960s was one of the first laboratories of the liberal 
peace. The US attempted to modernise their economies, believing that liberal political 
outcomes would follow (Carothers 1999; Packenham 1973: 70; Rostow 1971: 70). The 
claimed universal validity of the western state model saw elites supported by 
democratically elected governments. Latin America illustrates that while government 
favouring capitalism usually followed, democracy did not (Jahn 2007: 102; P. H. Smith 
1999: 150-52). This led Huntington (1968) to argue that economic progress in 
underdeveloped countries did not lead to democratization but was in fact often 
destabilising and conducive to the rise of authoritarianism  
 
Against this liberal search for state models, a neo-Marxist critical discourse arose 
explaining underdevelopment at the periphery as exploitation through the capitalist centre 
(Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1976, 1984). Post-development theorists reject ethnocentric 
solutions privileging instead the local, the grassroots and traditional knowledge (Escobar 
1995). This theory is criticised for reducing local actors to “pawns” of outside forces (T. 
Smith 1979). In terms of the ascendancy of the liberal internationalism – the turning point 
of which will be addressed next – Third World Approaches to International Law 
deconstruct the impact of international law on colonised peoples and seeks to eradicate 
the conditions of underdevelopment in the developing world (see Bedjaoui 1979; 
Kennedy 1988; Mutua 2000). These scholars reject international law as a racialised 
hierarchy of international norms and institutions that play into the power dynamic 
between first- and third-world (subordinate) peoples.  This scholarship warns against the 
harm Western powers and institutions (IMF, World Bank) can do, albeit unintentionally. 
However, it has failed to articulate an alternative global legal regime (Attar and Miller 
2010) and does not provide a theoretical framework for tackling conflicts or building 
governance internally. 
 
Instead what emerged at the end of the 20th century was the ascendancy of liberal 
internationalism and the revival of Kant’s separate peace in the emergence of liberal peace 
dominating international relations ideology and thus policy.  
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iii) Liberal internationalism ascended 
Throughout the 20th-century liberal-peace theory gained traction and a liberal hegemonic 
order eventually developed. However, the Cold War standoff prevented any global 
preference for domestic state institutions.  This all changed as the Cold War ended. Such 
was the optimism in the superiority of liberal internationalist ideals that the liberal peace 
was offered as the solution to a range of societal problems – particularly civil violence 
(see for example: Diamond 1995; Levy 1988a; Muravchik 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997, 
1999).  The fall of the wall thus became an “interregnum moment”, in the same vein as 
the conclusion of both world wars, despite being what Heathershaw calls a “reductive and 
teleological informed reading” of that event (2008: 600).   
 
The 1990s “third wave” of democratisation caused “tremendous optimism” in the 
likelihood of further consolidation and expansion of liberal states (Fukuyama 2005a: 84).  
Indeed the total number of democracies increased by nearly half from 1990 to 2003, not 
least because of what Danner (2009: xxi) calls the “… great telegenic festival of freedom” 
in the East, matching the sharp decline in civil conflicts over the same period. With the 
invasion of Iraq and subsequent attempts to rapidly democratise that country, it was 
thought the entire Middle East  would “flip”  turning it into a “crescent of shining, 
prosperous democracy” (Etzioni 2007: 38; see also Muravchik 2002).  
 
Those scholars who contributed to the Kantian revival at the end of the 20th century 
believe that in the present day there is a promise that war will fade, and realist principles 
will be finally superseded. Russett warned in 1995 that the “edifice of realism will 
collapse if attributes of states’ political systems are shown to have a major influence on 
which states do or do not fight each other” (Russett et al. 1995: 164).  Indeed strong 
empirical and theoretical evidence shows that liberal states do exercise restraint, and 
separate peace exists between liberal states (Doyle 1983; Lake 1992; Rummel 1997; 
Solomon 2003; Weart 1998). Empirically this is confirmed by Huntington’s (1993) study 
of the expansion of democracy and Weart’s (1998) examination of every recorded conflict 
between democracies since the beginning of dēmokratia in the ancient city-state of 
Athens.  Explanatory factors echoing Kant’s philosophy include the lack of inclination to 
wage war on nations where citizens hold the same basic ideals and principles, 
unfavourable public opinion, shared norms of compromise and cooperation, shared 
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interests in international trade, powerful internal institutional checks and public opinion, 
and reinforced mutual respect and cooperation through membership of international 
organisations (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; S. M. Mitchell et al. 1999; Owen 1994).  
 
Where there have been wars between seemingly liberal states, these have been explained 
as a matter of perceiving  one of the parties as less liberal than the other/s, i.e., Wilhelmine 
Germany in 1914 (Owen 1994).  The fact that liberal states are perhaps no more peaceful 
in their interactions with states that are non-liberal than are states generally is where the 
liberal peace combines realist insights on the world outside the liberal zone of peace – the 
zone of war – or the “victor’s peace” (Mearsheimer 1995; Richmond 2005). This is a 
choice “between preserving liberalism’s material legacy of the current world order at the 
cost of liberal principles or of finding ways of adjusting to a changing world order that 
protects liberal principles” (Doyle 1983: 349).   
 
Further, many studies support the internal peacefulness of liberal states (Hegre et al. 2001; 
Ray 1995; Rummel 1997; Russett et al. 1993). This is primarily attributed to democracy’s 
guarantee of basic human rights and nonviolent avenues for the resolution of political 
disputes (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 23-24). Doyle expands on this, pointing to four 
institutional requirements: Citizens possess “juridical equality” and other fundamental 
civic rights (i.e., religious freedom and freedom of the press); representative legislatures 
derive authority from the electorate’s consent and exercise authority free from restraint 
(including from other states); the economy protects the rights of private property which 
extends to the means of production; and the economy is shaped by supply and demand 
and a market free from strict control (Doyle 1997: 207). Legitimacy associated with 
democracy makes it difficult to mobilize arms against the prevailing order, reducing the 
likelihood of civil war (Owen 1994: 90).  
 
The realist counter-perspective dismisses this “proof” as liberal fantasy arguing that 
permanent peace is not possible (Layne 1994; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993, 2002). 
The notion that internal processes and political structures within a state can play a role in 
shaping international behaviour is rejected. They also dispute the empirical evidence, 
countering with Finland’s support for Nazi Germany – and the non-military overturning 
of democratically elected governments in Chile and the Dominican Republic by the US 
(Russett et al. 1995). Further, they point to the reclassification of democracies as 
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“authoritarian” when they go to war (i.e., Germany pre- and post-WWI). Democracies, 
they argue, are simply too new to reveal any real patterns (Russett et al. 1995: 164-65; 
Waltz 2002). Waltz (2002: 31) further dismisses Kant’s republics as too restrictive to ever 
be reality. When pushed to explain patterns of peaceful states Waltz and others revert to 
an argument against a casual relationship between democracy and peace favouring instead 
great power relations. The expansion of liberal states in this view would have little impact 
on international peace and security but may alter the power balance of states international 
which could endanger world peace (Mearsheimer 1995).  Instead of the active 
construction of liberal states, partition along ethnic lines is seen as the solution for 
societies experiencing civil conflict (Kaufmann 1996).  
 
While not dismissing the relevance of power plays in liberal democracies’ foreign 
policies, the empirical evidence that liberal ideology and institutions have independent 
power over decisions on war has been overwhelmingly convincing (Owen 1994). It is, of 
course, possible that the two forces sometimes push in different directions, just as some 
actors in the world or domestic politics are liberals and some realists.  However, as Levy 
(1988b: 662) concludes the democratic peace “comes as close as anything we have to an 
empirical law in international relations”. 
iv) Liberal peace-building 
The consequence of the casual relationship between liberalism and peace pushed to the 
fore by the ascendancy of liberal internationalism are theoretical arguments for the active 
construction of peace through liberal peace-building.  In his seminal work Kant, Liberal 
Legacies and Foreign Affairs Doyle (1983) is credited with reintroducing Kant’s logic of 
the separate peace and providing important impetus for the revitalisation of liberal 
internationalism. He argued for a global structural environment whereby illiberal regimes 
made a choice between liberal reform and participation in the world market or collapse 
and civil war (Doyle 1999: 54-5). It was logical and rational to attempt to create the 
perpetual peace; he argued, as where policy-makers had been informed by Kantian 
principles they had been quite successful (Doyle 1986). When civil war occurs, therefore, 
the UN should intervene: 
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...successful contemporary peacebuilding changes not merely behavior but, more 
importantly, it transforms identities and institutional context. More than reforming play 
in an old game, it changes the game (Doyle, 1999:55). 
 
Here Doyle goes beyond Kantian theory which did not champion external force and also 
the liberal internationalist policy of the time, where the strategy employed to push 
liberalism was limited to structural and diplomatic instigation. Further, he argues that the 
community of liberal states must be protected from the wilderness of the “illiberal other” 
who threatens the growth of peace – for if not reformed then collapse would follow 
(Chesterman et al. 2005; Doyle 1983, 1997, 1999).  Liberal peace-building, therefore, is 
a means of  constructing liberal states in post-conflict contexts to expand the zone of 
peace (Doyle 1997).  It can assist post-conflict peoples in realising the emancipatory 
political development that they would not otherwise have the resources or capacities to 
take part in, thus freeing individuals from their archaic societal constraints (ibid).  
 
Liberal peace-building is assisted by the belief that liberalism is the highest possible point 
along the trajectory of historical progress (G. H. W. Bush 1990; Morris 2011). Political 
systems in the more established democracies are taken to display a “clear moral and 
practical superiority”, with the associated high level of development, they provide the 
model all other states are expected to follow (Diamond 1996: 35; Paris 1997: 57). This 
idea is most famously pronounced in Fukuyama’s (1992) declaration of the “end of 
history”. States that allow such full democratic domestic competition fall outside history 
and those who fail to allow it are regarded as still within history.  
 
Liberal internationalism has therefore changed the logic of international legitimacy 
through the introduction of the ideals democratic self-determination, good governance 
and  human rights promotion. As Clark concludes, although these have been important 
elements of the international society since the end of WWII, these ideals were not 
visualised as ends in themselves. Now, these elements are understood as the “means to 
the wider international purpose of security, order and peace” (I. Clark 2005: 188). This 
necessitated a move away from the notion of sovereign states and non-intervention to a 
post-Westphalian understanding of the separate peace requiring not only the international 
system to be liberalised but individual states as well for international peace to cement 
(Bellamy and Williams 2004b; R. H. Jackson 1990).   
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This is fundamental change. The Westphalian system’s rules of legal equality, non-
interference in other state’s territory, reciprocity and respect for religious and political 
diversity were preconditions for the evolution of the liberal state (Bellamy and Williams 
2004b: 3; K. J. Holsti 1999: 284-86).  Over the last few centuries, Westphalian 
sovereignty has been the single most universal and agreed-upon norm of international 
politics underlying international law, the UN system, and historical movements of anti-
colonialism and national self-determination (Krasner 2004, 2005). Globalisation however 
impacted upon the state in terms of increased interdependence and integration (N. Harris 
1990; Ohmae 1993).  The result is that a number of problems are now considered to be 
of international concern and causality including intra-state conflict. A more recent 
manifestation of this is the concern over global terrorism and failed, unstable or war-torn 
states pushed to the fore of foreign policy and international politics in a post-9/11 world. 
State weakness and the inability to enforce law and order domestically is identified as the 
most worrisome dangers to the international system (Gros 1996; Helman and Ratner 
1993).  
 
Mechanisms to “fix” these states have come to be viewed as central to maintain global 
order and to exercise them is equated with “responsible membership” of international 
society (Chandler 2006; Newman et al. 2009b). The UN placed the building of state 
institutions at the centre of post-conflict efforts in its 2005 review (Call 2005). Donors 
restructured their offices in response and the World Bank created the Fragile States Unit 
(Bensahel 2007). Rotberg (2005: 42) goes as far as to claim that peace-building has: 
“become one of the critical all-consuming strategic and moral imperatives of our 
terrorised time”. The impact of the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 heightened the 
merging discourses of development and security in the language of non-governmental 
actors and militaries and defence ministries (see for example G. Bush 2002; Development 
Assistance Committee 1997, 2003; Leader and Colenso 2005; Solana 2003). Liberal 
peace-building now emphasises security and stabilisation (Duffield 2007) and “failure” 
has been used as justification for intervention (DFID 2006; USA 2002).  
 
This is not to imply that peace-building in the liberal internationalist approach is an 
attempt to transform radically the very structure of global political and economic order.  
It is more temporary and limited then that – a means for universalising the Western liberal 
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state and the liberal zone of peace and security (Gates et al. 2004). Ultimately this is a 
conservative enterprise in reaffirming the sovereign state system based on liberal 
premises, not about instigating supra-national projects of an international organization, 
reform and justice which is perhaps what President Wilson was envisaging (MacMillan 
2004). Liberal internationalists do however have a bias against any alternative political 
system and as such the possible compromising of liberal principles in a post-conflict 
transition is the lesser evil.  
 
Embracing liberal peace theory the dominant Western, and de facto international, view of 
peace-building is as a tool for the international community to use in assisting societies 
emerging out of conflict to stabilise by attempting to construct post-conflict societies in 
“liberalism’s divine image”. This is why peace-building is more commonly termed 
“liberal peace” in contemporary literature (Susanna Campbell et al. 2011; Lidén et al. 
2009).  The neo-liberal state model is championed as a new universal standard in order to 
replace out-dated models of governance with modern institutions (Paris 1997: 56). The 
framework’s core components are liberal democratic political structures and processes 
(good governance, democratic multi-party elections, human rights, the rule of law, the 
development of a limited but functional state and the empowerment of an ethnocentric 
type of civil society) and liberal or neo-liberal economic practices (the privatisation of 
public enterprises, reduced state subsidies, the deregulation of capital markets and the 
lowering of barriers to international trade) (Bellamy 2008; Richmond 2008; Selby 2013).  
 
In summary, the liberal internationalist theory of peace and peace-building that dominated 
at the end of the 20th century is a composite of liberal peace theory and liberal peace-
building with elements of internationalism and contingent sovereignty and even some 
cosmopolitan elements. The liberal peace suggests a progressive and rational ontology 
and epistemology of peace which can be legitimately constructed for others.  
The idea to consciously construct peace led to a methodological approach moving away 
from providing space for negotiated settlement to authorising the transferral of peace 
through the process of liberal peace-building. What followed was the comprehensive 
testing of this theory for those states emerging from conflict through UN peace-building 
policy and practice.  
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IV. UNITED NATION’S PEACE-BUILDING: LIBERAL PEACE-BUILDING IN 
PRACTICE 
Liberal peace-building arose from recognition that UN strategy faced limitations with its 
traditional military-style (peace-keeping) measures in the context of post-Cold War intra-
state conflict (Boutros-Ghali 1992, paras 11 & 21). US-Soviet polarization meant that the 
UN had avoided domestic arrangements in its missions when no agreement on the nature 
of those arrangements could be agreed upon. In fact, Security Council vetoes had caused 
paralysis from all but minimal activity (Paris 2004: 15). However the ascendancy of 
liberal internationalism and globalisation became defining forces in the birth of the 
concept of peace-building at the UN, as the near universal collective security organisation 
(Paris 2004: 19).  This section explains the next piece in what we now recognise as the 
liberal peace: how post-conflict peace-building evolved from a board ambit of potential 
post-conflict activities to a more specific view of state-craft and institutional reform. This 
was assisted by the idea of responsible international membership in the responsibility to 
protect. The UN’s own assessment of its peace-building practice is then discussed – 
supplemented with supporting literature – and brief comments on the need for further 
operational and policy reform in light of lessons learned. 
i) The beginnings of liberal peace-building at the UN 
Post-conflict peace-building developed from the then UN Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali’s attempts to centre the UN as a progressive autonomous agent of peace and global 
justice at the end of the Cold War. He sought to capture growing Western interest in 
actively trying to construct peace in societies struggling from conflict through progressive 
multilateral consensus (Sabaratnam 2011).  And he grasped the opportunity to (Boutros-
Ghali 1992, para 3):    
achieve the great objectives of the Charter – a United Nations capable of maintaining 
international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, 
in the words of the Charter, “social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom.”  
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Thus “post-conflict peace-building” was added to the UN vocabulary in his An Agenda 
for Peace 11  – affirming the emerging paradigm of liberal internationalism.  
 
Peace-building was initially defined broadly as: “rebuilding the institutions and 
infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife” (1992, para 15). Its aim was to: 
“identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order 
to avoid relapse into conflict” (1992, paras 5, 21). Boutros-Ghali argued for a generic 
interpretation of peace-building dealing with the full range of concerns involved in the 
transition from protracted violent conflict to stable peace. This required an understanding 
of conflicts that were based on structural violence and social grievance. The pragmatism 
of a broad potential spread of activities came explicitly aligned with the objectives of the 
liberal peace from inception.  Economic development and political freedom were seen as 
the appropriate conflict remedies. Peace-building should advance political democracy, 
establish order, foster economic development, and improve human rights (para 55).  
Boutros-Ghali believed there was:  
 
… an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and 
transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any 
new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted 
at all levels of international and national political communities (para 59). 
 
The identified outcomes included institutions necessary to maintain (electoral) 
democratisation, human rights protection, the rule of law, a strong civil society and 
economic reform (Boutros-Ghali 1992 paras 32; Richmond and Franks 2009a: 3). 
A major evolution occurred when peace-building became synonymous with reform of 
state and society. This is evident in the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace (Boutros-
Ghali 1995b) where Boutros-Ghali struggled with realistically addressing intra-state 
violence while continuing to address the injustices underlying conflict (1995b paras 13 & 
22). Instead of concluding that interventions were overambitious he persuaded others that 
where state institutions had been destroyed intervention had to evolve into a 
                                               
11 The term appears to have been first coined by Galtung in his essay Three approaches to peace: 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding where he relates peace-building to reaching for positive 
peace by creating structures and institutions of peace based on justice, equity and cooperation, thereby 
permanently addressing underlying causes of conflict and preventing their turn into violence Johan Galtung, 
Peace, War and Defence - Essays in Peace Research (2; Copenhagen: Christian Eijlers, 1975) at 282-304. 
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comprehensive reform agenda to build effective government (para 13). Boutros-Ghali 
also focused on development as a way to peace (1995a, para 3 & 40; Report of the 
Secretary-General 2005a). However, he cautioned that “only sustained efforts to resolve 
underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved 
peace on a durable foundation” (para 22).  
 
The reform agenda has tended to overshadow underlying issues. In 2000 Under-
Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi aligned peace-building explicitly with the aims of 
liberalisation: “democratization and civil society building that includes effective civilian 
governance and a culture of respect for basic human rights” (Report of the Secretary-
General 2000, para 39). This mirrors liberal internationalism’s active construction of 
peace through liberal peace-building:  “force alone cannot create peace; it can only create 
the space in which peace may be built’ (viii-ix).  Three key peace-building objectives 
were outlined: consolidating internal and external security, strengthening political 
institutions and good governance, and promoting economic and social rehabilitation and 
transformation (Report of the Secretary-General 2001). 
ii) Re-definition of state sovereignty (or The Responsibility to Protect)  
How the UN would go about liberal peace-building, as discussed above, was previously 
constrained by the Westphalian state system. However as maintenance of international 
peace and security came to be viewed as dependent upon the liberalisation of states 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1999: 49-50) pushed for redefinition towards human 
rights notions of sovereignty: 
States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and 
not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the 
fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and 
subsequent international treaties – had been enhanced by a renewed and spreading 
consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than 
ever conscious that its aim is to protect human beings, not to protect those who abuse 
them. 
 
In 2001, the UN’s International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was 
tasked with answering Annan’s challenge. In making recommendations to the 
international community in its report The Responsibility to Protect, the commission 
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followed Annan’s lead in reframing sovereignty away from its associations with “control” 
and towards the idea of sovereignty as “responsibility”. A new social contract in effect 
was proposed, expanding upon the one that should exist at the state level (amongst 
citizens and between citizens and the state), to one between states and the international 
community (para 1.35). When a state fails to protect its citizens, and peaceful measures 
are not working, it is now proposed that the international community should assist (Report 
of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change 2004; 
United Nations General Assembly 2005b) – not just react militarily, but prevent and 
rebuild (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, para 
2.29). This has been important development for the liberal peace as it meant it was longer 
at odds with the very notion of sovereignty. Instead, those favour of the liberal peace 
could now call for it to operate in the very name of sovereignty through post-Westphalian 
capacity building for democratic “self-determination” by means of direct involvement in 
the internal affairs of conflict-ridden states. As part of this framework, peace-building is 
directly addressed as the “responsibility to rebuild” (para. 2.29, 5.1-5.21). This serves to 
move further intervention away from traditional military connotations towards local and 
rebuilding measures.  
iii) Peace-building in practice 
Current UN peace-building practice sits somewhere between a vision-based commitment 
to “the responsibility to protect” and a more conservative belief in peace-building to 
further the aim of the pacific union of liberal states (Lidén 2006: 37).12 As noted in the 
Boutros-Ghali’s original proposals for peace-building, liberal peace-building is but a 
subset of the potential activities that could be considered peace-building (Paris and Sisk 
2009: 14). However it is peace-building which is clearly emphasised in UN documents: 
 
A mission’s mandate should include peace-building and incorporate such elements as 
institution-building and the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, by 
assisting the parties to develop legitimate and broad-based institutions... 
                                               
12 For a more detailed discussion of the different graduations of peace-building directing practice see 
Richmond The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005). Heathershaw 'Unpacking the 
Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses', Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies, 36 (2008), 597. Michael Banks, 'Four Conceptions of Peace', in Denis J. D. Sandole 
and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to 
International Applications (F.Pinter; London, 1987), 259-74. 
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Strengthening state institutions, increasing political participation, engaging in land 
reform, strengthening civil society, finding ways to respect ethnic identities: all are seen 
as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance. The aim of peace-building is 
to build the social, economic and political institutions and attitudes that will prevent the 
inevitable conflicts that every society generates from turning into violent conflicts. In 
effect, peacebuilding is also the front line of preventive action (Report of the Secretary-
General 2001, para 9 & 10) 
 
Newman, Paris and Richmond, therefore, define peace-building as more closely akin to 
peace-building in the “promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a 
range of other institutions associated with ‘modern’ states” (2009a: 1). There are of course 
a number of other tasks which concern stability – such as security and safety along with 
the provision of basic services and return of refugees – which overlap with peace-keeping, 
and humanitarian and development assistance to other UN activities. And while peace-
building itself is not formally defined by the UN (United Nations Peacebuilding Support 
Office 2010: 5), Newman et al’s definition is strengthened by the peace-building 
strategies – and the prominence afforded them – as outlined in the UN’s mission 
mandates.  
 
The idea that democracy causes peace has had important implications. As Paris has 
observed, all UN operations in the 1990s “sought to transform war-shattered states into 
liberal democracies as quickly as possible” (Paris 2004: 5). “Peace-building is 
unapologetically seen as the central objective of any peace operation” accordingly to 
Brahimi, the Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General (2007: 4). In 1994, the 
mandate of the UN Mission in Haiti authorised coercive measures to promote democracy 
for the first time (United Nations Security Council 1994a). Operations in Kosovo, East 
Timor and Sierra Leone in 1999 marked the beginning of a new generation of peace-
building missions, with even greater focus on building conditions for basic stability 
together with liberalisation. The mandates of these missions were substantially more 
extensive than for previous operations and clear peace-building strategies were 
incorporated into the objectives (Paris and Sisk 2009: 7) The mandate of the UN Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo sets out the usual security provisions as well as 
elements of peace-building in establishing an interim administration to build provisional 
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institutions for democratic self-government, elections, and economic reform (United 
Nations Security Council 1999, 10(c), (e) and (g)). The UN Assistance Mission to East 
Timor’s mandate directs the development of functioning state institutions, and the 
organisation and overseeing of elections.  Similarly, for the UN Mission in South Sudan 
building and strengthening state institutions was given critical priority. Building core state 
institutions was the overarching goal even before the job of assessing what work was 
required was done (para 3(a)).  
 
There is a consensus that peace-building has political, social, economic, security and legal 
dimensions, each of which requires attention. However to distinguish it from 
development, peace-building is understood to be a political project where legitimate 
political authority is created to avoid violence resuming. For UN peace-building, inspired 
by liberal internationalist ideology and with the aim of replicating the liberal western 
state, the focus is specifically on the technical exercise of institution-building:  
Functioning government, political, market and social institutions have long been 
recognized as prerequisites for establishing popular confidence in the State and 
preventing violent conflict. Institutions — defined broadly as the rules of the game and 
the organizations that frame and enforce them — provide the incentives and constraints 
that shape political, economic and social interaction” (Report of the Secretary-General 
2012, para 43) 
 
Institution building along with sustained international support are seen as critical actions 
to prevent relapses into violence and to produce more resilient societies (Report of the 
Secretary-General 2012). As Richmond (2010) observes, the main focus remains on the 
top level and the reverse engineering in official processes with international experts 
prescribing knowledge, procedures and structures and has, thus resembled more a system 
of governance as opposed to a reconciliatory process. 
iv) The UN’s peace-building record and lesson learned 
While the emphasis on liberal peace-building is clear, the UN’s record of peace-building 
practice is less so.  The assessment provided in this section is supported where necessary 
by evaluations from external parties who contribute to peace-building and the wider 
academic community. There is no easy framework for evaluation due to the fact that the 
UN’s formal learning infrastructure has been under-resourced and knowledge collection 
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unsystematic. This is not to say that learning has not taken place, but that it makes it 
difficult to present clear suggestions for reform based on that learning (for further 
elabortion on learning and change see: Susanna Campbell 2008). Two points will be 
explored. Firstly, that the goal of establishing domestic peace and stability through the 
introduction of political and economic liberalisation has not been a great success. And 
secondly, while a large number of key lessons have been learned and put into practice 
there remains a number of key dilemmas which are as yet unresolved. 
 
Reflecting on the UN’s first decade of peace-building Annan (Report of the Secretary-
General 2001, para 4) observed:   
The United Nations has faced many difficult and complicated conflicts. While it is 
possible to point to several successes during this past decade, it must also be 
acknowledged that there have been cases where efforts fell short of objectives... more 
than once during the last 10 years the United Nations has withdrawn a peacekeeping 
operation, or dramatically altered its mandate, only to see the situation remain unstable, 
or sink into renewed violence 
 
Successful cases include reforming systems of governance that became responsive to 
people’s basic needs at the local, regional, and national levels (Report of the Secretary-
General 2001, para 12). While no specific examples are given in UN documents, Namibia 
and Mozambique are sometimes identified in the literature (Chesterman et al. 2005; 
Cutillo 2007). These, however, did not strictly-speaking follow civil conflict, since the 
withdrawal of South Africa in both cases brought about resolution of conflict (Paris 2004: 
135-47). Subsequent complex missions in less favourable conditions have been 
associated with terrible tragedy – genocide, deteriorating security, stalemates and the 
return of violence after UN withdrawal – albeit not always on the same scale as before 
(Report of the Secretary-General 2006; Security Council 1999; United Nations General 
Assembly 1999). There is strong evidence of relapses into armed conflict and also of new 
conflicts emerging in places where peace-building has failed, as well as the reverse-
development that this conflict then produces  (Call and Cousens 2008; Collier et al. 2003). 
A 2010 UN report on peace-building noted: 
 
The tragic consequences of failed peace agreements in the 1990s (e.g. Angola), renewed 
conflicts (e.g. Haiti and Rwanda) and protracted wars (e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan, DRC)  
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highlighted the need for the UN to develop new approaches to the challenges of building 
sustainable  peace in complex emergencies and intra-state conflicts. The emergence of 
multidimensional peace operations, the creation of new conflict units (e.g.  UNDP/BCPR) 
and the design of new service lines (e.g. SSR, DDR and the rule of law) demonstrated  
the converging interest among humanitarian, development, political, security and human 
rights actors  to help prevent and resolve conflict and to build sustainable peace. Relapse 
into violence in Haiti and Timor-Leste following UN interventions there reinforced the 
need for carefully-planned, well-coordinated exit strategies to prevent relapses and to lay 
the foundations for sustainable peace. (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office 
2010: 45) 
 
The UN has undoubted achieved a number of positive results. Encouragingly there is 
decreasing levels and intensity of armed conflicts (Human Security Centre 2005, 2011).  
Success rates are however hard to define due to the much disputed definition of “success”. 
International peace efforts must be part of this record but precisely how is unclear (Call 
and Cousens 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). If success, however, is defined broadly 
as the ability to establish a stable and enduring democratic political system, then the UN’s 
assessment is of failure. This conclusion is widely supported in the academic literature 
(Fukuyama 2005a; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009).  Following elections in Angola 
(1992) and Liberia (1997) conflict returned. In other cases such as Cambodia, BiH, 
Tajikistan as Lyons (2009: 91) points out elections have served as war termination but 
with only a secondary, limited and arguably damaging relationship to democratization. 
 
Whatever the measure, even in more positive instances such as in Cambodia, Takikistan 
and most recently Burundi, success is not widely embraced, and caveats abound – virtual 
peace, dictatorship, instability, continuing violence, serious underlying antagonisms, 
highly disputed governance structures (Heathershaw 2008: 337-39; Human Rights Watch 
2012; Lund 2003; Mac Ginty 2006c; Richmond and Franks 2007). An important finding 
of Lunds’ (2003) study of a large number of UN peace-building missions is that the record 
is very mixed even at the most basic level of ending the threat of major violence once a 
security presence withdraws – or negative peace.  
 
One of the possible explanations for this is that the demand for UN assistance in the early 
post-war years was so great that learning struggled to keep up. As Paris and Sisk (2009) 
document in their comprehensive study of missions, early problems in Angola (1992), 
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Rwanda (1994), Cambodia (1992) led to a reorientation of strategy towards the 
construction of effective, legitimate governmental institutions in transitional states such 
as Timor Leste (1999), Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (1999). Liden et al (2009: 587) 
observe attempts to replicate these efforts in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) have 
severely weakened the credibility of liberal international peace-building due to a lack of 
international and local legitimacy, and continued resistance and violence and general 
insecurity. Unfortunately at a fundamental level the liberal peace-building project has 
been given “an aggressive face in global politics” in part due to the reaction of the US to 
9/11 and the “war on terror. This has hampered the illiberal peace-buildings appeal as the 
purported carrier of human rights and democracy (Duffield 2007; Lidén et al. 2009: 587). 
 
The UN and others observe that efforts by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping 
Operation’s Lessons Learned Unit did not have a great deal of impacts on practice, and 
there was no mechanism for learning across the course of a mission, let alone developing 
best practice (Dahrendorf 2003; Report of the Secretary-General 2000, para 229). Where 
attempts were made to transfer experience from one mission to another, this was often 
transferred in a one-size-fits-all manner leading to suboptimal outcomes (Dahrendorf 
2003: vi). An example of the problem of early learning is exit strategies. Here elections 
were regarded as a signalling democratic stabilization and guaranteed a timely withdrawal 
(Chesterman 2004a; United Nations 2003).  Benner et al (2011: 30) take this further 
arguing that a long-standing “culture of constant improvisation” meant that the UN 
bureaucracy strictly opposed efforts of evaluation or systematized knowledge acquisition 
which led to such problems (Benner et al., 2011: 30). This is supported by anecdotal 
observation by Chesterman (2004a: 256); [learning] has not […] been one of the strengths 
of the United Nations. A senior Secretariat official describes this as an unwritten rule that 
‘no wheel shall go un-reinvented’”.  
 
The UN has been alert to the ad-hoc nature of peace-building and undertook to learn and 
better identify institutional machinery for peace-building (Annan 2005). Annan appointed 
a panel of experts under Brahimi in 2000. The resulting report was the first UN attempt 
to complement systematically past mission experiences with existing academic 
knowledge (Report of the Secretary-General 2000). Learning was identified as the 
missing link between the temporary nature of specific missions and the reality of 
permanent engagement (ibid, p xiii). The report strongly called for reform and paved the 
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way for a number of key developments. Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno 
strengthened the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit to understand better the change 
required of the UN and appointed David Harland to systematise knowledge acquisition 
and translate lessons into practice (Benner et al. 2007: 30).  End-of-mission reports were 
supposed to be systematically collected from 2006 (ibid), plugging a gap where for 
example there is no end of mission report on Afghanistan or on Liberia – only an election 
report for the first and a start-up mission evaluation for the latter  (Haeri and Blanc 2005; 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2004). 
 
Further reform came in the establishment of a dedicated body to advance peace-building, 
strengthen coordination and create learning capacity:  the Peacebuilding Commission 
(PBC) (United Nations General Assembly 2005a). As an intergovernmental body assisted 
by the new Peace Building Support Office and Peace Building Fund (a multi-donor trust), 
it provides sustained international attention towards countries undertaking peace-building 
and mobilises resource.  However, the PBC is a weaker version of the body Annan (2005) 
proposed, diluted because consensus from member states was deemed necessary. It has 
more members, smaller staff, and lower capacity, is less dynamic, relies on voluntary 
contributions to the PBF, and has very little power with advisory status to the Security 
Council (United Nations General Assembly 2010).  The mandated five-year review of the 
PBC called for improvements in nearly all areas of its work (United Nations General 
Assembly 2010). On the policy front, the UN’s ability to reflect on practice can only be 
as good as its organisational learning mechanisms. As an agency of best practice, a 
number of commentators are doubtful that the PBC can be the missing link the Brahimi 
report identified or a driving force of UN peace-building change when it operates under 
such constraints (Malloch-Brown 2011; Pugh 2005).  
 
Despite these constraints, a number of lessons have been learned. Key issues such as 
coordination and coherence, monitoring, capacity building, dependency, accountability 
and exit strategies are clearly addressed in a survey of UN reports (for example: Eide et 
al. 2005; Harland 2005; Report of the Secretary-General 2000, para. 210; United Nations 
2003: 72; United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2010). Of the many possible 
examples three illustrate the consensus across the UN’s self-assessment and the 
supporting literature on lessons learned of a technical nature. The need for strong political 
support from the international community is identified. This includes adequate resource 
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provision and political will as well as support from other organisations like the World 
Bank (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 27; Bratt 1997; Call and Cousens 2008; Carlsson et al. 1999; 
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office 2010). In the case of Rwanda, the lack of 
interest from the US, Russia and China and the impartiality of France, Uganda and Zaire 
has been identified as hampering the UN’s involvement and illustrates the tension 
between available means and desired ends. A second example is the importance of 
providing security for local populations through disarmament and demobilisation work 
and willingness on the part of the UN to enforce the settlement if required (Hampson 
1996; Report of the Secretary-General 2000). The contrasting experience of Mozambique 
and El Salvador where security was conveyed to local populations against disasters in 
Rwanda and Cambodia illustrates this. And lastly timeframes for peace have been clearly 
recognised as needing to be more realistic, moving away from fast exit strategies to the 
recognition that building peace takes time  (King and Mason 2006; OECD/DAC 2010; 
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office 2010). 
 
There are a number of other key issues which are less clearly resolved in the UN and 
supporting literature such as local ownership, cultural context, sustainability and 
legitimacy. This is not because the general agreement does not exist on their importance 
but rather because they move beyond the technical to raise institutional and operational 
dilemmas for the UN. As identified by Paris and Sisk these dilemmas can be framed in 
terms of establishing self-government through outside intervention, local ownership 
through international control, universal values promoted as remedies for local problems, 
a definitive break with the past in order to establish the liberal state and short term 
imperatives conflicting with longer-term objectives (Paris and Sisk 2009: 305-6).    
 
The achievement of local ownership in particular has been comprehensively identified in 
UN literature as the answer to the undesired effects of peace-building such as dependency 
on the presence and administration of  international assistance and the associated  
distortion of institutions and economy (International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty 2001, para 5.25-5.29; OECD 2011a: 11; United Nations Development 
Programme 2012). How this is “achieved” appears to relate to equally ill defined notions 
of participation, encouraging cooperation, establishing political processes that facilitate 
locals to take responsibility and strengthening national capacities (International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, para 5.31; Report of the 
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Secretary-General 2012, see particularly para 62; United Nations Peacebuilding Support 
Office 2013).  
 
There is no suggestion that the issues raised by UN peace-building practice are easy to 
overcome. The very nature of the peace-building enterprise is challenging. There has been 
much work done to overcome the ad-hoc nature of peace-building through committing to 
systemic knowledge gathering and the creation of institutional machinery.  However, UN 
policy still prioritises security and development and it is noted that the UN has not 
assessed and tested their theories of peace reflecting as they do the liberal peace’s aim to 
replicate the institutions of the modern state (Barnett et al. 2007). From the mixed record 
of post-conflict interventions one overarching lesson is clear; peace cannot be imposed 
on war-torn societies from the outside. How this translates into the work of the UN as the 
embodiment of the liberal internationalism with its strong commitment to the current 
practice of liberal peace-building has yet to be resolved. This was the exact finding made 
in a recent OECD report on stakeholder consultations to inform the first International 
Dialogue on Peace-building and Peace-building (OECD/DAC 2010: 29). 
V. BEYOND CRITIQUES OF LIBERAL PEACE-BUILDING  
Liberal peace-building continues to enjoy enhanced prestige at the international level. Yet 
the unresolved tensions addressed in the previous section and the very mixed record of 
practice, has left it open to scrutiny and review, making it the subject of the most 
important debates in peace and conflict literature. Concerns are widely expressed, and 
some reject the idea that peace can be constructed by third parties at all. Critiques from a 
variety of perspectives identify a number of flaws primarily concerning ontological and 
methodological narrowness (Beate 2007; Chandler 2006; Cooper 2007; Cramer 2006; 
Duffield 2001, 2007; Mac Ginty et al. 2007; Mac Ginty 2008; Newman et al. 2009a; Pugh 
et al. 2008; Richmond 2007). Putting aside claims from a realist counter-perspective such 
as “give war a chance” (Luttwak 1999), the critics can be broadly grouped into three 
categories;  the problem solving approach advocated by those who seek to refine practice; 
those who seek to rebalance peace-building with more attention given to emancipatory 
strategies; and those that see liberal peace-building as fundamental flawed and damaging.  
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i) Problem-solving approach  
At the opposite end of the spectrum from realists are the problem solvers who see liberal 
peace-building as viable. They propose refinements to the process by which the liberal 
peace is implemented. King and Mason (2006: x) for example call for a fundamental re-
thinking of both the “institutional infrastructure and strategic approach.” This is not a call 
for peace-building missions to be abandoned, but for greater resources: “Remedying the 
deep-rooted problems of post-conflict societies requires more robust instruments and 
longer time horizons” (ibid).  
 
One of the most influential scholars in this area is Paris. As Heathershaw (2008: 612) 
concludes, Paris’ research (1997) forms part of the qualitative evidence that the theory 
and practice of liberalising the economy and political system in post-conflict spaces have 
failed.  Paris found that peace-through-liberalisation strategies had not changed the 
political culture of formerly non-liberal states and instead had contributed to violence 
rekindling or recreated historical sources of conflict (2004: 155).  This, he argued, is due 
to little guidance provided to peace-builders as to the problem of constituting government 
(ibid, p. 174).   
 
He does not reject liberal underpinnings or assumptions of peace-building but rather 
distinguishes between liberalism and liberalisation in arguing for “institutionalisation 
before liberalisation” (Paris 2004, 2006).  Effective institutions can, he argues, serve to 
implement liberalism’s principles until they become an unquestioned part of the society’s 
political culture.  This would be particularly relevant where the people have no immediate 
political or economic interest in change, or their power depends on the status quo. The 
identified refinements to peace-building practice, therefore, are greater coercive elements 
integrated into operations for them to be consistent with the aim of reverse-engineering 
the liberal peace. A strategy which Paris says is better characterised as “coercion before 
liberty” (2004: 46–51). A level of international governance akin to the UN’s transitional 
administrative arrangements in BiH and Timor Leste would be required (ibid, p. 212).  
 
The end goal remains liberal democracy, and the primary path to achieving this is through 
the construction of liberal institutions. Problem-solver critics do not address the 
fundamental tension in illiberal, undemocratic forms of intervention attempting to 
66 
 
produce liberal democratic societies (Paris 2010) – as dilemma identified in the lesson 
learned section.  They assume that coercive intervention justified for the long-term 
benefits of democracy and human rights will facilitate and ultimately be superceded by, 
legitimate post-conflict orders.  In refining the prevailing approach, they are using the 
same mythologies based on the same ontological assumptions as liberal peace-building.  
Paris and others (Dobbins 2003; Dobbins et al. 2005)  focus instead on missions with 
larger footprints in terms of financing, manpower and mandate as a way to achieve better 
outcomes (Zurcher 2011: 71).   
 
Elements of these refinements have been incorporated into strategic policy and practice 
reflecting the rise of the peace-building discourse. Even the UN’s PBC has followed this 
trend prioritising “good governance” above all else based upon perceived security threats 
to the Western states rather than on the resolution of conflict (United Nations 
Peacebuilding Commission 2007), tempered slightly by a commitment to local 
ownership.13 The peace-building framework implicitly acknowledges that the benefits of 
peace-building may be unequal and selective (Curtis 2012: 12).  As Paris (2011b:159) 
argues, coercive peace-building is as good as it gets:  “there is no realistic alternative to 
some form of liberal peace strategy.” However outcomes can vary from the ideal liberal 
state because this is an elite-driven (international actors and local elites) process where 
political mechanisms created promote more accountability and “compel individuals to 
consult, deliberate, and negotiate with one another as they decide what they consider to 
be the good life” (Barnett and Zurcher 2009: 49).  Indeed, it may only be the symbols and 
ceremonies of the liberal state that are recognisable.  
                                               
13 Sabaratnam in her history of changes in international conflict management over the last 20 years 
concludes that the idea of “peace-building” appears to be disappearing altogether as policy actors seek to 
focus on states and regional security Meera Sabaratnam, 'The Liberal Peace? An Intellectual History of 
International Conflict Management, 1990-2010', in Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera 
Sabaratam (eds.), A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books 
2011), 13-30. The new hierarchy is obvious in the OECD document which defines good governance and 
peace-building as activities which are to be understood as activities falling under the general umbrella of 
peace-building Oecd, 'Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations', (Paris: 
Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 2007). The UK’s Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit was 
renamed the Stabilisation Unit in late 2007 and in the US Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization was created in 2004–5 to: “promote the security of the United States 
through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization  
assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife” The 
President of the United States, 'United States National Security Presidential Directive', NSPD-44 
(Washington: The White House, 2005). 
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ii) Rebalancing of the liberal peace  
Another group of critics rejects coercion and urges for a rebalancing of liberal peace-
building through more emancipatory and participatory perspectives.  They believe that in 
overlooking local conditions liberal peace-building “violates the intrinsic moral value of 
the communities affected” because “norms are seen to be relative to specific communities, 
cultural identities and ways of being” (Hutchings 1999: 123).  Emancipation is tied to 
particular contexts and locally derived meaning and values.  As Bush (1996: 86) 
summarises: 
the challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies is to nurture and create the political, 
economic and social space within which indigenous actors can identify, develop, and 
employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful, just, and prosperous society. 
 
Communitarians are a subset of this group. They focus on local perspectives and 
territorial sovereignty in arguing for a lighter international footprint. Internationalism is 
therefore rejected, and the liberal democratic state is only relevant in contexts from which 
it arose (Hutchings 1999). For communitarians, peace can only be “communal” – 
meaning that that it must be owned exclusively by the people of the society in question 
and must be designed to work with its unique characteristics. For example Cousens and 
Kumar (2001: 4) argue that the aim of peace-building should be “the construction or 
strengthening of authoritative and eventually, legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal 
conflict without violence”. Therefore, international actors’ roles should be limited to 
facilitating intergroup relations in procedural ways not affected by the cultural dimension 
(ibid, 186). 
 
Other critics who advocate for rebalancing do not reject the liberal model outright but 
question the universalisation of liberal practices, values and institutions. Richmond, for 
example, rejects the assumption that peace has an “ontological stability” providing for  it 
to be understood, defined and reverse engineered through the liberal state (Richmond 
2005: 121). On a practical level peace-building in the most complex settings of Sub-
Saharan African, Iraq or Afghanistan is at odds with state-centred analyses because the 
local context differs deeply from the liberal internationalist ideal type of states. Critics 
point to the weakness of state boundaries and structures, and the difficulties the 
international community has had in accepting the reality of statelessness and the 
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possibility of new arrangements departing from state formation. In reality, the promise of 
economic reforms has not usually been recognised, and there has not been meaningful 
integration into the global financial, economic and trade systems (Selby 2009). The liberal 
model originated in the West where economic development was a fundamental 
precondition for the liberal peace (Hegre 2004: 41).  In overlooking the realities of 
political order in this context liberal peace-building can do no more than create “no war, 
no peace” situations (Boege et al. 2008).   
 
In refining liberal peace-building, these critics thus seek to destroy the ideological barriers 
between liberal peace-builders and their subjects (Boege et al. 2009; Lidén 2009; Mac 
Ginty 2008, 2011; Oliver Richmond and Mitchell 2012). They focus on mechanisms that 
address the underlying causes of conflict, including the structural imbalances within 
institutions, economies and societies at large. The status quo should not remain and, 
therefore, reverse engineering the liberal state where individuals and groups can continue 
practices of exclusion by controlling the spoils of the state will not bring peace. In 
removing imbalance, institution-building would need to be contextual (Jeong 2005).  
Most importantly rebalancing the liberal peace requires a move away from blueprints to 
focus on relationships, attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups. An everyday 
focus would seek to alter internal social dynamics and address social injustices and 
inequalities. These changes cannot be externally imposed (T. Rose 2004: 74). The end 
goal, therefore, is not necessarily liberal peace-building but broader social and political 
transformation that can challenge conflict in peaceful ways using appropriate 
mechanisms, regardless of form. It is a return to politics before ideology where 
negotiation, consensus, consent and reconciliation form the basis of peace. 
 
While communitarians reject individualism, they do not offer any particular political 
solutions. The hybrid strategies identify the everyday setting (local realities, institutions, 
knowledge and agency) to rebalance peace-building with the context in which practice is 
occurring. Richmond and Franks believe that through contact between liberal peace-
building and local dynamics a post-liberal peace could emerge unencumbered by 
“idealistic prescriptions” (Richmond and Franks 2009a). While this concept could be 
helpful, researchers at the Berghof Research Center (Boege et al. 2008) agree that the 
implications for the strategy of international actors are unclear.  
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iii) Liberal model is fundamentally flawed and damaging    
The final group of critics rejects liberal peace-building as being ineffective and indeed 
damaging to local populations. Among them, critical theorists identify three main 
problems with liberal peace-building:  it is conservative, hegemonic, and enforces 
inequalities. Pugh (2004) and Duffield (2001: 23-26) view liberal peace-building as 
maintaining the status quo. They focus on the global order accusing liberal peace-building 
of reinforcing current global political and economic order through the commitment to the 
liberal peace. The liberal zone of peace is seen as an elite club with benefits sustained by 
the global distribution of power, wealth and security (Bellamy and Williams 2004b).  
Hegemony is achieved in an “ideational” (Tadjbakhsh and Richmond 2011: 226) way 
through the dominance of the cultural and ideological trait of liberalism. It is reinforced 
in material ways through the unjust principles of the way power and wealth are organised 
in international politics including within international organisations (Pugh 2005: 23-42). 
Liberal peace-building has been used to gain  power and serve economic and geostrategic 
needs  and the “responsibility to protect” has legitimised and given moral authority to the 
mainstreaming of this in practice (Chandler 2004: 3-4; 2010; Duffield 2001: 75). Indeed, 
the “responsibility to protect” doctrine is not seen as a radical redefinition of sovereignty 
because it is still centred on the authority of the state (Warner 2003).   
 
Liberal peace-building, these critics claim, enforces inequalities at the international level 
and domestically. They point out that democratization invariably produces competitions, 
loser and winners. Fast-paced economic liberalisation, in particular, is seen as a coercive 
enterprise which results in inequality, exclusion, underdevelopment and the increased 
likelihood of further violence (Pugh 2004; Pugh et al. 2008).  The neo-liberal economic 
system is seen as one of inclusion and exclusion where the prosperous benefit and the 
interests of the needy are undermined (Bellamy and Williams 2004a). Bellamy and 
Williams (ibid) point to empirical evidence in the Human Development Reports, which 
questions the relationship between liberal democratic capitalism and development for 
post-conflict societies. This is in line with Galtung’s (1969) theory of structural causes of 
conflict. Here exclusion and dependency are seen as a form of structural violence which 
can lead to real warfare – even civil war – on the margins of the liberal peace. Unless the 
global politics of contemporary conflict is taken into account, conflict will continue. 
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Like the previous group of critics, critical theorists accept that the liberal peace is relevant 
only to the context in which it developed (Duffield 2007; Pugh 2008; Pugh et al. 2008: 
290-7).  However, they accuse the problem-solvers of merely adjusting and “shoring up” 
the liberal peace without subjecting it to real scrutiny (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 402). 
Support here comes from the post-modernists. They point to persuasive critiques of 
modernity in the West (Bauman 1989; Durkheim 1893; Habermas 1990, 1998b; Lyotard 
1984; Nietzsche 2008; Weber 1947, among others).  These critiques do not appear to have 
dented the almost “evangelical” (Darby 2004: 8) optimism in the emancipatory potential 
of the democratic peace promoted by liberal internationalism which continues the 
modernisation of the developed world on a global scale. As Beate (2007) observes the 
liberal world underpinning modernisation theories addressed above. These policies 
survived and led to a reincarnation of such theories and policies under a new name – for 
example, the 80’s Regan administration’s democracy promotion. (Paris 2004: 32). From 
this position they then take issue with the method of reverse engineering the liberal peace 
through the transplantation of Western models of social, political and economic 
organisation onto post-conflict societies.   
 
Critical theorists too reject the importance placed on outdated statehood and sovereignty. 
As McGrew (2000: 410) argues “just at the historical moment when liberal democracy is 
being transformed by the forces of globalization it is proposed to erect a version of it at 
the global level”.  The intra-state wars of the post-Cold War era are not even truly “civil” 
– often crossing borders and the economic and political logic of states. Therefore peace-
building must consider the global, regional and local agendas (Duffield 2001).  
 
Lastly critical theorists and postmodernists do not think that the liberal peace can live up 
to its own principles. Human rights and democracy depend on individual autonomy, and 
where this does not exist, these liberal norms will only appear to be in place. As Chandler 
(2011: 187) concludes, liberal institutionalism: 
 
… reduces law to an administrative code, politics to technocratic decision-making, 
democratic and civil rights to those of supplicant rather than the citizen, replaces the 
citizenry with civil society, and the promise of capitalist modernity with pro-poor poverty 
reduction. To conceptualise this inversion of basic liberal assumptions and ontologies as 
“liberalism” would be to make the word meaningless… 
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Postmodernists believe the promotion of grand narratives is based on flawed 
presumptions of the emancipatory and peaceful potential of modern society (Darby 2009). 
They would focus instead on what causes oppression and insecurity, and seek political 
community that was contextually relevant – not housed in a state structure if this causes 
detriment to some (Carothers 2002).  Critical theorists recognise that while local actors 
can be fluid and have multiple identities, that they have agency and capacity and may 
express their existence through resistance, co-option, and the transformation of peace 
(Pugh et al. 2008).  
 
Much of the critical theorists’ energies are devoted to exposing present hegemonic abuse 
and relatively little to suggesting future practical alternatives. They do not seem to 
discriminate between practices that may have emancipatory potential from those that 
clearly do not – instead placing all current peace-building efforts under the “liberal” 
banner.  Lessons learned, for example, are just more problem-solving. Thus while post-
modernists pose a fundamental challenge to the current international order and 
architecture of liberal peace-building they do not provide specifics as to how political 
community is contextually achieved (Archibugi, Held & Köhler, 1998a; Falk, 1995; 
Habermas, 1998; Held, 1995: 279-280; Held & Archibugi, 1995; Hutchings, 1999: 161).  
VI. FINDING COMMON GROUND IN THE LITERATURE TO REVEAL A GAP FOR 
RESEARCH 
Most critical literature tends to shy away from concrete solutions. However, some 
familiar themes can be found in the spectrum of critiques and in the UN’s self-assessment. 
While liberal peace-building is recognised for the most part as a laudable enterprise, 
reverse-engineering the liberal peace, it is a very limited strategy for peace. The literature 
instead focuses on ideas surrounding “local ownership”, as the core missing parts of 
peace-building practice. This section briefly looks at the common ground before 
searching for the reconciliation of local ownership with liberal peace-building.  This 
exercise reveals a gap for further research. 
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i) Reconciling local ownership and peace-building practice: emerging from the 
critical literature and UN assessment 
Despite concerns over western triumphalism, liberal peace-building does attempt to build 
the capacity for peaceful ways of challenging and resolving conflict through holding 
elections and institutionalizing democratic governance. Post-conflict peace-building 
missions are recognised as having achieved a great deal in terms of stability and 
termination of violence in the immediate pause of the post-conflict period, but have been 
less successful in building peace long term (Paris 2004; Report of the Secretary-General's 
High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change 2004; T. Rose 2004). Reverse-
engineering the liberal peace was perhaps the obvious (and often only) option on the table 
in the immediate post-Cold War period. The nature of local life, however, is far more 
complex than international intervention affords in its templates and prescriptions. 
However, Duffield concedes (2001), that without liberal peace-building many societies 
may well have not had the assistance of large-scale peace-building since its agencies, and 
economic and political support often are driven by liberal states. 
 
Notwithstanding variations in language there is concern over the liberal peace’s 
ontological and methodological narrowness.  Three points illustrate the problem. 
Representing the problem solvers, Fukuyama (2005b) acknowledges that there is much 
we do not know about “transferring” strong institutions to developing countries. There is 
also emerging consensus on the limits of rapid transition to a liberal state economic model 
which notably did not occur all at once in the history of western liberal states. And finally, 
it is doubtful whether peace can be legitimately constructed for others through the 
transference of technical knowledge and frameworks without addressing local 
characteristics, culture, and priorities (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office 
2013; Willett 2006). Liberal peace-building is thus administering to incidences of 
conflict, not conflict causes (Mac Ginty 2010). On the more critical side, Mac Ginty 
(2006c: 3) concludes that as a technocratic process of “ticking boxes, counting heads and 
weapons, amending constitutions...” liberal peace-building cannot be an emancipatory 
process but resembles a stabilisation exercise.  
 
There is however also agreement that the primary responsibility for finding peace lies 
with those who have been affected by violent conflict.  While the idea of local ownership 
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has rhetorical acceptance (OECD 2011b; Report of the Secretary-General 2012; United 
Nations Development Programme 2012) – as has been outlined in this chapter – it lacks 
official definition or the depth of clarity needed to inform policy. Notions of bottom-up 
peace-building have been incorporated into peace-building programmes (Ramsbotham et 
al. 2011: 226-30; World Bank 2003). However, the priority is clearly still institution-
building and making sure these institutions run effectively (OECD 2011a; World Bank 
2011). Liberal peace-building’s constituting elements (e.g. democratization, economic 
liberalization, neoliberal development, human rights, and the rule of law) have been 
widely adopted and propagated as non-negotiable which may explain the disregard for 
context-specific history and politics. Liberal peace policy is locked into top down peace-
building (OECD 2008) – not only in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya but in the most 
current contexts of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and South Sudan (De Coning 2012: 108). And while the focus continues to be on 
international or regional peace, rather than on the space for peace to develop in the 
particular post-conflict context, the “who” in policy  remains  the “state” rather than 
people or communities (Richmond 2009a: 566). David Roberts refers to this as “achieving 
the technical” while ignoring “achieving the political” (Roberts 2011: 420).   
 
The unresolved nature of the twin focuses of local ownership and institution-building 
measures to “fix” states, while subtle, is nonetheless also apparent in the literature. In the 
majority of Chesterman et al’s (2005) Making States Work – one of the best collections 
of literature on post-conflict peace-building – the contributors implicitly adopt a 
Weberian perspective of the state, concentrating on the challenges that government 
institutions face in maintaining the monopoly on coercive power. Only in the conclusion 
do the editors regroup to discuss issues of local ownership, local needs and transitional 
justice. This discussion bears little relation to the evidence presented in the case studies 
or to peace-building promoted in the book as a whole.   
 
Notwithstanding the popularity of “local ownership” rhetoric, a clear u-turn is identified 
in the literature and political discourses away from a holistic approach and 
comprehensively to peace-building as policy and practice. Within the scholarly literature 
notions of reconciliation and rehabilitation once featured prominently in mainstream 
thinking about conflict management (Crocker et al. 2001) emphasising that approaches 
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from different traditions might be brought together to address failures in peace-building 
practice. The change in both intellectual and political direction is illustrated by the US 
Institute for Peace’s third compendium on conflict management which jettisoned 
references to “peace” and “reconciliation” when addressing uses and limits of government 
in conflict management.  The editors consciously turned away from peace because of the 
new security environment characterised  by “rogue states” “terrorism”, “weapons of mass 
destruction” and “conflict” (Crocker et al. 2007: 4)  reflecting the change echoed in the 
dramatic proliferation of literature on state failure and implications for interveners 
(Chesterman et al. 2005; Fukuyama 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; R. Rotberg 2004b).  
 
The debate around the manifestations of local ownership and its consequences has 
therefore been shallow to date. This is not surprising according to Kymlicka as there is a 
pattern of liberal blindness to cultural difference, particularly in the way individual human 
rights has overshadowed the idea of minority rights at the UN (Kymlicka 1995; Ryan 
2007). Therefore, Campbell has termed policy on “local ownership” as co-option rather 
than adoption to marginalise the critiques of top-down approaches (Stephen Campbell 
2011: 43). When “local ownership” rhetoric is employed without being fleshed out and 
when the post-conflict society is treated as an isolated entity or as a tactic to promote the 
liberal peace, this accusation seems to have some merit (Richmond and Franks 2009b: 6).  
 
Yet as the problem solvers critics observe, current practice even with modification and 
co-option of local ownership will not build the kind of liberal states envisaged by Kant 
that are able for the most part to channel conflict in peaceful ways. Mainstream peace-
building theory has to face the problem of promoting a model that does not work in many 
contexts. Few solutions are at the level of the community emerging from conflict. In 
attempting to preserve peace-buildings positive intentions, a more holistic understanding 
of peace-building seems to be required. The lessons of existing peace-building practice 
and the overwhelming academic knowledge embodied in the critical literature highlight 
strategies for peace finding acceptance in the local culture. It would appear that the 
implication of this is the space for non-technocratic ideas for peace and negotiation of 
peace frameworks to arise from the owners of the peace’s experience, culture, identities 
and context. This is not to over-romanticise traditional or indigenous practices of peace 
and goverance that reinforce the power of elites in a negative way or impose social 
conformity in a brutal way (T. Chopra 2010; Mac Ginty 2008). However, there are often 
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local practices for dealing with social challenges and local understanding of the “rule of 
law” that can be built upon as well as perceptions of peace and how that might be achieved 
(Donais 2012). Where there is not, space for these processes to develop is even more 
imperative if challenging. Legitimacy then flows from the points of view of the 
population, from continued deliberation and dialogue, not from the timetable of donors 
with blueprints of post-conflict peace-building. 
ii) Identifying gap for research   
The lack of meaningful attention to local ownership and associated transformation of 
peace-building within the liberal peace-building framework has been clearly identified in 
the literature (Chesterman 2007; Donais 2009). There appears to be significant 
dissatisfaction with and increasing resistance to the liberal peace as experienced by local 
populations in post-conflict contexts (Tadjbakhsh and Schoistwohl 2008). However the 
complimentary wealth of critical literature of liberal peace-building, while noting the 
inner contradictions and unsuitability of reverse engineering methodology, contains very 
few solutions available for consideration. It focuses instead on responding to the dominant 
practice of the liberal peace rather than providing a greater understanding of local 
contextually relevant alternatives.  
 
Yes, this is theoretical. These are essential two competing – but not necessarily 
contradictory – version of the peace-building theory. Liberal peace-building which holds 
liberalization as the key to solving conflict, relying as has been explored in this chapter 
on the liberal peace thesis which is the belief that liberal democracy and liberal 
marketisation will lead to greater peace. In practice, liberal peace-building is by necessary 
quite intrusive and the transition to local ownership remains a marginal concern. 
 
In identifying local ownership as a key to mitigating failure thus far, the literature 
reviewed in this chapter clearly points towards a more holistic interpretation of peace-
building that is broader than the technocratic enterprise of liberal state-building and 
understands the underlying causes of conflict and indeed how peace is negotiated locally.  
 
The implications of this are two-fold. Firstly an approach to peace is required that 
encompasses these concerns. I argue this can be found in the theories and norms emerging 
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under the umbrella of “conflict transformation” because this approach focuses on conflict 
being transformed primarily within the society in question through local learning, 
understanding, and change.  Conflict transformation pushes beyond the status quo and 
could be used as a framework to explore the tentative emergence of an alternative peace-
building paradigm that is much more in tune with the local actors, issues, rules. Due to 
the emerging nature of conflict transformation as a coherent theory and local ownership 
as a concept, the current discussion has gaps and is based on theory largely untested in 
the field and, therefore, has an uncertain trajectory and conclusions. However, it seems 
necessary that theory does continue to develop and explore in order to distil holistic 
possibilities for post-conflict peace-building. 
 
Secondly in shifting the focus from technical solutions to the local a gap is revealed in 
the lack of understanding of possibilities of autochthonous solutions for governance that 
channels conflict in peaceful ways. I, therefore, propose to investigate the building blocks 
of pacifying Leviathan in the immediacy of the post-conflict pause and the shape of the 
‘space’ that might be needed for autochthonous solutions based that learning to emerge.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the early decades of the 21st century, there appears little doubt that liberal 
internationalism has emerged as a significant peace tradition. This chapter has explained 
the dominance of the liberal peace model through a review of its enlightenment theoretical 
origins – particularly Kant’s perpetual peace – the ascendency of the liberal 
internationalist ideology in the 20th century, the persuasiveness of the separate 
democratic peace as revitalised by Doyle in the 1980s, and the evolution of the liberal 
internationalist peace-building means to the wider international purpose of security, order 
and peace through the evolution of the concept of (liberal) peace-building at the UN. 
 
As peace-building has evolved, it is not at all clear that the chosen method – reverse-
engineering the liberal peace – is the solution to the post-Cold War concern with intrastate 
conflict. Rapid liberalisation has actually triggered violence and ignores the complexity 
of transitions and the mismatch between expectations for rapid peace and processes that 
historically took much longer. The transplanting of imported and hence unfamiliar 
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constitutional forms has been criticised but repeatedly resuscitated. Not surprisingly, 
paused-conflict states find it impossible to govern themselves with model solutions which 
fail to consider the richness of the national, cultural, political, and temporal context. 
Armed conflict has often resumed. 
 
The UN faced early challenges prompted by the sudden demand for peace-building 
coupled with unsystematic mechanisms for institutional learning. Where lessons have 
been implemented, they have tended to encompass the most technical aspects of peace-
building – coherence, mandates, efficiency, coordination and monitoring. A range of 
reforms has strengthened knowledge collection so as to inform policy and practice. 
However, a number of unresolved dilemmas remain. The most serious of which is that 
the liberal peace is characterised by the diminution of the local and oddly, of peace itself.  
This is because the focus on structures in the sense of institution building can change 
without any real attention to individuals or culture, leaving group identities and 
antagonisms intact. Liberal peace-building of this kind appears to be a much more 
conservative interpretation of peace-building than Boutros-Ghali intended when he 
warned that social grievance and political freedom would need to be addressed. Kant too, 
in the prioritising republican constitutions, makes clear that peace is contingent on 
indigenous democracy. 
 
In reviewing the literature, it is evident that the liberal peace-building as it is currently 
conceived has prioritised security and order at the expense of testing and assessing 
whether current policy actually assists in building sustainable peace.  The critical 
literature too identifies a number of fundamental flaws concerning the liberal peace’s 
methodological and ontological narrowness. Standardised processes and endpoint for 
those activities do not mesh with context-specific factors. Solutions are limited. The 
problem solvers call for more coercive peace-building to build the façade of liberal states 
while the critical theorists would do away with the entire practice. Those who seek to 
rebalance liberal peace-building hope to soften external prescriptions through social and 
political transformation that can challenge conflict in peaceful ways using appropriate 
mechanisms, regardless of form. It is a return to politics before ideology where 
negotiation, consensus, consent and reconciliation form the basis of peace.   
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There is certainly scope for this recognised in the general agreement evident in the UN 
and critical literature that the primary responsibility for finding peace lies with those who 
have been affected by violent conflict.  In shifting the focus from technical solutions to 
the local, a gap is revealed in the lack of understanding of possibilities of autochthonous 
solutions for governance that channels conflict in peaceful ways. Rather than the liberal 
peace, I propose to use the more holistic approach of conflict transformation to inform 
this research as it is primarily concerned with local learning, understanding, and change.  
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3: The approach of conflict 
transformation 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The liberal peace-building dominance addressed in chapter two is characterised as fast-
paced, top down, ethnocentric project with universalistic assumptions. It problems in 
theory, as well as practice, were documented through exploration of the UN’s lessons 
learned and the critical literature. The dominance of liberal internationalism and liberal 
peace-building is however just one peace traditions. Promising alternatives may be built 
on the basis of theories and norms emerging under the umbrella of “conflict 
transformation”. Throughout human history conflict transformation has existed but as a 
field of study and practice it emerged in the 1990s incorporating some core ideas of 
contemporary conflict resolution. Briefly, conflict transformation holds that enduring 
peace requires that the underpinnings of actual or latent conflict must be transformed 
primarily internally through local learning, understanding, and change. There is no grand 
theory within the conflict transformation field. Instead, many isolated propositions and 
generalisations and countless analyses of social processes.  This chapter serves to define 
the scope of the research through an exploration of the approach of conflict 
transformation. 
II. WHAT IS CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION?  
In the first part of this chapter the conflict transformation approach directing this is 
explained. This begins with a definition of conflict transformation and the similarities and 
differences between the three board approaches to conflict under the peace-building 
umbrella – to manage, settle or transform. Despite its newness as an approach conflict 
transformation has a strong theoretical influence.  
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A complexity of terminology has often caused the parameters of these approaches to be 
unclear.  How these differ from each other is a matter of some debate.  
i) Conflict approaches: management, resolution and transformation 
Conflict transformation seeks to transform conflict into something that is desired in a 
longer timeframe.  It focuses not only on the content of the conflict but more importantly 
on the context and relationships between the actors involved. Conflict transformation is 
suited to post-conflict peace efforts as it is not driven by concerns simply to “solve” or 
“fix” undesired disputes but actually provides the ground to build something desired 
based on sufficient consensus, on learning.  
 
Debate exists as to whether conflict transformation is a distinct field or approach (Botes 
2003; C. Mitchell 2002; Ryan 2007). Adding to the confusion is the use of “conflict 
management”, “conflict resolution” and “conflict transformation” interchangeably 
sometimes by academics and practitioners when referring to similar strategies. There is 
no doubt that conflict transformation has emerged out of decades of conflict resolution 
and management practice and rests on the same tradition of theorising about conflict. As 
such there is a significant overlap between the three approaches – particularly in 
attempting to alter the political will to change behaviour – but there are a number of 
crucial contrasting elements.14  
 
Briefly, conflict management is anchored in political realism (see: Bercovitch 1984; 
Zartman 1995) and seeks to manage or contain conflict. It is the positive and constructive 
handling of difference and divergence underpinned by the notion that propensity to 
violence comes from already existing institutions and historical relationships and 
distribution of power (Bloomfield and Reilly 1998: 18; Miall 2004: 2). Conflict is 
inevitable and resolving it is not possible. Conflict management strategies attempt to 
move “zero-sum” into “non-zero sum” processes and, therefore, to end direct violence 
and enable agreement.  This is often through the identification of key leaders with 
established power to negotiate an agreement.  Conflict management tends to focus solely 
                                               
14 For a comprehensive discussion of the differences and similarities, see: Cordula Reimann, 'Assessing the 
State-of-the Art in Conflict Transformation', The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: 
Berghof Research for Constructive Conflict Management 2004). 
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on the third party with resources to exert pressure on the conflicting groups and to 
negotiate agreement. An illustration is the international nuclear and arms control treaties 
during the Cold War, which sought to ensure that the relationship between the major 
world powers did not get out of hand without addressing the underlying political issues  
(Wallensteen 2007: 4-5). More recent examples include the Sudan and Aceh peace 
accords (Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Richmond 2005: 89-96) 
 
Next is the more comprehensive approach of conflict resolution which emphasises the 
underlying causes and fundamental needs that are at the root of conflict (Burton 1990: 
31; Kelman and Cohen 1976; Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Conflict resolution, like peace 
research more generally, evolved as a critique of realism in international relations. Such 
theory developed in response to international wars that were largely “Clauswitzean 
affairs, fought out by power centres” (Miall et al. 1999: 15). In other words the conflicts 
tended to be between nation-states and were typically symmetrical in contrast to more 
recent patterns in conflicts that are internal or intrastate as well as being asymmetric, 
involve fragmented decision-making and often directed at citizens. As such this approach 
evolved from an elite-based civil society approach to a more general civil society and 
grassroots, approach (Paffenholz 2009). The aim is to develop: “processes of conflict 
resolution that appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute, and effective in resolving 
conflict” (Azar and Burton 1986: 1). This implies a goal of “ending” undesired conflicts 
in a relatively short time and focuses on the content of the particular conflict as something 
that is disputed and which gives rise to the conflict in the first place (Fetherston 2000). In 
other words, conflict resolution strategies are concerned with getting parties to reframe 
their existing positions. As Lederach (1995b: 201) argues resolution is a widely 
recognised term but “perhaps unintentionally, this term carries the connotation of a bias 
toward ‘ending’ a given crisis or at least its outward expression, without being sufficiently 
concerned with the deeper structural, cultural, and long-term relational aspects of 
conflict”. 
 
In practice, Ramsbotham et al (2011: 425) observes that in the Post-Cold war period 
conflict resolution became better know and widely invoked by aid and development 
agencies, international organisations and the media. Its increased prominence exposed it 
to raised expectations and sharp criticism. Conflict resolution has been tarred in much of 
the critical literature on the liberal peace and failed democratic efforts, unfairly in my 
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view as the liberal peace of the previous chapter is only a caricature of conflict resolution.  
However, conflict resolution theory presumes that people, particularly third parties, can 
have some control or power over violence. As a theory of modernity, it presumes that 
scholars and practitioners can understand violent conflict, have power over it, solve it, 
and that it will cease to exist. Traditional conflict resolution from above has resulted in 
several unfortunate outcomes in this regard and are limited at best and counterproductive 
at worst (Kaldor 2001).  
 
What has changed as referenced in the previous chapter and explored more fully by Ryan 
(2007: 43-45, 153-60) is recognition of the limits of top down interventionalism and at 
least a rhetorical acceptance of local culture and the need for ongoing, continuous 
processes, addressing root causes and building peace at multiple levels of society. It is 
here, Ryan argues that conflict transformation has perhaps emerged to refocus attention 
on conflict resolution basics that have been overshadowed (Ryan 2007: 154). Early 
conflict resolution practitioners believed very strongly that what was required was 
fundamental  structural changes as well as changes in relationships for  “resolutions” to 
be accepted, self-supported and durable and ultimately, sustainable (for example, 
see:Scimecca 1987).  
 
The understanding of conflict transformation preferred here comes from the Berghof 
Foundation: “a complex process of changing the relationships, attitudes, interests, 
discourses and underlying structures that encourage and condition violent political 
conflict” (Austin et al. 2011: 9). 15  At the very least this is a more holistic approach 
however some go further seeing conflict transformation as a complete conceptual 
departure from that which has come before (Curle 1990; Lederach 1995b; Rupesinghe 
1995). For Lederarch (ibid) conflict transformation moves beyond the management or 
resolution of conflict and seeks to do more than mere eliminating or controlling conflict.  
Instead, it seeks to transform the conflict’ creators through focusing on inherent 
dialectical process, transforming conflict dynamics and the relationship between the 
parties.  Or as Väyrynen (1999: 151) states, a way to create “new social relations, 
institutions, and visions”. Even those sceptical of the notion that conflict transformation 
                                               
15 There are a number of definitions of conflict transformation .Those concerned with transformative 
mediation focus solely on individuals as amplified by the work of Bush & Folger The Promise of Mediation 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994). 
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is a distinct approach – such as Mitchell (2002) – concede that what best distinguishes 
this approach from the other two is the emphasis on structures and relationships.  
A strong underlying inference in the conflict transformation literature is it resolves 
conflict resolution major deficiencies. As Vayrynen states (1991: 4):  
The bulk of conflict theory regards the issues, actors and interests as given and on that 
basis makes efforts to find a solution to mitigate or eliminate contradictions between 
them. Yet the issues, actors and interests change over time as a consequence of the social, 
economic and political dynamics of societies. 
Notter & Diamond (1996) argue that transformationists favour systemic chance and imply 
that conflict resolution cannot create the circumstances which would result in peaceful 
societies: “Transforming deep-rooted conflicts is only partly about "resolving" the issues 
of the conflict—the central issue is systemic change or transformation. Systems cannot 
be "resolved," but they can be transformed thus we use the term conflict transformation.” 
 
Others argue that conflict transformation represents conflict resolution at its deepest level 
which recognises the need for wide structural changes and relationship transformation for 
a durable solution, (C. Mitchell 2006: 15; Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 31). Conflict 
transformation as a term emerged Mitchell believes out of necessity due to the corruption 
of the conception of resolution – a term used to stand for “almost anything short of 
outright victory, defeat, and revenge as an outcome as well as for many processes 
involving overt violence (‘bombing for peace’) or covert coercion (economic sanctions 
to obtain parties’ acquiescence to a dictated settlement)…” (C. Mitchell 2002: 1).  
 
Whether it is a distinct approach or not, there is no doubt that it is holistic as evident in 
its theoretical influences. 
ii) Theoretical influences of conflict transformation  
Conflict transformation has a strong theoretical base despite its relative newness as a 
peace-building approach. Like peace studies generally it draws from many disciplines, 
including political philosophy, psychology, law, history, economics, public policy, 
international relations, governance, conflict theory and practice.  
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There are existing transformative elements in normative theories of politics from the 
founders of conflict resolution. Of particular note is the work of: Galtung on negative and 
positive peace (introduced in the introductory chapter) and group dynamics, Curle’s 
asymmetric relations theory, theories of non-violence and social transformation across 
many cultures offered by Sharp and others, Burton’s provention concept and addressing 
deficits in human needs,  Azar’s often forgotten work on the formation but also the 
transformation of protracted conflict (see for example: P. Ackerman and DuVall 2000; 
Azar 1990; Burton 1990; H. Clark 2000; Curle 1971, 1996; Galtung 1996; Galtung and 
Jacobsen 2000; Krippendorf 1973; Senghaas 1973; Sharp 1973; Wehr et al. 1994).  
 
Another source of influence is the extensive literature and major studies that have 
amassed on peace-building since the 1990s (J. Chopra 1998; Cousens and Kumar 2001; 
Jeong 2005, among many others). The critical literature explored in the previous chapter 
– while focused specifically on liberal peace-building – also shows many commonalities 
with the approach of conflict transformation. Some of this literature is suggestive of 
transformative elements including the Habermasian inspired emphasis on unscripted 
conversations and recognising diverse forms of community (Pugh et al. 2008), 
empowering locals, global solidarity and transforming the global order (Duffield 2007; 
Pugh et al. 2008). In this vein conflict transformation moves away from “universalist 
panaceas”. As Richmond explains “peace” is a method and a process as opposed to a final 
end state. Indeed, the acceptance of difference is a method of peace and processes 
whereby agency is afforded to those crucial groups in society to develop their voices,  
ideas and identities (Richmond 2008: 147) 
 
Much of this stretches towards to a cosmopolitan recognition of shared humanity and 
exposure to what Beck terms “otherness” (Beck 2006). Related to this is of course the 
impact of globalization – both positive and negative – including in resistance to its effects, 
globalization from below, international community and the responsibility to protect, 
international human rights, rise of intrastate conflict, global drivers of conflict such as 
environmental or systems of politico-economic networks  that transcend state boundaries. 
One theme characterising the conflict transformation literature is the call for 
cosmopolitan or peaceful global civic society building (E. Boulding 1990; Kaldor and 
Luckham 2001). 
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Lastly, conflict transformation has distanced itself from empirical approaches favouring 
normative and critical thought. This is not to say that there have not been valuable 
contributions to knowledge from the scientific approach. However, transformations with 
intangible and temporal elements are difficult to measure and, therefore, this approach 
instead favours narrative explanation or the role of storytelling. 
iii)  Key features of conflict transformation  
Thus far a number of key features of conflict transformation are detectable. The key 
features of conflict transformation are actions that attempt to change the various 
characteristics and manifestations of conflict by looking at the underlying causes across 
a long timeframe with the aim to transform negative practices of addressing conflict into 
positive and constructive ones. This concerns dealing with the structural, behavioural and 
attitudinal aspects of conflict (Austin et al. 2011: 13; Fischer and Ropers 2004). 
 
In order to provide greater clarity in this explanation of conflict transformation, adding to 
this definition is the expansion of several important aspects.  They first are why conflict 
transformation is preferred; the second is how it works in practice and lastly who 
transforms conflict.  
Why conflict transformation?  
Far from merely being the in-vogue catch phrase of conflict theorists, conflict 
transformation is a response to the changing nature of conflict in international relations, 
particularly over the last twenty-five years. Contemporary conflicts are often protracted, 
moving in and out of violence regularly. These changes, Miall argues, has required 
continual adjustment of conflict theory (2004: 1). Bell-shaped or cyclical models of 
conflict phases are not useful here. These conflicts warp the societies, economies and 
regions in which they are centred. They contain a mixture of violent actions and non-
violent oppression and inequality. Such complexities stand in stark contrast to the 
relatively simple configurations assumed by conventional theories of conflict resolution, 
such as those which advocate win-win outcomes in simple two-party contests.  
Burton and Azar’s early work (1986) on the then newly emerging conflicts focused on 
the intercommunal dimension of intractable conflict and relations between identity 
groups. Such conflicts, they argued, are due to unfulfilled, underlying societal and 
86 
 
universal human needs such as security, identity, equality, recognition and autonomy. 
These are deep rooted problems meaning that the conflict has created patterns that are 
part of the social system. When the humanitarian emergency or the like is under control, 
they questioned what strategies should be employed. Not being traditional interstate wars 
means there is no simple return to the status quo of mutual respect for territory. Peace 
thinking has had to adapt to address groups continuing to live together after violence 
between them had ceased. Deep rooted problems, therefore, need deep rooted changes 
(Leatherman et al. 1999: 50; Lederach 2003; Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 9). And as social 
conflicts it is likely that social change mechanisms must inform the solution. Van der 
Merwe noted in 1989 that the term “conflict resolution” could not encompass situations 
of gross injustice and inequalities built into the social and political system in relation to 
South Africa, as is also the case with the fundamental social problems of many deep 
rooted conflicts.  
The conflict transformation approach is appropriate for situations where conflicting 
parties have a real relationship; they share an extensive past and probably will have an 
extensive future relationship. There is a clear link between transformations and causes of 
conflict, therefore, is seems appropriate to look at further transformation in the post-
conflict pause. As Väyrynen (1991) argued “as a matter of fact, many intractable conflicts 
of interests or values may find their solution only through the process of transformation” 
(p.4). Conflict transformation scholars use terms like “transcendence” (Galtung 1996), 
getting to the “epicentre” (Lederach 2003: 31) (p31) in order to address the limitations of 
other approaches in the a high number of conflicts re-emerging in places that were 
supposedly resolved (Call and Cousens 2008).  Such deep changes necessitate addressing 
the structural and cultural background to the conflict. This means that it is not just the 
conflict dispute – or the “presenting window” in Lederach’s terminology (2003 pp 48) 
but the entire process and the impact on parties, relationships and institutions which are 
fundamental. Social change is the aim of conflict resolution, not just the immediate issues 
which may simply transfer the conflict into non-violent but equally unjust and destructive 
ways over the long term.  
 
This brings us to the how conflict transforms. Galtung identifies creative thinking as 
“new, sui generis, usually unexpected” – something radical to jolt groups out of their 
destructive relations (Galtung 1996: 96). Rather than some kind of end-state, 
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transformation is more open-ended and indeed a continuous and never-ending process 
(Galtung 1996: 151; Väyrynen 1999). Conflict does not have a finite life. Conflict are 
instead seen as the waxing and waning of social interactions and, therefore, need to be 
transformed (Galtung 1995: 51). Transformation will take time, particularly because 
creative ideas and process will take even longer to be valued and cement (Galtung 2000: 
11; Volkan 1997: 226). Therefore pressuring divided societies to hold early elections, for 
example, can lead to disastrous results. A long term commitment may be difficult to 
sustain but seems necessary when solutions may cause further problems, and without 
which there may be incomplete reconciliation.  
How does conflict transformation occur? 
A simplistic explanation as to how conflict transformation works in practice is that the 
conflict itself is transformed denoting some kind of sequence of necessary transitional 
steps which not only removes the situational elements behind the conflict but necessitates 
transformation of the conflict groups’ attitudes and relationship s. The “what” part of this 
equation is more difficult to explain due to the fact that conflicts, as Mitchell (2002), 
Väyrynen (1991: 4) and Ramsbotham et al (2011: 26) point out, are inherently dynamic 
phenomena.  
 
In addressing what is being transformed Lederach emphasises both the need for personal 
and relationship change, away from destructive interaction patterns and change towards 
justice, equality and non-violent conflict resolution in the overall social system. Lederach 
(1998) adds these overarching aims: the social-psychological (issues regarding identity, 
self-esteem, emotion, trauma and grief); the socioeconomic (providing financial aid, 
retraining, employment and development); the social-political (matters pertaining to 
demobilisation, disarmament, troop integration, and professionalisation); and the spiritual 
(concerns about healing, forgiveness, and mutual acknowledgement). This approach 
provides for the how of transformation and helps theorists and those in the field to come 
to terms with the need to address post-conflict peace-building in a more holistic manner. 
 
All these activities are part of a wider search for relational reconciliation through which 
relationships must be restored. Perhaps the most clearly articulated explanations of what 
is being transformed, as touched on in the introductory chapter, is Väyrynen’s (1991). 
Conflict transformation involves four dimensions – the structure of inter-group relations, 
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actors, rules and issues.  The first is actor transformation, either through changes in 
existing groups or the introduction of new ones. The second – issue transformation – 
manifests in changes to the relative importance of conflict issues particularly 
controversial issues and fostering common interest. Next rule transformation sees the 
redefinition of norms actors are expected to follow in their relationships. And the last – 
structural transformation – where the structure of conflict is transformed by a change in 
power distribution or degree of interdependence. To this Miall (2004) has added the fifth 
dimension  of “context transformation”, meaning significant change in the surrounding 
regional or global setting. 
 
Drawing on Väyrynen’s categories the transformation approach, therefore, assumes that 
changes in most if not all of these dimensions will be necessary post-conflict – to be 
“successful” – not simply the absence of violence, or establishing the shell of democratic 
structures or resolving the immediate conflict dispute. These ties back to the idea of 
positive peace through increasing justice in direct interaction and social structures 
(Berghof Foundation 1999-2014; Lederach 2003: 4).  
 
Kriesberg (1989: 337) summarises the how seemingly intractable conflicts move to 
tractability:  
Such movement arises from changes in the relationship between adversaries, from 
changes within one of the major adversaries, and from changes in the struggle’s external 
context. Often elements from two or three of these sources converge and combine 
together to form ways out of the conflict. The process that brings about the transformation 
of an intractable conflict into a tractable one entails the interaction between a set of 
changing conditions and of new policies, both long-term and short. 
While this may seem vague, it is honest. As Väyrynen cautions while transformation is 
better suited to situations of complex conflict than resolution, it is indeterminate, and the 
consequences can be hard to predict. There will be a number of incremental 
transformations which change the conflict in positive but possibly also less positive ways. 
Sometimes changes happen unintentionally as a by-product of broader changes that 
parties within the conflict neither planned nor could avoid but to which they had to adjust. 
The focus, therefore, must be on social transformation so that the mitigation of violence 
is not lost in what he calls the “normative approach” focusing on the improvement of 
society – as is the accusation levelled against the liberal peace  (Väyrynen 1999).  
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Another unknown is the time factor. Conceptual shifts and learning will take time – just 
as Fisher (2000: 13) argues valuing life and prosperity over what glory, power, and 
honour did in the western experience. Whilst there is no agreed upon minimum period for 
sustainability, most policy makers and researchers share a sense that it takes at least 
decades for peace to take hold and a further few generations for conflict to truly transform 
(Lederach 1995a, 1997). Sometimes only in retrospect can transformational change in 
relationships between groups be recognised. After the fact, it may be easy to identify the 
factors leading up to the change but at the time, as Gladwell (2000: 12) explains, the 
tipping point is: “the moment of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling point.” 
Who does conflict transformation?   
The transformation approach operates at multiple levels. A notable change in the conflict 
literature is the move from seeing intervention as the primary responsibility of external 
agencies towards appreciating the many different actors and levels (not just elites) 
involved in conflict transformation. And particularly the role of internal third parties or 
indigenous peacemakers (Crocker et al. 2007; Lund 2001; van Tongeren et al. 2005).  
The “who” therefore is a mix of transformative leadership as well as transformation work 
directed at the wider community. As Spies (2006: 3) and Miall (2004) have summarised, 
the value of outsider assistance in cases of deep-rooted and protracted conflicts – while 
undisputed – cannot inhibit the extent to which people own the design and outcome of 
transformation processes from inception determine the likelihood of sustainability of 
those efforts.  
Related to this is another key feature in terms of procedural elements – that of 
empowerment. Empowerment of individuals, groups and organizations to negotiate new 
relationships and structures for their post-conflict society validates and provides space for 
involvement in conflict transformation (Francis 1994; Lederach 1995b: 212). Adversarial 
relations are primarily transformed through interaction between adversaries. This is 
supported by  much Schwerin’s (1995) definition of “empowerment” which reiterates the 
basic components of transformational theory, referring to both direct as well as indirect 
ways to personal, relational and systemic change such as knowledge and skills, self-
esteem, self-efficacy, political awareness, rights and responsibilities, social participation, 
and access to psychological, social and material resources.  
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Traditional third party involvement, therefore, is directed at supporting internal actors and 
coordinating external peace efforts. International assistance particularly intervention may 
have been needed to transform the conflict. In the post-conflict pause, outside actors often 
play vital roles in supporting peace agreements through implementation assistance and 
monitoring, as well as stopping the flow of military or other support to one or more of the 
parties making the continuation or renewal of fighting more difficult.  
 
Lederach (1995a) believes an infrastructure for establishing peace is needed. This helps 
to legitimise the process but also draws together multiple levels of the population. Three 
levels that need to be impacted (Lederach 1998). The top-level elite leadership concerns 
the fewest people, perhaps just a handful of key actors. On the other hand, the grassroots 
level represents the greatest number of people and the population at large. Lederach’s 
(1997) framework differs significantly from other approaches because it includes the 
grassroots level and argues for a bottom-up approach. It is, however, the middle range 
which holds the potential for sustaining, in this case, the pacification of the Leviathan 
because while “important ideas and practical efforts do emerge” from the grassroots, for 
many people conflict resolution is “an unaffordable luxury” (51). And although 
politicians may decide for “the people”, acting on behalf of or in spite of them, even the 
most powerful warlords or groups leaders need popular support. It makes no sense to 
think of a return to any kind of peace simply in terms of the apex of the pyramid.  
III. MOVING BEYOND THE STATUS QUO: ADDRESSING THE UTOPIAN 
PERCEPTION OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION THEORY 
No approach to something as multi-facet and difficult as conflict will be without thorny 
issue, dilemmas and challenges. Multiple perspectives and analysis and possible 
intervention integrated into long-term peace processes tend to be time consuming,  non-
linear and fitful. Positive transformation of conflict through “people power” and the peace 
process in Northern Ireland and South Africa are often swamped by the challenges of 
Bosnia and Rwanda – but as Mitchell (2011) reminds positive transformations do 
undoubtedly take place and obstacles are overcome. 
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The challenges are indeed numerous. Conflict transformation will not happen smoothly 
or simultaneously for all parties in conflict. One side may be more receptive to peace 
while others or subgroups may prefer to hold out for better arrangements, and still others 
favour mutual accommodation. Conflict transformation challenges the status quo and, 
therefore, may be unsettling and indeed provoke a backlash from those groups in society 
who may be disempowered or stand to lose – having a vested interest in the status quo. 
In addition, conflict transformation is always multi-dimensional and occurs in different 
degrees among different parties. It is accepted that notions of a harmony of interests are 
difficult and related to this – letting go of the past may be difficult and needs to be 
carefully addressed. For all these reasons, scholars emphasis that transformations often 
advance in positive fashion and then fall back before advancing again (S. Fisher and 
Zimina 2009; Lederach and Appelby 2010). 
 
Popper (1961) warning against the tyrannical elements in some transformative 
approaches and to value incremental change. In post-conflict contexts, this does not mean 
that previous warring parties must suddenly embrace each other but rather that issues can 
be resolved through compromise, common sense, imagination and commitment to justice. 
The reality may be there is no one adequate peace strategy but rather a number of 
difference ones that will depend on the constraints and opportunities that exist in each 
place.  
 
Many challenges exist including navigating between local and global dynamics and 
finding ways to address and encourage exchange between a much wider range of actors. 
There are some obvious competing pressures when external intervention assistance is 
required with local empowerment. Particularly if ignoring the unattractive aspects of local 
cultures lead to ethno-nationalism and the possibility of deepening group identities. There 
are also the large number of dimensions of the experience of violent conflict and a wide 
range of possible approaches which could contribute to the rebuilding of relationships, 
communities and polities. Being self-critical in addressing the past is no small task. 
Tensions could obviously arise if dialogue focuses too heavily on relations without 
balancing this structural change towards imaging a future.  
 
It is not about fixing or resolving, but supporting and implementing workable structures 
in some areas so that people in paused-conflict states can negotiate governance 
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arrangements of their own choosing, not simply react to fear for their future. A clear 
shared sovereignty framework with consent for international referees will assist in this 
regard, as part of the international social contract. 
 
If, as it is argued here, conflict is the result of particular social structures and institutions 
favouring a dominant group: “we cannot hope to remove or alleviate those causes without 
altering those structures” and changing the relationships (Sluka 1992: 31). As is noted 
above a criticism of conflict transformation approach is that it exaggerates the differences 
between it and others approaches.  I have chosen to focus mainly on an interpretation of 
conflict transformation for its distance from connotations of “resolution” and 
“management” which suggest normative solutions and other conceptual pitfalls such as 
an emphasis on containment and control. And the notion of “transformation” fittingly 
conveys the role and dynamics of social conflict, moving as it does through phases of 
transforming relationships and social organising.  
 
The point is that there is no rapid fix to overcome war and violence, understanding why 
conflict transformation is so hard is the basic first step which forms the bulk of this thesis. 
Here in lies the main criticism of the conflict transformation approach. It is simply that it 
needs further development as to how change occurs (C. Mitchell 2002). It is the aim of 
this research to investigate the evidence of a small part of that. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no singular model of conflict transformation because conflict is by its very nature 
dynamic, unstable, context specific, etc. What is clear however is that semantic shift is 
necessary – from “resolution” to engaging with and transforming relationships, interests, 
discourses and the culture of the society that supports the continuation of violent or 
destructive conflict. How it occurs is far from prescribed but there are a number of 
common themes. The most significant of which include: innovative thinking, an emphasis 
on deep and wide-ranging change, understanding conflict as dynamic and potentially an 
agent of positive change, a focus on empowerment and sensitivity to local culture, an 
awareness that long term processes where quick fixes are not appropriate, an emphasis on 
working at all levels of society and on processes of self-reflection by both insiders or 
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outsiders.  Complementary roles can be played in a long term process of rebuilding by a 
range of actors: those within the conflicting groups, within the wider society, and outside 
assistance. Transformation is about ongoing support, not simply mediation and peace 
agreements. It is about gradual transformation through a series of changes and a range of 
actors playing important roles (Rupesinghe 1995, 1998).   
 
Conflict transformation cannot be easily dismissed as semantics or as utopian. But neither 
is transformation precise or clear approach. There is no one single strategy as is more 
clearly reduced in the liberal internationalist paradigm. What counts as transformation 
will vary in different contexts. For this reason, some have called for precision to be added.  
 
We begin this task by turning to groupism and the transformation of actors in the conflict. 
The following chapter will untangle primordial explanations for human violence to be 
able to come to a balanced discussion on how humans also cooperate and manage multiple 
and overlapping identities. Unfortunately, the phenomenon of groupism in conflict 
creates ‘us’ and ‘them’. The perception of shared interests, of commonality, or security 
may contribute towards the generation of alternative identities that may reduce the 
ethnicity’s salience and reorientate larger groups around governance.  
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4: Groupism  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Before the rise of liberal internationalism, it was assumed that understanding human 
nature’s unconscious and destructive tendencies could afford a unique and privileged 
position from which to understand resolves conflict. In the early 20th century, Einstein 
and Freud, for example, were asked whether human nature made war inevitable (see also 
Freud 1933).16Governments and insurgents, France and Germany, Protestants and 
Catholics, the bourgeois and the aristocracy, Israelis and Palestinians, Indians and 
Pakistanis, whites and blacks,  employers and employees, Muslims and Christians, are all 
examples of groups waging seemingly intractable conflict. Sometimes the result of these 
conflicts were genocide, mass murder, war, conquest, slavery, apartheid, exploitation. 
However rather than solely being “killer apes” (Dart 1953), it is argued here that a less 
sensational explanation of human nature is correct – humans are capable of inconceivable 
violence and genetic aggression but also incredible sociability and cooperation. 
Cooperative interaction amongst individuals has been a big part of human survival.  
 
Intergroup (e.g., racial, ethnic, or religious) conflict occurs when opponents have a sense 
of collective identity about themselves and their adversary. As Kreisberg (Kriesberg 
2003b) describes – where each side believes the fight is between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Excessive identification with a particular group can lead to intergroup conflict. But 
identity is a social construct maintained for social or political reasons. These boundaries 
can be transcended.  
 
Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the belief in the intractability of ethnic 
conflict has strengthened primordial explanations for human behaviour, rather than 
addressing the collective fears for the future, societal madness and human needs which 
sustain them. Institutional theorists have also struggled to governance strategies that are 
                                               
16 The Why War Letters were a public exchange on the origins of war and human aggression between Albert 
Einstein and Freud and were written at the behest of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation 
(a committee of the League of Nations).   
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flexible and moderating influences. The power-sharing literature stemming from Lijphart 
(1977, 1985, 1990, 1999, 2002) and Horowitz (1985, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2005) is 
particularly problematic in addressing groupism in paused-conflict governance. As top-
down containment approaches, in practice they have reinforced division because as 
emphasised in the preceding chapter, alternative learning has not developed.    
II. THE MYTH OF HUMAN NATURE 
The literature on war and conflict is immense. For the purposes of this research, the 
dimension that underpins all other angles from which war can be approached (historical, 
economic, ideological, ethical, political, etc.), is human nature.  There is no doubt that 
the history of humanity is one of extraordinary violence, but the question is why? The 
idea that human behaviour is inevitable has at times dominated discourse to such an 
extent, that game theorists once promoted a non-cooperative angle, based on the 
perceived wisdom of biology at the time. There are broadly two polar opposite schools of 
thought on the relationship between war (or violent conflict) and human nature. One 
views human nature as “man the hunter” or “demonic males” and the other as “nobel 
savages” or “peaceful societies”.    
 
The idea that war stems from “instinct” or “innate” or “biological” drive has a long and 
controversial history. Despite a veneer of civility,  war or violence is seen as distinctly 
human. In other words, it has been bred in. Scientist Raymond Dart (1953) for example 
believes that humans are at the bottom “killer apes”.17  With the development of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution and discoveries of apelike human ancestors in Africa a long line of 
theory spawned, often inferring behaviours and basic moral underpinnings. Dart 
originally saw early hominids as gentle fruit eaters who hunted small game and birds’ 
eggs to supplement their diet.  He changed his mind however after interpreting animal 
bones as primate weapons and holes found in ancient skulls as being caused by weapon-
                                               
17 This theme can be seen in William Golding’s Lord of the Flies. American anthropologist S. L. 
Washburns’s edited volume Man the Hunter related human hunting to human morality, and was popularised 
in playwright Robert Ardrey’s books on human origins and behaviour, the first of which argues that 
mankind’s very success as a species has been largely dependent on its ability to kill, see: African Genesis: 
A Personal Investigation into the Animal Origins and Nature of Man (New York; Macmillan Publishing 
Co, 1961).  
97 
 
wielding fellow hominids. He became convinced that they were armed big game hunters 
who killed their own kind and feasted on one another’s flesh. Early humans were (Dart 
1953: 209): 
confirmed killers: carnivorous creatures that seized living quarries by violence, battered 
them to death, tore apart their broken bodies, dismembered them limb from limb, shaking 
their ravenous thirst with the hot blood of victims and greedily devouring livid writhing 
flesh. The loathsome cruelty of mankind to man . . . is explicable only in terms of man’s 
carnivorous and cannibalistic origin . . . the world-wide scalping, head-hunting, body-
mutilating and necrophilia practices of mankind in proclaiming this common bloodlust 
differentiator, this predaceous habit, this mark of Cain that separates man dietetically 
from his anthropoidal relatives and allies him rather with the deadliest of Carnivora.  
 
Cartmill (1996) links Dart’s vision of human morality to early Greek and Christian views 
where the depravity of human nature is related to notions of original sin. Equally, Dart’s 
evidence for “man the hunter” was weak. On closer examination, his particular vision of 
the human hunter-killer hypothesis was dispelled by his protégé Brain (1981). Brain 
realised that bones associated with man-apes were exactly like those left by leopards and 
hyenas. The round holes and dents in the fossil skulls matched perfectly with leopard 
fangs and with impressions of rocks pressing against the buried fossils. It seems likely 
that hominids were the hunted – living in fear of big cats – and not hunters.  
 
Evidence of earlier, lethal, human violence is, therefore, ambiguous at best. Despite this 
the legacy of the dark and pessimistic view of humankind can be seen even today in 
Wrangham and Peterson’s (1996; Wrangham 1999) controversial but popular 
contributions to the field: “chimpanzee-like violence preceded and  paved the way for 
human war, making modern humans the dazed survivors of a continuous, 5-million-year 
habit of lethal aggression” (Wrangham and Peterson: 63). From field observations on 
conspecific killing among wild chimpanzees, they hypothesise that because chimpanzees 
often kill for no discernible short-term gain and assuming that longer-term payoffs are 
opaque to the animals involved, they must instead be motivated by an innate “dominance 
drive” (Wrangham and Peterson 1996: 182-99; Wrangham 1999: 14-22). Male 
chimpanzees – and by extension human males – seek out low-cost opportunities to kill –  
a strategy that returns net evolutionary benefits in the long term (not immediate payoffs) 
like mating opportunities, food and other resources (Wrangham 1999: 15-16). Such 
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findings of violence among our ancestors and primate cousins have perpetuated what 
anthropologist Sussman calls “the 5 o’clock news” view of human nature (Whipps 2006). 
Just as the daily news’ shows follow the dictum, “if it bleeds, it leads”, so many accounts 
of human behaviour emphasise conflict.  
 
Among the various challenges to Wrangham’s work, Browning’s (1998) reconstructive 
case study of the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 who participated in the Nazis’ Final 
Solution in Poland provides concrete human (not chimpanzee) evidence against innate 
drives. The approximately five hundred mainly middle-aged, working class German men 
–  “ordinary men” as Browning calls them –were tasked with perpetrating horrific acts of 
violence. In this case the massacre of 38,000 Jews and deportation of a further 45,000 to 
extermination camps. This was coupled with low-cost opportunities to kill. Following 
Wrangham, eager participation should have been the outcome. Incentives to participate 
included the anticipation of career advancement after the war and at the same time there 
were no discernible costs as the Jews were Polish and therefore not compatriots. Also, 
these men mainly came from the most philo-Semitic parts of Germany and had been 
immersed in a deluge of racist and anti-Semitic propaganda designating Jews as a moral 
threat to Germany. This indoctrination characterised their training and was ongoing 
(Browning 1998: 184). As armed agents, they were also not at threat from personal injury 
from their unarmed targets.   
 
There was a group who were increasingly “enthusiastic killers” – volunteering to hunt 
Jews and pull the trigger in firing squads. However, the study reveals that others actively 
avoided killing. While most of the remainder did not take up opportunities to kill, even in 
some cases disobeyed orders when they were not being monitored (Browning 1998: 168, 
84). Browning notes that: “almost all of them – a least initially – were horrified and 
disgusted by what they were doing” (Ibid, 184) and following the first massacre a “sense 
of shame and horror… pervaded the barracks” (Ibid, 69).18 Browning’s work draws on 
the Milgram experiments, showing that aside from the enthusiastic few, killers were not 
ideologically (or biologically) motivated. Social pressures – the fear of ridiculed or 
                                               
18 In Browning’s 1998 edition (the first being published in 1991) he provides a plethora of evidence from 
pre-1945 echoing these same feelings including from Himmler himself who ordered those no longer  able 
to take the psychological stresses to report to their superior officer. See: Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, and 
Volker Riess (eds.), “The Good Old Days”: The Holocaust as Seen by Its Perpetrators and Bystanders 
(New York: Free Press, 1988) at 82.  
99 
 
punishment – were sufficient to induce human beings, in general, to join in the slaughter.  
In that respect, it is “normal” or part of human nature to go along with killing, but not 
some innate dominance drive.  
 
In contrast to Dart and Wrangham, Hart and Sussman (2005) represent the opposed view 
contending humans are naturally not killers since our ancestors were hunted not hunters. 
This follows Rousseau’s description of first humans in his Discourse on the Origins of 
Inequality Among Men (1754) as “noble savages” who lived in a golden age that 
“mankind was formed ever to remain in”. Conflict occurred when humans organised 
themselves in societies with unnatural laws (private property and monogamy for 
example).19  The American sociologist Sumner, appears to have been one of the first to 
adopt the Rousseauan view, writing in 1911 that: ‘primitive man “might be described as 
a peaceful animal” who “dreads” war’ (cited in Keeley 1996: 8).  In spite of the 
presumption that most societies were peaceful in the past, anthropologists have had 
difficulty finding ethnographically known peaceful people.20 There are relatively few 
examples of internally peaceful societies that are also non-warring: the !Kung Bushman 
who live in the boundary area of Botswana and Namibia, the Copper and the Ingalik 
Eskimo, the Gehusi of lowland New Guinea, the Semang of peninsular Malaysia among 
others (Fry 2007; Fry et al. 2008; LeBlanc 2003).21  
 
 
                                               
19 Rousseau’s ideas where challenged at the time by empirical evidence from those who encountered native 
peoples round the world. In one such instance, for example, the aboriginal Tasmanians – who at that time 
had had no known contact with others – meet a group of unarmed French emissaries and attacked them. 
Such encounters strengthened the view that Rousseau’s belief in “noble savages” was naïve. The English 
social psychologist March promoted the Rousseauan stance in relation to the Dani of New Guinea, the 
typical warrior people in his view. See: He concludes that it is misleading to talk of “warfare” among these 
warriors because the battles are not akin to warfare associated with the struggle for survival in a world of 
scarcity and need.  
20 Without good evidence in low-density nomadic populations, it cannot be inferred that warfare was absent 
in Palaeolithic populations. The reverse is also true – there is no evidence that warfare was ubiquitous and 
inevitable. However the body of evidence for warfare before the onset of agriculture and the associated 
patterns of sedentism and surplus production is small but undeniable, and generally seems characterised by 
some degree of residential stability. See: Jonathan Haas, 'Warfare and the Evolution of Culture', in Gary M 
Feinman and Theron Douglas Price (eds.), Archaeology at the Millennium: A Sourcebook (New York: 
Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001), 329-50. 
21 The Peaceful Societies project lists 25 (inducing the Amish) on strict criteria and acknowledges that there 
are incidences of violence, such as homicide, among some of those selected. See 
http://www.peacefulsocieties.org (last accessed August 2010).  
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i)     Middle ground 
Unlike Rousseau’s “noble savage”, Hobbes’ (1651) addressed the question of the “state 
of nature” and came to a different conclusion. All human beings desire what is good for 
them, and aspire to peace so long as it is in the interests of the individual. But if danger is 
perceived then it is reasonable to adopt any means to secure self-preservation – what 
Locke terms the “rights of nature”. If these rights are enforced, the “state of nature” means 
life will inevitably be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. A stable society requires 
individuals to give up the rights of nature and to invest in decision-making in a sovereign 
group (or individual) able to act for the long-term good. War, in Hobbes’ conception, is 
a social condition that can only be controlled or averted through covenants.  
 
For Rousseau on one hand, humans are by nature non-violent but are led to violence by 
unnatural social constraints. For Hobbes, man has the natural capacity for violence but is 
constrained by social convention and strong leadership. Researchers have concluded from 
the on-again, off-again pattern of warfare that the notion that war is an inevitable 
consequence of human nature is incorrect.  
 
Ethnographer Malinowski wrote in 1941 that: “anthropology has done more harm than 
good in confusing the issue by… depicting human ancestry as living in a golden age of 
perpetual peace” (cited in Keeley 1996: 8). The Rousseauan camp has been seriously 
discredited by data-based studies including ethnographies of hunter-gatherer societies 
(Ember 1978; Keeley 1996; Wrangham and Peterson 1996). Independent groups, with 
the lack of exposure to external constraints, had adult male mortality rates of between 20 
to 30 percent (Wrangham and Peterson 1996: 77). As anthropologist Keeley points out,  
while the more recent the large-scale battles of the 20th century may not mirror those of 
the more primitive cultures,  primitive warfare can be openly ferocious22 and more deadly 
in a quantitative sense (the loss of 20 out of two to three hundred annually being 
substantial) than subscribers of the Rousseauan view hold it to be. While contact with 
Western civilisations has most likely made some socieites more warlike and violent, 
                                               
22 A raiding-technique example Keeley gives, which is common to groups as varied as the Bering Straits 
Eskimo and the Mae Enga of New Guinea, is to quietly surround enemy houses before dawn and slaughter 
the sleeping occupants by thrusting spears through the thin walls, firing arrows through the doorways and 
smoke holes, or firing directly at the occupants as they emerge from the structure after setting it on fire. 
See: Lawrence Keeley, War before Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 65. 
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Keeley’s (1996: 174) study refutes any notion that pre-state, tribal people did not engage 
in violent warfare: 
The facts recovered by ethnographers and archaeologists indicate unequivocally that 
primitive and prehistoric warfare was just as terrible and effective as the historic and civilised 
versions. War is hell whether it is fought with wooden spears or napalm. 
 
The point is that if war is as deeply rooted in our biology as the demonic apes’ camp 
suggest, then it would be there all the time (Haas 2001). War – defined as armed conflict 
resulting in 1,000 plus deaths per year – has infrequently occurred  between states since 
World War II and civil wars declined sharply after peaking in the early 1990s. Conflicts 
today mainly consist of guerilla wars, insurgencies, and terrorism which Mueller (2004) 
calls the “remnants of war.” He rejects biological explanations for the trend, noting that 
“testosterone levels seem to be as high as ever” (Mueller 2009: 313). While he 
acknowledges that many political scientists still consider war to be “an inevitable part of 
international and domestic life,” Mueller firmly states that “a continuing decline in war 
does seem to be an entirely reasonable prospect” (Ibid, 319). The emergence of prehistoric 
warfare is linked to growing population density, diminished food sources and the 
separation of people into culturally distinct groups. After the creation of “us” and “them”, 
violence became a complex response to environmental problems. Interesting the word 
“host” means both a warlike group and a person who receives another graciously. Both 
word senses have a common deviation. When did the stranger become the enemy? 
However, groups that are at war in one generation are at peace in the next. For instance, 
Vikings during the Middle Ages contrasting with their peaceful Scandinavian 
descendants or the militaristic, aggressive early 20th century nations of Germany and 
Japan who embraced pacifism, albeit after catastrophic defeats. The same group dynamics 
– cohesion and solidarity – which historically benefited victorious communities in 
presenting a united front against an enemy, have parallels in non-violent examples such 
as sports games and trade rules.  
 
Neither end of the spectrum assists in understanding paused-conflict governance and 
group dynamics in isolation, but a middle ground provides answers.  Smith (2007) makes 
a compelling case that while Homo sapiens is indeed far and away “the most dangerous 
animal”, it also endowed with a deep aversion to killing. Humans are capable of 
inconceivable violence and genetic aggression but also incredible sociability and 
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cooperation.  As biologist Bigelow (1969: 3) remarked: “We are without doubt the most 
cooperative and the most ferocious animals that ever inhabited the earth.” Humans, and 
most primates have a tendency to be hostile to non-group members, but it is 
nurture/environment, not nature/biology, which determines the level of aggression 
displayed by individuals (de Waal 1989).23 Also, as de Waal was able to prove through 
studying human’s closest relatives, fostering interdependence between monkeys and apes 
prompted cooperation.24  Fry adds (2007: xi, 2): “violent chimps and baboons can 
reconcile after fights, have cooperative, altruistic relationships” and humans “have a 
substantial capacity for dealing with conflicts non-violently”.   
 
Cooperative behaviour in humans can be seen throughout history.  Biology explains this 
through kin altruism and repeated interaction which applies to nonhuman species as well 
as humans.  However, there are also capacities that are much more highly developed in 
humans (unique even) which account for the scale and the range of cooperative activities. 
Human cognitive, linguistic and physical capacities are identified as allowing the norms 
of social conduct to form and social instiutions to regulate these,  the psychological 
capacity to internalise these norms regardless of the motivations such as self- or group-
interest (Johnson et al. 2003)   (Bowles and Gintis 2003). 
 
Smith’s thesis is that war has been part of human history, in one form or other, since 
prehistoric times. However where he departs from Dart is in proposing that humans have 
an innate ambivalence about war (2007: xiv): This is as long-standing as the converse and 
is especially popular among military scholars (Dyer 1985; Montagu 1976; Tinbergen 
1968). War is not “inhuman” or “animal like” but has been “normal” and has been 
“expectable” for thousands, perhaps millions, of years. War is also “idiocy” in that “war 
is grotesque” (D. L. Smith 2007: 6-7). What in human nature makes us resort to war? 
Smith argues that war benefited our ancestors (as victors), and this is why the disposition 
to war lives on in us. However, he does not think it is inevitable (Ibid, 27). Le Blanc 
(2007) agrees recent advances in biology which reveal that there aggressive and 
competative behaviour can be an example by primary genetic components. There are no 
                                               
23 For example, de Waal found in the case of the ordinarily “incorrigibly” aggressive rehesus monkeys, they 
grew up to be kinder and gentler when raised by mild-manner, stump-tail monkeys. He has also reduced 
conflict among monkeys and apes by increasing their interdependence —forcing them to cooperate to 
obtain food— and ensuring their equal access to food. 
24 His studies of the bonobos (pan paniscus chimpanzees)   
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such genetic components leading to cooperative behaviour. Dawkins (1976) argued in the 
1970s that genes were “selfish” which explained altruism at the individual level in nature. 
More recent studies suggest a genetic effect on prosocial behaviours, especially on 
altruism. 
ii)       Ordinary men and women 
From those who have had first hand experience of the worst of humanity come similar 
thoughts. Auschwitz survivor, Levi, rejected the idea that his Nazi oppressors were 
specially chosen monsters – some subspecies of human more prone to atavistic tendencies 
than others. He refused to accept the assumption of original sin. At the conclusion of The 
Drowned and the Saved (Levi 1989: 202) Levi indicates that he has been repeatedly asked 
what his “torturers” were like – his answer:  
The term torturer alludes to our ex-guardians, the SS, and is in my opinion inappropriate: it 
brings to mind twisted individuals, ill-born, sadists, afflicted by the original flaw. Instead, 
they were made of the same cloth as we, they were average human brings, averagely 
intelligent, averagely wicked: save the exceptions, they were not monsters, they had our face, 
but they had been reared badly. 
 
The Enlightenment faith in education as “inoculation” against savagery was strong prior 
to WWII; many were challenged by the persecution in Nazi Germany. Wiesel (1994: 27) 
states in his memoirs: 
The truth is that, in spite of everything we knew about Nazi Germany, we had an inexplicable 
confidence in German culture and humanism. We kept telling ourselves that this was, after 
all, a civilised people, that we must not give credence to exaggerated rumours about its army’s 
behaviour.  
Such examples serve as a warning against complacency. In Elias’ writing on German 
violence towards groups conquered they conquered in the East during WWII (i.e., Jews, 
Slavs and others), he sees the direct impact being worldwide revulsion by the mass Nazi-
led slaughter. The shock was greater still; he contend, precisely because the people 
believed that such acts of barbarity were, for Europeans, a thing of the past. Europeans 
assumed they were more “civilised” and “morally better” as part of their “nature”. Yet 
this was perhaps partly an illusion, a social-Darwinist pride in being less “savage” than 
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their ancestors and those in the developing world – but this had not been seriously 
investigated. The Nazi episode served as a reminder that: 
…  restraints against violence are not symptoms of superiority of the nature of “civilised” 
nations, not eternal characteristics of their racial or ethnic make-up, but aspects of a specific 
type of social development which has resulted in more differentiated and stable social control 
of the means of violence and… a corresponding type of conscience-formation. (Elias 1971: 
106-07) 
 
The international tribunal at The Hague is prosecuting war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and has documented many tales of horror from the break-up of former 
Yugoslavia. Despicable in their brutality as well as their pervasiveness during nearly three 
years of madness, these atrocities, sadly were not the work of a small number of isolated 
zealots. They were perpetrated by ordinary men and women, no different than most of us 
(Arendt 1964). Why?  
 
In “groupism” lies the answer. Gil-White (2001) has argued the human brain has a module 
for thinking about humans as groups. He gave the example of ethnic groups as sharing an 
invisible essence. Due to evolution humans are quick to categorise other “species” even 
when they look and sound the same. Smith describes this categorisation of peoples as 
“imagined communities” that hold together “mythic commonalities” which are intangible 
and impossible to define, such as blood (D. L. Smith 2007: 167).  
III.  GROUP IDENTITY 
Conflict between groups has been a popular topic long before the events of September 
11, 2001. One of the few psychoanalysts to have extensive first-hand experience in 
international relations and conflict resolution is Volkan (1997, 2004). His contribution 
serves to build a vital link between political science and psychology, providing crucial 
insights into the relationship and interplay between individual and group identity. Our 
group identities are: “the end result of an historical continuity, geographical reality, a 
myth of common beginning, and other shared events: they evolve naturally. They are 
neither bad nor good, but a natural phenomenon” (Volkan 1997: 22). Cooperative 
interaction amongst self-interested individuals has been a big part of survival, and some 
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of the strongest interpersonal bonds are formed by ties of “blood” and “ethnicity”. Feeling 
a sense of oneness with a group can motivate humans to be altruistic and self-sacrificing. 
Most people, however, see themselves as having multiple identities. Nothing could be 
more obvious than the fact that the same person could be a New Zealand citizen, of 
Chinese ancestry, vegetarian, female, heterosexual, a supporter of gay rights, without any 
contradiction.  
 
Sen (2006) emphasises that while identification with a particular group can facilitate 
within-group cooperation (see also Putnam 1995), excessive identification can lead to 
inter-group conflict. As long as groups, and the rituals that separate them are not 
“rigidified”, they function positively. However when threatened by conflict, group 
members cling stubbornly to experiences of their large group affiliations and these large 
group processes become dominant, subsuming or subjugating personal identity (Volkan 
2004: 107, 262). Huntington’s prediction of a new world order through a ‘clash of 
civilisations’ is perhaps the same “us” versus “them” reductive argument used by many 
previously including Christ in Matthew 12:30 (He who is not with Me is against Me) and 
since: Mussolini in fascist Italy (O con noi o contro di noi – You’re either with us or 
against us) and Bush on September 20 2001 (“Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists”). Put another way, the danger becomes apparent –  Deputy Governor John 
Danforth states in Arthur Miller’s The Crucible (1952: Act II): “But you must understand, 
sir, that a person is either with this court or he must be counted against it, there is no road 
between.” The “us” in our conscious choice compels us to feel solidarity with a group, 
sometimes without but sometimes with, a strong notion of an outside group: “them.” 
Thus, while groups promote the creation of “social capital” that allows their members to 
coexist peacefully, trading networks to emerge, public goods to be produced, the 
asymmetrical relationship between insiders and outsiders can be a source of polarisation.  
It is when people focus on one strand of identity, Sen believes, the trouble begins. Groups 
are left vulnerable to manipulation by chauvinists, often “ethnic” such as in the Hindu-
Muslim riots that he witnessed as a child in British India, and also in Nazi Germany, 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia and beyond. Sen’s warning is equally true of the literature and 
practice of conflict resolution about identity, where the one strand that is given the most 
attention is “ethnicity”.  
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i) The assumption of ethnic intransigence 
Group identity-based conflict can be difficult to manage. For people who share the same 
collective identity believe they have both common interests and common fate. “Ethnicity” 
is often pinpointed as the most complex cleavage for a democracy to manage (Diamond 
et al. 1995b: 42). The literature in Horowitz’s (2005: vii-ix) view, therefore, is “obsessed 
with ethnic conflict” and exclusively focused “on ethnic groups as building blocks of the 
polity”. Friberg (1993) and Lederach (1997) suggest calling them “identity conflicts” 
given the rigid connotations that ethnicity draws. “Identity” also connotes that group 
affinity is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, malleable.   
 
Like the dominance drive theory of human nature,  the assumption that the nature and 
intensity of ethnic divisions are beyond transformation comes from primordial 
justifications of ethnicity as a fact of human existence.  Ethnicity must have preceded any 
human social interaction and is thus unchanged by it. Ethnic groups are seen as natural, 
not historical and no explanations are offered as to how and why nations and ethnic groups 
seemingly appear, disappear and often reappear again. Intermarriage, migration and 
colonisation, resulting in multiethnic societies are also problematic for this view. Geertz 
(1963) for example, who was an influential proponent of the primordial school in the 
1960s, attempted to argue that while ethnicity in itself is not primordial, humans’ 
perception of it is. This is because their preceptions are embedded in their experience of 
the world and reinforced by the power of human “givens” such as blood ties, language, 
territory, and cultural differences. His work on the then new African states of the 1960s 
argued that they would find it difficult to act independently, because of the extent to which 
they would be hampered by their people’s sense of self (ethnicity, locality, religion, 
tribalism, etc.).  
 
There is no doubt that the salience of “ethnicity” increases during conflict, often 
sidelining other identities (gender, class, sexual orientation, class, profession, age). 
Sometimes the boundaries between such groups may have been drawn long before 
conflict broke out (very little interaction, intermarriage or indeed re-identification). It may 
equally be true that when the conflict is paused, the reduced threat of a common enemy 
can cause old group divisions to resurface.  However, the nature or character of these 
groups is not intransigent.  
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Instrumentalists view ethnic sentiments and loyalties as being cultivated by political 
leaders and intellectuals for political or material ends including state formation (Brass 
1995, 1997) – or by ethnic groups themselves. They assume an ethnic consensus that 
initially does not exist. The fear of being victimised may cause groups to make calculated 
decisions to engage in violence. Others stress that ethnicity is socially constructed. 
Anderson, Diamond and Kriesberg believe people choose (or have enforced) a history 
and common ancestry and create, as much as discover, differences from others (B. 
Anderson 1991; Diamond et al. 1995a; Kriesberg 2003c). In the words of Linz and Stepan 
(1996: 366): “political identities are less primordial and fixed than contingent and 
changing. They are amenable to being constructed or eroded by political institutions and 
choices.” As Kriesberg (2003a) argues identities are often based on shared values, beliefs 
and concerns (i.e.,. religious beliefs or political ideologies, attachments or practices) 
which are open to attainment by choice, not ascribed traits. This explanation is preferred 
here, although it is recognised that some ethnicity traits cannot easily be modified by 
social processes.  
The breakup of the Former Yugoslavia  
Once a conflict has descended into violence, people forgot that group relations may have 
been significantly more sociable and peaceful. The break-up of Yugoslavia to test the 
thesis that natural hatreds, hostility and intolerance are causal factors in ethnically based 
group wars. The allusions to ancient hatreds were the primary factor explaining the 
conflict’s barbarity. The inhumanity was characterised by “weekend warriors” and 
paramilitaries, 25 neighbours fighting against neighbours, and the targeting of civilians 
and a state policy of ethnic cleansing. Group relations post-WWII, however, were 
characterised by high levels of accommodation, contact, and trust. As a state created in 
the aftermath of WWI, intermarriage was low between the groups later party to the 
Bosnian conflict (Smits 2010), however, intermarriage in BiH was significantly higher 
than elsewhere in Yugoslavia and accepted – 16.7% in 1981 (see Hodson et al. 1994). 
Across the board, ethnic relations were cooperative and neighbourly. All sorts of people 
went about transacting normal relations without thought to nationality including  
                                               
25  83 paramilitaries operated in Bosnia between June 1991 and late 1993 – 53 Serbian (c. 20,000–40,000 
members), 13 Croatian (c.12,000–20,000) and 14 Bosniak (c. 4,000–6,000). 10 to 20 per cent of adult males 
in militias, added to the military and police, are more than enough for death and destruction against civilians 
on a massive scale. See: United Nations Security Council, 'Final Report of the Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780', (New York: United Nations S/1994/674, 1994b). 
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colleagues and workers, school pupils and teammates. Some were not interested in 
bothering to know another’s nationality. People holidayed in the different Republics. 
Significantly as Sekulić et al’s (2006: 800): study revealed:   
There is no evidence of urban violence between ethnic groups, ethnic ghettoization, or 
interethnic village confrontations during Tito’s years – events that the communists could 
not have held in absolute check in the face of longstanding ethnic hatreds. There was no 
need to dispatch police or military forces to prevent confrontations between ethnic groups. 
There was no indication of communal violence such as that characterising Muslim-Hindu 
relations in India or Catholic-Protestant relations in Northern Ireland. There was no 
outburst of fighting or hostility similar to the attacks on Chinese minorities in many 
Southeast Asian countries or even anti-immigrant outbursts (e.g., against Muslims in 
Croatia or Croatians in Slovenia) similar to those in contemporary Western Europe. In 
spite of the deadly relations during World War II, relations were largely cooperative and 
peaceful in the following four decades. 
 
Oberschall (2000: 982) argues that: “Yugoslavs possessed two ethnic frames in their 
minds, an ethnic cooperation and peace frame for normal times, and a crisis frame 
anchored in World War II memories.”  The ethnic groups (encompassing the six republics 
of BiH, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia and of two autonomous 
provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina) felt collective pride in having resisted the  might of 
the Soviet Union in 1948 and in their new economic system. A generation later, fuelled 
by power struggles following Tito’s death in May 1980 most people in Yugoslavia felt 
that their identities as Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, or Bosniaks were what defined 
them, not their identity as Yugoslavs.  
 
Primordial interpretations of this case argue that innate hatreds continued to simmer under 
the surface and were paused by 45 years of communism. On closer examination this fails 
to hold true. However the myth of ancient hatreds as promulgated by Kaplan (1993) in 
his book Balkan Ghosts, was accepted by politicians including President Bill Clinton and 
Prime Minister John Major.26 
 
                                               
26 Like Kaplan, Dijlas writing on WWII stated “the hatred between the Orthodox and the Moslems in these 
parts is primeval. Milovan Djilas, Wartime, trans. Michael B Petrovich (New York and London: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1977). 
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Rwanda – constructed ethnicity  
There is nothing intrinsically ethnic in these conflicts. Relegating all conflicts into a single 
box is dangerous. There are very few cases of purely ethnic conflict with mass eruptions 
of ethnic antagonism –not in BiH – nor Rwanda either. 
 
Unlike the Nazi killings, the Rwandan genocide was not an industrial process but one 
where a large chunk of the Hutu population participated in massacring their neighbours 
in and around their homes and churches.  “The children did not cry, because they knew 
us… They made big eyes. We killed too many to count,” said Juliana Mukankwaya, 
explaining why she and other women in her village rounded up the two children of her 
Tutsi neighbours and bludgeoned them to death (as quoted  in Gupta 2001: 3). She 
rationalised that death for these children, whom she had known since birth, was preferable 
to the harder life they would face parentless in civil war after their father had been 
slaughtered in front of them, and their mother dragged away. 
 
The existence of antagonistic ethnic relations does not explain why people did this.  In 
Rwanda, the Hutu and Tutsi were physically one group in terms of language 
(Kinyarwanda), religious and philosophical beliefs and customs but became diverse 
imagined communities. The weakening of social relations and the invention of tribalism 
are a consequence of the colonial era, where the Belgians’ brutal administration practices 
institutionalised the superiority of the Tutsi through systematic discrimination.  
 
While the Tutsi were traditionally the owners of cattle, ethnic hatred did not exist between 
the ‘groups’ in precolonial times.27 Any distinctions then were simply about occupation 
and class, but membership was not necessarily static (Prunier 1997). Although differences 
between the groups therefore existed, it was not until Europeans arrived that they became 
significant. Tutsi were preferred first by the German colonial administration at the turn 
of the 20th century, and after WWI, by the Belgians, for appointment to administrative or 
military posts, as well as educational opportunities. The Belgians paved the way for future 
conflict in Rwanda by guaranteeing the monopoly over power. The minority Tutsi 
                                               
27 For more on this period of Rwandan history see: Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) at Chapter 1, Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become 
Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2001) at Chapter 3.. 
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“overrule” of the majority Hutu became harsh and created a sense of collective Hutu 
identity. While colonisation entrenched socio-economic disparities, the division of groups 
along “ethnic” lines occurred through colonial mythology packaged in Europe and 
disseminated in Rwandan schools which devised a history conforming to the then-
fashionable theory that a superior “Caucasoid” race from northeastern Africa – in this 
case, the Tutsi – had arrived in Rwanda. Using their political and military abilities to 
conquer the far more numerous but supposedly “less intelligent” Hutu, they were in effect 
responsible for all signs of true civilisation in “black” Africa (Colletta and Cullen: 37; 
Forges 1999: 34-35). From 1926, a census forced all Rwandans to record their ethnic 
identity. Identity cards were issued by the state proclaiming the holder’s race. The 
education system was segregated, and Hutu were not allowed to join the priesthood or 
government.  
 
By the 1950s colonial attitudes to the Hutu softened, mainly at the behest of the Catholic 
Church and UN pressure. However, better access to political and socio-economic system 
left the ruling minority Tutsi fearful of a majority uprising and ethnic politics intensified. 
During the 1959 pre-independence struggle, a social revolution occurred in which the 
Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu People overthrew the Tutsi leadership, ironically 
with the help of Belgian forces. Violence between the groups spread and many Tutsi 
became refugees in neighbouring countries. On independence in 1962, the new Hutu 
extremist elite purged Tutsi from government and the army. The Tutsi were further 
marginalised when the traditional social and political systems (warrior class) being 
replaced by the central administration of the state.  
 
Tutsi rebel groups in Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and the former Zaire, began violent 
incursions into Rwanda initiating further conflict, more Tutsi out-migration and 
repression of Tutsi from the central government – a pattern which continued over the next 
thirty years. Interestingly intermarriage between the groups increased in the decades 
following the revolution but with the creation of a one-party state the economy declined 
and many demanded reform. In October 1990, Tutsi rebel forces of the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded northern Rwanda, precipitating the arming of local officials 
by Rwandan security forces, the expansion of the national army and the rounding up of 
Tutsi accused of collaborating with the rebels on the basis of their ethnicity. The Hutu 
political elite played upon memories of the past to disseminate messages of hate directly 
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to a large audience through the media. Even as evidence of human rights’ abuses 
mounted, many international actors on the ground were hesitant to point the finger at the 
government (Forges 1999).28  By the end of 1993, preparations for violence continued to 
take place in full view of UN peacekeepers. On April 6 1994, President Habyarimana 
died when his plane was shot down over the capital of Kigali. The defence forces 
immediately attacked Tutsi and pro-peace Hutu. Madness gripped the country.  A 
campaign of Tutsi elimination ensued with speed. It is estimated that 800,000 Rwandans 
died within a three-month period at the hands of their brethren – more than any other mass 
slaughter in recorded history.  
 
More accurate examples of purely ethnic conflict are the nationalist rejections of alien, 
minority or foreign rule such as occurred in apartheid South Africa and elsewhere.  
However, even these struggles had complex histories (i.e. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Vietnam, 
and Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion). It is not as simple as the states with ethnic 
minorities being more prone to conflict than others. There are fewer than twenty states 
that are ethnically homogeneous (ethnic minorities account for less than five percent of 
the population), including Japan and Sweden, who have had a uniform composition for 
some time. The population transfers and genocide that took place during WWII and the 
way borders were redrawn at war’s end, created further states with few minorities – 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. However, ethnic homogeneity is no guarantee 
of harmony. Critics point to Somalia, the most ethnically homogeneous state in sub-
Saharan Africa which has been torn apart by clan warfare and competition for power. 
Explanations are more complicated; ethnic groups can be formed over time by processes 
of administrative classification, political mobilisation and socialisation.  
ii) Shapers of group identity – human needs and collective fears 
Strong, even extreme, attachments to ethnic, religious, national and clan identities have 
appeared to push individuals and groups to engage in inhumane and improbable acts 
                                               
28 Unhappy Rwandan activists approached international human rights organisations to create a joint 
commission on the situation in Rwanda.  Subsequent inquiry showed that Habyarimana and his group were 
responsible for massacres of Tutsi and others in opposition to them. See: International Commission of 
Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda, 'Report of the International Commission of 
Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990 ', (Joint Publication: Human 
Rights Watch (New York), the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (Paris), the International 
Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Montreal) and the Interafrican Union of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (Ouagadougou) 1993). 
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towards those perceived to be the enemy. The basis for groupism is widely assumed to 
concern human needs. As Guetzkow (1957: 47) said in 1957: “Groups, in general, are 
organised to meet human needs, their structures and processes are in part moulded by 
these needs”.  Burton (1987) argues that identity groups will do almost anything to fulfil 
their needs and that grievance develops from needs’ deprivation, which is often relative. 
These go beyond basics such a food, shelter, water, personal safety and well-being to 
encompassing psychological needs – identity recognition, security, autonomy, 
distributive justice, etc. These seemingly individual needs are articulated through identity 
groups. As Druckman (1994: 44-45) expands:  
Much of social behaviour appears to be motivated by the need for affiliation (affective 
involvement), the need for achievement (goal involvement) and the need for power (ego 
involvement). Groups function because they are attractive to members (affective 
involvement), accomplish things and solve problems (goal involvement) and provide 
status for the members (ego involvement). 
 
Needs are held as non-negotiable, and for that reason any pressured settlement will only 
bring about a short-term ceasefire. Observers accept that reactions to coercion are 
culturally variable, and that needs are understood and satisfied differently (Kelley 1973). 
From Azar’s work (1990: 10-11), the importance agreed governance are apparent. In 
terms of the state for example – it has been “endowed with authority to govern and use 
force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens, and to provide collective 
goods”. It is the state’s role that satisfies or frustrates individual and identity group needs 
and governance that can build civic nationalism and bring people together.29 Needs such 
as security and recognition, are not zero-sum in that one party need not gain at the expense 
of another. 
 
Therefore post-Cold War ethnic conflict –  rather than being  the result of ancient hatreds 
or the sudden ‘uncorking’ of Soviet repression – are most often caused by “collective 
fears of the future”, the denial of the “needs” and chauvinistic behaviour that can by 
                                               
29 Azar died before the Cold War and the collapse of that world order. Other literature has built upon this, 
referring to the problem as a “crisis of governance”. See: Stephan Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism 
and War', International Security, 18/4 (1994), 5-39, Erhard Eppler and Herfried Munkler, '“New Wars” 
Discourse in Germany', Journal of Peace Research, 41/1 (2004), 107-17. Robert H Jackson, Quasi-States: 
Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the 
International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
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magnified by political memories and emotions  (Evera 1994; Lake and Rothchild 1996).  
The emotion that poisons ethnic relations is fear, particularly as violence worsens (see 
Lake and Rothchild 1996; Sekulic et al. 2006). Fear could concern group extinction, 
assimilation into or domination by another group, one’s life and property, or of being a 
victim again. Hate follows fear where the threatening others are demonised and 
dehumanised. In Yugoslavia, the means of igniting and spreading fear was through the 
news media, politics, education, popular culture, literature, history and the arts.  And once 
mobilised, they become the focus of collective action within society. 
iii) Collective madness 
The darker side of collective identity is the feeling of the enemy. As myth-making 
animals, humans create what Jung (1959) calls “archetypes” – vilifying and 
depersonalising evil ones – and ultimately denying them humanity. We are more 
compassionate to living things that resemble us. We, therefore, dehumanise in war and 
conflict to lift humans from deep inhibitions to overcome an aversion to harming humans 
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1979). Dehumanisation enforces “us” and “them” identities and inspires 
fear and repugnance. As Hume (2007: 225) observed in 1739, in what is perhaps the first 
published observation of dehumanisation in war:  
When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the character of 
cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent: but always esteem ourselves and allies equitable, 
moderate, and merciful. If the general of our enemies be successful, it is with difficulty 
we allow him the figure and character of a man. 
This can be seen in the racist literature of the adherents of slavery, in the formation of 
hate groups all over the world, in Menachem Begin’s epithet for his Palestinian enemies: 
“beast walking on two legs” (Holmes 1985: 368; Kapeliouk 1982) and  in the warnings 
to the Tutsi played on Hutu-controlled Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines: “You 
cockroaches must know that you are made of flesh! We won’t let you kill. We will kill 
you”.  Depictions of subhuman beasts or parasites, rats or another kind of vermin needing 
eradication, are common. As is the idea of dirt, vermin or disease requiring society to be 
decontaminated. Wiesel’s Night (1982) and Levi’s If This Is Man (1987) document the 
stages of dehumanisation the Jews experienced in concentration camps. They were 
physically stripped, numbers tattooed on them to eliminate the need for individual names, 
human relations were cancelled and so on. Another technique employed by those seeking 
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to dehumanise others is to displace responsibility for one’s actions onto a spiritual or 
secular authority (Roscoe 2007).  Although all this seems irrational, the mind is organised 
in modular fashion which allows for the possibility of conflict between its components. 
It is possible that one part of the mind can withhold information from the other (D. L. 
Smith 2007: 113). In situations where a strong “them” exists, a kind of collective madness 
can arise.  
 
In this respect, state breakdown and associated anarchy and security issues cause groups 
to arm, much like the arms race at the interstate level. Other forms of “trauma” – as in 
shock felt by a large percentage of the population – could include political assassination, 
economic depression or feelings of severe relative deprivation, unprovoked acts of war 
(or terrorism), or some form of disaster. Any of these events can trigger a dramatic change 
in collective mental states, either directly, or through incremental accretion that can be 
transmitted by contagion (Bostock 2010). In societies with many overlapping identities 
free from real or perceived wounds, a strong sense of coherence (social capital) and 
recognition (psychic capital)30 there will be plenty of immunity against contagious fear 
and resistance against chauvinistic leaders who prescribe violence against “enemies” as a 
solution.  While explanations of collective madness usually focus on the coalescing of 
such factors – rule of law breakdown, failure of power sharing democracy, absence of 
intervention, and certain kinds of leadership – it is the presence of psychological 
preconditions which forms collective mental states with which other factors, such as 
manipulative leadership, interact. This is not due to ethnic hatred, but fear and 
insecurity.31 In the Yugoslav crisis, Ignatieff (1993: 42) puts it thus: 
Once the Yugoslav communist state began to split into its constituent national particles 
the key question soon became: will the local Croat policeman protect me if I am a Serb? 
                                               
30 As opposed to psychic numbing: “general category of diminished capacity or inclination to feel.” See: 
Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic 
Books, 1986) at 442. Coherence is a feeling of confidence in one’s internal and external environments, the 
opposite of collective paranoia. The importance of memories of pleasure, success, achievement, 
recognition, what Boulding refers to as “psychic capital”, arguably relates to the fulfilment of basic human 
needs. Kenneth Boulding, A Reconstruction of Economics (New York and London: Wiley, and Chapman 
and Hall, 1950). 
31 The classic example of this interaction is Hitler and Germany. As Langer wrote, it “was not only Hitler, 
the madman, who created German madness, but German madness that created Hitler”. Walter C. Langer, 
The Mind of Adolf Hitler. (London: Secker and Warburg, 1973) at 138. The explanations given for the 
psychological preconditions giving rise to Hitler include Germany’s defeat in WWI and the Treaty of 
Versailles’ harsh terms, compounded by the Great Depression of 1929 and distorted by the belief that defeat 
was caused by communists, republicans and Jews.  
 
115 
 
Will I keep my job in the soap factory if my new boss is a Serb or a Muslim? The answer 
to this question was no, because no state remained to enforce the old ethnic bargain. 
 
All states are at risk of collective madness, but a well-adjusted, collective, mental state 
provides some immunity from violent conflict. However when this “state” is disordered, 
individuals can offer themselves as saviours. Power is consolidated and their intentions 
translated into actions, particularly through fear and panic.  Most studies of organised 
violence do not attribute all causality to leadership. There must be a facilitating fellowship 
or at least acquiescent bystanders (Staub 1992), and very likely a situation where the “raw 
material” of collective grievances are present.  These  disturbances may already exist in 
large measure or be augmented from small beginnings. Such patterns were common 
features in the early stages of the Third Reich, the Cambodian and the Rwandan genocides 
and the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
iv) Victimhood 
Many analysts single out the discourse of victimisation and victimhood as one used 
extensively by the groups in the Balkans region (ie. Mai 2001). Being a victim provides 
a kind of moral authority, a sense that one deserves to be treated specially. In fact, being 
a victim is so powerful that we would expect people to assume victim status if they can, 
as victimhood gives us the right to take action against our enemies while blaming them 
for violence at the same time (Searle-White 2001: 92).  As Denitch (2000) explains:  
In the distorted pictures which I observed in Yugoslavia each party consistently presented 
itself as a victim and the Other as a threat or a potential threat. None of the parties reacted to 
the Other directly but to its own projections of the Other. 
Example 1: Battle of Kosovo and WWII grievances  
Sometimes victimhood is deliberately misused to justify war against other groups. 
Slobodan Milošević regime’s systematically represented Serbs as victims in Croatia, BiH 
and Kosovo (Silber and Little 1996). A polarising incidenct concerned the 
commemorations of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (5 June 1389) at the 
very battlefield (Gazimestan) where Serbs had lost and been enslaved by the invading 
Turkish army of the Ottoman empire. This occurred against a backdrop of ethnic tension 
116 
 
between Kosovo’s minority Serb32 and majority Albanian population, caused partly by 
the pushing through of a new constitution which reduced the autonomy of Kosovo. This 
led to a demonstration in which many Albanians were killed by Serbian security forces, 
and also political tensions between Serbia and the other republics of Yugoslavia. During 
Milošević’s (1989) speech to an audience of roughly a million people, the first allusion 
to the possibility of future armed violence and of Serb victimhood was heard:   
Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others. Their national 
and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of history and through two 
world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when they could they also helped 
others to liberate themselves. 
His speech was the climax of many months of events looking at the “betrayal of Serbia” 
and public “rallies for truth” to show Serbs outside of Kosovo the reality for Kosovo 
Serbs. Even the 600 year old remains of the Serbian battle leader, Prince Lazar, were 
paraded around Serb inhabited areas of Yugoslavia. As Petrovic (2000: 170) observes, 
Milošević sought to combine “history, memory and continuity”, promoting the illusion 
that those who had fought and lost in 1389 were the same as those fighting for Serbian 
national survival in the present. 
  
In his closing remarks, Milošević turned to relations between Serbia and the rest of  
Europe. He portrayed medieval Serbia as not just the defender of its own territory, but of 
all Europe in the fight against the Ottoman Turks. Orientalism – Muslims as an “other” 
(accusing Bosnian Muslims of wanting a state based on Sharia law, Serbian women for 
their harems and viziers or ministers to rule the country) – was contrasted against 
Europeanisation:  “to the values of Europe, meaning to Christianity, to modernity, to 
Civilisation with a capital C” (Vetlesen 2005: 153), echoing Huntington’s polarisation of 
the West against Islam.33   
                                               
32 The Albanian birthrate was high and combined with Serb out-migration Kosovo changed from 23 per 
cent Serb in 1971 to 10 percent by 1989. Serb nationalists accuse Albanians of threatening them with 
violence and the police and judiciary of not protecting them. Accusations sexual assault and rape by 
Albanians against Serbs were reported in the media and widely believed by Serbs even though there is no 
evidence to suggest that this was true.  
33 No other political theory has been given warmer reception and greater prominence in Serbia than the 
clash of civilisations. It provided Serbian propaganda with a degree of academic respectability and 
legitimacy as the conflicts of the 1990s in former Yugoslavia had been in Serbian defence of the values of 
(Western) civilisation against its enemies. See Dmitry Pozhidaev, 'What Statements Do Not State', Journal 
of Language and Politics, 6/3 (2007), 327-49. 
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Victimhood was invoked in the memory of the bloodbath carried out by the fascist Croat 
forces (Ustashe) in the early 1940s in which many Serbs had lost family. Stories were 
recited of the Croat-run concentration camp at Jasenovac where a large number of Serbs 
were killed, 34 of massacres of Serbs such as at Omarska (later a notorious Serb-run 
concentration camp), and anecdotes about Ante Pavelic, the Croatian Nazi-puppet 
dictator.35 As Danner (2009: 208) explains: “effective propaganda must have within it a 
kernel of truth.” In the blame game, something that happened 2,000 years ago can be as 
relevant as an event that took place 50 years ago or just the other day. Milan Kovačević, 
the former deputy mayor of Prijedor, who helped establish and operate the Omarska camp 
where Croats and Muslims were put to death in 1992, justified it as payback for Jasenovac 
where he was interned as a child. However he denied Omarska was at the same level i.e. 
a death factory (Roger Cohen 1998: 479):  
…Memories cannot be destroyed. Many Serbs know, intimately, who slaughtered their 
grandfathers. Clinton knows the Dayton Accords, he knows they are good for him, but I 
doubt that he understands us. This part of the world is like a wind tunnel: the gusts that 
come through it are uncontrollable… 
…There is a direct connection between Jasenovac and Omarska. During World War II, 
the Croat and Muslims killed us; this time, it was the other way round, we killed them. 
Perhaps in fifty years it will happen again, to us. 
 
There may well have been collective memories, but these had to be opened and activated 
and directed by chauvinistic goals. Nationalists such as Milošević, Tudjman did not 
invent the crisis frame. They did, however, activate and amplify it assisted by the space 
created by the already weakened state. Burg (in Sisk 1996: 39) concludes, “. . . 
interregional conflicts were precluded in [Yugoslavia] . . . by the actions of determined 
secessionists, not by the presence of spontaneous hatreds at the mass level.”  
 
Instead of primordial explanations for why groups conflict, nationalists or chauvinists 
activate and amplify what Oberschall (2000) calls the “crisis frame”. Ethnic manipulation 
is possible because of a cognitive frame. This concerns a “mental structure” placing and 
                                               
34 There are no official statistics on the casualties and huge debate has reigned: perhaps c50.000 Serbs, but 
also Jews, Gypsies, anti-Fascist Croats and various others.  
35 Similar claims were made about the Bleiburg massacres (May 1945) where Croatian soldiers and civilians 
were killed in fleeing from the defeated Independent State of Croatia, a puppet state of the Nazi regime. 
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linking people, groups and events into a narrative that can be communicated and shared 
with others (Snow et al. 1986). 
IV.  POWER SHARING 
In marrying elements of human nature and groupism together, peace-building literature 
and practice have attempted to incentivise groups to join together in governance with 
guarantees that they will not be excluded from politics in the paused-conflict polity. There 
are two main theoretical views on how to accommodate conflicting groups, primarily 
ethnic, through power sharing – the consociational approach of Lijphart (1977, 1985, 
1990, 1999) and the integrated approach of Horowitz (1985, 1990).36  
 
Lijphart’s theory is based on the premise that it is impossible to erase the distinctions 
between groups once they appear. Sometimes factors like a common enemy unite groups, 
but this is short-lived. If the conflict involved differences between groups, then the state 
must be built around these ethnic differences. Ethnic groups should, therefore, be kept 
apart and institutional power divided between them. Fearon & Laitin (2000: 849) have 
argued, consociation “border[s] on primordialism as they assume unchanging and 
unchangeable ethnic identities”. Lijphart does not favour state partition or secession. 
Instead, state structures should be adjusted to accommodate most of the ethnic groups’ 
interests to afford them equal influence on the decision-making process and governance. 
Four characteristics define this approach: participation of the representatives of all 
significant groups in government (a grand coalition); a high degree of autonomy of the 
groups; proportionality; and minority veto (Lijphart 1990: 494). Lijphart’s 
recommendations are based on his reading of political practices in several European states 
(Belgium and Netherlands) and established conditions conducive to consociational 
democracy such as territorial loyalties, a handful of political parties and the some cross-
cutting cleavages. Proportional representation systems are therefore the electoral system 
favoured by consociationalism, as well as parliamentary systems and decision-making 
                                               
36 Both approaches have been built upon, for instance see: Peter Harris and Benjamin Reilly (eds.), 
Democracy in Deep- Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiations (Stockholm: International IDEA, 1998), 
Timothy Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace, 1996). 
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procedures that require concurrent and/or qualified majorities. Later, in defence of the 
theory’s assumptions, Lijphart (2002) focused more on power sharing and autonomy over 
the “secondary characteristics” of proportionality and minority veto but still maintains 
that executive power sharing means all significant groups must be represented in political 
decision making. 
 
Horowitz, on the other hand, believes in an integrated approach. States will not be able to 
exist peacefully if old divisions are left untouched. The building of inter-group links is 
crucial, both at the central level and in as many other levels as possible. Co-operation 
between groups should be encouraged and fostered by political and electoral incentives 
pre-election, not just rigid institutions requiring groups to work together after an election. 
Where “ethnically based political parties pervade civilian politics” (Horowitz 1990: 455) 
– the extreme end of the scale – a peaceful system can still occur provided that there is 
equal involvement of all in decision-making. Ideally links built between groups should 
progressively de-ethnicisation politics. Horowitz’s “centripetal” recommendations 
include presidential systems. Consequently Reilly (2006) advocates preferential voting. 
When used in ethnically heterogeneous districts, such voting practices, it is claimed, have 
facilitated vote pooling across the ethnic divide, encouraged the emergence of more 
peace-making political parties, and promoted the formation of resilient inter-group 
coalitions (Horowitz 1990; B. Reilly 2001). Reilly’s work, particularly in Papua New 
Guinea (B. Reilly 2006), praised informal power sharing approaches that resulted in 
political inclusion through deal-making rather than the prescriptions of law. While there 
is no doubt merit in voluntary accommodation, the limits of this are obvious, for while 
Papua New Guineans “own” elections – as in they have become part of their culture – 
corruption and game-playing are rife.   
 
The commonality between the two theories, which pertains to any investigation of post-
conflict peacebuilding, is of state decentralisation which allows groups to enjoy a degree 
of autonomy. This respective independence has a number of advantages, the feeling of 
not being dominated by another group being the cardinal one.  
 
The problem with power-sharing mechanisms, as seen in practice, is that ultimately they 
are elite-driven, thus ignoring the masses of ordinary people who are supposed to switch 
off their “us and them” mentality.  Any new governance compact is not just between 
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political groups within the general population and between the general population and 
those elected to govern. Power sharing is not seen as a means of teaching groups to live 
together and negotiate over issues on which they disagree but is upheld as a means of 
stopping violence between groups who are not willing to otherwise stay the course. This 
tends to create vested interests that can only be modified by consensus which is unlikely 
if one group refuses to budge.  The focus on stability in the short term favours strategies 
which actually increase instability, and are unlikely to generate loyalty to peace in the 
long term. Horowitz (1985) essentially is advocating containment of group conflict so 
that identities do not crystallise as characterised by more severe conflict, rather than 
eradication or a new consensus. International policy-makers have contributed to the 
reinforcing of ethnic divisions in states undergoing conflict. Primarily, this is because 
post-conflict institutions are built on an implicit assumption that ethnic divisions are 
beyond transformation – an “assumption of intransigence”. While the likes of Simonsen 
(2005), interpret this as working against reducing the significance of groupism strategies 
that still emphasise identities strengthen their importance. Both these theories are not 
without their critics, particularly because of the lack of practical evidence that they work. 
Lijphart’s solution, at the extreme end as in the case of BiH addressed in Chapter 5, tends 
to freeze the conflict in place instead of resolving or indeed transforming it (see for 
example Paris 1997; Synder 2000). 
 
Roeder and Rothchild’s (2005: 6) most recent edited study offers “power dividing” which 
is seen as: “an overlooked alternative to majoritarian democracy and power sharing”. 
Power sharing, they argue, is only useful in the short-term to overcome commitment 
problems that may characterise conflict parties in the immediate paused-conflict context 
agreeing to and sticking with a peace settlement. In the long-term, however, power 
sharing is detrimental to peace and stability. Instead, they recommend civil liberties: 
taking powers away from government while those that are left are distributed amongst 
multiple, cross-cutting majorities, therefore establishing checks and balances through 
balancing one decision-making centre against another. This kind of consensus approach 
is based on the arrangements associated with the US constitutional and presidential 
system and a Madisonian model of federalism which contextually bears a microscopic 
resemblance to the situation in conflict-torn countries. Perhaps because of these 
difficulties, Roeder and Rothchild’s policy recommendations for international assistance 
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include delaying intervention assistance until a ‘victor’ emerges and holding groups 
together that want to live together (Roeder and Rothchild 2005: 337-45).  
i) Strengthening group strategies  
While the debate between consociationalists and integrationists has raged over the years 
questioning the value of power sharing as a mechanism to transform conflict in divided 
societies is scarce. The implication is that there are no absolute answers. Bringing all 
parties to the conflict together is crucial – in a peace conference for example – but all 
parties must be locked into the process so that they do not out-chauvinise each other or 
hold a knife to the throat of the process.37  Initial representation by group leaders is fine, 
but then what? Movement is needed.  
 
Of the few recent examples of scholarship proposing strategies to bind leaders together 
in governance without forming blocks in the way political parties do, is McGarry and 
O’Leary’s (2004) work on the Northern Ireland conflict. Here they advocate strongly for 
the use of sequential proportionality rules (d’Hondt or Sainte Laguë) in allocating cabinet 
positions. Such a mechanism avoids protracted bargaining between groups and increases 
groups’ incentives to remain part of cross-communal coalitions.  
 
The other important dimension is the growing awareness of conflict having regional or 
global affects. In the case of Northern Ireland, the fact that cross-border institutions 
formalised cooperation with the independent Irish (republic) government and renewed 
inter-governmental cooperation between the British and Irish, provided regional 
cooperation38 on the issue and an acknowledgement that if the majority of Northern 
Ireland and Ireland wanted a united Ireland, then this right would be acknowledged. The 
signatory parties committed themselves to respecting the outcome of future referenda on 
this issue. Self-determination disputes are obviously central to a range of conflicts as 
highlighted by Kosovo most recently. In these cases, the issues at stake are not simply 
about sharing power, or even primarily about sharing power. Questions of autonomy, 
                                               
37 A November 2010 example of this is the inability of the Iraqi parliament to form seven months after 
elections because the Kurds with their 57 seats refused to join either of the two sides which need their 
support.  
38 Institutions of cross-border cooperation have been utilised elsewhere, in South Tyrol for example, and 
also in less conflict prone situations such as the arrangements surrounding the European Union.  
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sovereignty, acquisition, symbols, explicit recognition as national communities and 
institutional links across state frontiers are also crucial.  
 
Consociations have been accused of entrenching and institutionalising pre-existing 
groups and deincentivising group elites to change.  Horowitz (1985: 566-76). McGarry, 
O’Leary (2007) and Lijphart responded to this by attempting to move theory away from 
the corporate model of power sharing towards a liberal model. Here, groups that emerge 
during democratic elections would be recognised regardless of what they are based upon. 
Examples in the real world – such as BiH, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Cypus – follow the 
corporate model. Finally, instead of an emphasis on grand coalitions, joint consent across 
significant communities is needed so that elites are not governing with factional or lower 
levels of support from their own segments. This would exclude just any coalition or 
indeed the cooptation of unrepresentative minority leaders. 
 
For the purpose of this research, the approach of Simonsen is preferred because it captures 
many elements of conflict transformation theory and the malleability of groupism. Instead 
of an assumption of intransigence, Simonson (2004) argues for a spectrum of processes 
to promote common interests and loyalty to universal institutions.39 As he argues: “this 
span of processes is not one that signifies an alteration of the character of existing ethnic 
(or group) identities – which, if successful, would eventually lead to ethnic 
reidentification (assimilation) – but rather could be described as de-ethnicising politics, 
making ethnicity less salient” (2004: 290)  While he does not offer any strategies outside 
of those already discussed this vein of thinking is also seen in the argument of the 
International Crisis Group (2003a) against the applicability of consociationalism in 
Kosovo. Risk factors are identified as the minority’s small share of the population, a lack 
of internalised human rights culture, and immature political structures unable to 
accommodate the mobilisation of minority groups. Quoting a report by the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the ICG argued 
that UNMIK: “should wager on a civic future for Kosovo, rather than seek compromises 
with collectivist (“ethnicist”) political structures for tactical and short-term advantage . . 
                                               
39 Ironically, the conflict and subsequent peace-building activities may provide the opportunity to develop 
a broader group identity. Anti-colonialism movements often united groups with very different interests, 
only for them to fracture after independence. On Bougainville however, war and peace-building served to 
unify. What it means to be a Bougainvillean is therefore a relatively new concept. See Sean Dorney, The 
Sandline Affair (Sydney: ABC Enterprises, 1998) at 39.  
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. it is impossible to build a multi-ethnic Kosovo by directly implementing multi-ethnic 
policies” (International Crisis Group 2003a: 17). The difference between pre-determined 
groups and the self-determined groups of the liberal consociational model for elections 
seems to be wishful thinking given the mindset of identity groups in the lead up to 
elections without alternative strategies and learned constitutionalism.  
 
Conflict, however, is not solely attributable to tangible interests and breakdown of 
institutional order. The identity literature canvassed above clearly shows that 
psychological dimensions must be addressed in terms of the relationship between 
individuals, groups and governance structures.  Socially constructed identities are another 
layer of complexity that must be broken down, requiring not just political settlement 
strategies but also reconciliation (Kaufman 2006; Long and Brecke 2003: 28-31). 
Intangibles like myths and fears make intrastate group wars intractable leading to security 
dilemmas between groups and to symbolic chauvinistic politics where compromise seems 
like a betrayal. Policy tools to encourage changes in attitudes and social practices concern 
groups abandoning provocative rhetoric but also explicitly acknowledging each side’s 
own responsibility and the other side’s wounds.  Other initiatives include public education 
efforts, media campaign, evocative ceremonies, and referenda – even on the future, and 
problem-solving workshops. An example of the latter is that pioneered by psychologist 
Kelman (1992), where people from opposing sides of the conflict are brought together to 
conquer misinformation, hostility and fear. Human rights’ mechanisms can grow out of 
this, and minimise the capacity to define “the other”, just as human rights’ standards 
emerged from suffering in WWII. 40 But they have to mean something, be a road map to 
any culture’s history, not just be forced upon groups and on states. 
 
De-ethnicising politics will not occur if public discussions about groupism are taboo. As 
will be addressed further in Chapter 6, dealing with the past is important, and this is the 
only strategy that will stop divisions in society being re-emphasised. Current research 
coming out of Rwanda suggests that the focus is still on a single identity (Hilker 2009). 
Thinking back to Sen’s critique of the reductionist view which explains the continued 
                                               
40 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966; Convention 
against Torture 1984; Convention against Genocide, as well as the Geneva Conventions (1864-1949) 
among others. 
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production of violence by overlooking people’s multiple identities and also the diversity 
within identity groups. Although unsurprising that Rwandans are still focused on identity 
given the “ethnic” nature of the violence, what is concerning is the continuing 
stereotyping narrative in relation to the experience of the conflict. Young people 
overwhelming attributed victimhood to Tutsi and guilt to all Hutu. Only a few were aware 
of the complexities of the conflict. It does not appear that Hutus, Tutsis and “mixed” 
Rwandans have entered into dialogue on the conflict or to examine their constructed 
identities and experiences and interests that are in common. A potential dangerous 
cocktail for future conflict is seen in the continuing pervasive sense of insecurity about 
the identity of others and the ongoing reinforcing of difference in “ethnic” stereotyping. 
 
Long and Brecke’s (2003) study of ten cases of civil war settlements included seven 
successes (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Mozambique, South Africa and 
Honduras), not all concerned “ethnic” identity war but all with awful violence and group 
dynamics. In all examples four desiderata of forgiveness were present – public truth 
telling, partial justice (focus on most egregious offences), the redefinition of social 
identities and a call for new relationships: the “forgiveness model”. Nationalist discourses 
must be reconstructed to emphasise that which justifies peace and reconciliation, 
silencing or muffling the discourses and symbolisigm that fuel fear. At the same time, 
dialogue and institutions must foster cooperation in solutions to mutual problems and in 
turn help build positive images and attitudes toward the other group. Little research on 
the impact of reconciliation exists, but it represents a useful addition to the toolbox 
(Kaufman 2006) and also to handling spoiler problems identified in the next chapter.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Understanding human nature and identity have huge salience for paused-conflict 
governance. While there might not be defined differences to outsiders, there will be an 
“us” and “them”. The breakdown in public power is almost secondary to this. Without 
groups being willing to come together for governance, all else will fail. The tools of 
democracy, where they are capable of being used from the outset, will be exploited, and 
war by other means will continue.  
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It is of little use to proclaim the existence of a state if that state’s potential citizens see 
themselves in the first instance as members of groups or local loyalty systems, which are 
not so close to governance that they perceive themselves as participating. Power-sharing 
arrangements in this regard may reinforce division and difference. 
 
It is the gradual internalising of new patterns of social identification, which, in this 
respect, constitutes the advance of any governance strategy. Establishing a “we” or a 
mutual perception of belonging in the reinforcing of shared interests, commonality and 
the provision of security may contribute towards the growth of alternative identities that 
can promote larger groups to come together around governance. These conflicts can take 
time and sometimes all it takes is a few extremists or spoilers to derail the progress.  
Where the norm has become something else it is difficult to reverse; however the 
malleability of political culture offers the potential for peace. Paused-conflict governance 
is as much about ideas and psychology as is it is about political institutions. In this respect, 
the focus at the political level should be less on traditional power-sharing mechanisms 
past the initially crucial requirement to have buy-in from all groups in the peace process, 
and rather on developing forward movement – the allocation of power portfolios using 
the d’Hondt method for example, binds leaders together without the formation of blocks.  
 
For a paused conflict society, building new identities based on agreed rules of the game 
is required, not employing strategies that cement existing identities or polarise grievance. 
Through understanding groupism, combined with the necessary exhaustion which will be 
explained next, the foundational building blocks are laid through which the Leviathan 
could pacify.  
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5: Receptivity – turning to other 
strategies when war/violence 
becomes more “tiring.” 
I. RECEPTIVITY, AN INTRODUCTION 
Towards the end of the 1980s, nuclear war was still a distinct possibility. Then the Soviet 
Union collapsed bringing the Cold War peacefully to an end. In 1994, South Africa’s 
apartheid era ended without significant violence. It would seem that if the capacity for 
war is genetic, then so too is the capacity for peace. However it is not necessarily for 
moral reasons that violent conflict has lessened, particularly in the developed world, but 
that violent conflict has declined as the result of receptivity to alternative peaceful 
strategies; to learning and ultimately to accepting rules for governance. This comes about 
through a mixture of experience and tiring and the evolution of mechanisms flexible 
enough to survive the residual conflict.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how conflicting groups move from being 
violence-minded to pursuing alternative strategies. This receptivity does not in itself 
guarantee the pacification of the Leviathan. Receptivity can, however, create a platform 
for change where there is a true mind shift away from violence towards positive peace. 
This occurs when there are sufficient consensus and appropriate approaches to sideline 
spoilers. Where the parties to the conflict are not receptive in this sense, it may well be 
that frustration will continue, violence spark or chauvinism return. Those who continue 
to fight in the mind (i.e. focus exclusively on singular identity) are examples of false 
receptivity, causing groups to retreat to their previous positions, albeit without arms and 
this must be recognised and carefully managed. However, where the peace-inclined 
exceed those that are simply too aggrieved to renounce violence (or indeed who benefit 
from the continuation of conflict), the ground is paved for the renegotiation of the rules 
for governance based on agreed learning – the theory of the next chapter.  
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At the internal state level, the assumption of the complete resolution of social conflict is 
ahistoric but mechanisms flexible enough to survive have created pacified spaces in a 
number of countries where receptiveness came first. Receptivity is more than the idea war 
weariness– that war induces in its participants an inhibition against subsequent war for 
several years (see O. Holsti and Rosenau 1984; Richardson 1960). Nor is it the same as 
“mutually hurting stalemates” (Zartman 1985) where neither party to a conflict can 
overwhelm the other. It also differs from “ripeness” which is explored at length in the 
conflict literature (e.g. Svensson and Wallensteen 2010: 38). Ripeness is posited as the 
point when a combination of factors means that the relevant parties accept that it is the 
right time to resolve the immediate conflict peacefully, often with outside mediation or 
intervention. Instead, receptivity encompasses a true mind shift from war to non-violent 
strategies. Groups tire with violence when the pursuit of other strategies either 
necessitates an end to violence (i.e. for trade) or provides viable alternatives without the 
costs of violence. Tiring is simply the first stage, an agreement not to do violence, a 
pattern that has been slowly evolving in a zigzag fashion, more entrenched in some 
regions than others, since human existence.  
 
There are many examples of tiring without true receptivity. World War I, for example, 
was called the “war to end all wars” 41  but the further consensus for alternatives to 
violence was ultimately needed. The League of Nations was created to promote 
cooperation, peace and security by the triumphant allied powers. A mere two decades 
later the world embarked on an unparalleled plunge into darkness that devastated Europe 
with over fifty million deaths. The UN is the manifestation of the allied forces finally 
saying, “no more state war” and meaning it. This deeply held notion has inextricably 
become part of the makeup, the very culture, of the West. A larger group identity was 
established, and rules agreed to – the UN charter being the psychical manifestation of this 
receptivity. 
 
Even in such positive examples peace needs constant reinforcing and remembering, as a 
backsliding process can quickly occur.  
                                               
41 Made famous by then USA President Woodrow Wilson, but probably attributable to author H G Wells 
as a paraphrase of his 1914 book entitled The War That Will End War.  
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II. DECREASING VIOLENCE 
According to anthropologists Keeley (1996) and LeBlanc (2003, 2007) death in tribal 
warfare, based on the proportion of the population at the time, dwarfs that of modern 
times. If the 20th century’s wars had killed the same share of the population that perished 
in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not the 
50 – 70 million causalities of WWII. While a decade has passed in which Darfur and Iraq 
occurred, shortly after the century in which Stalin, Hitler, Mao and Pol Pot existed, the 
claim that violence is diminishing may seem somewhat delusionary. However many and 
varied studies support the conclusion that violence has declined, albeit in a zigzag fashion, 
including political scientist Payne’s (2004) A History of Force: Exploring the Worldwide 
Movement Against Habits of Coercion, Bloodshed and Mayhem; as well as the work of 
philosopher Singer (1981), scholar and journalist Wright (2001), and anthropologist 
Knauft (1991). Tiring and the acceptance of other strategies (and rules) has caused a 
gradual shift away from the use of violence in human relationships, dramatically 
decreasing by the end of the 20th century. 
 
Such a claim is graphically illustrated by homicide rates, particularly in Britain, where 
the traditional blood feud was criminalised as early as the fifteenth century and the 
obligations of personal vengeance transferred to the expanding national legal system 
(Leyton 1997).  Looking at violence across an elongated timeframe Gurr (1981: 296) 
described fourteenth century England as: “a society in which men (but rarely women) 
were easily provoked to violent anger and were unrestrained in the brutality with which 
they attacked their opponents”. Criminologist Eisner (2003) assembled hundreds of 
homicide estimates from Western European localities between 1200 and the mid-1990s. 
In every country analysed, murder rates declined steeply – from 24 homicides per 100,000 
Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. An increase 
since the 1960s was common though not universal (see Eisner 2008), attributed to “minor 
perturbation, proportionately no greater than upward swings in homicide rates in 
Elizabethan times and during the Napoleonic wars – swings which proved to be 
temporary” (O’Donnell, 2002:56).  
 
Instead, the early modern English ruling elites protected their persons and their estates by 
the encouragement of what Elias (1994) called the advance of the shame frontier beyond 
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personal aggression. This process extended down the social hierarchy and replaced the 
earlier pleasure in aggressivity with a new set of cultural notions, a new “sensibility” that 
bracketed violence with fear, embarrassment, and revulsion. From the outlawing of 
human sacrifice, witch burning, lynching, slavery, vigilantism, duelling, capital 
punishment, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, rape as a spoil of war came the 
creation of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Transgression of these 
anti-violence norms will occur. Entrenchment will be greater in certain However anti-
violence norms play an important role in constraining behaviour. Importantly they also 
lead to the creation of laws and institutions which then monitoring and enforcement the 
anti-violence mechanisms. Anti-discrimination laws, for example, have evolved out this.  
III. DEVELOPED-WORLD RECEPTIVITY  
The catalyst for the birth of modern international rules concerning armed conflict, and 
indeed for the creation of the expansive normative framework constituting contemporary 
international humanitarian law, was the experience of Swiss businessman Jen-Henri 
Dunant. Having witnessed the aftermath of the horror of the Battle of Solferino (24 June 
1859) where some six thousand died, and almost 40,000 were wounded in just one day of 
fighting, Dunant reported (1986: 5,11): 
Here is a hand-to-hand struggle in all its horror and frightfulness; Austrians and Allies 
trampling each other under foot, killing one another on piles of bleeding corpses, felling 
their enemies with their rifle butts, crushing skulls, ripping bellies open with sabre and 
bayonet. No quarter is given; it is a sheer butchery; a struggle between savage beasts, 
maddened with blood and fury. Even the wounded fight to the last gasp. When they have 
no weapon left, they seize their enemies by the throat and tear them with their teeth… 
While not a doctor, his efforts to assist the overwhelming number of wounded, who were 
dying from lack of care, and the publication of this experience in 1862 led to the creation 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the first Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (1864). This marked 
the transformation of something that had been, at best, a practice armies had respected 
when so inclined into a rule of law. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 followed, 
codifying the rules of war. At the end of WWII, and because of it, the Geneva 
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Conventions’ protections were extended to include, among others, prisoners of war and 
civilians and so the framework of the UN developed. 
 
People have been searching for strategies to limit violence for much longer.  The 1648 
Treaty of Westphalia sometimes referred to as the “Peace of Exhaustion”, ended the 
Thirty Years War involving many European countries and can be seen as the first world 
charter. The creation of a European community of sovereign states was possible only 
because its members recognised each other as having equal legal standing and guaranteed 
each other their independence.  
 
However even in the West, killing has not actually been banned outright – self-defence, 
rules of war, continued defence force reserves, the death penalty, euthanasia. However, 
rules containing violence have developed. Public attitudes to war since the 20th century 
stand in stark contrast to past notions that warfare and violence as the means of settling 
disputes were a normal part of human existence. The distance between the benches in the 
British Parliament is precisely determined by the length of two swords and one foot and, 
while each MP's locker still contains a loop of silk on which to hang a sword, members 
are less able to attack each other and not allowed to cross the mid point during debates – 
the origin of the saying “toe the line” (Richard Cohen 2002: xxii). For governments, war 
was simply an instrument of statecraft. Force can now only be directly against another 
state in self-defense or with the sanction of the UN Security Council. Ideologies 
glorifying violence and war as noble and virtuous endeavours are virtually non-existent 
today (excluding some terrorist organisations). The hyper-nationalism that drove Nazi 
Germany and Imperial Japanese is rare. 
  
In terms of war, the EU has at its very core the concept of “never again-ism”. The 
accession process’ criteria include compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the European Convention on Human Rights – which arguably sits at the heart of the 
new Europe and holds members to a non-violence code. It is virtually inconceivable that 
France would take up arms against Germany or Greece against Turkey. The embrace of 
peace is thus an example of conflict transformation theory driving institutional 
development. 
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Within the scholarly community, there is intense debate over the cause of war aversion at 
the international level – interdependence, monetary cost and increase in international 
membership – but no coherent theory or real evidence exist to support any of them. Such 
explanations point to changes likely to enhance security long term, but none accounts for 
the steep decline in international wars, particularly since the 1980s. The creation of stable 
nations with effective legal systems and police forces has negated the Hobbesian anarchy 
of all against all. Eisner (2008) and Elias (1994) see this as the transition from knightly 
warrior societies to the centralised governments of early modernity. The associated 
increase in life expectancy has made humans less reckless with their lives and, therefore, 
less inclined to partake in violence (see also Payne 2002, 2004). Smith (2007) develops 
this further, arguing that it is not just fear of being killed or wounded that plays a vital 
role in the desire to escape the horrors of war, but also revulsion.42  
 
Pinker (2007) argues that along with cultural changes and changes in attitude, humans 
have become more interdependent on and empathic towards those outside their immediate 
tribes or groups, due to globalisation and improvements in technology. Singer (1981) calls 
this the circle of inclusion, evolution having bequeathed humans a small kernel of 
empathy, which by default is applied only to a limited group (i.e. friends and relations) 
but has over the millennia expanded to encompass: the clan, the tribe, the nation, both 
sexes, other races and even animals. Networks of reciprocity may have pushed out the 
circle, but so too may have the inexorable logic of the “golden rule”: that privileging one’s 
own interests becomes harder when one knows and thinks about other living things 
(Singer 2002).43 
  
Whatever the case, something in modernity has arguably made humans wiser when it 
comes to violence. Homicide as the primary form of conflict resolution was once an 
unexceptional feature of life; today it is rare to non-existent in the West and far less 
                                               
42 For arguments against a simple aggression-warfare explanation and countless examples of avoidance of 
participation (desertion, mutinies, imprisonment, incapacitation), see: J Mg  Van Der Dennen, 'Four Fatal 
Fallacies in Defense of a Myth: The Aggression-Warfare Linkage', in J Wind and V Reynolds (eds.), Essays 
in Human Sociobiology, Vol. 2 (Brussels: V.U.B. Study Series, 1986), 43-68, Dave Grossman, On Killing: 
The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston; Little Brown, 1995), Barbara 
Ehrenreich, Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War (New York: Metropolitan Books., 
1997), G Cashman, What Causes War? (Lexington: Lexington Books., 1993). 
43 The rule or code can be found in many philosophies and religion, as far back as antiquity. In the Christian 
tradition see Leviticus 19:18: telling one to go beyond one’s own interests and love thy neighbour as 
oneself. Some argue that it is more than an ethical code, but the “essence of a universal morality”. 
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common elsewhere than it used to be. Despite residues seen in the activities at Abu Gharib 
and Guantanamo Bay, when such violence does occur it is usually hidden and widely 
condemned upon discovery.  Exhaustion with violence in industrialised countries has 
been the critical factor in the decline of international wars. Interdependence and 
membership of international institutions are a consequence of the peace achieved through 
war aversion, not its causes (Mueller 2004). However, the different trajectory of civil 
wars suggests this “worldwide” war aversion is easier explained by what I call developed-
world receptivity.  
IV. RESIDUAL VIOLENCE AND RULE BREAKING 
Running parallel to developed-world receptivity, violence continues to fester in zones of 
anarchy such as frontier regions, collapsed empires, unstable states and territories 
contested by mafias, gangs, and other dealers of contraband. 
i) Man’s capacity to do violence 
Journalist  Danner’s (2009) Stripping Bare the Body: Politics, Violence, War documents 
countries beset by violence: Haiti, BiH and Croatia in the early 1990s, post-invasion Iraq 
and recent torture in secret prisons around the world. Having arrived in Haiti in 1986 to 
cover the country’s “transition to democracy” (a popular phrase of the Regan era) after 
President-for-life, Jean-Claude Duvalier, and his wife were flown into exile on an 
American plane. Many, including Danner, believed that the elections would change the 
cycle of violence. Danner quickly realised that (2009: xix): 
 Violence is the motor of Haiti’s politics, the means of regime change, the method of 
succession. The struggle for power is ongoing and endless, permeating all aspects of life…  
The appalling massacre of Haitians, as they set out to vote, by soldiers and the feared 
Tontons Macoutes militiamen (the paramilitary force of Duvalier and his father who 
preceded him as ruler from 1957), forced the election to be abandoned. This ushered in 
Haiti’s latest era of instability which in a 25-year period has seen more coups, revolutions, 
a few elections, an American occupation (not the first), and a dozen rulers. Man’s capacity 
to do evil is clear in the horrific sadism reported in this book – roving security mobs 
slaughtering civilians in polling places, civilians beating to death suspected sympathisers 
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of the former regime, and drunken machete-wielding peasants at road blocks. During the 
American occupation of the 1990s, no action was taken that would risk American 
casualties, and therefore militiamen were not disarmed. 
 
Despite being the great “petri dish of foreign aid” (Danner 2010), in Haiti there is no 
receptiveness to positive peace and the reality of the corrupt state remains unchanged. 
After the 2009 earthquake, Danner (Ibid) writes: 
There is nothing mystical in Haiti’s pain, no inescapable curse that haunts the land. From 
independence and before, Haiti’s harms have been caused by men, not demons. Act of nature 
that it was, the earthquake last week was able to kill so many because of the corruption and 
weakness of the Haitian state, a state built for predation and plunder. Recovery can come only 
with vital, even heroic, outside help; but such help, no matter how inspiring the generosity it 
embodies, will do little to restore Haiti unless it addresses, as countless prior interventions 
built on transports of sympathy have not, the manmade causes that lie beneath the Haitian 
malady. 
 
Moving to the post-Cold War Balkans, on television screens across the world genocide 
was revealed – soldiers and militias slaughtering civilians, shelling, ethnic cleansing and 
images of emaciated prisoners peering out from behind barbed wire fences – evoking 
memories of WWII and outrage. The international community perhaps failed to recognise 
truely the evil that was being done.  The massacre at Srebrenica, for example, was revenge 
the Muslim inhabitants having used the “safe area” to make nightly raids on surrounding 
villages, killing Serbs. Many of Srebrenica’s men understood this and tried to escape the 
region (Danner 2009: 261). General Ratko Mladic responded without mercy, massacring 
two to three times as many Muslims regardless of their individual responsibility for Serb 
casualties.  Compounding this brutality was the death of his father, decades earlier, at the 
hands of the Ustashe – the Croatian fascist anti-Yugoslav separatist moment and puppet 
Nazi regime. 
 
Danner’s book documents violent conflict, revealing the capacity of individuals to get 
caught up in violence. Despite the gradual decrease in violence, failure to appreciate 
mankind’s capacity for it risks repetition. The American occupation of Iraq and the torture 
conducted in CIA secret prisons is clearly linked to the broader depravities Danner 
documents – from Port-au-Prince to Omarska (the site of a notorious Serb-run 
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concentration camp in WWII).  The International Committee of the Red Cross report 
(2007) on compliance with the Geneva Conventions in Iraq revealed that the US had 
revived long-outlawed torture practices.  
 
Sand’s (2008a) indictment of the “fig leaf” legal arguments which distinguished between 
those who had protection under the Geneva Conventions and those that did not, transpired 
to be about the desire to interrogate detainees without constraint. Guantanamo became a 
Geneva-free zone as early as 2002. The practices used mirror in some respects the UK 
government’s techniques in dealing with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1970s, 
including those that culminated in Bloody Sunday.44 These actions are widely accepted 
to have prolonged the conflict by 15 – 20 years because of the resentment generated 
within the community as well as with IRA members and the violence it provoked. The 
US Senate report (Committee on Armed Services 2008) into the treatment of detainees 
concluded in a similar vein. Treating detainees harshly reinforced the view that the US 
was concerned with destroying Islam, increasing resistance to cooperation and creating 
new enemies.  
 
When photographs of Abu Ghraib’s abused prisoners surfaced, protestations of a “few 
bad apples” were heard from the senior levels of the US government. The reality was 
found to be quite different (Committee on Armed Services 2008: xxi). However, as 
shameful as the abuses are, they are mild when compared with many other atrocities in 
human history. Today we see them as signs of how low our behaviour can sink and should 
remember why our standards have risen. 
 
The fact that senior government officials, with the help of lawyers in the US Department 
of Justice, had convinced themselves and others that these practices were legal (B. 
Woodward 2006) shows that there is no immunity against atavistic vengeance and no 
junction at which people stop cloaking their baser instincts in the language of justice. 
Many have denounced these events as the point at which the United States of America 
(USA) lost “moral authority” (Committee on Armed Services 2008; Malinowski 2008). 
                                               
44 Bloody Sunday refers to the event of January 30 1972, where during the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association March in Derry North Ireland, 27 protesters were shot (13 died) by members of the First 
Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment. The “Saville Report” released in June 2010 concluded that the 
paratroopers had lost control, shot fleeing civilians and lied to hide their acts. 
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Crucially however the USA changed the agreed rules; they “reformed” international law 
unilaterally, the same law that was applied to the world’s Miloševićs and Taylors. They 
not only made the Geneva Conventions not applicable, but they also disregarded the 
Convention against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.  
 
The Bush administration forgot the lessons of history. Aptly perhaps for a nation so 
concerned with rules, they simply found lawyers who could be relied upon to give the 
‘right’ legal advice. The large number who understood the reciprocal nature of existing 
rules was ignored. Sands (2008b) and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(2007) documented how US Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and other high-
ranking administration lawyers helped to design and implement the interrogation policies 
seen at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and secret CIA prisons to which detainees were 
“disappeared” and tortured.  The media “took its eye off the ball” (Sands 2005: 230) and 
no powerful constituency was publicly willing to defend the rule of law, although of 
course various NGOs such as Human Right Watch tried. In both the United Kingdom 
(UK) (who went along with this remaking of the global rules) and the USA, court 
decisions were needed to correct the illegality of disregarding the Geneva framework, 
including in the UK the use of “evidence” in court extracted under torture.45 The passing 
of law which provided for the indefinite detention without trial of non-nationals who 
could not be deported required the UK to derogate from the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and this was held to be in violation of Britain’s international legal 
obligations by the House of Lords.46 Lord Hoffman’s judgement illustrates the lesson: 
(para 97)   
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with 
its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as 
these.  
 
                                               
45 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 US. 557 (2006) and A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, [2005] 3 WLR 1249. However, while Iraq may have destroyed 
President George W Bush and made Barrack Obama possible, it is worth noting that no one has been called 
to account for instituting a policy of torture, or for changing the rules.  
46 A & Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 
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Ironically, the US military had themselves drawn up the rules that culminated in the 1947 
Nuremberg trial United States of America v. Josef Altstöetter et al, 47 the only case in 
which lawyers have been investigated and prosecuted for carrying out professional duties 
which crossed the line into criminality.  Just over half a century later, it transpires that 
violence directed by the Bush administration had been in plain violation of international 
rules, but also in plain violation of President Abraham Lincoln’s 1863 disposition that the 
USA does not do cruelty.48 There is no difference between those who torture, and those 
who order the torture and changes to the agreed rules should not be undertaken, in effect, 
at gunpoint. Spencer Tracy’s character, Judge Dan Haywood, in the film Judgment at 
Nuremberg delivers his final verdict, foreseeing a time when the USA would seek to 
justify using the means of the enemy, “to rest survival upon what is expedient”: 49 
How easily it can happen. There are those in our own country too who today speak of the 
“protection of country” – of “survival”. A decision must be made in the life of every 
nation at the very moment when the grasp of the enemy is at its throat. Then, it seems that 
the only way to survive is to use the means of the enemy, to rest survival upon what is 
expedient – to look the other way. Well, the answer to that is “survival as what”? A 
country isn't a rock. It's not an extension of one’s self. It's what it stands for. It's what it 
stands for when standing for something is the most difficult! Before the people of the 
world, let it now be noted that here, in our decision, this is what we stand for: justice, 
truth, and the value of a single human being.  
V. FIGHTING IN THE MIND AND SPOILERS 
Not only can backsliding to violence occur, but receptivity can also be undermined by 
spoilers. Spoilers are particularly problematic for paused-conflict governance. Where 
they succeed, the results are devastating. Hutu extremists’ rejection of the Arusha Peace 
Accords in 1994 led to over one million Rwandans dying in less than three months 
(Melvern 2000). Jonas Savimbi’s refusal to accept the outcome of the 1992 UN-
                                               
47 Trials Of War Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Order No 10: 
Nuremberg, Oct. 1946-Apr. 1949, 3 (Vol. Iii 1951) (citing US. v. Altstoetter, 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948) 
48 General Orders No. 100 to the Armies of the United States in the Field (“General Order”), art 16 
(commonly referred to as the Lieber Code of 1863 after Dr Francis Lieber the Professor of Political Science 
who assisted in drafting them). These rules were later largely codified into international treaty law by the 
Hague Regulations of 1907. 
49 Judgment at Nuremberg (1961, USA)  
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monitored elections in Angola took the country back into civil war (Stedman 1997). 
While this thesis is not concerned directly with peace negotiations, spoilers are 
nevertheless a feature of paused-conflict governance, and the way perceived spoilers are 
approached early on can impact to varying degrees on Leviathan pacifying. Spoilers will 
not necessarily destroy peace if robust strategies are adopted with consensus (including 
internationally) recognising the force of normative power (critical mass) and reinforcing 
receptivity and tiring. There is no such thing as total peace; a contested peace is likely as 
various groups and individuals reach a point where learning precipitates trying out new 
rules. Therefore, toleration must be given to participants in a peace process within reason 
as they work through their issues – without justifying violent spoiling or “peaceful” 
spoiling. Most importantly spoilers must be recognised and limited as much as possible. 
 
Spoilers as a subject of scholarly research have been fairly unexplored. Stedman (1997, 
2000) clarifies, spoilers are those actors or groups who believe that emerging peace 
threatens their power, their outlook and interests. Therefore they react by spoiling – using 
violence to undermine, hinder or delay attempts to achieve peace. Spoilers differ in goals 
and their commitment to achieving them. As such, Stedman identifies three types of 
spoilers: those whose goals are immutable, seeing the world in all-or-nothing terms; those 
who have specific goals that may or may not be negotiable; and those who are greedy and 
calculate cost and risk. A broader view of spoilers are any actors that are opposed to 
peaceful settlement for whatever reason – including those who are originally “in” the 
peace process but then withdraw or threaten to obstruct, or parties to the process who are 
not actually committed to a peaceful endgame (because they do not care either way, are 
too aggrieved to move forward or see new nonviolent opportunities for personal/group 
enrichment) – in effect “peaceful” spoiling (Mac Ginty 2006a; Newman and Richmond 
2006). When extremism of violence is transferred into extremism of politics, even 
democratic politics, spoiling can continue by other means. However the label “spoiler” 
should not be ideologically directed at those who reject, for example, the formula state. 
Spoilers may even be external parties such as Diaspora communities, political allies or 
other entities.   
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i) Violent spoilers  
Violent spoilers are generally easiest to identify. DDR is already treated as an integral 
part of the peace process but often in a discreet fashion (Date-Bah 2003). It needs to be a 
central part of the ongoing paused-conflict governance strategy. Reintegration of those 
who carried arms (defence force, militias, rebel groups, child soldiers, freedom fighters, 
ordinary men and women) is hard. Previously armed groups often claim ongoing rights 
and hold knives at the throat of the transitioning society. War veterans in Zimbabwe, for 
example, have demanded a pension for life, destroying the national budget. They have 
taken land. The question is what to do with these trained people. Alternative strategies 
for violence or “muscle power” must be reinforced with such groups and at the same time 
their distinctiveness as a group must not be reinforced (pensions in Zimbabwe created a 
separate privileged group). This requires a holistic approach focusing on retraining and 
education initiatives, jobs and therapy – in an effort to keep them busy and allow them to 
reorient into “normal” society and become vested in the peace process (For the wider 
strategy, see: United Nations 2009). The challenges of DDR programmes are to be more 
embedded in the overall paused-conflict context and to present viable alternatives.  
Otherwise, such actors may backslide to violence. 
 
Outright greed is often the primary motivation, with violence itself creating opportunities 
for profit.50 The continuation of violence, rather than military victory, is primary to certain 
groups. In Sierra Leone, the exploitation of diamonds by both sides to the 1990s conflict 
fuelled violence and rendered the peace agreements meaningless. While debate reigns as 
to whether the conflict was contested over the diamonds or merely with the diamonds 
(Newman 2006), the continued violence during and after the “peace process” 
demonstrates the link between the spoils of war and spoiling.  
 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), fighting over the valuable mineral-rich 
regions of eastern Congo characterised the conflict. Unlike Norway or Chile, most 
                                               
50 Regional linkages (trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, supporting neighbouring regimes) 
are associated stresses, not to mention developed world governments and companies who benefit from the 
natural resources (oil, natural gas, mineral coltan, drugs and diamonds).  Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Namibia were all implicated in predatory economic exploitation of the civil war in DRC and 
85 companies were reported as in breach of OECD standards. See: United Nations Expert Panel, 'Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ', 
(S/2002/1146; New York: United Nations Security Council, 2002). 
140 
 
resource-rich countries (think Sudan, Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Ache/Indonesia and Bougainville/PNG) are unstable, corrupt and have elites 
oppressive of minorities or other groups – the majority of the population does not benefit 
from the resource wealth (Ascher 1999; Ross 2001). Political scientists and economists 
refer to this as the “resource curse” or the “paradox of plenty”. In addition, the character 
and duration of conflicts can be seriously influenced by resources as time goes by, even 
if resources were not the origin of the conflict, thus complicating efforts for other 
strategies away from violence.  
 
Studies suggest that while some conflicts concern natural resources, they are seldom the 
sole or even main cause of conflict. Various governments (e.g. Norway, Canada and the 
UK) and the UN have worked to develop sanctions, corporate responsibility and 
financially transparent extractive industries, as well as the World Bank and others 
(Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005). As Williams and Picarelli (2005) explain, resource 
control and interdiction regimes have inherent limitations as they rely exclusively on 
“supply-side” controls. Treating the symptoms, rather than the causes of conflict and the 
war economies fuelling them, is not helpful. Effective, transparent and equitable resource 
management must be an integral part of good governance programmes for paused-conflict 
governance, a subject that will be returned to in chapter 7. 
ii) War by other means – “peaceful spoiling.” 
Receptivity in this thesis is a true shift in mindset/paradigm. Zimbabwe currently 
illustrates the point. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) operates 
in the political realm as opposed to Mugabe and ZANU-PF, who are still in war mindset 
(and who control the country’s security force). As Luttwak (1999: 38) states: “Peace takes 
hold when war is truly over.” It is possible that, even where groups are receptive to the 
alternative strategies, groups realise there are gains to be made in winning the war through 
indirect means. von Clausewitz (1993: 167) warned, in relation to Napoleon: “The 
aggressor is always peace-loving; he would prefer to take over our country unopposed.” 
Conflict transformation, necessary for paused-conflict governance, instead requires 
neither a win nor a defeat but a willingness to put aside a group’s particular view of 
history, justice and morality, to make sacrifices in the interest of peace and nonviolence 
and establish a common notion of justice. In the DRC the fundamental weakness of 
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groupism, albeit powerful groups, was identified by the EU Special Representative – they 
could not make the peace process fail and assume the responsibility for that failure 
without committing political suicide because the population overwhelmingly supported 
the peace process.  Therefore, the EU and other international actors employed a “name 
and shame strategy”. The resulting public condemnation forced the groups to rethink their 
positions (Ajello 2008). 
 
As such, receptivity should not be confused with a deadlock or a realisation that some 
impending catastrophe makes settlement ripe. Such timing considerations and perceptions 
originating in mediation/negotiation theory (Haass 1990; Stedman 1991; Zartman 2000, 
2001) are just that, intervention strategies of international players. They are highly 
contested, not least because they only explain the opening of negotiations, not the process 
and are in effect tautological as where mediation is unsuccessful errors in timing can be 
blamed (Schrodt et al. 2003). Regardless of the attractiveness of this simple metaphor, 
when parties reach a mutually hurting stalemate a settlement may indeed be proposed and 
the timing may be ripe; however, without a mind shift from war to new rules for 
governance and inclusive politics, these are not likely to succeed. They may, in fact, arrest 
positive peace (Luttwak 1999). In BiH, the criminal syndicates that did well out of the 
war still exist today and are embedded in and occupy vital positions in the state apparatus 
(Andreas 2004). Entrenched political corruption and rent seeking have undermined the 
rebuilding, eroded public trust in government (due to the relationships between criminals, 
politicians and the security sector) and impeded the creation of effective state institutions 
and the establishment of the rule of law. Cambodia in 1993 was ripe for settlement by one 
measure, but the reality proved otherwise. The international community allowed a power-
sharing arrangement without a genuine reconciliation between the parties and violence 
soon prevailed.  
iii) Mistaking the real spoiler in Cambodia 
Sometimes the overwhelming desire for peace can marginalise spoilers. There are 
obviously variables (position, number, location) which are pertinent. However, for 
paused-conflict governance, the ability to diagnose correctly the spoiler problem is a 
difficult task in the fog of peacemaking. Unlike many other post-Cold War conflicts, 
Cambodia’s was not characterised by ethnic or tribal conflict, but a struggle for political 
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power by four different groups (Chandler 1998). Under UN supervision, an international 
treaty was implemented by which the four contending Cambodian political parties – the 
Cambodian People’s Party lead by Hun Sen; the National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia led by Prince Sihanouk; the 
Khmer People’s National Liberation Front; and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (the 
Khmer Rouge) – along with other countries, regional powers and Security Council 
members – agreed to the details of conditions for a “comprehensive political settlement 
of the Cambodia conflict” with the hope of assuring “human rights, and the non-return to 
the policies and practices of the past.”51 
 
Marginalisation was certainly the aim of the UN’s subsequent Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) in deciding to include the Khmer Rouge, who had been responsible 
for the deaths of over two million people from 1975-1979, in the Cambodian peace 
process. The Khmer Rouge responded initially, but when it became clear they would not 
hold power (Heder 1996), they made threats to disrupt elections and return to war unless 
certain demands were met. These included driving ethnically Vietnamese people from the 
country and the complete destruction of the CPP’s  administrative structures – a party 
which had been installed in government (1979-1989) by Vietnam. The core agreements 
of the peace process could not accommodate such demands.  Since the Khmer Rouge 
could not be defeated militarily, it was hoped that peace would marginalise them (Solarz 
1990). To counter their propaganda, the UN established a radio station in the lead up to 
the elections. While attacks on the UN forces were common, the Khmer Rouge did not 
launch any attacks against the elections but neither did they disarm. While the UN’s 
approach to the Khmer Rouge may ultimately have been vindicated as their power 
declined (Stedman 2000), by treating them as having goals that were immutable, the UN 
missed a chance to induce more cooperative behaviour (Peou 2002). Throughout the 
transitional period, the Khmer Rouge had actually displayed a great deal of cooperative 
behaviour, and contrary to predictions, did not engage in a sustained campaign of terror 
or intimidation of voters (Heininger 1994). The Khmer Rouge leadership ultimately split 
and disintegrated. However, the attention directed to it allowed for a much ‘quieter’ 
spoiler to manipulate the peace process.  
 
                                               
51 Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, UN Treaty No, 28613, 
Concluded at Paris on 23 October 1991, title and preamble. 
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The CPP led by Hun Sen52 began violating human rights and intimidating both political 
opponents and civilians in the lead-up to the elections.  Signs were evident early on, 
regardless of the warnings of UNTAC human rights officials, when CPP opposed the UN 
Security Council’s call for proportional representation electoral system in favour of 
“winner-takes-all” single member constituencies, hoping this would deliver a monopoly 
on political power (Peou 2002: 512). As UNTAC military force commander, Lt General 
John Sanderson (1994: 18) observed: “the corruption of the peace process began in 
Phnom Penh”, when Prince Sihanouk (later King) on his return to Cambodia attempted 
to form alliance with Hun Sen and, after a series of orchestrated demonstrations against 
representatives of the Khmer Rouge, ran them out of the city on their arrival for peace 
talks. When Prince Ranariddh’s (Sihanouk’s son) FUNCINPEC ultimately beat CPP – 
despite its best efforts to demonise FUNCINPEC as a front for the Khmer Rouge, showing 
a never-ending search for “enemies” – CPP refused to accept the results and rioted. 
Fearing civil war, particularly since the CPP still controlled the armed forces, the UN 
agreed to a power-sharing arrangement which afforded CPP greater power and more 
ministerial postions than its electoral performance deserved.  The overwhelming 
emphasis placed on the Cambodian election was to the detriment of “secondary” aims 
such as demobilisation and disarmament and human rights protection. Yasushi Akashi, 
the UN Secretary General’s special representative, acknowledged that the deal was 
“unorthodox by universal democratic principles” but defended the “practical wisdom” of 
combining FUNCINPEC’s political appeal with the governing experience and strength 
of CPP (Akashi 1993: 8). There is nothing wrong with innovative measures (with the 
“small” matter of who decides) but the UN failed to see that they were complicit in 
allowing the continuation of war by other means.  CPP’s increasing grip on power from 
1993 caused experts to warn of “creeping coup” (Doyle 1995). Interestingly efforts by 
FUNCINPEC to integrate the remaining Khmer Rouge looked promising after Pol Pot’s 
surrender in June 1997 and plans to recognise formally the constitution, disband its 
governing body and join government forces (Thayer 1997). However, Hun Sen and his 
party staged a coup, sending Prince Ranariddh into exile, assassinating FUNCINPEC 
officials and pro-democracy advocates. They manipulated the peace process to win, by 
other means, a war that they could not win through armed violence. 1995 is identified as 
                                               
52 While presented as a “moderate”, Hun Sen had previously been a member of the Khmer Rouge. Before 
rebelling against Pol Pot in 1978 he allegedly had been one of Pot’s most enthusiastic lieutenants in 
massacring Vietnamese.  
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the year Cambodia’s democratic forces were marginalised by traditional elites reinforcing 
factional hierarchy and the monarchy (Lizee 1996). 
VI. BEGINNING THE SHIFT FROM WAR BY OTHER MEANS TO MAKING 
BELIEVERS IN THE PEACE PROCESS 
A policy of sufficient inclusion means that all groups in conflict must be included – 
particularly those who have the power to bring the process down with violence (Hampson 
1996).  
 
While power sharing and electoral design strategies are intended to avoid polarisation and 
chauvinism, the enormous resources of the liberal peace (finances, political power, 
international legitimacy, etc.) and the monolithic nature of the enterprise to the determine 
of alternative forms of peacemaking, are an attractive prospect to many actors in the 
conflict.  Elections do not make democracy. Any residual emphasis on elections followed 
by the enactment of constitutions marking the conclusive transformation of conflict sorely 
misunderstands conflict transitions and romanticises constitutions as well as elections.  
 
First-past-the-post systems have long since fallen out of favour for states emerging from 
conflict. Kenya’s 2007 deeply flawed elections and rioting, for example, were preceded 
by a host of difficulties regardless of the rose-tinted-glasses rosy view of relative stability 
since 1991. The Kikuyu and previously the Kalenjin tribes practiced winner-takes-all 
style politics, excluding and discriminating against other (mainly tribal) groups. A broad 
coalition of opposition parties from different ethnic groups came together in 2002 to 
overthrow the 24-year dictatorship of President Daniel arap Moi. The new government 
signed a memorandum of understanding to share power but in 2003 the Kikuyu revoked 
this agreement. A notable feature of Kenyan society was one of ethnic enclaves akin to 
apartheid. Kenyan political scientist Ngunyi asked his country the following question in 
2003, a year after the Kikuyu leader President Kibaki came to power:  
Consider a hypothetical situation here. What would happen if President Kibaki decided 
to run for re-election in 2007 and lost? Would he and his men have the grace to hand over 
power peacefully? From the way they have behaved in the last one year, I doubt it. And 
where would that leave the country?  
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In Liberia, the implementation of the 1996 peace agreement brought an end to an eight-
year long civil war. Elections in July 1997 were judged to be generally free and fair by 
international observers. Charles Taylor was victorious and became the president.  The 
UN and other peace-builders declared the mission successful and largely withdrew. 
Shortly thereafter President Taylor began to reverse the fragile and preliminary 
movement towards democracy and reverted to a paranoid form of autocratic rule that all 
but put an end to organised opposition. There was nothing to stop him doing so because 
tiring with violence had not yet translated into institutional mechanisms to check power. 
After renewed civil war, he was finally ousted in 2003. 
 
Generally systems which give voters more than one vote or allow candidates to be ordered 
preferentially are seen as providing the space for voters to cut across preconceived group 
boundaries – such as proportional representation (post-apartheid South Africa, BiH), 
mixed member proportional (Lesotho) or preferential systems (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Northern Ireland, Republika Srpska). The latter’s alternative voting system was strongly 
advocated for in the 1990s to foster moderation between (ethnic) groups (Horowitz 1990, 
1997; B. Reilly 2001).53 Pooling votes was purported to encourage conciliatory political 
parties and the formation of “resilient” intergroup coalitions. The failure of such strategies 
is evident. In Fiji extreme parties advocated voting preferences for parties further away 
on the political spectrum than parties which were closer (A. Ellis 2006). The result – 
moderate parties finished last – and coups prevail. A similar pattern was evident in BiH’s 
Republika Srpska 2000 presidential elections.  
 
However, the International Peace Academy case studies of constitutional design reveal 
no clear choice of electoral system and highlight the difficulty in trying to use elections 
to engineer particular outcomes, such as moderation or inter-group compromise (Kristi 
Samuels and Wyeth 2006). Employing mechanisms for free and fair elections, securing 
campaign and voting environments, educating voters and guaranteeing women’s 
participation are in many ways straight forward, well outlined in literature and practice 
                                               
53 Particularly with ethnic groups in mind, it was thought that a preferential ballot would help flush out 
second and third preferences – obviously moderate parties – which would traverse the ethnic divided. More 
conciliatory stances on ethnically divisive issues are likely to be adopted, it is argued, as parties are 
incentivised to attract support from elsewhere.  
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(see for example: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2002; 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2007; The United Nations 
2005).  Elections, which after all are a contest for power, legitimise winners and winners 
could be spoilers.  
 
Peace can hide or even license the continuation of war by other means. For this very 
reason, a vocal minority argues against the erroneous belief in the democratising power 
of elections, proposing instead they should not necessarily take place immediately 
(Crocker and Hampson 1996; Paris 1997: 82-83; Walzer 1996). 54 Holding flawed 
elections can “traumatise” a country when violence returns, reinforcing the notion that 
weapons are a better source of power, or that the people’s choice is ultimately 
meaningless (Ottaway 1998: 150). Elections only make sense when a framework is in 
place which guarantees a modicum of the rule of law and security for citizens. The actual 
impact of elections remains an open debate. Taking too long to hold elections can breed 
mistrust, but interim governments may reinforce receptivity and provide the necessary 
space where the true tipping point from conflict to peace will be revealed.  
 
The interest structures must change, and as the Northern Ireland case below illustrates, 
this can take a considerable amount of time.   
i) Northern Ireland – tiring, holding together, moving on, maybe? 
Sometimes poor decision-making or insufficient buy-in with regard to spoilers early on 
still has a way of working out if groups can be held together for long enough so that 
“normal” life can function. In Northern Ireland, exhaustion with violence occurred in the 
1990s after over 3,500 deaths (1969-1998) from a conflict that had seemed as 
interminable as it was vicious (Fay et al. 1999). Tens of thousands of people were injured. 
Massive social and economic damage occurred. Britain publicly maintained a position 
                                               
54 In BiH, the OSCE had to certify that the “social conditions” existed for elections to be effective (Dayton 
Accords, annex 3, art 1(2)), and this was done, reportedly under pressure from the US. See: Marynard 
Glitman, 'Us Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach', Survival, 38/4 (1997), 66 - 83 at 78. The 
result was that the power of extremist nationalists was consolidated and the country’s division into separate 
ethnic enclaves, completed.  The competition of democracy means that holding elections in divided 
societies may reinforce societal differences, allow for the manipulation of intergroup differences and 
instead of working for the broader public good, foster parochial exclusiveness. Adversarial politics 
sharpening conflict in divided societies rather than fostering tolerance, found in Bosnia, or Angola, but also 
Rwanda, Sudan (Muslim v Christian), Sri Lanka, Ethiopia.  
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that it would not engage with the IRA.  However with the passage of time at crucial 
moments there was, indeed, contact through informal channels (Mac Ginty et al. 2007). 
Talk proved the only way out in the three-cornered conflict between the large British 
Army and militarised police force, the IRA and other smaller pro-united Ireland militant 
group, and pro-UK militant groups.  
 
The IRA and nationalists (mainly Catholics) wanted an end to British rule in Ireland – to 
unify with the rest of Ireland – and waged war to that effect. Local protestants were often 
targeted, giving the conflict its sectarian flavour. The majority protestant unionists 
(although a minority across the whole island of Ireland), wanted Northern Ireland to 
maintain its constitutional status as part of the UK (Elliott 2000; MacKay 2000). In a 
unionist Northern Ireland, nationalists felt discriminated against and in the late 1960s this 
often led to violent protests. Bombings and shootings resulted in causalities of politically 
uninvolved civilians, a disproportionate number of whom were young working class 
males (J. Reilly et al. 2004). Excessive reaction from the predominantly unionist police 
force provoked the emergence of militant groups on both sides – nationalists and 
unionists. British soldiers were dispatched to restore order. Conflict then ignited between 
the British army and the IRA, with unionist militants also attacking the IRA and its 
support community. The Northern Ireland Parliament was suspended in 1972 and 
governed directly from London.  
 
With time, the strategy adopted by the British and the Irish (Republic) governments was 
to engineer a settlement that would attract support from both communities. The result – 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1986. The inclusion of IRA militants contradicted the 
previous strategy of demonising violent actors, and this was difficult for the unionist 
majority to accept. Through the agreement, however, the British government recognised 
the constitutional aspirations of the nationalists as legitimate and also that the Irish 
Government could be a partner in the management of the conflict. It is this 
institutionalised relationship that has underpinned the peace process. 
 
The militant organisations first had to show an interest in peace through word and deed. 
By 1994, the paused-conflict peace was unstable, dependent on speedy and successful 
talks to accommodate sharply varying preferences regarding the country’s future. In 
February 1996, the IRA exploded a lorry bomb at London’s Canary Wharf, frustrated at 
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the slow pace of the British government in instigating multi-party negotiations. For the 
next 17 months, they carried out low level (compared to pre-1994) attacks in Northern 
Ireland. Care was taken not to harm civilians. A change of leadership in the UK (Tony 
Blair, elected in 1997) re-energised the talks which developed into multiparty 
negotiations between political parties leading to a comprehensive peace accord in April 
1998 (the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement), the establishment of a power-sharing 
government, and relationships with the Republic of Ireland and the UK. A referendum 
quickly approved of the agreements – 71.1 percent of voters were in favour (Coakly 2008: 
103) 
 
While the peace process suffered many shocks and setbacks such as broken ceasefires, 
the collapse of the power-sharing government, communal tension and violence from 
splinter groups, the process held. This is because of the intergovernmental relationship 
between successive British and Irish governments – who acted as guardians of the peace 
– and the lack of appetite among the militant groups and their support communities for a 
return to full-blown conflict. Even disaffected members of the IRA – the Real IRA and 
the Continuity IRA – were unable to attract much support once Sinn Féin was admitted 
to political negotiations. The Omagh bombing on 15 August 1998 killed 29 civilians and 
injured hundreds more – both Protestants and Catholics. Thought to be the work of the 
Real IRA, it provoked a wave of revulsion and mobilised the Nationalist community into 
a rejection of violence and spoilers (Dingley and Kirk-Smith 2000). 
 
All groups in the peace process were included in the peace negotiations. Penalties for use 
of violence were clear with parties obliged to sign up to principles of non-violence or face 
exclusion (Mac Ginty 2006b). An Independent Monitoring Commission adjudicated on 
alleged cease-fire breaches and recommended penalties. “Acceptable” (low level) 
violence was tolerated in order to keep the groups together.  Sinn Féin initially tried to 
fudge the issue of disarmament, fearing that it meant total surrender. The IRA eventually 
disposed of a first set of weapons in October 2001, and two further sets before 
decommissioning the remainder of its armoury in 2005. Unlike the Haitian examples 
given earlier, violence is no longer the means of getting things done. It is only a spoiler 
activity. Martin McGuinness, deputy first minister and leader of Sinn Féin (also second 
in command of the IRA in Derry, Dublin – by his own admission) (BBC 2010):  
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Our experience demonstrates that the way to deal with any disputes or contention is 
through dialogue and agreement. There are numerous examples that show this to be the 
way forward. We are currently consulting on legislation that aims to provide a workable 
framework for dealing with contentious parades. Let's be clear there is no excuse for the 
violent scenes and attacks on police, property and the community that we have witnessed 
in recent days. We are resolute in our commitment to tackle sectarianism and will 
continue to work with all communities to promote good relations. This will require the 
community to stand united against all those forces seeking to bring conflict back on to 
our streets. 
 
The Independent Monitoring Commission’s latest report (2010) affirms that the IRA’s 
leadership remains committed to the political path (para 4.4) 
 
Political spoilers were another obstacle. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) thwarted 
the peace process by boycotting the negotiations leading up to the Belfast Agreement, 
campaigning vigorously against the agreement in the subsequent referendum and refusing 
to attend executive committee meetings (despite being part of the power sharing 
agreement) because of the presence of Sinn Féin. They blamed Sinn Féin and the IRA for 
the Omagh bombings and their election campaigns in the early 2000s were unashamedly 
anti-peace process (Democratic Unionist Party 2003: 6-7):  
Sinn Féin/IRA’s… so called ceasefire is a mere illusionary tactic, used to advance 
terrorist activity over the last five years and beyond, demonstrates that the IRA has not 
gone away but is continuing to re-arm and perpetrate terror, even while in government.  
And having won power through the ballot box in 2003, the DUP were able to cease further 
implementation of the Belfast Agreement.  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the peace process was judged a failure. It had led to “a 
continued and protracted stalemate beyond serious hopes of revival” (Peatling 2004: 5). 
Northern Ireland illustrates the weakness in placing too great an emphasis on “ripeness” 
and “mutually hurting stalemates.” While relatively peaceful in terms of physical 
violence, and a positive example in dealing with certain types of spoilers, the peace 
process initially seemed to fail to transform the attitudes that underpinned the conflict. 
Instead, the 1998 peace agreement bolstered continued allegiance to traditional single 
identities by legitimising, via the power-sharing arrangements, Catholic nationalism and 
Protestant unionism (McAuley and Tonge 2007).  Evidence of this can be seen in the 
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increasingly polarised voting patterns in post-agreement elections where the hard-line 
DUP and Sinn Féin, outpolled the more moderate Ulster Unionist and Social Democrat 
& Labour Party (despite the leaders of both winning the Nobel Peace Prize). The 
Assembly has been suspended on several occasions, the longest suspension running from 
14 October 2002 until 7 May 2007. Powers then reverted to the Northern Ireland Office. 
 
Perhaps there are indeed circumstances where elites leading opposing parties representing 
the most militant strands on each side can cooperate and present alternative strategies to 
violence or war by other means. Early optimism over the peace process was unfair for 
there was never going to be a quick fix in light of two inclusionary processes – both sides 
being fixated on the Westphalian sovereign state and two groups attempting to impose 
their preferred form of integration on those that did not want it. Today, Northern Ireland 
has agreed to accommodate two distinct national communities that span two states. 
Peatling’s conclusion now seems less clear-cut. In 2006, only 24 percent of those 
surveyed felt confident that Ian Paisley and McGuiness would be able to work together 
as first minister and deputy first minister. By mid-2007, however, with the two men 
heading the new government that figure shot up to 67 percent (Coakly 2008: 106). The 
right institutional incentives have propelled these parties towards more moderate 
platforms. Following talks that resulted in the acceptance of the St Andrews Agreement 
in November 2006, an election to the Assembly was held on 7 March 2007, and full power 
was restored to the devolved institutions the next day. Some nine years after the peace 
agreement was signed, the formerly extremist parties agreed to become consuls in 
government together, dividing portfolios using the d’Hondt method explained in the 
previous chapter. There is evidence of facilitated moderation rather than polarisation 
(Garry 2009). Although disagreement between the parties over the devolution of 
responsibility for policy and justice led to a five-month government hiatus in 2008, an 
agreement was reached towards the end of the year. And further tension, such as the 
dissident republic violence of May 2009 where two soldiers and a policeman were 
murdered, was strongly condemned by Sinn Féin. Powers in relation to policing and 
justice were transferred to the Assembly on 12 April 2010. 
 
Northern Ireland may be moving out of its “no war no peace” phase (between points 3 
and 4 on Figure 2 above). It is not however a model for other conflicts but a product of 
its own unique context. With a fall-back position of being ruled from London, it also may 
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be the only conflict where rubbish was collected weekly, so to speak – the media was 
free, civil society was growing, and extensive human rights and equality legislation 
existed. It also lacked the problems associated with conflict states in the developing world 
such as “hostile neighbours, lootable natural resources and the multiplicity of armed 
groups that contribute to the vastly more complex peace implementation environments in 
other locations” (Stedman 2000). Here Stedmen is referring to the lack of complex social 
emergencies such as public health catastrophes or large-scale population displacements 
which characterise many civil wars, Northern Ireland has achieved – with much stumbling 
along the way – a complex power sharing arrangement. One that has been designed to 
prevent majoritarian rule and polarising blocks of power, thus perhaps affording it an 
opportunity to pacify slowly.  
 
Bougainville, on the other hand, is one of the best examples of renouncing violence and 
accepting peaceful strategies to begin the learning that comes next.  
VII. BOUGAINVILLE – FROM CIVIL WAR TO “PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS.” 55 
Bougainville’s decade-long civil war (1988-1998) was the most brutal in the Pacific post-
WWII.  The fear of “others”, as well as longstanding rivalries and tensions, saw 
individuals and groups become increasingly engaged in violent conflict.  People were 
injured and killed, 56 along with damage and destruction of public and private property 
which nearly destroyed the social and economic infrastructure (Joint Standing Committee 
on Foreign Affairs 1999b: 13). Conflict arose partly over issues concerning the enormous 
Panguna copper and gold mine owned by the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
and Conzinc Rio-Tinto of Australia Limited (later, after a merger, Rio Tinto Limited with 
Anglo-Australian owners)57 and also growing demands for independence from PNG.  
Independence demands had intensified from the 1960s onwards (Alley 2003: 226-31), 58  
                                               
55 Concept introduced by John Hayes, former New Zealand High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea, in 
Port Moresby (personal conversation on file with Andrew Ladley) and adopted by the Bougainvilleans. 
56 Directly or indirectly 10,000 – 20,000 people died during the conflict. Some as a result of Bougainville 
being cut off for a period by the PNG government which resulted in social services not being delivered. 
57 By the late 1980s, taxes on the Panguna mine accounted for one third of the national budget. 
58 Bougainville is an island 1000km northeast of Port Moresby, PNG. It has more in common (culture, 
ethnicity, tradition and geography) with Solomon Islands. At the end of the nineteenth century, the islands 
of Bougainville and Buka (today Bougainville’s two main islands), as the north Solomon islands, were 
portioned off from Solomon Islands and made part of Germany’s existing New Guinea colony in a deal 
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and the ethno-nationalist character of the conflict solidified as the PNG Defence Force 
(PNGDF) reacted in “poorly judged” and “ill-disciplined” ways (Regan 1998b: 277). 
Gregory Singkai, the Catholic Archbishop of Bougainville at the time, condemned the 
violence (Carl and Sr. Lorraine Garsu CSN 2002: 9):  
They are really unruly and undisciplined. They are bashing people without questioning 
them and putting them in jail. They are destroying people’s property, shooting cars, 
destroying their food gardens. People are really scared of them. Many innocent people, 
old people, women and children are being slaughtered. 
In 1990, the violence worsened significantly. On February 14 the PNGDF appeared to 
have been responsible for the death of six people suspected of being ‘militants’ in what 
became known as the St Valentine’s day massacre. Five bodies were dropped at sea from 
Iroquois helicopters supplied by Australia’s Government purportedly on the condition 
that they would not be used in combat (Dorney 1998: 40-41).  
 
The resulting legacy of fear and suspicion of the PNGDF consolidated Bougainvilleans 
(initially) behind Frances Ona and his Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). A 
Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) was also appointed. However, neither of these 
bodies had control over the BRA fighters who were mainly frustrated young men with 
few economic opportunities (some little more than criminals).  These men focused on 
perceived enemies within Bougainville – those suspected of cooperating with the PNG 
government or those seen as wealthy (i.e. the village of Ieta was burnt by men from the 
poorer mountain areas), not just the common enemy (PNGDF). With the common enemy 
officially off the island by mid-1990, many group-based disputes erupted resulting in 
harassment, imprisonment, torture and murder.  Joseph Kabui, Vice President and de 
facto leader of the BIG (Ona being the President) admits they realised early on they 
brought about anarchy. And this consequentially caused division and infighting amongst 
people who had once been united: clan against clan, generation against generation, class 
against class (Kabui 2001: 33).  Traditional and new rivalries (over power) along with the 
                                               
with Great Britain. PNG gained independence in 1975. Bougainville self-determination was denied despite 
potentially being a viable state with rich natural resources. Bougainville eventually agreed to remain part 
of PNG with a degree of autonomy through a provincial system of government. The borders created by the 
colonial powers split family and cultural ties established over generations. For a history of the partition and 
subsequent administrative role of Australia, see: Brenda Tohiana, 'Weaving Bougainville Together. Re-
Building Broken Communities: Restoring a Shattered Society', in Arlene Griffen (ed.), Lalanga Pasifika: 
Weaving the Pacific - Stories of Empowerment from the South Pacific (Suva: University of the South 
Pacific, 2006), 164-238. 
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associated attacks on civilians and human rights abuses, ultimately prompted armed 
opposition – Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF) (Boege 2006b: 6).  
 
The conflict may have been triangular –between Bougainvilleans and the PNG 
government forces and between the BRA and the resistance. However changing 
allegiances, little command and control across those forces and even fighting within the 
groups made Bougainville an increasingly violent place creating a lawless vacuum of 
civil strife (Regan 1998a: 279). Boege (2006a: 5) observes how the violent conflict 
produced “payback” where losses and fighting became a cause for even more fighting, 
prompting a vicious circle, indeed a culture, of violence. By 1997 Regan observed social 
disintegration, direct casualties, much suffering and indirect deaths from the breakdown 
of services and blockage of medicine and supplies, severely damaged infrastructure, and 
around 60,000 people (a third of the population) were in care centres where they then 
suffered at the hands of the PNGDF (Regan 1998b: 279; 2001). Directly or indirectly the 
figure of several thousand (Regan 2010: 26) to between 10,000 -15,000 (Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 1999a, 2.1) in a population of approximately 160,000 
civilians died either by direct fighting, disease, or deprivation of basic needs. In addition 
the economy had stagnated, educational opportunities for a whole generation were 
missed, and most of the impressive capacity (strong community support and revenue 
base) of Bougainville’s provincial administration was destroyed. 
 
Between 1990 and 1997 tentative moves toward peace were stymied by distrust, reneging 
on promises and further violence (including the Endeavour Accords 1990, Honiara 
Declaration 1991, Arawa Peace Conference 1994, Mirigini Charter 1994. See: 
Braithwaite et al. 2010: 26, 31-32, 35-36). The road to a paused conflict situation occurred 
after the Sandline Affair and the development of moderate leadership looking to bridge 
the deep divisions within Bougainville as well as a mood change within the general 
population towards peace. The peace movement evolved during the mid-1990s led by 
women’s groups, churches, NGOs, chiefs of Bougainville, who initiated indigenous 
conflict resolution practices assisted by moderate leaders on all side (Braithwaite et al. 
2010; Saovana-Spriggs 2010: 40). Former Judge Theodore Miriung became a rallying 
point for those prepare to negotiate with the PNG government.  While murdered in 1996 
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by PNGDF soldier (Report of Coroner T. Suntheralingam 1996)59 – the transformative 
civil-society push for peace he championed had planted seeds of doubt in the mind of 
inner-circle BRA leaders (Kauona 2001). A further boost to the peace framework 
occurred in 1997 when the PNGDF revolted over the leaked government plan to employ 
private mercenaries from Sandline International to defeat the BRA and take control of the 
mine (see Andrew 1997; Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 1999b: 29-39; 
O'Callaghan 1997). The resulting constitutional crisis led to the resignation of Chan 
provoked international condemnation and ended any option of a military solution. 
 
Bougainvilleans realised that they needed first to reconcile with each other before settling 
differences with PNG, and also that this should not be rushed. For it was not the mining 
and commercial representation issues that assumed direct roles in the peace settlement 
and subsequent reconciliation and peace-building, but other often longstanding issues, 
some ephemeral, which characterised the conflict. Women’s groups, churches and chiefs 
had begun to pressure the conflicting groups to negotiate for peace (Tapi 2002). Women 
acted as go-betweens with the warring factions to maintain constructive dialogue and 
mothers tried to bring their sons home by venturing into the bushes, even negotiating 
directly with the local BRA in the south and southwest regions (Carl and Sr. Lorraine 
Garsu CSN 2002: 28-31). Few schools were operating, the blockage was hurting with 
medical supplied difficult to get: “They were in desparate need of freedom from fear and 
freedom of the mind – there was a whole generation that didn’t know what that 
meant”(Kauona 2001: 85). 
 
The role of women as has been identified as “pivotal” – as a predominantly matrilineal 
society and one in which Catholicism and the worship of Mary accentuate the women’s 
roll as custodians of the land afforded them status and influence, particularly with their 
direct family members. In times of crisis matrilineal links that were the relationships that 
had been relied upon for garnering support and allies (Oliver 1973: 68-74; 1991: 6) and 
on mass, they had had enough of the violence (Josephine Sirivi and Havini 2004). The 
significance of their influence and opinions on fighters across sides has been documented 
                                               
59 There is some suggestion that it was actually the resistance. See: Guy Wilson-Roberts, 'The Boungainville 
Conflict, an Historical Overview', in Rebecca Adams (ed.), Peace on Bougainville (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2001) at 29.  
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in interviews conducted by Reddy (2006: 226) and also in the experience and 
determination of Bougainvillean  in to accentuate  the readiness for peace and learning 
collected by Sirivi and Havini’s  (Josephine Sirivi and Havini 2004). 
 
The savagery and brutality of the conflict shocked people in a society were violence and 
conflict was limited including against women (Nash 1992; Oliver 1973: 201). Previously 
existing society practice identified the rhythms of life having to be restored after the tribal 
conflict which was traditionally short-lived. But this conflict as well as causing casualties 
amongst fighters has seen attacks on civilians, assassination and murder, destruction of 
villages and rape and torture as a form of punishment and domination by one faction over 
another. The availability of weapons has been identified as making this easier (Reddy 
2006: 220). 
 
Brigadier Roger Mortlock, the New Zealand head of the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), 
reported back the observation of BIG deputy leader, Joseph: “There is a desire for peace 
sweeping this land, and if we, the leaders, want to keep our jobs, we had better sit up and 
take notice of it” Kabui (Mortlock 2001: 71). This desire was so strong that 
Bougainvilleans refused to let Ona or his loyal Me’ekamui faction60 derail the process, 
despite orders to kill peace process leaders and intimidation (Kauona 2001: 86, 92). The 
masses who wanted peace (90% in Kabui’s view), helped appease fears of a “loose 
cannon” taking a pot shot at a member of the TMG and left incidences, such as opening 
fire on the helicopter carrying New Zealand diplomat John Hayes (an incident that New 
Zealand chose not to publicise to the world), without any reprisal (Kabui 2001: 38; 
Mortlock 2001: 73).  
 
                                               
60 The Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF) was formed as a separate paramilitary force in 1998 after 
differences with the BRA over tactics and continued engagement with the peace process. Ona was 
concerned that this was diluting the BRA’s independence objectives, declaring Bougainville the Republic 
of Me’ekamui (a word Nasisi word meaning ‘holy land’) and himself President. The MDF did not all remain 
outside of the process, in fact, Damien Dameng’s participation brought in a number of other members and 
a partial reintegration of members into the peace process occurred. Ona however, remained outside, until 
his death in 2005. The MDF under the leadership of Chris Uma, continued to be separate, not recognising 
the Autonomous Bougainville Government, although in April 2010 they gave their support to President 
James Tanis who said he could work with the splinter group if re-elected, after signing an agreement for 
continuous dialogue and an alliance to work together for Bougainville’s future. See: Andy Carl and Sr. 
Lorraine Garsu Csn (eds.), Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea - Bougainville Peace Process, ed. 
Celia Mckeon (Accord, 12; London: Conciliation Resources, 2002) at 89. an, Pacific Islands Broadcasting 
Corporation, 'Rebel Group Backs Bougainville President', Islands Business Monday 17 May 2010. 
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Peace talks held in New Zealand first addressed intra-Bougainville conflicts including 
almost 100 leaders (women’s groups as well as the Kauona and Kabui,  the new premier 
of the Bougainville Transitional Government Gerard Sinato and Bougaivillean MPs 
elected to the new PNG Parliament). Lasting over ten days these involved a traditional 
vomiting sessions where emotions are vented without restrained. This can be spoken, 
shouted or cried out –  in other words, a kind of venting of psychological poisons. In a 
2004 interview Reddy captures the spirit of Burnham I:  
 
There were no specific procedures—we went into the room with NZDF in between our 
factions—we were ready to throw punches. The vomiting session united us and from then 
on we stood back as one. The BRA and the BIG were housed together, but separate from 
the Resistance. There was real enmity. It was really very difficult. Someone would shout 
to another person, ‘You shot my brother, you murdered my brother’. And they would 
jump across to do violence but the NZ military were in between. This went on until 
nothing was left inside. The women played a very important role, they would say ‘Look, 
I am here, there is my son over there, and over there is my other son. And all of you, you 
are all our sons.’ During this time, there was no agenda and it was so important to vomit 
it all out. (Reddy 2006:228) 
 
As the talks developed and moved on to include the PNG government, “peace by peaceful 
means” became the accepted wisdom of the Bougainville peace process. Mortlock 
introduced the metaphor of a river – flowing from its source to a final destination – not 
in linear fashion, but meandering around rocks, sometimes running freely and at other 
times barely moving, but always continuing to flow. The receptive groups in Bougainville 
understood this image, and it helped to build trust and confidence in the process. Gerard 
Sinato, the Premier of the BTG in 1997 took ownership and used the phrase constantly 
(Kabui 2001: 40). This language became part of the Lincoln Agreement on Peace, 
Security and Development on Bougainville signed on 23 January 1998 (hereafter the 
Lincoln Agreement): 
 
Peaceful Means  
The parties will cooperate to achieve and maintain peace by peaceful means. They also 
pledge to renounce the use of armed forces and violence and agree to resolve any 
differences, by consultation, both now and in the future. They confirm also their respect 
for human rights and the rule of law.  
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Peace by peaceful means held the process together for the Bougainville Peace Agreement 
signed on 30 August 2001. The opening paragraph of which reads:   
This agreement is a joint creation by the Government of the Independent State of Papua 
New Guinea and Leaders representing the people of Bougainville ("the Parties") to 
resolve the Bougainville conflict and to secure a lasting peace by peaceful means… 
 
The agreement gave autonomy to the region and allowed for the containerising of all 
weapons. Kabui observes: “The weapons were their source of confidence, comfort and 
protection for well over a decade of conflict. To put away their most trusted ‘friend’ is 
indeed an act that was unthinkable only a few years ago.” (Carl and Sr. Lorraine Garsu 
CSN 2002: 64). Awareness of the need to settle helped solidify a consensus on the 
principle that the territory could not function in future – whatever its status – outside an 
institutionalised dialogue between Bougainville and PNG authorities. Violence, would 
not help either side in this regard.                                                               
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Receptivity is the move away from violence to the acceptance of other strategies for 
dealing with conflict. Where positive, disarmament, reconciliation attempts and complete 
buy-in to the peace process are evident.  The decline of violence worldwide has had 
profound results. However least this become a license for complacency, it is recognised 
that peace exists because people were revolted by the experience of violence in their time 
and created rules to contain it. The articulation of a better way needs remembering, as the 
recent furore over the violent methods used against those suspected of terrorism 
illustrates.  In this regard, Bougainville represents the wisdom in reinforcing receptivity, 
specifically through the mantra of “peace by peaceful means”, and recognising the value 
in reconciling groups before moving to establish concrete governance strategies which 
could exacerbate existing rivalries. Receptivity, where positive (as opposed to strategies 
that simply continue war by other means), creates a platform to negotiate rules of 
governance based on agreed learning – the theory of the next chapter.  
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The challenge may still be to devise governance institutions and electoral rules which 
encourage serious candidates to be moderate and seek significant cross-factional support 
– but there is no magic formula in this regard. Rather than focusing on free and fair 
elections, fostering mechanisms that will change attitudes and expectations in the 
direction of building confidence in peace are required.  International actors can assist in 
directly funding citizen’s organisations, and associations build cooperation between 
groups in war-shattered societies, in order to prevent exclusionist groups from 
monopolising political life, and to build “social capital” (Putnam 1995).  Women, as 
Bougainville shows, are not only often the majority in populations devastated by death 
and displacement, but are a tremendous resource for conflict transformation and should 
be treated as equal “owners” in peace efforts.  
 
Where these is no sufficient consensus on positive strategies for peace, singular identity 
groups flourish, war continues, and enemies must still be found and dealt with. Often the 
allure of the rewards of the state apparatus masks war weariness and quickly is revealed 
as the continuation of war by other means.  Strategies to deal with spoilers in this regard 
vary from the well-established practices of DDR to the more difficult ways in which to 
foster moderation in politics. Moderation may only occur if groups can be held together 
for long enough to see the merits in tempering seemingly entrenched positions, or be 
forced to do so by the wider population.  
 
In the next chapter, we turn to learned constitutionalism which continues the themes of 
experience and learning and represents a more focused look at the past and the future of 
the paused-conflict society in question. In creating new systems, elites all over the world 
(in varying degrees of the concert with their peoples), reached for new rules. 
Overwhelmingly, those rules were, at least in form, democratic constitutions. Democracy 
may be the best endgame currently foreseeable but, rather than reverse-engineering, 
dealing with the past (reconciliation) and imagining a future (governance, 
accommodating multiple and overlapping group identities), requires local ownership and 
the embodiment of that particular society’s own struggles, battles and ensuing lessons. 
The point at which this learning materialises in the acceptance of new rules for 
governance is when Leviathan may be pacified. 
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6: Learned Constitutionalism – 
learning lessons for governance  
I. LEARNING LESSONS 
In stable democracies after years of war and conflict, lessons were eventually learned to 
articulate the suffering of the past and ways to avoid the capacity of humankind to do 
violence – the repetition of conquest, of civil war, of slavery, of overwhelming civilian 
casualties, and of torture and mutilation as routine punishment.61 In these societies, the 
rejection of violence turned into accompanying political support for constitutionalism that 
transformed them into inclusive, peaceful states.   
 
Where change happen swiftly (and sometimes peacefully) this is a sign that incremental 
peace-building has reached what others have called a critical mass (Rogers 1995), or a 
tipping point (Gladwell 2000) or even, a stage of “ripeness” (Zartman 1985). However, 
giant steps in learning on the surface are more likely the result of the slow and less visible 
experiences and decision-making processes. Such as those shaped by the past and an 
imagined future (perhaps through peace conferences) that culinate in the articulation of 
new rules that are owned by the people. There are many examples in history where ideas 
seemed to take suddenly hold – such as the major social movements in the 19th and 20th 
centuries concerning national struggles for independence from colonial rule (Norway, 
India for example) and working-class movements for union collective bargaining rights. 
After the Great Depression, the vulnerability of democracy in Europe was faced with 
fierce ideological challenges of fascism and communism. In the UK, the small number of 
“black shirts” (the British Union of Fascists) was crushed by middle-class values, most 
notably when violence was added to the mix. In other places, different results emerged 
which spread the learning over generations as trial-and-error processes of regime 
                                               
61 For a general overview of such lessons, see books on human rights’ development such as Helen Stacy, 
Human Rights for the 21st Century (Standford: Standford University Press, 2009). 
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alteration occurred (R. Rose and Mishler 1996). This is not to say that democracy is the 
end of history, but rather that the liberal state’s Leviathan has made peace with itself 
under current threats and conditions.  
 
The precise moment that receptivity tips into new rules of governance is challenging to 
pinpoint. After the fact, it may be easy to identify factors leading up to the change but at 
the time, as Gladwell (2000: 12) explains, the tipping point is: “the moment of critical 
mass, the threshold, the boiling point”. Similar to the processes that bring about collective 
madness, the level is when momentum for change becomes unstoppable. A critical mass 
is a crucial factor; it is not necessarily enough that elites want to assist change as they 
may not be able to control their respective groups or that the mass of individuals 
desperately yearn for something more but are held in check by an authoritarian regime. 
Contest will always be there, but the mass of individuals, leaders, ex-combatants, victims, 
all of whom firstly need to reorient from violence (exhaustion), must take the time to 
reconcile, to build the constitution and rules of the game – becoming believers in the 
process, discussing the issues, strengthening the rules, defending them, remembering. It 
is only then that groups may be willing to come together for governance through the 
perception of shared interests, of commonality, or security, contributing towards the 
generation of a web – albeit a fragile one – of alternative identities that can reduce the 
salience of the identity conflicts and division discussed in Chapter 4, and, instead, create 
larger groups constituted around governance.  
 
Traditionally, this process is thought to be embodied in the waves of constitution-making 
which have followed the creation of states. Therefore the omnipresent status of 
constitutionalism in post-Cold War, post-conflict settings, should signal that constitution-
making is a widely agreed upon and understood the phenomenon. Yet few within the 
dominant discourse of liberal peace-building see constitutions as truly embodying 
particular polities’ own struggles and battles, including attempting to project forward with 
contextually appropriate guiding rules based on learning. Instead scholars of 
constitutionalism like Howard (1991), view constitutionalism in line with a Diceyan 
interpretation of the British constitution (consent of the governed, limited government, 
the open society, sanctity of the individual, the rule of law, enforcement of the 
constitution, and adaptability), which are acutely foreign to the kind of learning required 
in post-conflict contexts.  
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Transplanting of imported and hence unfamiliar constitutional forms has been criticised 
but repeatedly resuscitated. Not surprisingly, paused-conflict states find it impossible to 
govern themselves with model solutions which fail to consider the richness of the 
national, cultural, political, and temporal context. It is argued here that romanticising 
constitutions based on a rose-tinted glasses’ view of modern constitutional triumphs such 
as the USA’s independence constitution, has implications for learning and reflects a 
flimsy appreciation of groupism and exhaustion. This is vividly apparent in the American 
constructed constitution of BiH that formed part of the Dayton Accords.  The absence of 
learning – including dealing truthfully with the pain of the conflict period in order to 
establish a “usable past” – translated into constitutions means that it impossible for 
countries to practise constitutionalism and imagine a shared future. It is only then that 
rules and creeds can emerge, be codified in constitutions and in conventions and in 
cultural rules of government that continue to develop, be institutionalised, articulated in 
court decisions, recorded in historical narrative, heard in leaders’ oratory and perhaps 
assisted by international actors. 
II. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In Modern Constitutions, Wheare (1966: 1) defines constitutions as: “the rules which 
establish and regulate or govern the government.” Constitutions are often described as  
“power maps”, deriving their mandate from the governed and regulating the allocation of 
powers, functions and duties among various agencies and officers of government, as well 
as defining the relationship with the “governed”. In other words, constitutions form the 
main source and basis for governmental rulemaking and are primarily designed to check 
against capricious or arbitrary rulemaking. This power map may be found not in a single 
document but also in key rules (written or otherwise) such as human rights’ charters (i.e. 
EU Declaration on Human Rights), parliamentary codes of conduct, the role of the 
military, accepted societal practices – even peace treaties. A “constitution” is actually 
made up of structures, processes, principles, rules, conventions, and even culture that 
comprise the ways in which government power is exercised (Palmer 2006). 
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In Western democracies, constitutions are somewhere in between the two models outlined 
in the literature (Habermas 1998a; H. Lerner 2010; Muller 2007) in the way they conceive 
of identity – the nation state constitution (strong national identity, perhaps homogeneous 
but could be imagined)62 and the liberal procedural constitution creates “the people” (the 
private sphere of religious and ethnic identity separated from public sphere of civic or 
“thin” identity).63 A combination of thick identity elements – religious, linguistic, national 
– meshes with liberal principles and human rights, and, most importantly, a wide societal 
consensus exists regarding the foundational elements of the constitution.   
 
The distinction between constitutions and constitutionalism is more than mere semantics 
(Curry et al. 1999: 4). Constitutionalism is the act of being controlled by the rules, not 
limited only by the desires and capacity of those who exercise power (Wheare 1966: 137). 
But it is more than that; constitutionalism is closely linked to the rule of law. 
Constitutionalism requires political justice (Rawls 1996: 4-35). For Rawls, political 
justice has three features: 1) a specification of certain basic rights, liberties and 
opportunities; 2) an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties and 
opportunities, especially with respect to claims of the general good; and 3) measures 
assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties 
and opportunities. Many constitutions seek to build what we might call a ‘charter’ of 
values to set a course for the relationship between the citizens/peoples and the re-
imagined state. Unsurprisingly, inclusiveness and non-discrimination are generally at the 
heart of such charters.  In new states founded upon complex identities, and often 
competitive religious denominations, suggestions of the perpetual dominance of one 
group would smack of racism, apartheid and religious bigotry. These claims of 
fundamental values were often contained in preambles to a constitution, or in the early 
sections.  They are also social constructions of history and identity – the state claiming 
new governance and values for a wholly new group (Liu and Hilton 2005). 
 
                                               
62 Examples of this include constitutions which establish a national language (France), an official state 
religion (Iceland, Norway) or privilege “ethnic” citizens (ie. Germany’s immigration laws up until 1999). 
63 The US constitution is a good example of the people coming together through the constitution with shared 
democratic procedures being the binding force of the new polity. See: Bruce Ackerman, We the People: 
Foundations (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1991). 
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In that regard, this thesis argues for an even more expansive definition of 
constitutionalism – learned constitutionalism.64 The Constitution of the USA starts with 
the phrase, “We, the people ...”. This makes sense on the basis of the assumption of such 
a pre-contractual “we”. History is full of examples illustrating the rules and creeds that 
have emerged out of learned constitutionalism. The federal conventions of the 1890s in 
Australia, 65 the Magna Carta 1215, 66 or the UN Charter 1945 – which in many respects 
is the mother of all constitutions. The process of learned constitutionalism, therefore, 
encompasses the processes and mechanisms which led up to the decision to create a new 
“constitution”.67 
 
Liberal learned constitutionalism has emerged from the particular historical context of 
the societies in questions with many familiar elements such as the separation of powers, 
the review of the constitutionality of laws and the control of the amendment. However 
the tendency to propagate and adopt model forms of institutions and rights that experts 
are convinced will address particular problems of governance or social conflict in paused-
conflict states has been criticised but repeatedly resuscitated. As Learned Hand said 
(1959: 190): 68  
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, 
no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. 
 
                                               
64 The literature uses the terms “constitution-making” and “constitution-building” interchangeably to refer 
to the immediate processes of writing, enacting and implementing a constitutional document, with or 
without international involvement. Arguably “making” is narrower – encompassing the immediate task of 
drafting and implementing the said constitution. “Building” implies an ongoing process but neither of these 
terms is used in any defined way here because of the haphazard and uneven use of these terms in peace-
building literature.  
65 Records of the Australasian Federal Conventions of the 1890s, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/pubs/records.htm (last accessed 19 August 2010) 
66 Much of the Magna Carta has disappeared into history; however the protection of the rights of citizens 
against the limited power of government – which at the time was the agreed outcome of the civil war 
between King John and a number of his barons – is today at the heart of the rule of law and of 
constitutionalism itself. 
67 Ghai and Galli recognise this distinction generally in relation to the future evolutionary process of 
nurturing the text. 'Constitution-Building Processes and Democratization: Lessons Learned', in Reginald 
Austin, Najib Azca, and Feargal Cochrane (eds.), Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Further 
Reading (2; Stockholm: International IDEA, 2007), 232-49. 
68 Hand originally made this observation in a speech, The Spirit of Liberty, at an ‘I Am an American Day’ 
ceremony in Central Park, New York City, on May 21, 1944. This precise citation is often used in the USA 
to warn against reliance on judicial review as a mechanism for avoiding the implementation of 
unconstitutional legislation. Hand was however focused on constitutionalism itself. 
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In post-conflict contexts, it is society’s exhaustion with violence and accompanying 
support (or critical mass) for new rules by which the Leviathan is pacified. Learned 
constitutionalism is the idea that there must be clearly articulated lessons rooted in the 
historical experience, otherwise there is no “usable past” - the search for historical 
experiences which might be drawn on in the effort to legitimise and then stabilise 
governance after conflict, before the drafting of actual written constitutions and the 
building or rebuilding of institutions of governance. Rules and creeds can emerge, be 
codified in constitutions and in conventions and in cultural rules of government that 
continue to develop. Learned constitutionalism, therefore, refers to the wider picture – 
taking stock of the events leading up to the decision to create a new constitution or amend 
or reinstate and/or the other agreements and processes that might have constitutional 
effect, as well as the issues relating to making the constitution “work” with enough 
flexibility to adapt and be strengthened as the state solidifies over long periods. It can be 
enabled and facilitated by certain conditions, including appropriate international 
interventions. More obvious pointers of common identity come later: symbols, cultural 
traditions, customs.  
i) Waves of constitution making  
The history of constitution-making as the foundation of the state can, like democracies, 
also be seen in waves:  
 the late 18th century cases of Poland(1791), France and the United States 
(1787), preceded in 1701 by the UK’s Act of Settlement69 which along with 
the Bill of Rights 1689, are the cornerstone of the British (unwritten) 
constitution;  
 in the wake of the 1848 revolutions in Europe (see Robertson 1967);  
 after WWI including the Weimar Constitution of the newly defeated German 
state and the creation and recreation of  Poland and Czechoslovakia; and 
 after WWII with the adoption of new constitutions by the defeated powers 
under the “more or less strict tutelage of the Allied Powers” (Elster 1995: 369).  
 
 
                                               
69 An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject  
(12 & 13 Wm 3 c. 2). 
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The post-WWII period saw: 
 the beginning of the breakup of British and French colonial empires, which 
gathered speed in the 1960s and birthed a constitution production factory for 
new states modelled closely on those of their former colonial masters;70  
 the process of democratisation (or “deepening democracy”) saw new 
constitutions in Latin American and parts of Asia;  
 the fall of dictatorships in Southern Europe during the mid-1970s resulted in 
the adoption of new constitutions in Portugal, Greece and Spain; and 
 towards the end of the 20th century, the collapse of communism in 1989 
precipitated regime change in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, necessitating 
further constitution-making.    
In the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall, constitution-making has had to address 
fundamental institutional crises in addition to regime change. States “failed”, sometimes 
in the context of the collapse of communism and sometimes, as in parts of Africa (Nigeria, 
Zambia, Tanzania, etc.), as part of the wave of democratisation that followed the fall.  
However constitutional theory, until very recently, tended to focus on constitutions in 
stable political contexts, rather than their role during periods of political change. This is 
partly due to the post-WWII dominance of the realist approach in political theory, which 
saw constitutions as mere reflections of the balance of power at the time of drafting and 
did not consider them to have any particular role as agents of change or transformation. 
Of late there has been limited acknowledgment of ‘transitional constitutionalism’ – the 
constitutional development that occurs immediately after a period of substantial political 
change. As Teitel (1997: 2076) points out, constitutionalism is: “inextricably enmeshed 
in transformative politics”, can codify the prevailing consensus, and also transform it. 
Therefore, while a group of lawyers could produce an excellent constitution, 
constitutionalism has moved on from the notion that an expertly drafted constitution is all 
that is necessary.  
 
Constitutions are not a panacea for the problems of paused-conflict governance.  However 
in practice constitutions, like elections, are seen as the first key challenge for post-conflict 
peace-building to provide for political and governance transition. They determine the 
                                               
70 For example the constitution of the Ivory Coast was modelled on that of the Fifth French Republic, 
whereas those of Ghana and Nigeria followed the British Westminster model. 
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overall system in which people live together and are therefore also the starting point either 
for future turmoil or for societal stability and integration. While the liberal peace-building 
sees constitutions as recipes for conflict resolution, in this thesis they are mere ingredients 
(and representative of others) in the process of transformation – ingredients must be 
malleable to survive but pungent enough not to be overpowered by others. Given the 
instances of intra-state conflict reigniting, it is obvious that the struggle for political power 
during the paused conflict context is where the fight for sustainable peace really begins 
(and can end) and where exhaustion and identity dynamics can assist or alternatively, 
destroy the process. The implication of forced constitutions, sham constitutions, 
inflexible constitutions, the realist’s view of constitutions or the minimalist view 
(frequent and fair elections, freedom of speech and the press) should be apparent. Without 
learning being translated into constitutions, post-conflict societies cannot practice 
constitutionalism. 
ii) Uganda: constitution making after independence 
Uganda was put under British rule in 1895. The independence constitution paid no notice 
to the society’s traditional institutions, different ethnicity, customs and values, and 
especially, tribal and religious loyalties. Not surprisingly, it was replaced in 1966 and 
again in 1967 under Milton Obote. The practice of constitution-making in the 1960s 
Uganda was not tied to the processes of learning. There was no domestic tradition that 
had absorbed the lessons from the struggles akin to those between the English Parliament 
and the monarchy in the 17th century, the associated gradual evolution of an independent 
judiciary, or the society-wide changes that the industrial revolution produced, including 
the demand for universal adult suffrage and fair working conditions (Ladley 2010). 
Instead, it was independence, the uncontainable demand for it, which consumed Ugandan 
political leaders during this time.  
 
Ugandans suddenly had to begin the process of remaking their own history, learning their 
own lessons and capturing contested histories in a succession of remade constitutions. A 
mere three years after independence Prime Minister Obote suspended the constitution, 
overthrew the constitutional role of the King of the Buganda, made himself both president 
and prime minister, and abolished all the semi-federal kingdoms that had been part of 
Uganda’s tribal history. This led to an authoritarian presidential system and the “hell on 
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earth” (Furly and Katalikawe 1997: 243) which was Uganda during the 1970s and 1980s 
– a period characterised by the ruination of economic and social institutions; Idi Amin’s 
reign of terror under which many innocent people were murdered and tortured; a series 
of coups bringing about unstable and short-lived government; and at the same time, a war, 
in which the National Resistance Army (made up mainly of young men and child soldiers) 
ultimately triumphed bringing Yoweri Museveni to power.  
 
Uganda’s fourth and current constitution (1995) should have reflected the lessons of post-
independence. In being mindful of the past, the newly formed political party – the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) – wanted to produce a “good constitution”, to 
both validate their coup for the benefit of all (not a small group) and solve the country’s 
political, economic and social problems (Furly and Katalikawe 1997).  The emphasis 
placed on mass participation and widespread consultation, whereby a Constitutional 
Commission toured the country, educating people on constitutional issues as well as 
consulting, listening and receiving their memoranda, prolonged the process (four years in 
total). Accusations that this approach was a way to ensure that the NRM stayed in power 
for as long as possible were heard (Furly and Katalikawe 1997: 252). Some truth in this 
may have been proven by future events, but at the time, the NRM’s approach to 
constitutionalism was unprecedented not only in Uganda’s history (Waliggo 1994: 22) 
but for that matter in Africa (with the exception of South Africa) and maybe even further 
afield (some parallels could be drawn with the Canadian enactment of the Charter of 
Rights).  
 
Was it learned constitutionalism? The constitution did reflect learning in the preservation 
of human rights and particularly the protections afforded to women (art 33), in the 
constitution’s permanence, and the limits placed upon executive power.  However, like 
other African leaders who came to power after conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, believing 
themselves indispensable to their country’s national development, therefore, requiring an 
indefinite rule, nearly a quarter century later Museveni is still the President (a position he 
will contest again in 2011). 71 Uganda is a one-man-ruled state, part democratic, but 
                                               
71 A growing genre of “post-colonial autobiographies” on the lives of key leaders like Mandela (Lee Kuan 
Yew, Gandhi, Marcus Garvey, Joseph Ephraim, Casely Hayford, Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah) are 
written about as part of the history of government and country. The deep connections between the writing 
on individual lives and the narratives of nations emerging from colonialism, Holden argues has had 
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mostly authoritarian (patronage system, army at personal disposal, intimidation of the 
courts and media), with no real pressure from international parties or donors, and no 
strong united opposition (mainly due to the ban on multi parties which was only lifted in 
2005) or civil society to force change – unlike that clearly evident in the succession 
politics of Ghana, Kenya and Zambia.  Museveni has forgotten his own learning. Shortly 
after being elected President in 1986, he observed that the: “problem of Africa in general 
and Uganda, in particular, is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power” 
(quoted in Tangri and Mwenda 2010: 31-32). 
III. ROMANTICISING CONSTITUTIONS  
In common with Uganda’s experience, many post-colonial constitutions were quickly 
replaced in an array of experimentation with authoritarianism, one-party states, 
presidential systems, military government and socialism.  Some of the independence 
constitutions endured remarkably, such as those of India, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea 
and much of the Pacific (Widner 2008). However, over 200 new constitutions were signed 
in the thirty year period between 1975 and 2005 in countries at risk of internal violence 
(East Timor, Rwanda, Cambodia, the Comoros, Bougainville, and in the Balkans). The 
most recent wave of constitution-making has been prompted by the stabilisation/peace 
processes employed in fragile or conflict-torn states, many of which are in Collier’s 
Bottom Billion (2007) – those states that are in trouble for reasons of poor governance, 
resource curse, geography or simply bad luck.  All this effort has sparked scholarly 
interest in post-conflict constitution-making, not surprisingly. This will not be the last 
wave; many of these constitution-making processes are ongoing (i.e., Fiji, Zimbabwe, 
Somalia, and Nepal) and future events may well precipitate unexpected results –as 
September 11 2001, for example, did with military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
two new constitutions.   
 
Post-conflict constitution-making however, has the tendency to promote model solutions 
rather than learn and adapt to the richness of each new national, cultural, political, and 
temporal context. As Tushnet (1999: 1330) notes:  
                                               
profound effects on the formation of new national identities. See: Autobiography and Decolonization: 
Modernity, Masculinity, and the Nation-State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).  
169 
 
Under the pressure of time and the need for political compromise, a constitution’s drafters 
are likely to latch on to whatever solution is near at hand to the immediate problems they 
face. They will not have sharp understandings that the institutions they are creating have 
some necessary characteristics flowing from the very nature of the institutions. With 
respect to details, they are, in short, bricoleurs.  
As a result, constitution-makers tend to turn to history for models to follow, ideas to 
plunder and rely on international guides or experts. Replication is inevitable to some 
extent, but this propensity undermines the very goal of attempting to re/construct a 
particular society through learned, constitutional change. 
 
At the most basic level, constitutions are documents setting out principles by which a 
society is to be governed. The negotiation of a meaningful, social contract, accompanied 
by a mind-shift away from war and winning is another matter.  This raises the question 
of whether too much is expected of constitution-building?  It is possible that the western 
perspective on constitutions is a product of its own history and a dose of romanticism. 
 
The American and French transitions of the eighteenth century gave birth to modern 
constitutionalism, and more than two hundred years later every country in the world, with 
the exception of Israel, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (although arguably this 
has changed somewhat with the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1950 in UK domestic law), boasts a written constitution on 
the basis of the Enlightenment faith in modern constitutionalism. 
i) America’s Independence Constitution – an evolution 
The American experience was a much less defining break than the rupture characterising 
the events which happened in France.  Protestant interpretations of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition that were first secularised into political compacts and then incorporated into 
constitutions and bills of rights (Lutz 1988). The Constitution may have been born of 
revolution, but it was “well-heeled” one at that (Craven 2004: 10). The records from the 
period, such as the Federalist papers, show the key American political leaders were 
consciously trying to absorb the received lessons of the past, including ancient 
constitutional battles – the Magna Carta 1215 and Bill of Rights 1689 (UK) – and the 
pathologies of political power under other forms of government. Locke’s (1680-1690) 
inalienable rights of all humans and associated limits on political power, for example, 
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were used to critique the British government’s failure to respect justified revolution. 
Comparative political science was also scrutinised, from Machiavelli, Harrington, 
Montesquieu, Hume, 72 to the Scottish social and economic  theorists –Smith, Ferguson 
and Millar (Lutz 1984, 1988; Richards 1989).73  
 
The Declaration of Independence 1776 and the Articles of Confederation 1777, outlining 
how the national government would operate can be seen as American’s first national 
compact.  Immediate battles with the British provided ground for learning. The rejection 
of the British parliament’s attempts to tax them (even if the British had mounted hugely 
expensive military campaigns in North America against the French), was not simply 
based on the desire for independence, but because taxation violated the common law 
principles fundamental to both the legitimacy and proper interpretation of the British 
Constitution. Of paramount significance were the 17th century arguments of Lord Coke 
in relation to the tyranny of King James I, and the common-law principle of “no taxation 
without representation”, which was argued to have equal application to parliament as to 
the monarchy (Howard 1968: 139-50; Richards 1989). The failure of the Articles of 
Confederation to limit oppressive state power and grant central government essential 
powers for governance (Rosenn 1990: 3) were also at the forefront of the new experiment. 
While forward looking in agenda, the process was grounded in history, and the goal was 
clearly to establish a peaceful process to make governance decisions in the new polity – 
a goal that has been echoed in almost every preamble of a constitutional document ever 
since, including the UN Charter.  
 
During a momentous constitutional reflection process, one of the most creative and 
significant periods of constitutionalism in the modern period, the American experience 
                                               
72 Machiavelli’s (1469 – 1527) Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio (commonly referred to in English 
as The Discourses) outlines his republican thought and guided the constitutional framers.  James 
Harrington (1611-1677) in The Commonwealth of Oceana believed a strong middle class was best for 
stable democracy – “the doctrine of balance” - and that revolution was a consequence of the separation of 
economic and political power. His ideas are said to have been partly responsible for the direction taken in 
the US:  written constitutions, bicameral legislatures, and the direct election of the president. Hume (1711 
– 1776) had strong ideas on human nature and the corruptible beast that is political power and therefore 
was a strong advocate of federalism. The authors of The Federalist were overwhelming Humean in their 
epistemology of political science, although his ideas later fell out of favour, particularly with Thomas 
Jefferson.  Montesquieu (Charles-Louis de Sécondat, Baron de Montesquieu – 1689 – 1755) articulated the 
separation of powers’ theory in his 1748 L'Esprit des lois  (usually translated as The Spirit of the Laws). 
73 Smith’s, Ferguson’s and Millar’s later developments in political science, along with Hume’s and 
Montesquieu’s made Americans more skeptical of the continuing utility of the classical republican models 
that Machiavelli and Harrington had admired – particularly the classical republics of Rome and Sparta.  
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was not without a struggle. It did not even start in 1787 or indeed end there. A product of 
conflict between some of the colonists and the British, the “revolution” itself was strictly 
speaking a liberation struggle.   Constitution identity was consolidated only after the Civil 
War (1861-1865) and conflict amongst the colonialists (sometime referred to as the 
second American Revolution) (Richards 1992: 577). The Bill of Rights was not inserted 
until 1871 (comprising the first ten amendments).  
 
The original constitutional text was not the epitome of revolutionary democracy it is 
sometimes idealised to be. The constitution entrenched southern slaveholding power 
through the “three fifths” clause which granted the southern states greater representation 
and influence.74 This was bolstered by the slave importation clause, 75 which barred 
Congress from banning the importation of slaves until 1808 by not providing an express 
power to free the slaves; and the fugitive slave clause,76 which prohibited harbouring and 
protecting, so that slaves who had escaped and made to the ‘safety’ of a free state could 
be returned or reclaimed by their owners. The core constitutional identity, encapsulated 
in “all men are created equal”, 77 was not fully deployed until the abolition of slavery in 
1865, 78 some 76 years after the constitution’s enactment.79  
 
The constitution established a democratic form of government based on popular 
sovereignty; it did not however guarantee the right to vote, leaving this up to the states. 
White property-owning males were the sole enfranchised group in all but five of the 
states.80 Perceptibly, it was also only after the abolition of slavery that the constitution 
                                               
74 US Constitution 1787, Article 1, s2(iii) which declared that the slave population was to be counted at 60 
percent and added to the number of free citizens in a particular state to count towards representation in 
Congress. See: Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1981), and 'Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death and How 
It Was Made', Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration, 32 (2000), 230-
45.  
75 US Constitution 1787, Article I, Section 9, Paragraph 1.  
76 US Constitution 1787, Article IV, Section 2, Paragraph 3 
77 US Constitution, Paragraph 2 
78 US Constitution, Thirteenth amendment  
79 Condemnations of slavery exist. Madison for example, identified group political psychology based on 
race as one of the worst forms of faction: “the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man.” 
Speech by James Madison (June 6, 1787), in Max Farrand (ed.), The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) at 134. For a comprehensive account of attitudes towards 
slavery see: John P. Kaminski (ed.), A Necessary Evil? Slavery and the Debate over the Constitution 
(Madison: Madison House Publishers, 1995). 
80 Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania had restrictions based around whether one 
paid tax. Vermont was the only state (territory) to extend suffrage universally to every adult male without 
qualification. See: Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the 
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was amended in 1870 to provide voting rights for adult black males and a further fifty 
years before it was amended to apply to women.81 From time to time, Americans have 
been willing to make minor changes to the constitution but only in the civil war were they 
prepared to make major alterations. The Constitution is “successful” because it enjoys 
wide respect and obedience. Federal and state courts have played important roles in 
making the rule of law meaningful through their decisions, which have in turn almost 
always been carried out by federal and state executives, even the president.82 
 
Further evolution can be seen in the judicial action from the 20th Century to  provide equal 
protection at the state level to many (but not all) of the rights ‘guaranteed’ in the Bill of 
Rights, through a process of interpretation of the 14th Amendment. While conventional 
wisdom maintains this amendment has been a major success – with the equal protection 
clause providing the basis for the constitutional revolution that ended racial segregation 
and paved the way for equal rights for both women and African Americans - its very 
nature has been one of gradual explication of its meaning.   
 
Most of the positive developments can be seen in the post-1950 period – such as the 
desegregation of the South, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the protection of 
fundamental rights such as reproductive freedom83 – but the Supreme Court also 
institutionalised rigid levels of scrutiny into constitutional jurisprudence and therefore 
effectively limited judicial oversight to only a few areas.  Some argue that the promise of 
the 14th amendment has gone largely unfulfilled. Perhaps the greatest tragedy was the 
                                               
Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers Inc, 2001) at 315-31. 
81 US Constitution, Fifteenth and Nineteenth amendments  
82 In Cooper v Aaron 358 US. 1 (1958) the Supreme Court rules that states were bound by their decisions 
and could not chose to ignore them.  In 1973 they ruled on what states could and could not control with 
regards to abortion (Roe v Wade 410 US. 113 (1973)), on the practice of segregated schools in certain states 
(Brown v Broad of Education 349 US. 294 (1955)) and directed President Nixon to turn over tapes that 
contained information which ultimately cost him the presidency, in effect ruling that the president is not 
above the law (see United States v Nixon 418 US. 638 (1974)). They also allowed the publication of 
purloined Vietnam War documents that made up the “Pentagon Papers” which the Nixon government 
alleged would endanger national security (New York Times Co. v United States 403 US. 713 (1971)) and 
directed the return of a steel mill confiscated by the president because a proposed strike would interfere 
with preparation for Vietnam (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer 343 US. 579 (1852)). More recently 
in Boumediene v Bush 553 US. 723 (2008) the court ruled that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay as 
unlawful combatants could seek habeas review of their designation before a civilian court. 
83 Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954) held that the “separate but equal” doctrine had no place 
in public education; the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights during the 1950s and 1960s in cases 
such as Duncan v Louisiana 391 US. 145 (1968); and the decision in Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 
(1965) which upheld married couples’ privacy right to use contraception.  
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interpretation in Plessy v Ferguson, which held that laws separating the races were 
constitutional (Chemerinsky 1992).84   
 
Through romantic nationalism, the US constitution-making experience, and many that 
followed, with all its complexities has been condensed and repackaged out to current 
situations. The key lesson actually, is that the US Constitution evolved and endured – the 
framework established allowing for ongoing learning and adjustment (i.e. the 
Philadelphia Constitutional Congress of 1787, the ratification process of 1791, the 
amendments, the establishment of the Supreme Court 1805, judicial action in the 20th 
century ), in which the key institutions and actors have ‘negotiated’ and ‘learned’ ever 
since. Slavery and the secession of the South, however, challenged that framework and 
had to be settled by war.  
ii) BiH: the rose-tinted glasses’ view of constitution-making 
In the aftermath of WWII, the UK and its dominions offered hope – Westminster 
democracy was a living reality in Canada, Australia and New Zealand at a time when 
Germany, Austria, much of Latin America, and even the United States’ Supreme Court, 
had been left reeling. Ackerman (1997: 772) observed: “It was their culture of self-
government, their common sense and decency that distinguished their evolving 
commitment to democratic principles – not paper constitutions and institutional gimmicks 
like judicial review”. This culture developed over centuries and was then successfully 
transplanted through settlement to foreign shores such as New Zealand. The USA 
constitution-making process, along with the British, therefore, looks analogous in key 
respects to many learning processes that followed.  
 
However, the danger in romanticising constitutions is nowhere more vividly apparent 
than in the case of BiH. After the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the three-year, civil war 
in the territory of BiH ended with the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.85 Often cited as a 
                                               
84 163 US 537 (1896).  
85 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 
I.L.M. 75. This is an international treaty between the three neighbouring ex-Yugoslav states of Croatia, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro since 2003) and the Republic of BiH. The annexes 
are mainly agreements between the Government of BiH and the two entities that constitution the state: 
including the constitution (no.4), the human rights’ regime for the state (no.6), the repatriation of refugees 
(no.7). Surrounding this, but not strictly speaking formally a part of the Agreement, is a plethora of other 
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classic example of consociational power-sharing among the dominant ethnic groups in 
the country – the Bosniaks, 86 Coats and Serbs. The aim was to create a weak central 
government and give significant authority to the two, ethnically distinct, regional bodies, 
later confirmed as the Federation of BiH (the Federation) for the Bosniaks and Coats and 
Republika Srpska (RS) for the Serbs (art 2 and Mansfield 2003: 2057). Although the 
constitution designated an overarching, sovereign state incorporating the three groups, 
the entities own constitutions give them wide powers of regulation and enforcement over 
the kind of laws that affect their citizens. Only those legislative functions that touch upon 
BiH's international obligations is reserved by the centre (Szasz 1997: 2062) 
 
In retrospect, many commentators believe the Dayton Agreement is flawed (Aolain 1998 
; Szasz 1997); a “disaster” (Szasz 2000: 298); “Perhaps most damning to the 
consociational project are the incentives to validate and reinforce the ethnic cleansing of 
the Civil War period by this ethnic assignment of power” (Issacharoff 2004: 1887).  The 
entities with their own ethnic and religious power distribution have tied citizenship and 
political rights to ethnicity. The RS’s own constitution originally opened with a preamble 
(later amended, see below):  
Starting from the natural, inalienable and untransferable right of the Serb people to self-
determination on the basis of which that people, as any other free and sovereign people, 
independently decides on its political and State status and secures its economic, social 
and cultural development; 
Respecting the centuries-long struggle of the Serb people for freedom and State 
independence;  
Expressing the determination of the Serb people to create its democratic State based on 
social justice, the rule of law, respect for human dignity, freedom and equality;  
… Taking the natural and democratic right, will and determination of the Serb people 
from Republika Srpska into account to link its State completely and tightly with other 
States of the Serb people ....  
It continued by declaring itself a “[s]tate of Serb people and of all its citizens” (art1(1)). 
The constitution ensures that the official language is Serbian and while article 28 
“guarantees” freedom of religion, it specifies that “[t]he Serbian Orthodox Church shall 
                                               
arrangements between the US and European states (the sponsoring states) including arrangements for the 
High Representative and various UN documents.  
86 This group originally called themselves Muslims but changed to “Bosniaks” or “Bosniacs” later on.  
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be the church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion”. The State also 
materially supports the church and “co-operate[s] with it in all fields and in particular, in 
preserving, cherishing and developing cultural, traditional and other spiritual values.” 
There is no mention of Islam or Catholicism, the religions of other groups. This is a 
constitution which falls into the first model discussed early – the nation state – creating a 
governance order based on the homogeneity of the Serbian population, or in other words, 
exclusion of the others. 
 
For any non-Serb to return to their pre-war home in the territory of RS, they must accept 
permanent subordinate status in the Serb dominated (88% of the population) and 
controlled entity. Only Serb members of the state-common institutions are elected from 
RS and, therefore, a non-Serb could not  represent the people or meaningfully participate 
in the electoral or democratic processes in that entity. The same pattern with reserve 
ehtnicities is true for the Federation. Ethnic assignments of power it seems, have been 
used to settle historical scores. During the civil war, the Serb population in the territory 
went from 54.3% to 96.8% and the Bosniak population fell from 28.8% to 2.2%.87 The 
BiH Constitutional Court later found:  
[A]fter the Dayton-Agreement came into force, there was and is systematic, long-lasting, 
purposeful discriminatory practice of the public authorities of RS in order to prevent so-called 
"minority" returns either through direct participation in violent incidents or by abstaining 
from the obligation to protect people against harassment, intimidation or violent attacks solely 
on the ground of ethnic origin ...88 
  
Within the common institutions of the national state of BiH, the pattern ethnic control 
being linked to political authority is replicated.89 All common institutions are governed 
                                               
87 Historically the majority of Yugoslavia’s population were Serbs, mainly residing in the poorer southern 
areas of country. They were dominated by the Turks, and later by the more economically advanced Croatian 
and Slovenian populations in the northern parts of the country. Request for Evaluation of Constitutionality 
of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Constitution of the Federation of 
BiH, Case U 5/98-11I, Partial Decision of July 1, 2000, para 131 
88 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Request for Evaluation of Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Constitution of the Federation of BiH, Case U 
5/98-11I, Partial Decision of July 1, 2000, para 95 http://www.ohr.int/dwnld/dwnld.html?content_id=5853 
89 According to its constitution, the centre remains responsible for the development of “trade, customs, 
monetary, immigration, asylum and foreign policy, the financing of the state institutions and their 
international obligations, international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, operation of common and 
international communications’ facilities, regulation of inter-entity transportation, and air traffic control”. 
BiH Constitution, art 3 (1). All other governmental functions and powers are delegated to the entities (art 
3(3)) 
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by tripartite executives made up of the same recipe – an equal division of Serb, Bosniak 
and Croat – and where the checks and balances are honed to a fine degree.  For example, 
the presidency consists of three representative members who rotate the position of the 
chair (art 5). An “executive impasse” (Mansfield 2003: 2058) can occur whenever a 
particular decision is seen to be “destructive of a vital interest of the entity from the 
territory from which he was elected” (art5(2)(d)). Vital interests are not defined. Perhaps 
euphemistically it means where group interests are threatened, legitimately or otherwise. 
Ethnic power distribution (art 4(1) and (2)) cause similar problems in the Upper House 
of Peoples and the Lower House of Representatives of the bicameral Parliamentary 
Assembly (see: Morrison 1996; Szasz 1997). The practical reality is that almost every 
important issue is deadlocked (McMahon and Western 2009: 73). The end point of 
disagreement is a referral to the Constitutional Court. 
 
The Constitutional Court is the sole exception to the ethnic paralysis of post-Dayton and 
is entrusted to uphold the constitution (art 6(3)) and to decide on disputes arising under it 
(art6(3)(a)). An ethnic impasse is avoided through three of the nine members being 
foreigners.90 Without any pre-learning, the court has become the forum for challenging 
the constitutionality of the Dayton Agreement itself.91 Focusing on the original preambles 
of the constitutions of the entities, 92 the court held:  
Segregation is, in principle, not a legitimate aim in a democratic society. It is no question 
therefore that ethnic separation through territorial delimitation does not meet the standards of 
a democratic state and pluralist society as determined by…the Constitution of BiH... 
Territorial delimitation thus must not serve as an instrument of ethnic segregation, but-quite 
the contrary-must provide for ethnic accommodation through preserving linguistic pluralism 
and peace in order to contribute to the integration of state and society as such (para 57). 
 
                                               
90 See Articles 6(1)(a) and (b); the three members are selected by the President of the European Court of 
Human Rights “after consultation with the Presidency”, and cannot be citizens of any neighbouring country.  
91 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Request for Evaluation of Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Constitution of the Federation of BiH, Case U 
5/98-11I, Partial Decision of July 1, 2000. This case was brought by Bosniak Alija Izetbegovic, the then 
chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina . Izetbegovic had objected strenuously to the final form 
of the Dayton Accords as hammered out by Serbian President Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman. 
Ultimately, however, Izetbegovic was forced under pressure from the US. to accede to the ethnic 
assignment of power through the territories. See: the account of the US Ambassador: Richard Halbrooke, 
To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998) at 308-09. 
92 Partial Decision, The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina similarly provides that 
"Bosniacs and Croats as constituent peoples... [act] in the exercise of their sovereign rights." 
177 
 
The legacy of Dayton was then directly addressed: 
It is beyond doubt that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska were 
– in the words of the Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation, signed in Dayton 
10 November 1995 –  recognised as "constituent Entities"…But this recognition does not 
give them a carte blanche! Hence, despite the territorial delimitation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by the establishment of the two Entities, this territorial delimitation cannot serve 
as a constitutional legitimation for ethnic domination, national homogenisation or a right to 
uphold the effects of ethnic cleansing (para 61). 
 
The Court has therefore interpreted the Dayton Agreement as having tried to facilitate the 
re-establishment of the multi-ethnic state existing prior to the civil war. However, the 
ruling and subsequent striking down of the entities’ preambles was cautious and did not 
rule on the repatriation of ethnic refugees. The Court declared all people equal and upheld 
individual rights, but did not reject the obvious special collective rights which in effect 
create powerless minorities in each entity. This cautious judgment is compounding 
further, as the former president of the Constitutional Court, Kasim Begic (2000), 
confirmed, by the participation of foreign judges. This provides a guarantee of 
independence, but the court was still clearly divided with a five (foreign and two Bosniak 
Judges) to four votes (Serb and Croat dissenting).  
 
There is no agreement on an imagined future on BiH. Of the three groups, only the 
Bosniaks want a democratic, united, majority-ruled, centralised state. The Serbs reject 
any notion of a common state (Szasz 1997: 762). The world community favoured the 
single-state model with no change in boundaries which largely overlaps with the 
Bosniaks’ position, except that the international parties were willing to settle, as has been 
illustrated above, for an arrangement that would be acceptable, even marginally, to the 
other two groups (London Conference 1992). Unlike the South African experience 
discussed below, the different groups were kept apart during the negotiations with an 
American team moving between them. There was no attempt or indeed opportunity for 
the groups to see if they agreed upon anything, or even if their understanding of the text 
was the same. Unsurprisingly none was particularly enthusiastic to enter the foreign-
shaped arrangements and a number of “carrots and sticks” were offered. In a cruel twist 
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of fate, the person representing the Serbians was not even a Bosnian, but the President of 
Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic.93 As Paul Szasz (1997: 764) concludes:  
The truth is that they [the groups] were largely bludgeoned and partly bribed into putting their 
initials and (a few weeks later in Paris) their signatures to texts that none of them had any 
significant role in developing. 
 
If success is based on ending the civilian slaughter, then the Dayton Agreement and 
appended constitution were undoubtedly triumphant. However, applying the agreement’s 
own measure of “success”, full compliance with its provisions does not exist. Therefore 
the Office of the High Representative, established in 1995, continues to oversee the 
“peace” settlement.94 International referees were probably the only option to supervise 
the transition period, but their failure is not an indictment of such measures. Their task is 
made impossible because the constitution itself does not embody learned 
constitutionalism or indeed any understanding of groupism. Ethnic segregation, in this 
case, cannot simply be dismissed as organic, but is partly the product of a legal and 
constitutional order that has cemented single, identity based groupism into its structure. 
Critics of Lijphart’s power-sharing agreements argue that such measures can only work 
if groups can cooperate and comprise, and if leaders are committed to maintaining unity 
(Horowitz 1985; Issacharoff 2004). Nothing in the Dayton process has done anything but 
generate dissent. The danger of focusing so heavily on the three groups is that tensions 
and difference among these groups are magnified and exacerbated. And at the extreme 
end of intolerance is pure racism.95  Lijphart (1977: 47-50) himself acknowledges that a 
government by groups for their groups may water down  fundamental rights according to 
individuals by international law and representative democracy. 
                                               
93 President Karadžić was banned from the talks after being indicted for war crimes. Of more serious 
concern for the process however, was the fact that Milošević also represented the then Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and on many crucial points did not consult with or take advice from the Bosnian Serbs. See: 
Paul C. Szasz, 'The Dayton Accord: The Balkan Peace Agreement', Cornell International Law Journal 90/3 
(1997), 759-68 at 763. 
94 See Article II of Annex 10. The Office can also impose legislation and remove officials who obstruct 
implementation.  
95Within the two entities school textbooks have been sanctioned which present historically inaccurate and 
prejudicial accounts of the conflict. Educational qualifications are not recognized in the other entity. Recent 
law has eliminated some of these problems by putting in place a universal curriculum and facilitating wider 
recognition of school certificates. However schooling is still operated in many of the cantons, particularly 
in the Federation, as a “two schools under one roof system” whereby those children from different ethnic 
groups either have lessons at different times or in separate parts of the school building. See: Janine Natalya 
Clark, 'Bosnia's Success Story? Brcko District and the 'View from Below' ', International Peacekeeping, 
17/1 (2010), 67-79.  
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Chandler (2000) believes that the peace process in BiH would have had greater success 
if Horowitz’s model had been employed. Others argue that the society is so deeply divided 
along ethnic lines, and an exclusive focus on individual rights at the expense of collective 
group rights would lead to serious problems, possibly violence (Mansfield 2003: 2084). 
Of course democratic theory and international law should be flexible with regard to 
models to further domestic harmony. However in BiH the strong relationship between 
ethnicity and citizenship creates perverse incentives and fosters continued segregation 
through the entities. The only incentive is to move to the entity that represents the 
respective, ethnic group in order for greater political cohesion, influence and power. The 
constitution could instead have acknowledged this de facto partition and structured the 
incentives accordingly (no EU funding unless compliance with minimum standards, 
refugee repatriation, etc.) or have fostered post-war integration. Indeed, there is one 
example of this outside of the two monolithic entities: the small self-governing Brĉko 
District (northeast). Despite being the site of some of the worst war-time violence, today 
Bosniak, Croat and Serb communities live in relative ‘harmony’.  
 
Throughout the rest of BiH, the conflict has simply changed its form, shifting to state 
institutions – a war by other means. While violence is at least limited, the rhetoric largely 
remains the same. Unlike the increasingly moderate language evident in Northern Ireland, 
in the last four years, ethnic chauvinism from the leaders of the three groups has 
intensified, bringing any hope of reform to a standstill (McMahon and Western 2009). 
The International Crisis Watch (2010) reported in April of the continuing “provocative” 
statements of RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, including the “peaceful divorce” of the 
entities. In early 2010, a full fifteen years after the signing of the Dayton Agreements, the 
RS Parliament passed a law creating a framework for holding an independence 
referendum. Some interpret this as a test run for Dodik’s secessionist goal and certainly 
the proposal to ban headscarves indicates racial intolerance (see Bancroft 2010; Donahue 
2010). Bosniak presidency representative Haris Silajdžić has called for a more centralised 
state and the dissolution of the RS which he regards as “an undeserved reward for Serbian-
orchestrated genocide” (McMahon and Western 2009: 70). With the Serbs openly defying 
the OHR (International Crisis Group 2009), any future Serb withdrawal from state 
institutions could easily provoke a constitutional crisis.  
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iii) Cambodia: empty learning 
In many cases, a glaring gap between constitutions and learning is evident. Cambodia 
resembles a democratic country on paper, governed by the rule of law and adherence to 
international human rights’ standards. The chapter of the 1993 Constitution entitled, “The 
Rights and Obligations of Khmer Citizens” (articles 31-50) was included in answer to the 
“declaration of fundamental rights” required by annex 5 of the Paris Agreement which 
set out a list of minimum rights for inclusion, as well as a requirement that the declaration 
be consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant 
international institutions. In other words, ratification of the UN human rights’ agreements 
was on the insistence of the UN and with a high degree of coercion. 
 
Just as the UN (Guidance Note of the Secretary-General 2008, 2009) guidance for 
constitution-making and the rule of law is formulaic ignoring capacity, the risk of such 
an approach to human rights is the same: the result – empty mechanisms. The 
methodology of its enforcement is universally applied even where there is no capacity. In 
2005, Human Rights Watch produced its observations on human rights observation 
progress and political pluralism development (Human Rights Watch 2005: 19, 26). The 
picture painted was one of political intimidation against opposition parties, independent 
media and civil society, coupled with a corrupt, incompetent and biased judiciary. The 
latest Human Rights Watch World Report (2010: 279-81) reiterates disrespect for human 
rights: almost total control over the broadcasting media, unsolved murders of journalists, 
criminal conviction of government critics, restrictions on the rights of freedom of 
association and assembly, arbitrary detention and land confiscations As noted in chapter 
4, the UN took a calculated risk in pushing ahead with elections and while the elections 
were free and fair and enjoyed massive participation the continued flaring of political 
violence became an excuse for a brief and secretive constitution-making process 
(Benomar 2004: 84), one in which, the ‘losing’ side was excluded from the process, and 
the ‘wining’ side’s flaws were overlooked, which meant that the constitution could not 
render accountable those responsible for major human rights violations.  
 
A constitution which contains such rights tells one nothing about whether a society has 
learnt the lessons of the past and will endeavour to have a robust culture of free speech or 
equality in the future. As Tushnet observes: “…some constitutions are simply 
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shams”(1999: 1481). Of course, there will always be a range of acceptable interpretations 
of rights – reasonable limits prescribed by law96, for example, but courts generally provide 
for independent review. In much of Africa however, many of the problems that have 
arisen post-independence or post-conflict do not concern the lack of constitutions, but the 
absence of learned constitutionalism and respect for the rule of law. Constitutional 
provisions have been: “abrogated, subverted, suspended or brazenly ignored” (Fombad 
2007: 3).  
 
The Cambodia example illustrates the wider point that where learned constitutionalism is 
evident, a social contract is being negotiated, and the process is as important as the 
provisions. Referring back to Lederach’s (1997) integrated model for peace-building, 
there can be no question of “top-down” versus “grass roots” reforms. To succeed, even if 
the physical constitutional process is elite (top) driven, it has to be “owned” and “sold” at 
every level.  
IV. AGREEING ON A USABLE PAST AND AN IMAGINED FUTURE  
BiH illustrates a clear-cut case of the impossibility of learned constitutionalism with an 
imposed constitution and a top-heavy, paused-conflict process dictated by international 
actors. It is an inescapable fact however, that constitution-making processes inherently 
coincide with earth-shattering events: war, defeat in war, reconstruction after war, coup, 
regime collapse or fear of regime collapse, economic or social crisis which sometimes 
turns into political revolution, or indeed revolution (Elster 1995; Ginsburg et al. 2009). 
While non-crisis constitution-making does exist – most recently in Finland and also seen 
in Sweden’s 1972 reform of its 163-year-old constitution – constitutions are rarely written 
in times of continuous tranquillity in the life of a state but in moments of “political 
dishevelment” (Scheppele 2008: 1379). It is indeed a paradox. For every example of 
peaceful transition – such as Spain’s move from Franco’s dictatorship to constitutional 
democracy in the mid-1970s and development of a vibrant constitutional culture over the 
next two decades – the task of constitution-making generally emerges in conditions that 
are likely to work against it.  Constitutions are understood in the literature to be blueprints 
                                               
96 “As can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, and Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
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– not only to get the state through the immediate crisis – but also to progress the state, as 
a launching pad for new futures. If written for an indefinite future, they should ideally be 
adopted in calm and undisturbed conditions, through rational, impartial argument. In 
turbulent circumstances, passion and self-interest, rather than reason, might prevail.  
 
Kafka’s man in the middle from He – an ambivalent character caught between the past 
and future, with the risk of group affiliation overwhelming him – is an apt illustration of 
the predicament of man or society as a whole or indeed, as Arendt used the parable, of 
the role of constitution drafters, torn by the future and the past (Arendt 1961: 7):97  
He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind, from the origin. The second 
blocks the road ahead. He gives battle to both. To be sure, the first supports him in his 
fight with the second, for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second 
supports him in his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically 
so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but he himself as well, and who 
really knows his intentions? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded 
moment – and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been yet – he will 
jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, 
to the position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other.  
Political thought, of which constitutional interpretation is a part, arises from living 
experience and as such, where constitutions have come from the groups’ own lessons, 
they are truly transformative. Strong leadership or mass appeal for change saw success in 
Bougainville and also in South Africa where members of the apartheid government and 
the major political opposition groups negotiated core principles encapsulating their 
learning that were binding on the subsequent, democratically inclusive, drafting of the 
new constitution. In general, the articulation of learned constitutionalism mechanisms in 
operation or practice would be evident, not only through the concessions and initiatives 
in peace agreements or constitutions but also in the language and actions of officials 
perhaps talking about ‘common citizenship’ and ‘shared responsibility’; in the rhetoric of 
leaders on their country’s national day; in the behaviour of citizens; and in the recognition 
that violent warfare is no longer necessary, that representation is available in government 
as a means of being heard.  
                                               
97 This quote is from the last of a series of notes under the title HE. First published in 1946 English 
translation by Muir. 
183 
 
i) International assistance for local learning  
How learned constitutionalism is assisted is a fraught area. In many post-conflict cases, 
external states – as sources of external capital and expertise – think external advisors 
should have input. While sometimes this brings with it benefits of material support, 
enhanced international credibility for the new government, or the provision of a neutral 
counterbalance and expertise to domestic interest groups (Bannon 2007: 1866), the risks 
concern unfamiliarity with local culture and politics. Provisions developed on the advice 
of external actors may have less standing than purely domestic provisions over which the 
citizens or political elites feel a sense of ownership, particularly if there is a whiff of 
external influence serving the interests of an external state.  
 
It is for this reason Feldman (2005) argues it is essential to leave all aspects of 
responsibility for the constitution to domestic actors as part of the learning process. As 
the expression of a people’s right to self-determination, there has been a clear historical 
evolution from the imposed constitutions that characterised, for example, the Japanese 
post-WWII experience and to some extent the decolonisation period, through a period of 
messy transplantation or borrowing, to a more recent conception, in the literature at least 
(Guidance Note of the Secretary-General 2009), of constitutions as locally owned and 
indigenous processes – with much comparative analysis and expertise.  The reality is 
somewhat different (Boege et al. 2008: 15):  
…donors tend to assume the role of teaching “them” (politicians and people of so-called 
fragile states) how to do “our” (the western developed donor states’) institutions better. 
“We” tend to impose “our” idea of what a “good state” is on “them” There is much talk 
of ownership, but often this is not much more than lips service; in effect, locals are 
supposed to “own” what outsiders tell them to – “local ownership clearly means “their” 
ownership of “our” ideas”… 
 
Dann and al Ali (2006: 423-63) note that international assistance or “influence” can be 
divided into total, partial and marginal categories. While the aforementioned case of 
Bosnia was total, at the other end of the spectrum, marginal influence occurs where 
international expertise is voluntarily sort out by domestic actors, or where inspiration or 
borrowing from other constitutions occurs, and where there is local ownership of the 
process and the content of the constitution.  Examples of this include South Africa and 
Eastern European states in the early 1990s. The middle category is somewhere between 
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more-than-voluntarily requested but weaker than a foreign takeover. Here the 
constitution-making process is directed by external actors in a procedural and/or a 
substantive way. The power of drafting and adoption, however, remains in the hands of 
domestic actors. The “pouvoir constituant” – the force of the people as a political body 
creating new order (B. Ackerman 1991) – is not entirely intact but not entirely 
surrendered.  
 
This middle road appears to be the most common category of recent cases, including East 
Timor and Iraq, but influence still varies greatly, and outside motives can creep in. The 
US’ main concern in Iraq was to ensure that the constitution’s section on human rights 
would not create a means of claims being brought against US troops in Iraqi courts by 
locals (Dann and Al Ali 2006: 459).98 In the case of East Timor, the United Nations 
managed the entire constitutional process and were the only case where no allegations 
have been made concerning the undue impact of external actors on the constitution’s 
substance. Perhaps as a multilateral institution, 99 the behaviour of the advisors tends to 
be more balanced. 
 
Procedures established for the drafting and enactment of new or substantially amended 
constitutions post-conflict should make a difference. However, the reality is that 
pinpointing what is ‘right’ in any given constitution-forming context is difficult to boil 
down in a methodological way. Many have tried to understand the role of international 
assistance, and while a plethora of best practice guides exists (Guidance Note of the 
Secretary-General 2008, 2009; V. Hart 2003; Kristi Samuels and Wyeth 2006), there is 
no concrete answer. Most recently the International IDEA has launched Constitution 
Building Programme (CBP) to study the practice of constitution building and share 
                                               
98 Article 44 of the older draft Iraqi Constitution, not that one that was presented for adoption in 2005 even 
though a similar clause had been in the TAL (art 23),  read as follows:  
“All individuals shall have the right to enjoy all the rights mentioned in the international treaties and 
agreements concerned with human rights that Iraq has ratified and that do not contradict with the principles 
and provisions of this constitution” 
Regardless of any “official” reasons for removing this article – that the United States reportedly sought its 
removal, concerned it allowed the constitution to supersede international treaties - there has been much 
debate over this move. The analysis from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace states that: “it 
undercuts the human rights protections available to individuals” Nathan J Brown, 'The Final Draft of the 
Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary', (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
2005) at 2. 
99 However the likes of the IBRD and the IMF with their particular missions, sometimes impress upon the 
constitution-making process legal and economic mechanisms that would be more advantageous to their 
membership than the constitution-making society in questions. 
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insights with national and international actors, in order to strengthen the role constitutions 
can play in democratic and post-conflict transitions. At best, it is noted that there is no 
firm view of international assistance and certainly no concrete framework surrounding 
such activities, a significant gap, which will be returned to in the next chapter (Ladley 
2010). The actual physical act of constitution-drafting and enactment is but one stage in 
the process. International monitoring of constitutional implementation is where the 
intentional community can provide the best assistance, not unlike election-monitoring, 
but this would need a clear mandate, in an area that already suffers from the benign but 
confused and confusing offers of international assistance.  
 
The literature does agree that public participation is crucial (Chesterman 2004b: 211; V. 
Hart 2003). Legitimacy is as much about process as it is about content. The Agenda for 
Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992) saw a clear role for the UN in promoting formal and informal 
processes of public participation (see also Guidance Note of the Secretary-General 2009). 
Granted there is no concrete evidence on the effect such processes has in supporting better 
peace process and plenty of examples where no real change was observed (i.e.,. Eritrea 
and Ethiopia,) (Ginsburg et al. 2009: 215) or indeed the very activity inflamed conflict 
(Congo-Brazzaville, Chad and Solomon Islands). 100 On the other hand no opportunity to 
participate has meant constitutions are perceived as imposed (i.e.,. in Nigeria, Zimbabwe 
and Bahrain) (Kirsti Samuels 2007 606). It would seem that part of building immunity to 
future hiccups in governance and also the requirement of Rawlsian justice – for the social 
contract – requires voter education. Higher levels of trust and cooperation were 
undoubtedly observed in Benin and of course South Africa, and this is an area where the 
international community can offer logistical and financial support.   
 
                                               
100 Ian Scales argues from observations during his time based on the Western Province island of 
Kolombangara over 1999-2000 that political aspirations for great independence and thinking towards a 
federal system of government led to ethnic tension particularly in the West and politicians in the Western 
Province used the ill-conceived June 2000 Malaitan coup in Honiara to push their federalism preferences. 
Fukuyama observed that the desire to create a federal system seemed to be pre-empted by the need for 
better control over service delivery and to control immigration into the territories.  See:  Ian Scales, 'The 
Coup Nobody Noticed: The Solomon Islands Western State Movement in 2000', The Journal of Pacific 
History, 42/2 (2007), 187-209, Francis Fukuyama, 'State Building in Solomon Islands', Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, 23/3 (2008), 18-34. Ultimately, under the Townsville Peace Agreement of mid-October 2000, the 
Solomon Islands’ government was mandated to introduce a form of government that would give more 
autonomy to the provinces. Despite facilitation by the UNDP and the drawing up of a new draft Solomon 
Islands’ Constitution, it has not yet been passed. 
186 
 
The form of government, however, is not the concern of internationals. Samoa’s 
determination to “own” their governance system saw them break with the conventional 
Westminster model, incorporating elements of traditional governance systems and 
custom.  Only matai (traditional chiefs and family title-holders), it was decided, would be 
allowed to vote and be elected to parliament, 101 contrary to attempts by the UN to impose 
universal suffrage. This allowed Samoans to own their 1962 independence constitution 
and parliamentary democracy from the first, and also the sharing of the head of state 
duties between the two major contesting traditional leaders. In the current climate, 
dominated by the formula-state model, it is highly unlikely this would be acceptable to 
donors and the international community. While occasionally condemned overseas as a 
violation of the UN Declaration of Human Rights’ universal franchise principles 
(Quentin-Baxter 1987), village-level, electoral competition adjusted to the electoral rules 
and universal suffrage was introduced in 1990 (So'o and Fraenkel 2005). Human rights’ 
protections came with liberal democracy, and have been absorbed (not always without 
contest) into the relationship between citizens and the Samoan state, and were further 
strengthened when Samoa became a member of the UN in 1976.102 
 
Context however, is everything. The level of conflict in a particular country, for example, 
will necessitate quite different types of international assistance. Sometimes without 
international assistance, self-determination may well be impossible. In other situations, 
assistance will be rejected outright. While Feldman’s (2005) thesis was based on Iraq, 
other situations may necessitate support being given to voices from wider society in their 
efforts to be heard and empowered, instead of leaving the process to the particular 
country’s elites. In Bougainville, encouraging the marginalised but powerful groups in 
society, like women, to express their voice was crucial for getting more people involved 
(Boege 2006b) and for ownership. Women made powerful displays of protest during the 
conflict – such as in 1990 when those on the island of Buka challenged a BRA blockade 
preventing emergency medical supplies being distributed by the PNGDF or the women 
of Selau in north Bougainville who held 5,000 strong, all-night, peaceful vigils protesting 
                                               
101 See the Electoral Act 1963 (Samoa). Two candidates are also elected as representatives of naturalised 
Samoan citizens and Samoans who are of European descent. 
102 Occasional conflict between fa’asamoa which upholds the practice of the matai (responsible for 
upholding social order and leading consensual decision making) can be seen in the 1998 case of the village 
of Salamum where the matai banished several families for trying to establish alternative religious practices 
(private prayer sessions) after rejecting the Methodist church. 
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against the violence  (Carl and Sr. Lorraine Garsu CSN 2002: 30). The opening up of 
markets under the TMG provided women with meeting places. Bodies such as the 
Provincial Council of Women encouraged and helped in this endeavour (Jaintong 2001) 
and groups like the United Kieta Women’s Co-ord Group (UKWCG) became the 
cornerstone of peace, health, good living and reconciliation. Jossie Sirivi, (who led BIG 
women) talks about the importance of the peace being “sold” to others, and believes 
women played a big part in this (Jossie Sirivi 2001). Realising that Bougainville was 
traditionally a matrilineal society, the TMG united the two main women’s groups – 
Jossie’s BIG and Theresa Jaintong’s Bougainville Council of Women. Realising the 
strength in unity, and united in their exhaustion and receptivity to alternative strategies, 
they could then combat a generation of young men who disregarded their status and 
treated them poorly. Leaders of women’s organisations speaking with one voice 
ultimately played an important role in the July 1997 Burnham talks held in New Zealand. 
Bougainvillean women also attended meetings leading to the signing of the Lincoln 
Agreement on 23 January 1998. The Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom, an 
organisation representing women from BRA and BIG, demanded the complete 
withdrawal of PNGDF from their areas. 
ii) Public participation  
Obviously public participation, without learning, without exhaustion and a true mind-
shift is tokenism. Learned constitutionalism necessitates that elites, representing political 
forces with significant amounts of power, commit to making the arrangements work after 
they go into effect. Peace conferences are usual in this endeavour. Similar buy-in from 
the population generally constitutes one more compact or buttressing element in the 
process. A referendum is common, an alternative example occurred in a number of 
countries, including South Africa, and has been admired by many (V. C. Jackson and 
Tushnet 2006: 287-89). The buttressing of exhaustion and learning requires building in 
enough “never again-ism” (truth commissions for example), and making believers out of 
the process (retraining, reorienting, education, jobs, therapy, etc.).  Without this – where 
weak consensus reigns, or where political deals are hatched for short term “fixes” 
ignoring the involvement of the wider people103 – positive and peaceful governance will 
                                               
103 A current example is obvious in Zimbabwe, where negotiators are aiming primarily for a political deal 
in the proposed new constitution – reflecting the short-term interests of the political parties. This goes 
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likely not emerge. Where the methodology of changing rules does exist, however, the 
momentum can push aside those who would rather stick to violence (the splinter IRA 
groups for example, or those focused on looting the state). 
 
iii)  Breaking with the past  
Presuming that all the good-will in the world exists (exhaustion), at the domestic level 
critiquing the past is a requirement of learning – even that which is shameful and patently 
unjust. More than mere “debunking” must occur, for the past will not go away and will 
continue shaping the present and informing the future – through the festering of 
grievance. Group relationships cannot be mended without this articulation, not just for an 
imagined future – which is often what a constitution sets out to frame– but also of an 
understanding of the past. If the very issues or events that caused the inter-group 
relationships to break down or cleavages to appear (whether real or constructed) are not 
addressed, reconciliation will not occur. Kreisberg (1999: 107) states: “a fundamental 
dimension of reconciliation is the truthfulness about the past and the present, open and 
shared recognition of the injuries and  losses experienced”. 
 
Like the Rwandan example presented in the previous chapter, interviews conducted in 
the Brčko District of BiH, a district distinguished from the rest of the country due to its 
peculiar status as self-governing and multi-ethnic, suggest there is no open talk about the 
war (J. N. Clark 2010: 71). The past is “taboo”. Talk inter-ethnically is gauged in very 
general terms, for example – war is futile and should never happen again (United Nations 
Development Programme 2005: 30). This could reflect the lack of chauvinist or 
nationalist rhetoric in the district, people being more consciously aware of offending 
others. Avoidance of offence, however, could also be reminiscent of “chosen amnesia”. 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006; 2008: 137):  
…aspects of the past seem to be eclipsed from the discourse, creating a form of amnesia, 
albeit selective…which functions as a coping strategy, a way of maintaining the social 
equilibrium and of living in a climate of mutual distrust.  
                                               
against the wishes of Zimbabweans who had hoped for a democratic charter based on learning since 
independence in 1980, including the need for accountable government and the safeguarding of basic human 
rights. Zim Online, 'New Constitution, a Damp Squib: Ngos', ZimOnline, Monday 25 October 2010. 
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The silence observed in Brčko, supposedly the model of reform in BiH serves to maintain 
some form of social harmony and order. The worry is, of course, that not dealing with the 
past means that history may be doomed to repeat itself. As philosopher and novelist 
Santayana (1905: 284) said: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it”. 
 
Justice and reconciliation must form part of the process of addressing the past – the 
psycho-social dimensions of conflict are an important factor, and easily overlooked in the 
rush for western politicians, policy makers, development agencies and NGOs to 
concentrate on material reconstruction and rehabilitation (roads, schools, hospitals, etc.). 
Transitional justice can be delicate as amnesties are often used to induce cooperation in 
peace processes. Equally large-scale purges can deny the state essential human skills. Yet 
facing up to the past is essential to reconciliation and to the possibility of returning to 
normal life (if indeed there is such a thing). The notion that abuses will no longer be 
tolerated, or part of the culture of society must be a clear message regardless of whether 
amnesties, truth and reconciliation commissions, or hybrid courts are employed. 
Instruments of transitional justice have been improved upon, the lessons for example from 
the South African experience, critiqued and strengthened for use in Sierra Leone and East 
Timor (Brahm 2009; Dickinson 2003; Hayner 1994). Internationally, global justice and 
the responsibility to protect have evolved to see heads of states face criminal trials. 
Arguably, therefore, transitional justice serves a role in healing social wounds but also in 
the transformation of world politics – a transformation interpreted as strengthening the 
rules of exhaustion.104  Fancy processes are not necessarily required. Despite no 
substantive policing, court or prison system, Bougainville remains one of the safest 
communities in PNG, due to community-based, justice systems. There emphasis is not on 
punishment, but on restorative justice, a practice which has existed for thousands of years 
(Reddy 2008).   
 
                                               
104 The institutions of justice and reconciliation are not perfect. Call in particular has outlined the problem 
with “victor’s justice”, the impact of the US’s patchy support of transitional justice efforts, and the 
somewhat peacemeal evolution of these transitional justice efforts. Charles Call, 'Is Transitional Justice 
Really Just?', Brown Journal of World Affairs, 11/1 (2004), 101-13. 
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The South African experience is a positive example of breaking with a repressive past. A 
future filled with the hope of freedom was to become the prevailing theme in 
constitutional interpretation and discourse surrounding it.105 
iv) South Africa’s constitution: “a ringing and decisive break with the past.” 106 
South Africa’s dire, apartheid-era human rights’ record began shifting in the early 1990s 
with deep changes to social, political and economic structures within the country. Until 
recently, little was known about one such gathering of key elites from all sides which 
shaped learning on conflict and governing.  The 1993 Mont Fleur scenarios were devised 
to stimulate debate on how to shape South Africa over the next decade, bringing together 
22 leaders or potential leaders (thinkers, key policy makers, business people, politicians, 
with strength of character and those identified as likely to become future leaders). A set 
of stories was presented to the participants on what could occur. Three contained 
warnings of the various ways in which things could go wrong. One was a benign picture 
of inclusive democracy and growth. The best of the resulting narratives produced around 
these scenarios were then used to extend the discussion and learning with more groups 
(political parties, companies, academics, trade union and civic organisations). While the 
participants were not negotiators, the fact that a substantial number of Mont Fleur 
participants went on to occupy influential positions in South African produced learning 
and influence well beyond anyone's imagining. The value of listening and talking openly, 
in particular, helped: “to shift the economic thinking and acting of the ANC and other 
left-wing parties and to avert an economic disaster” (Kahane 2004). Mutual 
understanding was the product, translated from the elite to wider groups, and delivered in 
church sermons for example.  
 
Further setting this change in motion was the December 1993 agreement to adopt an 
interim constitution (included an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights) authored by 
the two main political forces, the African National Congress (ANC) and the National 
                                               
105 See for example, the postamble to the Interim Constitution of 1993: “this Constitution provides a historic 
bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and 
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence…” 
106 S v Mhlungu (1995) 3 S.A. 867 (CC) 873 
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Party (NP). After becoming supreme law in 1994, 107 the interim framework set out a 
process for a new constitution.   
 
Although much “borrowing” occurred, a distinctive feature of the South African 
transition was the relatively modest role played by external advisors. A commitment to 
the process of constitution-making was evident in the consensus which moved 
negotiations forward;  the recognition of the futility of walkouts or boycotts; the use of 
informal conferences (bosberaad or bush conference) which facilitated trust and broke 
down stereotypes; the avoidance of triumphalist rhetoric in favour of compromise; and 
the refusal to allow spoilers to derail the process (even in light of the assassination of the 
ANC’s Chris Hani or the St James’ Church Massacre at Kenilworth) (Hamill 2003).  
 
The constitution that was eventually adopted in 1996 was subject to inspection by the 
Constitutional Court.108 The Court had to certify that the constitution’s provisions were 
substantially in accordance with the 34 constitutional principles agreed upon by the major 
groups in society at the beginning of the drafting process and then enshrined in Schedule 
4 of the interim constitution.109 The principles included, among other things, three tiers 
of government, a multi-party democracy, the separation of powers and broad parameters 
for devolution of power to the provinces. At the forefront were universal, justiciable and 
entrenched fundamental rights. This signalled a big change since South Africa had 
previously been viewed as a “pariah” by the UN and other international bodies and in 
return South Africa had considered the UN an enemy and paid scant attention to the 
various decisions and documents originating from it. The apartheid state had dismissed 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as communist propaganda and vilified other 
declarations and resolutions (Sohn 1994: 63-107; South African Law Commission 1989).  
                                               
107 For more on this initial process, see: David Welsh, 'Negotiating a Democratic Constitution', in 
J.E.Spence (ed.), Changes in South Africa (London Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 25. The 
task of constitution-making was delegated to a 46 member, proportionally represented, constitutional 
committee of MPs who were in turn divided into a number of committees focusing on different aspects of 
the constitution. These committees were supported by a secretariat and expert constitutional advisors. The 
assembly devoted time and energy to soliciting the views of all South Africans and to communicating their 
progress and work back to the people.  
108 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly In re Certification of the Amendment Text of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [1997] 2 SALR 97 (CC), 162. The foundation members of the 
court included: an international war crimes prosecutor – Justice Richard J Goldstone; former law professors 
– Justices Yvonne Mokgoro, Kate O’Regan, and Albert Louis Sachs; and the attorney who founded the 
nation’s leading civil rights litigation firm and represented Nelson Mandela during his imprisonment – 
Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson. 
109 South African Interim Constitution, Schedule 4, Part 5. 
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The new constitutional framework protecting individual rights arose from the strength, 
but also the suspicion, of the old order during the negotiating process; the adherence of 
the ANC to the notion of fundamental rights; and the strong belief held by many South 
Africans that ethnicity and division ought not to be a part of the post-apartheid state. 
These were crucial to securing the acquiescence of the minority, largely white parties.  
The principles provided a set of constraints and guidelines for the writers of the permanent 
constitution.110 Among these was principle 14 – “[p]rovision shall be made for 
participation of minority political parties in the legislative process in a manner consistent 
with democracy” – which assured the white minority that democratic rule would not 
simply be an invitation to majoritarian retribution. As Issacharoff (2004: 1876) explains:   
Whatever the historical merits of retribution, and whatever the grave injustices of apartheid 
rule, the fact remained that without some formal guarantee of security, power would never be 
ceded except on the closing end of a bloody civil war. 
 
An independent arbiter, in the form of an independent judiciary, was agreed upon to 
strengthen the security provision of the constitutional principles.111 The creation of the 
Constitutional Court resolved the impasse over the problem of the constitutional 
compromise being unelected architects, which, while this could be overcome through the 
final constitution being adopted by a properly mandated body, 112 the insecurities of the 
various groups might not be sufficiently addressed and, therefore, they might subvert the 
                                               
110 A full list of constitution principles contained in Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution can be found 
here http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/constitution/english-web/interim/schedules.html#sched4 
111 When debate began over the need for a Constitutional Court, it was felt that many of the apartheid-era 
judges were unsuited as the new power of judicial review would allow a partisan and insulated minority to 
overturn the law enacted by the majority. See: Johan D Van De Vyver, 'The Randolph W. Thrower 
Symposium, Comparative Constitutionalism: Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid South Africa', 
Emory Law Journal 40 (1991), 745-834 at 802-04. Four existing judges were appointed, from the more 
progressive side of the existing judiciary. By the end of 1996 as the new constitution was enacted, the new 
court had decided around forty cases with decisions in many cases being a triumph of human rights and 
democracy: for example, the abolition of capital punishment as this violated the right not to be subject to 
torture of any kind; and the ruling that the state generally bears the onus of proof in criminal cases. Crucially 
on issues outside of human rights – on the power of provincial government not controlled by the ANC, the 
court was seen to “be making decisions without fear or favour”. See: Jonathan Klaaren, 'Executive Council, 
Western Cape Legislature V President of the Republic of South Africa', South African Journal of Human 
Rights, 12 (1996), 158-62 at 159. 
112 A two-stage transition was employed. An interim government governed through a coalition while the 
constitution was being drafted. A national legislature elected by universal adult suffrage, would then double 
as the constitution-making body tasked with drafting the new constitution within a certain timeframe. 
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objectives of a negotiated settlement.113  The Constitutional Court assumed the mantle of 
the ultimate arbiter of the constitution, holding full powers of judicial review. Prior to 
1994, the South African Parliament was completely sovereign with the courts only having 
a procedural review over laws adopted.  
 
After a rigorous process which included submissions from political parties and the public, 
as well as public hearing, the unanimous 288 page judgment, the Court refused to certify 
the text of the draft constitution. The Constitutional Assembly was directed to relook at 
ten sections.114 These mainly concerned excesses of majoritarianism. For example, the 
provision enabling a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly to amend the Bill of 
Rights was insufficient to ensure that the Bill of Rights would be entrenched, as required 
by Constitutional Principle 2. The court also rejected the notion that judicial review could 
not be used for certain categories of statutes, and judicial review was unsurprisingly 
affirmed as a commitment to constitutional supremacy and jurisdictional guarantees for 
judicial power in Principles 4 and 12. 
 
The constitutional principles could not guarantee the future, but they did provide a process 
and framework within which areas of commonality were defined and differences located. 
Some have argued that for the former NP government the principles guaranteed the 
survival of the old order, that they were willing to transfer some power to the ANC; “so 
long as the resulting state would have substantially inferior powers compared with those 
of its predecessors” (Mutua 1997: 81). This misses the point.  Although the comparison 
to the past is valued, in post-apartheid South Africa, the successor government would 
obviously have less power if any learning had been done. Without such constitutional 
constraints, a racial civil war would have been inevitable – remembering of course that 
the white minority, while they may not have been able to overcome the ANC, still 
controlled the military. What materialised through thorough negotiation was the 
realisation that the rules of the game had to be, in the future, fair for all parties concerned.  
                                               
113 In the words of the Constitutional Court: “The government and other minority groups were prepared to 
relinquish power to the majority but were determined to have a hand in drawing the framework for the 
future governance of the country. The liberation movements on the opposition side were equally adamant 
that only democratically elected representatives of the people could legitimately engage in forging a 
constitution: neither they, and certainly not the government of the day, had any claim to the requisite 
mandate from the electorate.” In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(4) SALR 744, 779 (CC). 
114 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa [1996] 4 S.A 744 (CC). 
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A successful model was thus created for the transformation of their conflict built around 
concepts of political inclusiveness, power sharing, and mutual accommodation between 
former enemies, thus preventing the alternative – an ethnic meltdown of the likes that 
occurred in Rwanda and BiH. The reality of the ANC’s towering, political ascendancy 
and one-party dominance perhaps eclipses some of the earlier idealism (Hamill 2003: 3). 
Nonetheless, Nelson Mandela employed an inclusive rhetoric of blame in order to further 
political transformation, contrasting sharply with Milosovic’s 1989 rhetoric invoking 
collective memories in order to assign blame to others:  
We place our vision of a new constitutional order for South Africa on the table not as 
conquerors, prescribing to the conquered. We speak as fellow citizens to heal the wounds of 
the past with the intent of constructing a new order based on justice for all.115 
The Mont Fleur sessions, the interim constitution and the generally slow nature of the 
progression towards the 1996 Constitution (certainly by the standards of other 
constitution-drafting examples), defused pressure to finalise governance question which 
were highly contested. At the same  time,  a sense of security was conveyed to minority 
constituencies. While some have more recently criticised the court for playing a pragmatic 
role in rejecting calls to develop wide rights jurisprudence – deferring to the government 
to craft policies to achieve those objectives. 116 Since the court had played a role in 
creating the fledgling democracy in what was after all still a deeply divided and violent 
place, it is not surprising that they also showed reluctance to substitute decrees for 
democratic deliberation and compromise. 
V. THREATS TO LEARNING STABILISING 
Returning to the two models of constitutions outlined above (national-state and liberal-
procedural), clearly divided societies are going to struggle to fit into the nation-state box. 
                                               
115 Contrasted too against the recent rhetoric of ANC Youth League President Julius Malema urging the 
seizure of white farms and fight against what he called Western imperialism. 
116 For a summary of the criticisms – particularly Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2001) 1 SALR 
46 (CC) in which constitution's guarantee of a right of access to adequate housing did not prevent the court 
from deferring to "reasonable" measures taken by the state to provide such housing - and a defense of its 
pragmatism referring to the courts decisions on the death penalty and gay and lesbian equality arguing that 
“the Court has been pragmatic in selecting only a few cases on which to expend its institutional capital. 
Mark Kende, 'The Fifth Anniversary of the South African Constitutional Court: In Defense of Judicial 
Pragmatism', Vermont Law Review, 26/4 (2002), 753-68. 
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Equally, however, there may be insufficient popular support for the liberal-proceduralist, 
constitutional approach. Where society is deeply divided, this can still be acknowledged 
in a flexible constitution. By recognising the limits of concrete legal solutions, 
controversial decisions are deferred to the people’s representatives, the courts or the 
people through referenda – such as Northern Ireland’s or Bougainville’s referendum on 
status117 – introducing an element of gradualism instead into the process.  Interim 
constitutions can be seen as part of this continuing evolution. This is not the traditional 
perception of constitutions as revolutionary moments (B. Ackerman 1991).  Some 
societal consensus is needed to create a shared civil and procedural identity. In Western 
societies, people hold multiple and overlapping identities. In divided societies, it is 
important that the constitution does not clash with private identities to promote spoilers 
or preference of one version of the state over another.  Through the integration of the 
multitude of individuals in a common, safe space, a new, untied collectivity can emerge 
for paused-conflict governance, a collectivity which will grow and strengthen, perhaps 
reducing the salience of other identities. The relationship between constitutions and time 
is paramount. Reining in radical change and instead creating clear stepping stones, 
moving from the idea of a resolution to providing a framework for transformation, is 
required.  Such an approach does not endeavour to present a homogeneous unity and 
recognises internal segmentation but on the other hand, it does not attempt to privatise 
issues of identity by ignoring them and expurgating them from the constitutional arena 
(Rawls 1996: 151). Learned constitutionalism acknowledges groupism and defers (not 
ignores) contentious issues so that further learning can take place. 
 
The critical mass necessary for Leviathan to be pacified, should also not be undone by 
fundamental errors associated, mainly, with reverse-engineering the liberal peace 
overlooks issues of  capacity, foreign concepts, real rules and counter cultures.  Enacting 
constitutions which cannot be effectively protected has been one obvious omission in 
post-conflict constitution-making. Producing a situation where the pacifying society’s 
expectations cannot be fulfilled makes the learning and rules redundant. In Somalia, for 
example, the constitution process suggested by Samuels (2007 ) included civic education 
                                               
117 The Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001 provided for autonomy within the framework of the PNG 
Constitution but also provided for a constitutionally guaranteed referendum on the territory’s political 
future in 10-15 years’ time. These mechanisms were passed by the PNG Parliament in March 2002 where 
increasing powers are assumed by Bougainville. 
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and consultation. However, this was stymied by security realities. There has also been a 
parallel problem of the wide gap between domestic (localised, clan authority) and 
international conceptions (central state) of the Somalian state. This is a fundamental 
problem for the most difficult of post-conflict cases, requiring a change in direction for 
the international community and the formula-state model. Instead, as the restorative 
justice example from Bougainville demonstrates, local practices should be supported to 
provide mechanisms for the learning. 
 
In other settings, such as northern Kenya, traditional forms of justice delivery are more 
powerful than state institutions, particularly when the institutions that constitute “the 
state” are physically located far away. In such cases, these “rule-of-law” institutions could 
become redundant if they cannot adapt and be responsive to what Chopra calls “socio-
culture contexts” and be more mobile (T. Chopra 2010). The way round this, in the 
Kenyan case, was state support for declarations encompassing the different traditional 
conflict resolution mechanisms that groups within the northern region could agree upon. 
These run parallel to official law. Far from ideal, it suggested that the state rule-of-law 
exercise has failed, and further problems arise when the two systems contradict each 
other. In other countries, New Zealand included, indigenous courts or courts for 
indigenous issues (i.e. Australia) have been integrated into the official state system. 
Training judges specifically in social contexts (South Africa and Canada) and responding 
to the social diversity was in the case of South Africa, a way of eradicating the remnants 
of apartheid.  
 
In Cambodia, corruption is institutionalised, endemic at every level: “constructed and 
operated on a feudal basis, at the heart of which is the patron-client relationship  
propagated by elites” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 38). Papua New Guineans “own” 
elections, they have become part of their culture. However the cheating that occurs across 
the board is not really relevant; it is accepted as part of the culture. There is no true support 
for the core values of democracy and no social ceasefire on tribalism and cheating. In 
such situations, it is impossible to leap into governance but important to promote efficient 
administration based on a rule of law as well as a basic structure of justice, before 
vigorously promoting fully fledged democracy where the possibility of marginalisation 
from power has greater consequences (resources) than in existing liberal states. This kind 
of approach could have a number of short-term advantages while simultaneously laying 
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the foundations for more solid and fully developed democracy in the long run. This 
approach is acceptable under Rawlsian democratic theory: that certain minimum 
standards of decency are adhered to in the process (Rawls 1999).  
 
Accepting law as the basis through which to construe social relationships and to resolve 
conflicts is inherent in the process of learned constitutionalism (Hegel 1967). Paused-
conflict governance encounters a major obstacle where there is essentially no rule of law, 
no habitus of obedience to the law (von Bogdandy et al. 2005). Where real rules and 
counter cultures dominate in a society, learned constitutionalism will be more difficult, 
particularly if there is nothing to fall back on.  In Yugoslavia for example, the 
disintegration was a case of both national aspirations (Coat and Serbian) destroying the 
“habitus” of resolving conflicts peacefully within an existing legal framework and a legal 
tradition being undermined by decades of communist rule. In other situations, it is not the 
lack of a common identity or common traditions, that is the problem but the lack of a 
legal tradition tied to modern statehood. The case of Somalia illustrates this where the 
society to a significant extent is still constituted along the lines of various clans and sub-
clans from independence in 1960 and through the civil war that raged in the 1990s up to 
this very moment (Bradbury and Healy 2010). 
 
Depending on the context, tying rule of law and justice to something recognisable has to 
be the focus.  This in turn could assist in reinforcing exhaustion and also addressing 
groupism. However, strategies that do not pay careful attention to real rules are doomed 
to failure. BiH suffered from a post-conflict context where there was a judiciary, but it 
was not independent. It was already in crisis because of misuse as an instrument of ethnic 
cleansing during the war.  Corrupt judges could not separate themselves from their 
political and ethnic prejudices, and were overlooking the crimes of known criminals, 
because of the close relationship between the political power structures and organised 
crime. Fast-tracked privatisation placed key assets in the hands of local power groups or 
mafia.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Post-conflict constitution-making should not be seen as “resolution” in the manner of 
traditional revolutionary, constitution-formation. To make sense of the fundamental 
issues facing the paused-conflict state within the non-ideal “out-of-conflict” setting, a 
gradualism is suggested, allowing for learning to develop. The USA’s learned 
constitutionalism did not happen overnight; it evolved, and is ongoing. In paused-conflict 
contexts, discussions perhaps akin to South Africa’s Mont Fleur sessions, interim 
constitution periods, the use of traditional systems to deal with conflict or the creation of 
new reconciliation processes, agreement on basic core commonalities, all take time. 
Setting aside the controversial decisions that can overwhelm all else (succession, 
independence, etc.), it is crucial to provide the necessary space to break with the past. 
 
The risk of not allowing space for learning to develop is illustrated by BiH. As a classic 
example illustrating the danger of the romanticised (and completely inaccurate) 
interpretation of the “great” modern constitutions, group division has been solidified and 
strengthened through the constitution and the institutions established. It should be 
possible to acknowledge groups in constitutional frameworks without creating further 
division but only where there is receptivity first. Constitutions can codify the prevailing 
consensus, thus providing the framework for the conflict transformation and the necessary 
conditions for governance. However, the lessons of learned constitutionalism must 
continue to be articulated, providing immunity against future threats – for they will surely 
come. Political elites’ capacities for sustaining grievance and conflict are a sad reality of 
many cases (Fiji, BiH, Cambodia). South Africa was able to lower the stakes for playing 
the political game.  
 
The practical lesson for current peace processes (everywhere) is that societies emerging 
from conflict needed processes which involve extended discussions among groups, not 
only to share power and leadership positions among them (often the key goal of those 
involved), but to learn their own lessons about the past, in order to imagine a shared 
future. It is only then that this learning can be institutionalised in ways that work for their 
cultures, histories and peoples. If sufficient consensus, or a critical mass for change, is to 
eventuate, all groups must be involved and committed to the peace process. Learned 
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constitutionalism inherently has to be a domestic process, but there is room for 
international assistance. 
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7: Appropriate International 
Assistance 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding triad of building blocks focused on the primary domestic actors in 
conflict and the potential of the Leviathan to be pacified. The approach of conflict 
transformation does not however discount the help and resources of outsiders. 
International assistance may not be required; however few conflict-torn countries 
enjoy anything near the depth and breadth of civil institutions or the negotiation and 
leadership skills available, for example, to South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Post-conflict liberal peace-building is on the global agenda, and will not disappear in 
the short term given the focus on failed states and security. It must be acknowledged, 
that, despite flaws, international assistance and interdependence has helped to stem 
conflict worldwide (Human Security Centre 2010).  Much of the literature on conflict 
resolution and state reconstruction focuses on intrastate conflicts that were supposedly 
transformed by the skilful interventions of international mediators, NGOs or 
international organisations. This chapter examines the critical and sometimes 
contradictory roles that external support/intervention might play in peace-building 
after conflict.  
 
Outside pressures and oversight may buttress receptivity, hold groups together and 
provide space for learning to cement. However, the building blocks examined here are 
a package – the basic ingredients in a slow-cooking recipe – international assistance 
cannot occur without them. Where the understanding of the necessary conditions is 
present, however, international assistance may lend a hand in “short-cutting” the 
historical progression of the conflicting state pacifying. Most importantly, appropriate 
international assistance must encourage and support the learning process; both directly 
and by avoiding measures that cause harm. The form is up to the people of the 
particular state emerging from conflict, and the avoidance of contradictory signals in 
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the transformation of the Leviathan is crucial. As such, supporting international 
organisations should not come with a list of prescriptions that would undo any of this 
work. Thinking back to the lessons learned on peace-building highlighting in Chapter 
2 the local movements enjoy popular support and pursue broad social, political and 
security agendas if harnessed might be most capable of achieving this combination – 
even if their ideologies are significantly different from those of international actors 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2008: 5).  
 
Accepting that an international social compact exists – the “responsibility to protect” 
if you will – in which sovereignty is a privilege not a right, a framework of neutral 
international referees based on the newly emerging hybrid (domestic and 
international) legal framework of third party enforcement could overcome the lack of 
coherence and legitimacy that characterises current practice. A model of international 
referees is suggested. 
 
Against this backdrop, Collier’s (2007, 2008, 2009) recent proposal for the 
establishment of partnership domestic and international financial institutions to 
provide reliable receipt and delivery mechanism to implement government policy 
(particularly service delivery) is a close practical example. The Regional Assistance 
Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) provides a real-world opportunity to reflect 
on the Collier model. Partnership systems and institutions survived significant 
political challenge due to a framework of local agreements, regional or international 
resolutions, treaties, statutes and contracts. Such a framework is necessary to help 
‘buttress’ any international assistance in the event of domestic political or legal contest 
in paused-conflict states and, at the same time to keep international referees within a 
social compact with the state emerging from conflict.  
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II. REORIENTATING THE FORMULA-STATE MODEL  
Critics point to the new internationalism that has characterised the post-Cold War 
period as “the (new) white man’s burden”.118 Rebuilding, or indeed building 
governance, takes time and as an organised endeavour it may not even be possible. 
But if there is any hope for more than mere exhaustion in the states that suffer from 
repeated conflict, then internationals assisting must understand the theory of the 
previous three chapters. This thesis does not address the actual leadership of the 
international organisations working on the ground but is much more concerned with 
deeper understanding and the potential for new policy arising from this. However, it 
is worth noting that the issue of training and good leadership is likely to be critical. In 
this respect, pacifying Leviathan in any setting does not just require learning in the 
leadership and peoples of the state, but also learning of the leadership of any and all 
supporting international organisations.119 
 
The modernisation assumptions of the 1950s and 1960s discussed in Chapter 2 – 
particularly the belief in the natural linear evolution of developing states towards a 
self-perpetuating market democracy – were found to be flawed (Brugger and Hannan 
1983; Roxborough 1988). And yet, the formula-state model too assumes that a market 
democracy is best and that economic growth in developing countries will culminate in 
liberal capitalist economies and stable polities resembling Western democracies. The 
international organisations most strongly committed to market democracy are also 
those that have played the most significant role in peace-building: for example, the 
UN, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the OSCE, NATO, the World Bank 
                                               
118 The White Man’s Burden is a poem by English Poet Rudyard Kipling, originally published in the 
magazine McClures in February 1899 along with the subtitle The United States and the Philippine 
Islands. It concerns the US’s conquest of the Philippines and other former Spanish colonies. The phrase 
“white man’s burden” was latched onto by imperialists in the US as a characterisation for imperialism 
that justified the policy as a noble enterprise. More recently it is the name of a book by William Easterly, 
a New York University economics professor and former research economist at the World Bank. He 
contends that the West has failed, and continues to fail, to enact its ill-formed, utopian aid plans because, 
like the colonists of old, it assumes it know what is best for everyone. See William Easterly, The White 
Man’s Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2006). 
119 See: Fabrizio Hochschild, 'In and above Conflict: A Study on Leadership in the Untied Nations', 
(Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010). This recent study lists ten main findings all 
concerning general qualities of leadership, crucial for the effectiveness of the UN and maximising its 
resources. Although purporting to address unique challenges to leadership in the UN context (p9), the 
value in training or insight into the actual problems of post-conflict peace-building is not discussed – 
an interesting omission in an organisation focused in the 21st century on peace-building. 
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and the IMF. The “solutions” so far employed are based on romantic notions from the 
1960s but without the real world conditions of more stable states such as Cambodia.  
 
If the formula-state, as currently conceived, is too optimistic, what then? The evidence 
presented here paints a vivid picture of pacifying the Leviathan as a lengthy process, 
often conflict ridden, with no simple answers – certainly not able to be reverse-
engineered. The solution is also not simply about money and resources necessarily.120 
The international community has to be realistic about its attempts to assist the short 
cutting of gradual, incremental change.  
i) Slow things down  
Tight and rigid deadlines do not allow sufficient time for new political thinking to 
emerge or, more importantly, the realignment of groups. In BiH, the emphasis on 
elections to be held within six to nine months of Dayton caused voters to panic over 
an uncertain and unarticulated future. They tended to opt for the same nationalist 
parties that had dominated politics during the war (Caplan 2002: 41). At the other end 
of the scale, Bougainville’s rare status as one of the world’s peace success stories has 
meant that it has a good chance of becoming one of the equally rare success stories of 
post-conflict governance. This is in great part due to space and time to develop a home-
grown variety of “the state”. To the outsider, this process may seem painstakingly long 
but is appropriate for the societal context. At no stage during the New Zealand-hosted 
peace talks was a timetable dictated (Boege 2006b: 12). As Tapi (2002) observed, the 
freedom for the various group representatives to adjust to each other was crucial in 
overcoming the tense atmosphere that naturally prevails when people who have been 
at war with each other, often for years, commence negotiating. A similarly relaxed 
timeframe was employed in the demobilisation of arms. The entire Bougainville Peace 
Agreement envisages 10 – 15 years and more of transition.  
 
                                               
120 BiH for example had over $14 billion (1996-2007) in aid soon after the war ended. By the end of 
1996 alone, 17 different foreign governments, 18 UN agencies and 27 intergovernmental organisations 
and about 200 NGOs, as well as tens of thousands of troops from 36 countries were involved in the 
reconstruction effort. This reconstruction per capita (with a population close to that of New Zealand – 
less than four million) makes Germany and Japan look modest. See: Patrice C Mcmahon and Jon 
Western, 'The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia from Falling Apart', Foreign Affairs, 88/5 (2009), 
69-83. 
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Most importantly a long-term perspective is accepted by the people. It took four years 
for elections to commence (June 2005) and since then, state institutions are being built 
up in earnest. Mortlock, the first New Zealand commander of the Truce Monitoring 
Group in Bougainville freely admits to being somewhat cynical of military 
intervention. Intervention should only occur if peace is achievable, by which he means 
positive receptivity to peace (Mortlock 2001: 69): 
The necessary element is that the protagonists want peace. It is not enough to be war-
weary; they have to be hungry enough for peace to forgive those transgressions that 
inevitably happen in the course of a peace process.  
 
Winning a peace (as opposed to a war) requires “steely resolve” and endurance not 
only from the groups involved but also from the international parties. In the most 
difficult context, it can be years before learning cement into functioning institutions. 
Internationals can assist this through monitoring (like election monitoring) and 
support, not simply providing the tools, and expecting the respective states to know 
how to use them.  
ii) Top down approach: contrasting Cambodia and Bougainville 
In 1993, the emerging liberal peace framework seemed to be triumphing and was 
strongly supported by an international community of peace-builders. Cambodia was 
hailed as a momentous achievement – the successful replacement of a vicious 
intrastate and internationalised conflict with an elected government. A new 
Cambodian constitution and elections provided a new government in line with the 
promised “comprehensive peace” settlement of the 1991 Paris Agreement, at which 
point the UN Security Council declared the mission “successfully completed” and 
promptly withdrew (United Nations Security Council 1993). The UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) envisioned that it would implement the “peace” 
through a conservative top-down approach. In other words peace that was “conceived, 
instituted and imposed” from outside (Richmond and Franks 2007: 32). After this 
phase, it was optimistically felt that local ownership would be possible relatively 
quickly (Ibid). 
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The opinion of scholars appears to be virtually unanimous that UNTAC, despite the 
enormity of their mission, achieved organised elections with an unprecedented 90% 
participation, helped establish independence, ended the civil war and assisted with the 
return of refugees (Doyle 1995: 371). As Richmond and Franks (2007: 28) reflected 
there may be a number of “local political, economic and social dynamics” and “ 
international failings” that modified the liberal peace-building project in Cambodia, 
but the most important lesson appears to be the uncertainty over whether it is possible 
to transfer or reverse-engineer the liberal peace. Local elites never altered their winner-
takes-all attitude. The conflict continued to be the contention for power and the 
monopoly on violence and resources, framed now by competition over control of the 
modern state. If peace-building theory has moved at all, it must be the acceptance that 
the classic liberal state apparatus cannot simply be auctioned off. 
 
The benefit of an inclusive grassroots approach to paused-conflict governance can be 
seen in the process which resulted in Bougainville’s Lincoln agreement where 
stakeholders from all levels of the community were involved (Gault 2003). Agreement 
only made by the top level, when war and conflict are blurred at the edges, would have 
been inconceivable in a conflict such as this where top down control over these groups 
is not reality. Instead hundreds of Bougainvilleans attended peace talks and 
negotiations at Burnham (New Zealand) guaranteeing commitment, stability and 
implementation of the settlement reached. Local commanders of the BRA and BRF 
were not the only ones signing the agreement. Members of civil society and traditional 
institutions (the church and village elders) were present (Carl and Sr. Lorraine Garsu 
CSN 2002; Tapi 2002).  Having civil society assume shared responsibility constituted 
a “third party” reflecting the feelings of “the people”, of exhaustion, or receptivity to 
alternative strategies and ultimately the desire to play by the new rules. This is in 
keeping with Lederach’s (1997) model for bottom up approaches to peace building, 
supported by the ever growing literature (Call and Cook 2003; Richmond 2005; van 
Tongeren et al. 2005). 
iii) The real risk of never-ending involvement 
Without the package of building blocks put forward in this research, and true 
understanding of these dynamics by international actors, international assistance can 
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only at best manufacture (negative) peace for as long as there are international parties 
willing to police and run key elements of the respective states. A current example of 
international assistance “success” is that of the BiH’s multi-ethnic local state 
institution, the Brčko District (Griffiths 1998).  
 
The Brčko District has been heralded as an international assistance success story due 
to the mixed Bosniak, Croat and Serb population. It was once the site of a vicious 
ethnic cleansing campaign, a brutal concentration camp, and a major confrontation 
line. It was too strategically important to all sides to incorporate within the polarised 
logic of the Dayton map. Instead its future was left to binding international arbitration, 
and when no agreement could be reached by the entities, a separate district was created 
in 1999. The International Crisis Group (2003b) noted:  
Once seen as the most likely flashpoint for any renewed warfare in BiH, Brcko has 
since prospered to such an extent that it is regularly and rightly invoked both as the 
shining example of international stewardship in BiH and as a model for emulation by 
the rest of the country. 
By 2009, as Clark (2010: 67-68) recently reported, in stark contrast to other areas such 
as Stolac, Srebrenica and some parts of Mostar:  
Brčko bore few obvious war scars. Damaged and destroyed building were largely 
repaired or rebuilt; the town had a ‘relaxed feel’ and there were signs of economic 
development and rejuvenation. 
 
The resolution to this complex territorial problem has required intense international 
supervision through the OHR.  Reforms were based on a conception of 
‘democratisation’ that prioritised minority rights over majority rule, and its 
achievements were initially demonstrated in the advanced returnee figures121 (Doyle 
                                               
121 Brčko was taken over by the Serbs during the conflict and completely cleared of Bosniaks and 
Croats. Two-thirds of its pre-war population were displaced and at the same time some 26,000 Serbs 
settled there from other areas, taking over empty housing. The Arbitration Tribunal noted in 1998 that 
Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik (politicians from the Serbian Democratic Party, and in the 
case Krajišnik, now a war criminal – having been found guilty in 2006 of crimes against humanity – 
while Karadžić is currently facing similar charges) obstructed the return of displaced persons and 
actively encouraged Serbs to remain in the area to ensure a majority. See: Arbitral Tribunal, 'Arbitral 
Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, Final Award', (5 March, 1999) at 8. As 
of the middle of 2009, 22,095 minority returnees (refugees and displaced people) were recorded for 
Brčko District, the majority of whom returned early on in the District’s formation – around 2001-2003. 
See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
'Statistics Package', (UNHCR, 2009). Available here http://www.unhcr.ba/return/pdf%202009/SP_06_ 
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and Sambanis 2006: 238), which were greatly assisted by the international security 
presence. A multi-ethnic police force122, school system123 and independent judiciary124 
were created. On the surface, an improved economic outlook (in terms of economic 
opportunities and average salaries)  (Bieber 2005: 431), along with the removal of 
nationalist street names replaced with symbols reflecting unity (road signs in both 
Cyrillic (Serb) and Latinic (Bosniak and Croat) scripts and new street names for those 
applied during the Serb occupation of 1992)125 have both assisted. In terms of 
corruption, which is a real issue in BiH, Brčko was the first place in the country to 
indict and try politically important people for corruption – including a former judge. 
Such practices have asserted the “idea” of a coherent local state in Brčko, operating to 
guarantee rights for all citizens and protecting minority groups (Jeffrey 2006). 
 
At an institutional, top-down level Brčko’s achievements are significant. However, its 
“success” is heavily dependent on the international presence. The international 
operation in Brčko was at the time the most intensive ever launched in economic, 
political and financial terms and required the closest supervision in BiH.126 From the 
outset, the involvement of locals in the reform process was deliberately limited 
(Jeffrey 2006: 216), and perhaps initially this was sensible. However, accepting the 
magnitude of what has been achieved in Brčko – particularly in relation to the rest of 
                                               
2009.pdf (last accessed Friday 30 April 2010). 
122 Brčko’s multi-ethnic police force is the first for BiH, certified by the UN International Police Task 
Force as meeting international standards. According to opinion polls, it is well respected by the citizens 
of Brčko. See: Howard Clarke, 'Brcko District: An Example of Progress in the Basic Reforms in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina', (Meeting Report 293; Washington: Wilson Centre, 2004). 
123 While protested against initially, particularly by the Serbs, public opinion polls suggest that the 
introduction of multi-ethnic schooling has had a largely positive impact on popular attitudes. For 
example, an October 2004 poll indicated that 75 per cent of Bosniaks, 68 per cent of Croats and 62.1 
per cent of Serbs agreed with the statement: “It is entirely irrelevant in what language the classes in 
schools/universities are being held as all these languages are very similar”. Across the whole of BiH, 
the respective percentages were 56.1, 30.3 and 50.7 See: Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'Lessons from Education Reform in Brcko', (October: 
OSCE Mission to BiH Education Department, 2007) at 10. 
124 The independent judiciary (with modern criminal and civil codes) was established by hiring all 
judges and prosecutors, cementing the rule of law and giving confidence to those who wished to invest 
in the area that contracts would be enforced. The judiciary has been supported by international training 
and mentoring. 
125 For example, changing ‘Srspskih Oslobodilaca Brčkog’ (‘the Serb Liberation of Brčko’) to ‘Bosne 
Srebrene’ (‘Silver Bosnia’). 
126 NATO troops patrolled the streets and kept the peace. Municipal elections were coordinated by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The EU and the US Agency for International 
Development provided humanitarian relief and other NGOs helped reduce prostitution and human 
trafficking in the city. 
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the country – questions are now being asked about the durability of the tiny state if the 
international presence leaves.  
 
More importantly it is hard to discern the exact impact of international intervention in 
the area, especially on everyday inter-ethnic interactions and relations. Few studies 
have been conducted on the reintegration of ordinary people but like the rest of BiH, 
as Clark observes there clear signs of a lack of inter-ethnic trust, many missing persons 
and the continuation of strong and differing interpretations of the past and denial and 
competing truths (J. N. Clark 2010; Pickering 2007). People do business with each 
other, but limited engagement with those from other groups means reconciliation is 
thin at best.  In addition, peace is not truly owned. As Pugh and Cobble (2001: 44) 
warn:  
[c]ommunities have a right to own the regeneration of their societies, and without active 
participation, people will not become “stakeholders” in the peacebuilding ventures 
ostensibly generated to assist them.  
The greatest challenge for the post-conflict society is therefore not the destruction 
cause to buildings and institutions but rather the challenge of rebuilding the 
interpersonal relationships (Halpern and Weinstein 2004: 303-04).  Within the peace-
building programme these ordinary people and their problems should not be 
overlooked. Otherwise, an over-simplistic and overly-optimistic picture while emerge 
which does not coincide with everyday life.  Finding out how such “bridges” between 
groups are built and encouraging them should be the priority of international 
assistance. An approach to paused-conflict governance that neglects or pays 
insufficient attention to the “view from below” 127 is insufficient. This highlights issues 
not just of quality and ownership but also of sustainability.  
                                               
127 For the growing body of literature emphasising and exploring the views from below, see as examples:  
Elizabeth M Cousens and Chetan Kumar (eds), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile 
Societies, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001; Beatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: 
UN Missions and Local People, London: Hurst, 2006; Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger 
Duijzings, ‘Introduction’, in Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duijzings (eds), The New Bosnian 
Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, Paula 
M. Pickering, Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2007; Beatrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), After Mass 
Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities, Tokyo: UN University Press, 2007. 
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL COMPACT 
i) “Do no harm.”128 
The origins and forces of violent conflict are seldom reducible to internal factors 
solely. The responsibilities of foreign governments, institutions and individuals have 
to be kept in mind.  State builders are reluctant to assume direct responsibility for the 
outcomes of their interventions (Chandler 2006). Like domestic actors, the actions of 
internationals can amount to “spoiling”.129  
 
Somalia is one of the most tragic cases where the international community was partly 
responsible for the collapse of the state. The legacy of colonialism saw the country 
divided up and then granted independence in 1960 without the evolution of an 
experienced political class, like much of Africa. During the Cold War, the US and the 
Soviet Union competed for influence and control in Somalia because of its strategic 
location along oil routes from the Persian Gulf. Having assumed the mantle of 
socialism under General Siad Barre, the Soviet Union was then eager to offer 
assistance, arming and aiding Somalia in the 1970s.130 During attempts to annex 
Ethiopia’s ethnically Somali Ogaden region, the USSR gave their support instead to 
Ethiopia’s new Marxist military government. Somalia lost at huge cost. By the early 
1980s, the Soviet Union was replaced by the USA as Somalia’s military patron 
(Bradbury and Healy 2010; Woods 1997). After the civil war in the late 1980s between 
Somali elites and rival militias, the USA abruptly pulled out leaving a country 
dependent on imported food but with an abundance of the remnants of the Cold War 
– arms. Famine loomed and conflict ensued. After media footage of starving children 
aired in Western states, the UN intervened in April and the US in December 1992. The 
USA forces soon became actively involved in the civil war. Footage of a dead USA 
                                               
128 “Do no harm” is one of the eight frameworks that UN organisations implementing humanitarian 
programmes operate under. These frameworks are extrapolated from the three core principles humanity, 
neutrality, and impartiality  
129 For example, the Australian government’s considerable military assistance to the PNGDF provided 
them with the ability to sustain their war fighting capabilities in Bougainville over such a long time. 
See: Volker Boege, 'Bougainville and the Discovery of Slowness: An Unhurried Approach to State-
Building in the Pacific', (Occassional Paper Series, Number 3, June; Brisbane: The Australian Centre 
for Peace and Conflict Studies 2006b). 
130 From 1969 to 1979 similar transformations occurred throughout Africa including in Angola, Benin, 
the Republic of Congo, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique among others.  
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soldier being dragged through the streets prompted President Bill Clinton to pull 
troops out in 1994; for the failure which he blamed the UN, quite inaccurately (since 
the soldier was not under their control). Skipping forward in time, the northern polities 
of Somaliland and Puntland managed to create their own government structures 
through grassroots peace-building processes in the early 1990s, the former suffering 
initial setback through civil war, and the latter becoming the home of pirates, but both 
developing reasonably democratic political systems (Bradbury and Healy 2010). In 
the remaining southern area, the coalition known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 
eventually took control around 2006. Their roots were in Mogadishu’s merchant class 
who wanted a safer environment in which to trade and saw Islam as the common 
ground through which to unite the country’s clans and militias – the local form of the 
rule of law. For a while they succeeded where the Transitional National Government 
(TNG – 2000 to 2004) 131 and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG – 2004 
onwards) could not, restoring peace and order and reviving trade and employment 
(Kirsti Samuels 2007 ). In 2006, the US armed Ethiopian troops and sent them into 
Somalia to destroy the ICU, driving the moderate leaders into exile and leaving behind 
the more radical youth splinter group Al-Shabaa (now a designated terrorist group) 
(Lattimer 2008: 13; Norell 2008). Civil war returned. The northern sector is at peace 
but under threat. The TFG has no legitimacy or capacity to do anything and cannot 
hope to govern from the internationally secured area in Mogadishu. The options are to 
out-pace radicalism or for the international presence to stay long enough to see peace. 
 
The approach of conflict transformation makes a number of salient points for 
international assistance. It must be centralised around strengthening governance but 
must also find ways of working within existing traditions and structures of local law 
to reduce the risk of resentment. Too fervent a promotion of Western ideals if pursued 
by means of foreign intervention faces a serious challenge in the form of a possible 
reaction of resentment, leading to a possible backlash against democracy and 
democratic institutions. International assistance must try to establish peace through 
supporting the local population in the keeping of that peace, both as actors and 
                                               
131 Comprised mainly of elites from the diaspora community and former employees of Siyad Barre (the 
President of the Somali Democratic Republic from 1969 to 1991) it had little credibility inside Somalia, 
even within Somaliland and Puntland. 
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beneficiaries, but must resist promoting full scale democracy development until a rule 
of law is functioning.  
ii) Sovereignty is a responsibility  
It is only in the context of doing no harm that any state or the UN can legitimately 
argue as a global citizen that sovereignty is a responsibility – not a right. Security 
Council sanction for the use of force can be utilised where threats to neighbours are 
apparent, but there is no right to impose forcibly democracy, under any circumstances.  
The concepts underlying this chapter do conflict with the norm of the inviolability of 
state sovereignty (art 2.7 UN Charter). Arguably over the course of practice in the 20th 
century and into the 21st, a social contract between states and the international 
community has developed. As referred to in Chapter 2, sovereignty has shifted and a 
responsibility to protect come to the fore (International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty 2001; Thakur 2006). The abortive mercenary hiring of the 1997 
Sandline crisis in the PNG/Bougainville conflict, for example, provided the “circuit 
breaker” (Alley 2003: 252) that allowed for the international intervention. To ignore a 
country that has no capacity for self-government is now considered morally 
objectionable, if not illegal (International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty 2001). Perhaps a graduated system of sovereignty already exists and 
ultimately, building a framework for integration into broader regional institutions in 
recognition of the international social compact may be necessary, but it requires 
consent. 
 
The pacification of the Leviathan, however, must come from within, as part of learned 
constitutionalism. This is not to say that any external presence should leave the scene 
as soon as possible quite the contrary it seems. With true exhaustion and learning from 
the past, merit may be seen in accepting some form of international “refereeing” or 
oversight for years to come – but not of course in the mould of the former international 
trusteeship system (UN Charter, art 77 and 78). Even in transitional administrations, 
however, the UN is not a trustee ruling on behalf of a sovereign in exile (as in the 
international law of occupation) or ruling on behalf of the local population, but rather 
on behalf of the peoples of the world – a global board of referees if you will.  
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iii) International referees 
The logic of the learning process is that international help can cut across the historical 
evolution from conflicting to pacifying, through an agreed and appropriately 
buttressed framework that holds groups together. International assistance is not 
defined by the number of agencies on the ground or money spent (although there are 
obvious incidences where more should have been done by the international 
community such as in Somalia).  In divided societies, if groups wish to participate in 
governance – a competitive pursuit – then they need an external neutral party to 
adjudicate.  
 
Sports analogies resonate worldwide. If local groups want to play football 
competitively, a referee is required to umpire, supply the ball, mark the fields, check 
the goal posts, etc. The groups agree to follow the rules of the game. Football referees 
should not have to fight their way to the field, and then confront some teams that 
brought more than the allowed number of players, some that used guns to scare off the 
opponents and had supporters who attacked the referee. If the evidence was that there 
was no basic agreement on the rules and that cheating and fighting would be the result, 
the game would be postponed until further discussions yielded sufficient agreement. 
Unlike BiH where groups were kept apart and rules agreed without consensus, simply 
getting parties together in the first instance is a crucial first step. New Zealand brought 
people together during the Burnham talks. For example, once sworn enemies – BRA 
General Sam Kauona and PNG’s Brigadier General Leo Nuia were taken away 
separately to talk  together and “break bread” over dinner in New Zealand. 
 
Back in the world of competitive governance, if people were together long enough, it 
is possible that they would choose something that was not about favouring just 
themselves in the immediate term. They would recognise that they needed to be treated 
fairly when not in power.  South Africa was able to negotiate this for themselves by 
recognising the impossibility of progress if all participants had veto powers, which led 
to a policy of sufficient consensus moving forward. A top-down social contract needs 
to be backed by a bottom up recognition of the role that our personal values, social 
ties, cultural influences and traditions play in setting people against each other as well 
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as in healing these relations after conflict. This is analogous to Rawls’ (1999: 88) idea 
of a decent non-aggressive society being that which has:  
a common good idea of justice that assigns human rights to all its members; its basic 
structure includes a decent consultation hierarchy that protects these and other rights and 
ensures that all groups in society are decently represented by elected bodies in the system 
of consultation.  
 
The veil of ignorance in Rawls’ theory of justice requires that we temporarily ignore 
our physical, psychological and moral attributes. When this happens, we can decide 
our future social arrangements without the knowledge of which position we might 
hold in the future social context. Because of that we are not able to guide our decisions 
by selfish interests, but only by what we have – a capacity for justice. In doing so, we 
can consider all possibilities without bias.  
 
For international referees, Sen (2009) has usefully extended Rawls’ idea of having the 
right rules, institutions and social contract in the proposal of setting people free. The 
job of the international community is not to “resolve” but to provide access to 
transformation. In other words, they should not attempt to construct their view of a 
perfectly just society but provide space to allow people in paused-conflict states to live 
the life of their own choosing. International referees might be able to hold groups 
together, and help establish and monitor a set of processes that provides for the 
transformation of the post-conflict society.  
 
In addition, employing a conflict-based lens, as opposed to give simply people a 
chance for change. However, because governance can also exacerbate the capacity for 
groups to seek to benefit over others, more time will need to be taken around 
constitutional processes, interim constitutions and ongoing monitoring of learned 
constitutionalism, as well as education and training. To this end, key aspects of the 
decision-making process such as the Auditor General, parts of the judiciary and the 
police force, the holders of the purse strings, the public prosecutor, members of the 
electoral commission, among others, may require international actors to assume these 
roles. This should be co-sharing in governance, not taking over and running the state, 
and certainly not generating aid dependency. Accusations of neo-colonialism will 
abound and consent of course is crucial here. The goal is to search for something that 
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might work to change things, including strategies to support local reformers 
overwhelmed by corruption, nepotism, populist (and often racist) slogans and 
militarism.  However, if competitiveness cannot be managed, then it is a race to the 
bottom, much like an arms race. The framework for support perhaps provides some 
answers. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORKS 
Rubin (2006) argues that rivalries and fragmented authority at the international level 
mirror the division in post-conflict states like Afghanistan. He calls for a unified 
international decision-making body to coordinate the various agendas. Indeed, 
alternatives could be constructed in the legal compacts and agreements with the 
country concerned to provide a coherent strategy. Dann and Al-Ali’s (2006) study of 
Iraq, Sudan and East Timor’s constitution-making processes under external influence 
raises the point of how international influence should be governed by international 
law.  The sort of legal regime governing external influence has been set by UN 
Security Council Resolutions, or in the case of occupations, the law of belligerent 
occupation can assist. Whether influence is exercised in conformity with those rules 
is another matter. These laws did not, for example, stop the USA from interfering in 
the constitution-making process in Iraq after handing over sovereignty to the interim 
government. General rules of public international law could apply, however, and the 
authors argue that certain substantive standards of the political process, such as the 
right to democratic governance and certain human rights, have emerged as being 
inalienable and external actors have to respect these standards.  
 
Bell (2008) shows how peace agreements and constitutional arrangements have hybrid 
characteristics. The law’s role has been reconceived in the peace agreement context 
so as to address the particular challenges of transiting from the idea of agreements as 
contracts or treaties as social contracts.  A nice example concerns arrangements to 
enforce aspects of peace agreements. Typically, domestic obligations have to be 
enforced in domestic courts. But the complexity of peace arrangements often produces 
innovative ways of enforcement, such as Security Council approved arbitration, or 
provisions for guarantors of the agreement, or indeed a series of relationships (Ibid, 
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184). Since various forms of agreement are now at the centre of peace processes, it is 
necessary to reconceptualise the categories of domestic and international law to 
accommodate arrangements that draw on both.  This is the new law of third party 
enforcement (negotiated settlement) which is quasi-codified and supports the notion 
of an international social compact.  
 
Moving forward, clearly articulated frameworks are required, for consent, for 
legitimacy, for coherence, and indeed for assistance, which can survive a challenge by 
local politicians (or other spoilers).132 Two examples are addressed – Collier’s 
Independent Service Authority (ISA) model and RAMSI.    
i) Supporting governance through the ISA model  
In addressing international assistance, Collier argues (2007, 2008, 2009), that 
workable ways to bridge state collapse may exist for states of the “bottom billion” 
(countries where people live in abject poverty) to escape from a number of 
“development traps”. One key element of his proposals that is along the lines of the 
international referees proposed here is the establishment of partnership domestic and 
international financial institutions to provide reliable receipt and delivery mechanisms 
to implement government policy, chiefly in the delivery of essential services (2008). 
A board would be brought together, the ISA, made up of aid donors, expatriates and 
members of the government, sharing responsibility for effectively administering 
public funds from donor governments (and any other potential source included in the 
national budget – such as substantial national resource revenue). 133  These funds 
                                               
132 This part of the thesis draws directly on Andrew Ladley and Jessie Williams, 'Chapter 9 the Collier 
Challenge: How Can Reliable Transitional Financing Systems Be Created in ‘Barely Functional’ 
States?', in Manas Chatterji (ed.), Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political 
Perspectives (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, (14: 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2010), 147-65  
133 A centralised source of easy and unaccountable cash tends to annihilate a fledgling democracy by 
creating patronage machines and lowering the pressure to develop a social contract that comes with 
effective taxation. In resource rich countries, strong checks and balances are more important to escape 
the resource curse (i.e. Nauru). Taiwan (Republic of China) is a significant donor in Solomon Islands 
for example, “providing SBD 85 million, (approximately AUD 17.2 million), including over 6 per cent 
of the development budget, in 2008. Some commentators have suggested that Taiwan’s aid is neither 
transparent nor accounted for, and in some cases directly [channeled] to members of parliament 
through, for example, the Rural Constituency Development Fund." The requirement to account 
quarterly for this was waived by ministerial directive in 2008 although normal audit accountability 
requirements remain. Carole Pretorius, Peter Lokay, and Haggai Arumae, 'Solomon Islands: Public 
Financial Management - Performance Report', (Rotterdam: ECORYS Nederland BV, 2008). There is 
no doubt that Taiwanese government funding has contribution to corruption in the Solomon Islands. In 
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would then be channelled to private service providers and NGOs by entering into 
contracts with them; and monitor the performance of providers generating competition 
and at the same time protect service delivery from the patrimony and corruption that 
is common within the targeted states (Collier 2008: 14).   
 
Without the ISA model, international actors may choose to withhold funding. 
However, because domestic services are least capable of managing funds effectively 
and delivering services, much less with probity, bypassing the core functions of the 
state (centralising funds for public expenditure) is precisely the purpose. In addition, 
as the OECD’s Fragile States Group (2008) recognises, contracted-out services or 
functions should enable the state to strengthen its capacity and legitimacy over time. 
In terms of buttressing receptivity to peace, in particular, effective delivery and 
improvements would greatly assist. It is possible that governments may choose to 
channel more of their own revenue devoted to social spending through the ISA rather 
than through spending ministries whose role would then become focused on policy 
design, and taking away any avenue to corruption.  
 
Recognising and managing risk are key features of Collier’s model. It is possible, he 
argues, to reduce post-conflict governance risks by a combination of mutually-
reinforcing steps aimed at economic recovery, external guarantees of peacekeeping, 
fairer elections, and internationally supported public service delivery — all sustained 
at least over a 10-year-period. In this context, the international community is required 
to pay for the transition of the ‘bottom billion’ and the process must be sustained by 
restructured incentives that hold the players to a non-violent shared governance.  
 
In addition, foreign donors fearing committing resources in these precarious states, 
have sometimes adopted a “wait and see” attitude to assistance. The risk here is 
obvious. Such a stance can cause the chauvinists to ‘win’, as the current situation in 
                                               
2001 for example, the $US25 million “loaned” to the SIG in compensation to victims of the conflict 
was clouded in controversy. Its rapid and chaotic distribution led to claims of unfairness and extortion 
and accusations that particular ministers had improperly benefit. In 2006 general election, Taiwan was 
accused of financially supporting candidates. Graeme Dobell, 'China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: 
Diplomatic Chess Versus Pacific Political Rugby', (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy 
Policy Brief, 2007) at 11. In the same year the Taiwanese ambassador announced the Rural Community 
Development Funds ($400,000) to be paid annually to every MP to spend as they wished in their 
constituencies. 
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Zimbabwe illustrates where urgent calls for international support for the reform 
process to match populous expectation have been made, crucially to make it more 
difficult for the extremists to grab power once more. As Morgan Tsvangirai recently 
said, “Don't make us pay for working with Mugabe” (Masamvu and Steinberg 2009).  
ii) Buttressing against chauvinism in post-conflict states 
Stable states have good legal systems, where wealth formation is encouraged, and tax 
systems provoke the population into demanding accountability – what is called 
shareholder democracy. They are therefore able to withstand surprise events (both 
internal and external) and contestation continues to remain within the boundaries of 
existing institutional arrangements. In states emerging from conflict, and weak states 
generally, as has been illustrated throughout this thesis, democracy can be simply the 
staging of elections and groupism is often fostered. Even in a country like Fiji, this is 
evident, where a Westminster parliamentary system is unable to overcome communal 
representation which has seriously inhibited shared common political space. Politics 
has been pushed to the fringes, and the two most chauvinist positions are constantly 
being elected in a “winner takes all” contest. There is an incentive to get elected 
without shareholder democracy because there is generally no real form of taxation and 
no social contract in terms of the accepted rules and checks and balances to hold 
government accountable – let alone afford them the legitimacy to capture the middle 
ground, thus discouraging traditional spoilers (rebellions, coups etc).  
 
Collier emphasises that one can, indeed one must keep outside international assistance 
working through a range of strategies, including controlling finance and giving 
security guarantees. Whilst international referees cannot substitute indefinitely for the 
sort of social contract that must ultimately underpin government-by-consent, the goal 
is to buy sufficient time to get most of the warlords off the game and then to change 
the incentive structure. In the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, before the 
articulation of new rules of governance, a major goal is to get people busy, re-
establishing infrastructure, state and economic institutions, state services like schools, 
getting work for demobilised soldiers, rebuilding homes, getting markets functioning, 
etc. In this respect, Collier’s model provides for accountable spending where it could 
add the most value.  
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Collier’s model, however, does not project out beyond the first year or two. He does 
not explain the mechanisms that would implement and support ISAs, much less their 
ability to adapt. Leaders will eventually tire of shared arrangements. Shared 
sovereignty arrangements need to be supported with as much buttressing as possible. 
This may include international resolutions and treaties, domestic legislation, 
constitutional amendments, arrangements for international personnel who will work 
in the foreign state (including dealing with the issue of immunity), some means of 
connecting directly with the people, a means of dispute resolution, and so on. Where 
Collier stresses speed, it is argued here that durability requires the greater emphasis on 
the framework right from the start. The following components are needed: 
 
 Consent: There is no guarantee that international charters alone, either those 
of the UN or private sector led ones administered by international 
organisations, such as De Beer’s Kimberly Process or the Extractive Industries 
Initiative, will be enough to buttress shared international sovereignty in 
paused-conflict states. Returning to the idea of international social compacts, 
in order to capitalise on receptivity and learning, and in being weary of 
groupism, they would need to be signed and adhered to by all relevant parties 
within a state. It may be difficult, for example, in places like Somalia, to find 
people to give consent but for there to be any chance of short-cutting the 
alternative, incentives must be clearly presented to the people as well as to the 
previously warring factions. Spoilers too must be accounted for, as must 
constitutional questions and the issues of immunity as part of the international 
side’s responsibility to do no harm.  
 Legitimacy ties in with consent and with the function of the mission. Without 
legitimacy, consent may very well be withdrawn or popular support wane. The 
need for the institution or position holder (i.e.,. the Auditor General) to be seen 
as fair and efficient, not simply another arm of the “winner takes all” style of 
government, means that it/they will have to appeal to the public mood. Public 
support will also protect it from changing, political contexts that would 
otherwise destroy it. Therefore, such institutions will take on a very different 
feel from Collier’s separate administrative function, also concerned with 
public affairs and countering misinformation. While local ownership and rule 
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setting are paramount, the notion that policy and politics can be left intact, 
separate from the administration (or “refereeing) is dubious. What is the 
purpose of a monitoring function, if not to ensure the rules are followed, based 
on what “works”? Invariably in the roles that internationals may fill, 
judgements will have to be made, not simply the carrying out of policy. 
 Immunity: The accountability of international referees to the local population 
raises issues of immunity from prosecution. Traditionally governments have 
provided to other sovereign states and their representatives certain rights and 
facilities not available to ordinary citizens such as privileges and immunities. 
While these are extended in accordance with international law and are 
customarily based upon reciprocity and diplomatic practice developed through 
years of inter-governmental relationship, international intervention has moved 
on from traditional, military led operations. Yet individuals are accorded 
immunity in their role as state diplomats, officials of international 
organisations, and military and even civilian personnel under international 
agreements or individual contracts. Immunity and its potential to allow 
impunity are dangerous for any mission on the ground trying to generate or 
retain the confidence of the local population, not to mention establish the rule 
of law domestically. Not only that, it goes against the UN’s aim to rebuild 
peace and security if the rebuilders are immune from their criminal actions 
(Ladley 2005). The dimension of accountability is so far missing from this 
discussion, and must be not just on political terms but also on legal terms. 
Accountability to the local population, and the principle of doing no harm is 
just as important as accountability to donors and contributing countries. Legal 
immunity from the laws of a host country has a solid rationale in international 
law; however the military has its own processes for dealing with crimes where 
immunity exists and is also subject to the UN codes.  For civilians and the 
police, there are no equivalent processes and the current UN sanctions are 
essentially employment related. Making provision for civilians who commit 
crimes on peace operations was the objective of the Status of Force Agreement 
for RAMSI in the Solomon Islands, which ceded its criminal jurisdiction only 
if the sending country could prosecute any offences in its domestic courts. New 
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Zealand and Australia amended their legislation to cover non-military staff.134 
Arguably each place that provided an international referee would have to do 
this. Other options include: on-mission prosecution with a court established on 
the ground with the host state’s consent; and the establishment of an 
independent body akin to an Ombudsman’s office which could look at broader 
complaints relating to the operation of policy or to individuals where the 
complainant was not satisfied with the outcome of the internal investigatory 
process. However, like a Board of Inquiry, the Ombudsman lacks enforcement 
power as its findings are only recommendations 
 Guarantees: Collier suggests that military interventions in small, less-
developed countries where legitimate governments had been overthrown in a 
post-Iraq, post-colonial world, is controversial, requiring greater clarity of 
method and purpose. Collier does not elaborate as to when exactly intervention 
is warranted and how it should be carried out. History has taught us that 
confused recipes for intervention are particularly dangerous. In keeping with 
the theme of buttressing, it would seem highly appropriate to emphasise other 
guarantees. Oversight mechanisms building upon the election monitoring 
model, for example, could be employed during the transitional period (10 – 15 
years at least) to strengthen the implementation of constitutions. Security 
should be maintained and strengthened (i.e.,. cleaning up the police force if 
necessary) on the ground, not from afar with the only resource being the use 
of large scale force.  
 
Most importantly international assistance must improve governance and assist with 
pacifying the Leviathan. The RAMSI intervention in the Solomon Islands (2003 - ) 
provides a governance model analogous to Collier’s, emphasising the importance of 
compacts or codes and charters to form shared sovereignty arrangements between the 
international community and a government to reduce conflict. The challenges, 
however, discussed in this research, of spoilers, of war by other means, of groupism, 
have not been adequately considered by Collier to date. These issues are 
interconnected and complicated, not least due to the fact that any one of the possible 
                                               
134  Crimes (Overseas) Amendment Act 2003 (Australia) and the Crimes and Misconduct (Overseas 
Operations) Act 2004 (New Zealand). 
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ways international referees can assist goes to the heart of any state, but none more so 
than controlling revenue flows. While aid becomes a contractual arrangement, (and 
the money will be well spent in the short term) the governance challenge is to convert 
this idea into something that does not get out-chauvanised in post-conflict situations. 
Collier’s ideas are focused on the first year to two and are transitional, not 
transformative. Establishing a properly buttressed framework can assist in building 
immunity in local populations so that all sorts of international referees can assist in 
pacifying the Leviathan. 
iii) Comparing THE ISA Model with the Regional Assistance Mission in 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
The experience of the RAMSI is the closest real-world comparator to Colliers’s thesis 
– albeit in very different and arguably quite favourable circumstances – and is useful 
in illustrating some of the inherent difficulties to resolve for international assistance. 
The widespread social unrest that broke out in 1999 between the indigenous people of 
Guadalcanal and settlers from adjacent Malaita island developed into a low level 
armed conflict between opposing ethnic militias and continued after the signing of the 
Townsville Peace Agreement in 2000 with the complete breakdown of law and order. 
What Chabal and Daloz (1999) refer to as the “instrumentalisation of disorder” 
whereby criminality becomes a key political instrument, resulting in the effective 
capture and pillaging of the state by a small gang of corrupt leaders, ex-militants and 
renegade police officers. This left the government in a situation where they could not 
meet debt obligations or supply basic services. In addition, the Provincial Government 
Act assigned the responsibility for various service provision to the provincial 
governments (health, education, agricultural extension, etc.), which they were unable 
to supply for the most part (Frankel 2004). 
 
An independent authority - the Solomon Islands Rehabilitation Authority (SIRA) – 
was initially proposed to take over the government in the areas of law and order and 
financial management (Wainwright 2003). The government would have continued to 
run the remaining policy areas, but with substantial input from SIRA (Fullilove 2006). 
This plan, however, was regarded by Australia as too intrusive of sovereignty and the 
approach eventually adopted and deployed in July 2003 was a unique kind of 
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authority. RAMSI is not a transitional administration but a technical assistance 
package or framework for strengthened assistance. The official aim outlined in the 
framework document states that “strengthened assistance will address the most serious 
specific threats to security and economic recovery in Solomon Islands” (Solomon 
Islands Government 2003).  
 
The package came with security. RAMSI was designed as a police-led operation 
backed by (the unused threat of) military force. Officers of RAMSI’s participating 
police force were not advisors, but investigators with full domestic police power under 
Solomon Islands law. The results were dramatic. Law and order were quickly restored. 
In addition to re-establishing law and order, work under RAMSI’s economic 
governance pillar focused on the ongoing provision of advisors and in-line personnel 
to work with the government, mainly through the Ministry of Finance and Treasury, 
to stabilise government finances. The short-term objectives of controlling expenditure 
and work towards budget stabilisation were met very quickly (AusAID 2004).  
 
The Special Coordinator’s Office in Honiara (headed by an Australian diplomat) and 
a high-level inter-departmental committee in Canberra is responsible for overall 
coordination (Dinnen and Stewart 2008). The speedy manner in which RAMSI 
restored peace (law and order), essential services and stabilised government finances 
prompted considerable praise (Fullilove 2006). These achievements are an anomaly 
among the generally disappointing results of international interventions. RAMSI was 
commended as “a model for future deployment” (Watson 2005: 37). More recent 
initiatives include: 
 developing the capacity of staff and systems in the Ministry of Finance and 
Treasury; 
 implementing anticorruption measures which have reduced leakages 
particularly in Treasury and Inland Revenue;  
 implementing accountability processes in Customs;  
 providing foreign direct investment legislation and management; and  
 transparency of tax and duty exemptions.  
The backlog of central government financial statements were eliminated, and debt 
interest and trade creditor arrears were paid off (AusAID 2008; George 2008; Pacific 
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Islands Forum of Eminent Persons Group 2005; Winter et al. 2008). Australia has 
committed finances and resources to RAMSI until the end of 2013 (Osifelo 2009a). 
The World Bank and Asian Development Banks are currently supporting the budget 
showing their trust in the accountability structures (Osifelo 2009b).135 
 
In addition to law and order and budget stabilisation, RAMSI’s Participating Policy 
Force:  
 cleaned up the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) – around 25% (or 400 
officers) were removed, and approximately the same percentage of that 
cohort again were charged with a variety of offence including corruption 
and murder; 
 disbanded the paramilitary division which played a significant part in the 
conflict in 2000, and established joint patrols and community policing with 
the RSIP; 
 provided guarding and security services; 
 pursued criminal investigations; and 
 trained new recruits. 
The RAMSI police force is now less involved in day-to-day activities but focused on 
recruiting, training and mentoring RSIP, including promoting women’s participation 
and targeting corruption, while at the same time supporting traditional justice. Not 
only was law and order restored relatively quickly in the Solomon Islands, but the 
ongoing sense of security has, for the most part, endured because of the long haul 
approach to peace. And because security does not just mean military might, in this 
regard, international assistance could come in other forms.  RAMSI funds prosecutors, 
lawyers, judges, magistrates and court administration and logistics personnel, not just 
the police. In addition, support has been provided by the justice and prison systems, 
                                               
135 Criticisms have however still been aired – similarly to those leveled against other interventions – but 
calling for adaptation of the mission rather than its total withdrawal. There are a number of inherent 
weaknesses and reforms are ongoing to address issues of accountability and transparency, including 
concerns over the spending of special funds like the Tsunami Disaster Relief Fund. Pretorius, Lokay, 
and Arumae, 'Solomon Islands: Public Financial Management - Performance Report'. A number of 
other initiatives remain outside of this process, including regional and bi-lateral programmes. Others 
are concerned that RAMSI advisers are perceived by local bureaucrats to be contractors who are 
essentially working for private-sector interests, rather than for the public service and that Australian has 
used the programme to promote overseas business interests and private sector growth. Tim O'connor, 
Sharni Chan, and Dr James Goodman, 'Australian Aid: Promoting Insecurity', The Reality of Aid 2006: 
Focus on Conflict, Security and Development (London: Zed Books, 2006), 172-89, Tim Anderson, 'The 
Limits of Ramsi', (Sydney: AID/WATCH, 2008). 
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and a number of legal experts have performed roles such as the Solicitor General and 
the Public Solicitor. RAMSI has also worked to improve accountability and 
transparency in government and strengthen institutions such as the Ombudsman and 
the Auditor General.  
 
For the purposes of evaluating the merit of this international referees type of 
international assistance, RAMSI established something analogous to the proposal by 
Collier. International staff initially ran the budget process, accountability improved, 
donors approved, funds flowed (both from local revenue sources and donors), and a 
functioning state was quickly re-established.  The example thus suggests that an ISA-
like arrangements worked essentially as Collier hoped.  But the buttressing supports 
need to be appreciated, without which RAMSI would have been kicked out of the 
country some time ago. 
iv) Building immunity against regression and support for RAMSI  
A comprehensive legal framework carefully underpins RAMSI. It was implemented 
only after formal requests from the Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister and Governor 
General as well as the unanimous passage of enabling legislations through Parliament. 
Regional in nature, under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum, RAMSI developed 
from the framework of the Forum’s Biketawa Declaration of 2000 which sets out 
principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The 
heads of government and foreign ministers endorsed the declaration’s security 
recognition that:  “the need, in time of crisis or in response to members’ request for 
assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part 
of the extended Pacific Islands family” (section 3).  
 
RAMSI’s mandate was also explicitly agreed between the SIG and the countries of 
the Pacific through the Pacific Islands Forum at the time of the mission’s deployment 
in 2003. Endorsement of the mission also came from the UN Security Council and the 
UN Secretary General (although not by formal resolution). In addition, RAMSI was 
underpinned by a specific international treaty between the SIG and Australia, New 
Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga establishing the mission’s 
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deployment and reflecting the agreed upon mandate.136 Further, a legal foundation was 
established in the domestic law of the Solomon Islands, in the form of the Facilitation 
of International Assistance Act 2003 passed unanimously by Parliament in July 2003. 
The Act incorporates the RAMSI treaty, thus giving direct legal domestic effect to it. 
The Act provides powers, privileges and immunities of the type already agreed to by 
the SIG in the RAMSI Treaty.  
 
It was only after all this architecture was in place that assistance was requested under 
section 3 formally, through notice given by the Governor General to the regional 
governments, to establish RAMSI and intervene in Solomon Islands. 
 
In directly appealing to the population RAMSI also established a Performance 
Framework in 2005 which enables ongoing evaluation of this architecture, assessing 
its work against publicly stated objectives. The evaluation process includes:  
 a People’s Survey untaken by an independent contractor with Solomon 
Islands’ survey staff to obtain information on the views of locals on issues 
of relevance;  
 a performance report prepared by an independent group of experts;   
 self assessment mechanisms; and  
 oversight by the SIG/RAMSI Performance Assessment Working Group. 
 
In 2006, the context rapidly changed. Summarising these events is useful because they 
illustrate what is inevitable, that international referees and shared sovereignty 
arrangements will challenge and be challenged by local incumbents. The most 
dramatic evidence of trouble was in the major riots and arson in the capital Honiara 
that followed the April 2006 general election and the apparent victory of one faction 
led by Snyder Rini in securing office. In the wake of the riots and a vote of no 
confidence in the elected leader, Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare took office and 
                                               
136 Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and 
Tonga concerning the operations and status of the police and armed forces and other personnel 
deployed to Solomon Islands to assist the restoration of law and order and security. The mandate’s aim 
was to address challenges including civil unrest and lawlessness, economic decline and stagnation, and 
a dramatic decline in government standards. It covered: restoration of civil order; stabilisation of 
government finances; promotion of longer term economic recovery and revival of business confidence; 
and the rebuilding of government institutions or machinery.  
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promptly attempted to set up a commission of inquiry into the riots’ cause. This went 
against RAMSI legal advice that an inquiry would prejudice immediate criminal legal 
action against two MPs facing charges for inciting the riots. Both MPs were strong 
supporters of the Prime Minister and hence essential for him to retain office (AusAID 
2008). There was also concern that the RAMSI police had failed to anticipate or 
control the riots (Moore 2006). In September 2006, the SIG declared the Australian 
High Commissioner persona non grata, claiming he was interfering in domestic 
politics (Sogavare 2006). A further concern was the SIG decision to appoint Julian 
Moti as the Attorney General. In that position, Moti would have been responsible for 
the proposed inquiry. He was at the time wanted under Australian anti-paedophile 
legislation. The relationship between the SIG and RAMSI was also strained further by 
the SIG attempt to rearm its local police, prompting the Australian Foreign Minister 
to publish an open letter in a Solomon Islands newspaper defending RAMSI’s 
achievements and warning of a “deliberate push to undermine” it. Prime Minister 
Sogovare replied, accusing Australian of trying to run a “parallel government” (Jones 
2007). However, the people had learned from conflict and were strongly against re-
arming the police since it was looted police weaponry that had plunged the country 
into crisis before 2003.  
 
From 2006, therefore, growing threats were made by the SIG to repeal the 2003 
founding legislation, thus revoking consent and forcing the removal of RAMSI. These 
threats failed. Indeed, they backfired. A majority of MPs were needed to revoke the 
legislation but instead Prime Minister Sogovare’s government was toppled from office 
in a parliamentary vote of no confidence. RAMSI also faced a constitutional legal 
challenge in the Solomon Islands’ courts which was unsuccessful.137 The change in 
administration138 was in significant part due to its attempts to govern without the 
restrictions resulting from RAMSI’s role in the administration, a framework that was 
buttressed by the comprehensive agreement by a predecessor parliament, by the region 
and, arguably, by the population itself. When the political context changed these 
original arrangements held, not least because the general public saw RAMSI’s 
                                               
137 Nori v Attorney-General [2006] HCSI-CC 172 
138 Noting of course that this happened in a parliamentary system, which allowed a change of 
government by a confidence vote in Parliament. Other such confidence mechanism could be employed 
in other electoral systems. 
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presence as crucial for security. The 2008 and 2009 People’s Surveys confirms this, 
with 86 percent and 88 percent of respondents interviewed supporting its continued 
presence in the country (ANU Enterprise 2008, 2009).  
 
The Solomon Islands is a compelling case for the kind of framework required for 
international referees to assist with paused-conflict governance. Traditionally, 
constitutions have left measures against, for example, official corruption to legislation, 
because of the nature of democratic spoilers, in particular, in getting consent for 
partnership institutions during transitional periods will add to the buttressing and, in 
theory, will place them beyond the reach of politicians in power. There are a number 
of mechanisms that can be employed here, as was the case in the post-apartheid South 
African constitution where transitional arrangements to manage funds carefully were 
itemised.139 
v) Co-sharing not generating dependency  
Where interveners stay too long, they can be accused of creating “aid trauma”. The 
latest criticisms of RAMSI illustrate this point. There is no doubt that the SIG, in the 
capital Honiara at least, was unable to manage the conflict that had emerged by 2003 
– the response led by Australia was a robust military-style intervention by the region, 
nominally a police mission, but strongly militaristic from the start. The goal was to 
remove the weapons, secure law and order, and then rebuild the institutions of 
government, strongly supported by actual personnel doing the work. The situation now 
is less clear. The serious criticism suggests that the core mission was achieved 
relatively early, but that seven years down the track, the longer-term ones are failing. 
This is ostensibly because the local population appears to be increasingly resentful of 
intervention (possibly a complete take-over) in governance, whilst it remains grateful 
for the security stability (T. Anderson 2008). The arguments developed in this thesis 
would suggest, that like Collier’s work, the insights of the lens of conflict 
transformation have not yet been taken on board. There is a deepening resentment at 
relative deprivation and weakening domestic engagement. The analysis of this case 
                                               
139  See Section 240 -  Transitional arrangements: State Revenue Fund  
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suggests that there are no simple prescriptions.  Better insights to understand why 
things have gone wrong after such apparently ideal conditions are needed. 
 
As Wainwright (2006) has noted, among others, securing security so rapidly in the 
Solomon Islands has left locals with high expectations of what RAMSI can do. 
Compounding  the  problem  is  a  widespread  perception  that  it  is  only  RAMSI 
that  can  make  things  work.  The  phrase,  Weitim olketa RAMSI bae kam stretem 
(“Wait for  RAMSI  to  come  and  fix  it”)  has  become a common utterance. Local 
ownership is a key variable in post-conflict peace-building. Among the number of 
criticisms of RAMSI has been the need to turn to a strategy focused on indirect 
approaches rather than doing or directing (Baser 2007). For RAMSI’s activities to be 
sustainable it must now create genuine space for local initiative and accountability. 
This was the conclusion reached by the Pacific Islands Forum of Eminent Persons 
Group (2005). In 2013, RAMSI will have been in the Solomon Islands for over ten 
years, reflecting initial estimates (Moore 2006). However the notion that it can simply 
withdraw is an impossibility (Lineham 2006). This comes back to the importance of 
learned constitutionalism, that without the articulation of a future international 
assistance will in most instances not mesh with what local people want. The Solomon 
Islands tried to hold such discussions on new governance arrangements, with a draft 
constitutions circulating since 2004, none of which have yet been brought before 
Parliament. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Where international assistance is used in paused-conflict governance, it must 
encourage and support learning both directly and by avoiding measures that would 
harm or contradict. In a busy area of international relations, aid, governance and 
(mostly) domestic conflict, despite the prevalence of the formula-state, inevitably this 
field of post-conflict peace-building is developing quickly. The UN and other’s 
approaches are constantly changing, reacting, backtracking, searching for new 
“lessons learned”.  International actors can support societies in re-building governance 
into stable states that can practice positive peace, but must be mindful of the futility in 
a top down approaches and in reverse-engineering the liberal peace. The importance 
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of understanding the preceding triad of theoretical building blocks is crucial; otherwise 
unplanned never-ending involvement could be the outcome. 
 
The role of internationals is to provide outside pressure and oversight buttressing 
receptivity, holding groups together and providing space for learning to cement. They 
may be able to short-cut the historical progression of the conflicting state becoming 
the pacifying state. While not perfect, Collier’s challenge is to think differently and 
practically about solving problems.  It is not about fixing or resolving, but 
implementing workable structures in some areas so that people in paused-conflict 
states can negotiate governance arrangements of their own choosing, not simply react 
to fear for their future. A clear shared sovereignty framework with consent for 
international referees will assist in this regard, as part of the international social 
contract. Conflict transformation warrants internationals with coherent strategies and 
well-structured frameworks (that will actually assist with local learning), who accept 
long term support roles in slow paced democratisation. Implementing these 
agreements with states may take time, but does not presuppose no security provision. 
RAMSI’s buttressing was done in a remarkably short time, but it was well-signposted, 
the region was prepared and ready, virtually every single individual in the Solomon 
Islands parliament was receptive and hence willing to legislate, and the people were 
determined that the past should remain just that. Elsewhere, the conditions might not 
be so favourable but, if receptivity is not there, offering something not fully thought 
through will not assist in changing relationships but will once again result in a “winner 
takes all” response and ultimately fail. The process of agreeing on the kind of 
international assistance proposed here is therefore part of the learning, and can 
contribute to pacifying Leviathan. 
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 8: Conclusion 
 
From the outset, this thesis has accepted that there would be several steps in pacifying 
Leviathan. The first – the bulk of this thesis – has been to establish concepts and 
perspectives that might explain the complexities. Subsequent steps, including thinking 
through issues of implementation, will be necessary but are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. As argued throughout, pacifying Leviathan is hard conceptually and practically. 
In developed states, it took centuries and major conflicts, including two World Wars.  
In current examples, such as Sudan, Iraq, Congo, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Bougainville 
in Papua New Guinea and Mindanao in the Philippines, the processes have already 
been in a timescale of years, even decades. In each of those examples by the end of 
2010 the situation had apparently paused in relatively low-key conflicts rather than 
full-scale civil wars. This thesis has explored factors that are relevant to transforming 
“the pause” into positive peace. As discussed, however, for many domestic actors the 
goals might be different, especially if they are still fighting in the mind. In Zimbabwe, 
for example, the goal of one side appears to be to prolong the pause long enough to 
launch another campaign of violence; the mirror goal of the other side appears to be 
to prolong the pause long enough to make a return to violence either impossible or 
ineffective. The first would obviously constitute a failure of the peace process (but a 
victory for the strategists of violence). Equally obviously, the second would represent 
a dramatic success for the peace process and possibly a significant exercise in learning 
as set out in Figure 2 in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
 
Because of the immense importance of actual strategies, the lack of clear steps at this 
point of the argument might be frustrating. But those in the field have faced the same 
issues. A major, UK think-tank on development issues, for example, recently explored 
the practical implications of the UK government’s announcement that 50% of its new 
aid funding would go to “fragile states” (Overseas Development Institute 2009: 1)  
 In …conflict-related settings, the international community faces the dual task of 
promoting peace while helping to build more effective, inclusive and responsive states. 
This has led to a growing realisation among donors (including, for example, the UK 
Department for International Development DFID, the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the UN and the World Bank) that their peace-building 
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and peace-building interventions should be brought closer together – ‘peace-building for 
peace’ as the UNDP has put it. 
 
Even here, however, there are few practicalities on the table, with the paper showing 
the challenges rather than setting out strategies.  Hence, the paper (ibid, p. 4) concludes 
that donors need to: 
 start with the domestic context,  
 be more humble in their approach to fragile states,  
 be careful not to create undue expectations about what the state can deliver 
and  
 sharpen their political understanding and support for peace-building. 
 
These arguably are further reflections of the difficulties, rather than practical steps for 
implementation. In concluding the arguments of this thesis, therefore, only one 
implication, informed by the perspectives of learning outlined in Figure 2 of Chapter 
1, will be outlined: the transformation process needs to take longer, for the right 
reasons.  
 
For domestic and international actors, a strategy that from the outset envisaged taking 
longer (rather than scrambling to exit) would have major implications for the theory 
and practice of peace missions. Obviously, a strategy on this basis would need 
agreement from all key actors – and funding. But the justification for taking longer 
would include strategies for building the learning processes that are central to 
pacifying Leviathan. There would be limits of course. There is an obvious difference 
between a peace operation becoming part of a frozen conflict (as in Cyprus) and being 
framed from the outset as intended to pacify Leviathan. The key would be to create 
the right incentives for the parties to understand groupism, weigh the relativities of 
continued conflict against alternatives, be receptive and learn - rather than seeing an 
extended international operation as an acceptable, long-term “solution”.  
 
There are plenty of examples supporting taking longer to improve the odds of 
pacifying Leviathan. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Regional Assistance 
Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has been in operation for seven years, with no 
233 
 
fixed date for its withdrawal. In neighbouring Bougainville, the drawn out stages of 
the post 1997 have apparently provided time for “peace by peaceful means” to take 
hold in the imagination of the people as well as almost all the key leaders. Further, 
deferring key decisions on independence for 15 years produced an ideal climate for 
slow cooking on all the key ingredients. South Africa was not of course an 
international mission as such. Still, the parties took four years from Nelson Mandela’s 
release in 1990, to implement decisions resulting in the elections and interim 
constitution. And it was several more years before the constitution was finalised. 
Meanwhile, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission process 
produced several years of ongoing public learning, with the explicit rejection of the 
core philosophies and methodologies of the apartheid-era government. And across that 
whole period, visioning scenarios created learning for key leaders, the enormous 
significance of which is only just beginning to be made public (Global Business 
Network 2009).  
 
Understanding groupism suggests that more time would be useful for any projects that 
might build identities to reduce the risks of mono-identities, whilst also recognising 
the inherent value of belonging to a community or group – South Africa’s rainbow 
nation for example or the less well-known Bougainville process of rebuilding 
relationships between previous communities and protagonists. 
 
Getting agreement for slower cooking, however, requires careful discussion at all 
levels. There is no easy mechanism to combat sovereignty demands and local 
nationalism, if leaders/voters seek advantage in early or cheated elections, followed 
by demands for the withdrawal of international missions – sometimes with the external 
support that promises personal or group advantage, sometimes in the face of 
international pressures. Clearly, there is work to be done to create the necessary, 
institutional frameworks for post-conflict peace-building operations. But even without 
a fully-developed framework, the advantages of taking longer should allow all the key 
building blocks discussed in this thesis to be better explored: groupism, receptivity, 
learning and international support. 
 
Planning on longer transformation periods would also allow for a host of other 
strategies that would build on the arguments of this thesis, such as connecting public 
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discussions of the suffering from the conflicts (Truth Commissions, etc) with changed 
rules of governance (new constitutions, etc); or establishing responsibility for and 
technical mechanisms to combat cheating elections, alongside ways of addressing the 
issues (international observers/support, independent agencies) or the complexities of 
disarming both the weapons and the minds of combatants. 
 
None of this suggests that there may not be times to “strike while the iron is hot”. But, 
in general, it would be a brave commentator who suggested that “quick fixes” such as 
the Dayton Peace Accord for BiH in 1994, were “best practice” for future conflict-
transformation. 
 
The practical results might, at least in the short term, not be as radical as the criticisms 
might imply. But across time, there will be more learning and more strategies, linked 
by a better understanding of the issues involved. Such developments may then pacify 
Leviathan in current conflicts via strategies that learn from, but short-cut, the centuries 
that established democracies apparently required.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
235 
 
References  
 
Ackerman, Bruce (1991), We the People: Foundations (Cambridge Harvard 
University Press). 
--- (1997), 'The Rise of World Constitutionalism ', Virginia Law Review, 83 (4), 771-
97. 
Ackerman, Peter and DuVall, Jack (2000), A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-
Violent Conflict (P; New York: Palgrave). 
Adams, Willi Paul (2001), The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology 
and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc). 
Ajello, Aldo (2008), 'The Role of Elections in Stabilizing Post-Conflict Countries', in 
Tobias von Gienanth (ed.), Elections in Post-Conflict Countries – Lessons 
Learned from Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, and Kosovo (Accra, Ghana: 
Center for International Peace Operations and the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre), 28-33. 
Akashi, Yasushi (1993), 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia: Lessons to Be 
Learned', Presented to the School of International and Public Affairs 
(Columbia University: November 29). 
Alley, Roderic (2003), 'Ethnosecession in Papua New Guinea: The Bougainville Case', 
in Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff (eds.), Ethnic conflict and secessionism in 
South and Southeast Asia: causes, dynamics and solutions (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications ), 225-56. 
Anderson, Benedict (1991), Imagined Communities: Reflections on Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London: Verso). 
Anderson, Tim (2008), 'The Limits of Ramsi', (Sydney: AID/WATCH). 
Andreas, Peter (2004), 'The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in 
Bosnia', International Studies Quarterly, 48 (1), 29-51. 
Andrew, Justice Warrick (1997), 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Engagement of Sandline International', (Boroko: Supreme Court of Papua 
New Guinea). 
Anghie, Antony (2001), 'Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: 
Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations; ' 
NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 34, 513-633. 
Annan, Kofi (1999), 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty', The Economist 352, 49-50. 
--- (2005), 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights 
For All', Report fo the Secretary-General (A/59/2005; New York: United 
Nations General Assembly). 
ANU Enterprise (2008), 'People's Survey 2008', (Honiara: RAMSI). 
--- (2009), 'People's Survey 2009', (Honiara: RAMSI). 
Aolain, Fionnuala Ni (1998 ), 'The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A 
Legal Analysis', Michigan Journal of International Law, 19 (4), 957-1004. 
Arbitral Tribunal (1999), 'Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in 
Brcko Area, Final Award', (5 March). 
Ardrey, Robert (1961), African Genesis: A Personal Investigation into the Animal 
Origins and Nature of Man (New York; Macmillan Publishing Co). 
236 
 
Arendt, Hannah (1961), 'Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future ', Between Past 
and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (London: Faber), 3-15. 
--- (1964), Eichman in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil (New York: Viking). 
Ascher, William (1999), Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures 
in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). 
Attar, Mohsen Al and Miller, Rosalie (2010), 'Towards an Emancipatory International 
Law: The Bolivarian reconstruction', Third World Quarterly, 31 (3), 347-63. 
AusAID (2004), 'Solomon Islands: Rebuilding an Island Economy', (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia). 
--- (2008), 'Annual program performance report for Solomon Islands 2007–08', 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia). 
Austin, Beatrix, Fischer, Martina, and Giessmann, Hans (eds.) (2011), Advancing 
Conflict Transformation. The Berghof Handbook II (USA: Barbara Budrich 
Publishers). 
Ayoob, Mohammed (1995), The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, 
Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). 
Azar, Edward (1990), 'The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict', in 
Vamik D Volkan, Josept V Montville, and Demetrios A Julius (eds.), The 
Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Volume II: Unofficial 
Diplomacy at Work (Lexington: Lexington Books). 
Azar, Edward and Burton, John (1986), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and 
Practice (Brighton: Wheatsheaf). 
Ballentine, Karen and Nitzschke, Heiko (eds.) (2005), Profiting from Peace: 
Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner). 
Bancroft, Ian (2010), ''European standards' hinder Balkans', The Guardian (online). 
Banks, Michael (1987), 'Four Conceptions of Peace', in Denis J. D. Sandole and Ingrid 
Sandole-Staroste (eds.), Conflict Management and Problem Solving: 
Interpersonal to International Applications (F.Pinter; London), 259-74. 
Bannon, Alicia (2007), 'Designing a Constitution-Drafting Process: Lessons from 
Kenya', Yale Law Journal, 116 (8), 1824-72. 
Barnett, Michael (2006), 'Building Republican Peace: Stablizing States after War', 
International Security, 30 (4), 87-112. 
Barnett, Michael and Zurcher, Christoph (2009), 'The Peacebuilder's Contract: How 
External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood', in Roland Paris and 
Timothey Sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge), 23-52. 
Barnett, Michael, et al. (2007), 'Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?', Global 
Governance, 13, 35–58. 
Baser, Heather (2007), 'Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon 
Islands: What can we learn from the RAMSI experience?', (Maastricht: 
European Centre for Development Policy Management). 
Bauman, Zygmunt (1989), Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
BBC (2010), ''No excuse for violence': Statement by NI ministers', BBC News, 13 July. 
Beate, Jahn (2007), 'The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, 
Intervention and Statebuilding', Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1 
(2), 211-29. 
Beck, Ulrich (2006), The Cosmopolitan Vision (Cambridge: Polity Press ). 
Bedjaoui, Mohamed (1979), Towards a New International Economic Order (New 
York Holmes & Meier). 
237 
 
Begic, Prof. Dr. Kasim (2000), 'Address Before the Presidents of European 
Constitutional Courts at the Preparatory Meeting', (Brussels: Oct. 20-21). 
Bell, Christine (2008), On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreement and the Lex 
Pacificatoria (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Bellamy, Alex (2008), 'The “Next Stage” in Peace Operations Theory', in Alex 
Bellamy and Paul Williams (eds.), Peace Operations and Global Order 
(London: Routledge), 17-38. 
Bellamy, Alex and Williams, Paul (2010), Understanding Peacekeeping (2 edn.; 
Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Bellamy, Alex  and Williams, Paul (2004a), 'Conclusion: What Future for Peace 
Operations? Brahimi and Beyond', International Peacekeeping, 11 (1), 183-
212. 
--- (2004b), 'Introduction: Thinking Anew about Peace Operations', International 
Peacekeeping, 11 (1), 1-5. 
Benner, Thorsten, Binder, Andrea, and Rotmann, Philipp (2007), 'Learning to Build 
Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organization Leaning: Developing 
a Research Framework', GPPi Research Paper Series No. 7 (Berlin: Global 
Public Policy Institute). 
Benner, Thorsten, Mergenthaler, Stephen, and Rotmann, Philipp (2011), The New 
World of UN Peace Operations. Learning to Build Peace? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Benomar, Jamal (2004), 'Constitution-Making after Conflict: Lessons for Iraq', 
Journal of Democracy, 15 (2), 81-95. 
Bensahel, Nora (2007), 'Organising for Nation Building', Survival, 49 (2), 43-76. 
Bercovitch, Jacob (1984), Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict 
Resolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview). 
Berdal, Mats (2009), Building Peace After War (London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies). 
Berghof Foundation, (1999-2014), 'Conflict Transformation - Our Interpretation '.   
Bieber, Florian (2005), 'Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostrar 
and Brcko', International Peacekeeping, 12 (3), 420-33. 
Bigelow, Robert (1969), The Dawn Warriors: Man's Evolution Toward Peace 
(Boston: Little Brown). 
Bloomfield, David and Reilly, Benjamin (1998), 'The Changing Nature of Conflict 
and Conflict Management', in Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (eds.), Democracy 
and Deep-rooted conflict (Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA)). 
Boege, Volker (2006a), 'Traditional Approaches to Conflict Transformation - 
Potentials and Limits', Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: 
Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management ). 
--- (2006b), 'Bougainville and the Discovery of Slowness: an Unhurried Approach to 
State-Building in the Pacific', (Occassional Paper Series, Number 3, June; 
Brisbane: The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies ). 
Boege, Volker, et al. (2008), 'On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State 
Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’ ', (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management). 
Boege, Volker, et al. (2009), 'Building peace and political community in hybrid 
political orders', International Peacekeeping, 16 (5), 599-615. 
238 
 
Bostock, William Walter (2010), 'The Psychological Preconditions for Collective 
Violence: Several Case Studies', Journal of Alternative Perspectives in Social 
Sciences, 2 (1), 273-97. 
Botes, Johannes (2003), 'Conflict Transformation: A Debate Over Semantics or a 
Crucial Shift in the Theory and Practice of Peace and Conflict Studies', The 
International Journal of Peace Studies, 8 (2), 1-27. 
Boulding, Elise (1990), Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an 
Interdependent World (New York: Syracuse University Press). 
Boulding, Kenneth (1950), A Reconstruction of Economics (New York and London: 
Wiley, and Chapman and Hall). 
--- (1978), Stable Peace (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press). 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992), 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. ', (A Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Work of the Organization; New York: United Nations ). 
--- (1995a), 'An Agenda for Development', (New York: UN Department of 
Information). 
--- (1995b), 'Supplement to the Agenda for Peace', (Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Work of the Organization; New York: United Nations ). 
Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert (2003), 'The Origins of Human Cooperation', in 
Peter Hammerstein (ed.), The Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation 
(Cambridge: MIT Press), 429-44. 
Bradbury, Mark and Healy, Sally (2010), 'Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting 
Somalia and international peacemaking', (Accord Issue 21; London: 
Conciliation Resources). 
Brahimi, Lakhdar (2007), 'Statebuilding in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries ', 
Building Trust in Government - 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government 
(Vienna, Austria). 
Brahm, Eric (2009), 'Judging Truth: The Contributions of Truth Commissions in Post-
Conflict Environments', in Noha Shawki and Michaelene Cox (eds.), 
Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in 
Contemporary Human Rights Politics (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 
Company ), 119-40. 
Brain, Charles Kimberlin (1981), The Hunters or the Hunted? :An Introduction to 
African Cave Taphonomy (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press). 
Braithwaite, John, et al. (2010) Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: 
Sequencing Peace in Bougainville [online text], ANU Press  
Brass, Paul (1995), Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage Publications). 
--- (1997), Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective 
Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Bratt, Duane (1997), 'Explaining Peacekeeping Performance: The UN in Internal 
Conflicts', International Peacekeeping, 4 (3), 45-70. 
Brown, Archie (1999), 'Russia and Democratization', Problems of Post Communism, 
46 (5), 5-6. 
Brown, Nathan J (2005), 'The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and 
Commentary', (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ). 
Browning, Christopher (1998), Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland (2 edn.; New York: Harper Collins). 
239 
 
Brugger, Bill and Hannan, Kate (1983), Modernization and revolution (London: 
Routledge). 
Buckley-Zistel, Susanne (2006), 'Remember to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy 
for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda', The Journal of the 
International African Institute, 76 (2), 131-50. 
--- (2008), 'We Are Pretending Peace: Local Memory and the Absence of Social 
Transformation and Reconciliation in Rwanda', in Phil Clark and Zachary D. 
Kaufman (eds.), After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-conflict 
Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (London: Hurst). 
Burton, John (1987), Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict: A Handbook (Lanham: 
University Press of America). 
--- (1990), Conflict Resolution and Provention (New York: St Martins Press). 
Bush, George (2002), 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', 
(Washington, DC: White House). 
Bush, George H W (1990), 'Toward a New World Order - Speech by the President of 
the U.S.A. given to a joint session of the United State Congress', (Washington 
DC: 11 September). 
Bush, Ken (1996), 'Beyong Bungee Cord Humanitarianism: Towards a 
Developmental Agenda for Peacebuilding', Candian Journal of Development 
Studies, Special Issue 75-92. 
Bush, Robert and Folger, Joseph (1994), The Promise of Mediation (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers). 
Butler, Michael J. (2012), 'Ten Years After: (Re) Assessing Neo-Trusteeship and UN 
State-building in Timor-Leste', International Studies Perspectives, 13 (1), 85-
104. 
Cahen, Michel (2005), 'Success in Mozambique', in Simon Chesterman, Michael 
Ignatieff, and Ramest Thakur (eds.), Making States Work: State Failure and 
the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo United Nations University), 213-33. 
Call, Charles (2004), 'Is Transitional Justice Really Just?', Brown Journal of World 
Affairs, 11 (1), 101-13. 
--- (2005), 'Institutionalising Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
Concepts and Issues for DPA', (New York: United Nations Department of 
Political Affairs). 
Call, Charles and Cook, Susan (2003), 'On Democratization and Peacebuilding', 
Global Governance, 9 (2), 233-46. 
Call, Charles and Cousens, Elizabeth (2008), 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: 
International Responses to War-Torn Societies', International Studies 
Perspectives, 9, 1–21. 
Campbell, Stephen (2011), 'Consturing Top-down as Bottom-up: The Governmental 
Co-option of Peacebuilding "From Below"', vis-à-vis: Explorations in 
Anthropology, 11 (1), 39-56. 
Campbell, Susanna (2008), 'When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of 
Organisational Learning for Peacebuilding Success', Journal of Peacebuilding 
& Development, 4 (2), 20-32. 
Campbell, Susanna, Chandler, David, and Sabaratnam, Meera (2011), A liberal 
peace? The problems and practices of peacebuilding (London: Zed Books). 
Caplan, Richard (2002), A New Trusteeship? International Administration of War 
Torn Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
240 
 
Carl, Andy and Sr. Lorraine Garsu CSN (eds.) (2002), Weaving consensus: the Papua 
New Guinea - Bougainville peace process, ed. Celia McKeon (ACCORD, 12; 
London: Conciliation Resources). 
Carlsson, Ingvar, Sung-Joo, Han, and Kupolati, Rufus M (1999), 'Report of the 
Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda', S/1999/1257 (United Nations: 16 December 1999). 
Carothers, Thomas (1999), 'The Rise of Democracy Assistance', in Thomas Carothers 
(ed.), Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace), 19-46. 
--- (2002), 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', Journal of Democracy, 13 (1), 5-21. 
--- (2004), 'Critical Mission: Essay on Democracy Promotion', (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 
Cartmill, Matt (1996), A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature 
Through History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press). 
Cashman, G (1993), What Causes War? (Lexington: Lexington Books.). 
Chabal, Patrcik and Daloz, Jean-Pascal (1999), Africa Works: disorder as political 
instrument (Oxford and Bloomington Indiana: James Currey and Indiana 
University Press). 
Chan, Stephen (2010), The end of certainty: towards a new internationalism (London: 
: Zed Books). 
Chandler, David (1998), The History of Cambodia (3 edn.; London: Westview). 
--- (2000), Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (2 edn.; London and Sterling, VA: 
Pluto Press). 
--- (2004), 'The Responsibility to protect? Imposing the "liberal peace"', International 
Peacekeeping, 11 (1), 59-81. 
--- (2006), Empire in Denial: The Politics of State Building (London: Pluto Press). 
--- (2010), 'The Uncritical Critique of 'Liberal Peace'', Review of International Studies, 
1-19. 
--- (2011), 'The Uncritical Critque of the 'Liberal Peace'', in S.P Campbell and D 
Chandler (eds.), The Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of 
Peacebuilding (174-190; London: Zed Books). 
Chemerinsky, Erwin (1992), 'Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The 
Unfulfilled Promise', The Symposium: One Hundred Twenty-Five Years of the 
Reconstruction Amendments: Recognizing the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 25 (4), 1143-58. 
Chesterman, Simon (2002), 'East Timor in transition: self-determination, statebuilding 
and the United Nations', International Peacekeeping, 9, 45-76. 
--- (2004a), You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and 
State Building (Oxford: Oxford University). 
--- (2004b), You, the People - The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and 
State Building. (1 edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press) 296. 
--- (2007), 'Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN 
Statebuilding Operations', Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1 (1), 3-
26. 
Chesterman, Simon, Ignatieff, Michael, and Thakur, Ramesh Chandra (2005), Making 
States Work: State failure and the crisis of governance. (New York: United 
Nations University Press). 
Chopra, Jarat (ed.), (1998), The Politics of Peace Maintenence. 
Chopra, Tanja (2010), 'Dispensing Elusive Justice: The Kenyan Judiciary Amongst 
Pastoralist Societies', Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 2, 95-110. 
241 
 
Clark, Howard (2000), 'Civil Resistance in Kosovo', (London Pluto). 
Clark, Ian (2005), Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
Clark, Janine Natalya (2010), 'Bosnia's Success Story? Brcko District and the 'View 
from Below' ', International Peacekeeping, 17 (1), 67-79. 
Clarke, Howard (2004), 'Brcko District: An Example of Progress in the Basic Reforms 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina', (Meeting Report 293; Washington: Wilson 
Centre). 
Clausewitz, Carl von (1993), On War (Vom Kriege), eds Michael Howard, Beatrice 
Heuser, and Peter Paret (1832 original edn., Oxford World Classic; London 
Oxford University Press). 
Coakly, John (2008), 'Has the Northern Ireland Problem Been Solved', Journal of 
Democracy, 18 (3), 98-112. 
Cohen, Richard (2002), By the sword: a history of gladiators, musketeers, samurai, 
swashbucklers, and Olympic champions (New York: Modern Library). 
Cohen, Roger (1998), Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo (New York: Norton). 
Colletta, Nat and Cullen, Michelle 'Violent Conflict and Transformation of Social 
Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia', 
(Washington, DC: World Bank). 
Collier, Paul (2000), 'Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for 
Policy', (Washington DC: World Bank). 
--- (2007), The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can 
Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
--- (2008), 'Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security. A Report for the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations', (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
--- (2009), War, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Place (New York: Harper 
Collins). 
Collier, Paul, et al. (2003), Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press and World Bank). 
Committee on Armed Services (2008), 'Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. 
Custody', (110th Congress, 2nd Session: United States Senate). 
Connolly, Danielle (2011), 'The Global Political Agreement and Democractic 
Transition in Zimbawe', Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper 
Series (Oxford: University of Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies), 1-7. 
Cooper, Neil (2007), 'On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace', Conflict, Security and 
Development, 7 (4), 605-16. 
Cousens, E M and Kumar, C (eds.) (2001), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating 
Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). 
Cramer, Christopher (2006), Why Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for 
Violence in Developing Countries (London: Hurst & Co). 
Craven, Gregory (2004), Conversations with the constitution: not just a piece of paper 
(Sydney University of New South Wales Press). 
Crocker, Chester and Hampson, Fen Osler (1996), 'Making Peace Settlements Work', 
Foreign Policy, 104, 54-71. 
Crocker, Chester, Hampson, Fen Osler, and Aall, Pamela (eds.) (2001), Turbulent 
Peace: The Challengse of Managing International Conflict (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace Press). 
--- (eds.) (2007), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World 
(Washington United States Institute of Peace Press). 
Curle, Adam (1971), Making Peace (London: Tavistock). 
242 
 
--- (1990), Tools for Transformation (United Kingdom: Hawthorn Press). 
--- (1996), Another Way: Positive Responses to Violence (Oxford: John Carpenter ). 
Curry, James, Riley, Richard, and Battistani, Richard (eds.) (1999), Constitutional 
Government: the American Experience (4 edn., Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing 
Company). 
Curtis, Devon (2012), 'The Contested Politics of Peacebuilding in Africa', in Devon 
Curtin and Gwinyayi Dzinesa (eds.), Peacebuilding, Power and Politics in 
Africa (Ohio University Press), 1-30. 
Cutillo, Alberto (2007), 'Reviewing Fifteen Years of Peacebuilding. Past, Present and 
Future of International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflicts and 
Italy’s Contribution', (Working Paper 01/2007; Italy: School for International 
Studies at the University of Trento). 
Dahl, Robert A (1971), Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press). 
Dahrendorf, Nicola (2003), 'A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change. 
Synthesis Report', (London: Conflict, Security and Development Group, 
King's College London). 
Danilovic, Vesna and Clare, Joe (2007), 'The Kantian Liberal Peace Revisted', 
American Journal of Political Science, 51 (2), 397-414. 
Dann, Philipp and Al Ali, Zaid (2006), 'The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant  
Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor 
', Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 10, 423-63. 
Danner, Mark (2009), Stripping Bare the Body: Politics, Violence and War (New 
York: Nation Books). 
--- (2010), 'To Heal Haiti, Look to History, Not Nature', The New York Times, 22 
January 2010,  p. A31. 
Darby, Phillip (2004), 'Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations 
International', Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 33 (1), 1-32. 
--- (2009), 'Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial', 
International Peacekeeping, 16 (5), 699-716. 
Dart, Raymond (1953), 'The predatory transition from ape to man', International 
Anthropological and Linguistic Review, 1, 207-08. 
Date-Bah, Eugenia (2003), Jobs After War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and 
Reconstruction Puzzle (Geneva: International Labour Organization). 
Dawkins, Richard (1976), The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press). 
De Coning, Cedric Hattingh (2012), 'Complexity, Peacebuilding and Coherence: 
Implications of Complexity for the Peacebuilding Coherence Dilemma', 
(Stellenbosch University). 
de Waal, Frans (1989), Peacemaking Among Primates (Harvard University Press). 
Democratic Unionist Party (2003), 'DUP Assembly Election Manifesto', (Belfast: 
DUP). 
Denitch, Bette (2000), 'Unmaking multi-ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Media and 
metamorphosis observed', in Joel Halpern and David Kideckel (eds.), 
Neighbors at War. Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, 
Culture and History. (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University). 
Development Assistance Committee (1997), 'DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and 
Development Co-operation. ', (Paris: DAC, OCED). 
--- (2003), 'A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry 
Point for Action', (Paris: DAC, OECD). 
243 
 
DFID (2006), 'Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor', 
White paper on International Development presented to Parliament (London: 
UK Parliament). 
Diamond, Larry (1995), 'Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, 
Issues and Imperatives', (New York: Report to the Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Violence). 
Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan J, and Lipset, Seymour Martin (1995a), 'Introduction: 
What Makes for Democracy?', Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing 
Experiences with Democracy (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner), 1-66. 
Diamond, Larry, Linz, J, and Lipset, S M (1995b), Democracy in Developing 
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner). 
Dickinson, Laura (2003), 'The Promise of Hybrid Courts', The American Journal of 
International Law, 97 (2), 295-310. 
Dingley, James and Kirk-Smith, Michael (2000), 'How Could They Do it? The 
Bombing of Omagh, 1998', Journal of Conflict Studies,  (Spring), 105-26. 
Dinnen, Sinclair and Stewart, Firth (2008), 'Politics and Statebuilding in the Solomon 
Islands'. 
Djilas, Milovan (1977), Wartime, trans. Michael B Petrovich (New York and London: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich). 
Dobbins, James (2003), America's role in nation building: from Germany to Iraq 
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation). 
Dobbins, James, et al. (2005), The UN's Role in Nation Building: From the Congo to 
Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation). 
Dobell, Graeme (2007), 'China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess 
Versus Pacific Political Rugby', (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International 
Policy Policy Brief). 
Donahue, Patrick (2010), 'Bosnia Serb Leader Won't Rule Out Republika Srpska 
Independence', Bloomberg, Sunday April 25. 
Donais, Timothy (2009), 'Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local 
Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilidng Processes', Peace and Change, 34 
(1), 3-26. 
--- (2012), Peacebuilding and local ownership: post-conflict consensus-building (New 
York: Routledge). 
Dorney, Sean (1998), The Sandline Affair (Sydney: ABC Enterprises). 
Douglas, William (1962), 'Lawyers of the Peace Corps', American Bar Association 
Journal, 48, 909-10. 
Doyle, Michael W (1983), 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs: Parts 1 and 2', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (3-4), 205-54 and 323-53. 
--- (1986), 'Liberalism and World Politics ', American Political Science Review, 80 
(4), 1151-69. 
--- (1995), UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's civil mandate (London: Lynne 
Rienner). 
--- (1997), 'Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism', (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company). 
--- (1999), 'A Liberal View: Preserving and Expanding the Liberal Pacific Union', in 
T.V.Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), International Order and the Future of World 
Politics (Oxford Oxford University Press), 41-66. 
Doyle, Michael W and Sambanis, Nicholas (2006), Making War and Building Peace: 
United Nations Peace Operations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
244 
 
Druckman, Daniel (1994), 'Nationalism, Patriotism and Group Loyalty: A Social 
Psychological Perspective', Mershon International Studies Review, 38 (1), 43-
68. 
Duffield, Mark (2001), Global Governance and the New Wars (London Zed Books). 
--- (2007), Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of 
Peoples (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Dunant, Henry (1986), A Memory of Solferino (International Committee of the Red 
Cross). 
Durkheim, Emile (1893), The Division of Labour in Society (New York: Free Press). 
Dyer, Gwynne (1985), War: The Lethal Custom (London: Guild Publishing). 
Ehrenreich, Barbara (1997), Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War 
(New York: Metropolitan Books.). 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenaus (1979), The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals and 
Aggression (London: Thames & Hudson). 
Eide, Espen B, et al. (2005), 'Report on Integrated Missions. Independent Study for 
the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group', (Oslo, London: Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs and King's College). 
Eisner, Manuel (2003), 'Long-term Historical Trends in Violent Crime', Crime and 
Justice: A Review of Research, 30, 83-142. 
--- (2008), 'Modernity Strikes Back? A Historical Perspective on the Latest Increase 
in Interpersonal Violence (1960-1990)', International Journal of Conflict and 
Violence, 2 (2), 288 - 316. 
Elias, Norbert (1971), 'The Genesis of Sport as a Sociological Problem', in Eric 
Dunning (ed.), The Sociology of Sport: A Selection of Readings (London Frank 
Cass), 88-115. 
--- (1994), The Civilising Process, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Stephen Mennell 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd). 
Elliott, Marianne (2000), The Catholics of Ulster: A History (New York: Guilford). 
Ellis, Andrew (2006), 'Elections are Not an Island: The Process of Negotiating and 
Designing Post-Conflict Electoral Institutions', Post-Conflict Elections in West 
Africa: Challenges for Democracy and Reconstruction (Accra, Ghana: 
International IDEA). 
Ellis, Elisabeth (2005), Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World 
(New Haven: Yale University Pres). 
Elster, Jon (1995), 'Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process', Duke 
Law Journal, 45, 364-96. 
Ember, Carol (1978), 'Myths About Hunter-Gatherers', Ethnology, 17 (4), 439-48. 
Eppler, Erhard and Munkler, Herfried (2004), '“New Wars” Discourse in Germany', 
Journal of Peace Research, 41 (1), 107-17. 
Erikson, Mikael and Wallensteen, Peter (2004), 'Armed Conflict. 1989 - 2003', 
Journal of Peace Research, 41 (5), 625-36. 
Escobar, Arturo (1995), Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of 
the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Etzioni, Amitai (2007), Security First: For A Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press). 
Evera, Stephen van (1994), 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War', International 
Security, 18 (4), 5-39. 
Farrand, Max (ed.), (1966), The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press). 
245 
 
Fay, Marie-Therese, Morrissey, Mike, and Smyth, Marie (1999), Northern Ireland’s 
troubles: The human costs (London Pluto). 
Feldman, Noah (2005), 'Imposed Constitutionalism', Connecticut Law Review, 97 (4), 
857-90. 
Fetherston, Ann Betts (2000), 'Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: 
A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks', International Peacekeeping, 7 
(1), 190-218. 
Finkelman, Paul (1981), An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press). 
--- (2000), 'Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death and How It Was Made', 
Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration, 32, 
230-45. 
Fischer, Martina and Ropers, Norbert (2004), 'Introduction ', in Alex Austin, Martina 
Fischer, and Norbert Ropers (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The 
Berghof Handbook (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), 11-22. 
Fisher, Markus (2000), 'The Liberal Peace: Ethical, Historical, and Philosophical 
Aspects', BCSIA discussion Paper 2000-07 (Harvard University: Kennedy 
School of Goverment). 
Fisher, Simon and Zimina, Lada (2009), 'Just Wasting Our Time? Provocative 
Thoughts for Peacebuilders', in Beatrix Schmelzle and Martina Fischer (ed.), 
Peacebuilding at a Crossroads? Dilemmas and Paths for Another Generation. 
Berghof Handbook Dialogue No 7 (Berlin: Berghof Foundation), 11-35s. 
Flower, Harriet (2004), The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Fombad, Charles M (2007), 'Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional 
Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role of Political Parties: Lessons and 
Perspectives from Southern Africa.', American Journal of Comparative Law, 
55, 1-46. 
Forges, Alison Des (1999), 'Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda', 
(Human Rights Watch). 
Francis, Diana (1994), 'Power and conflict resolution ', in International Alert (ed.), 
Conflict Resolution Training in the North Caucasus, Georgia and the South of 
Russia (London: International Alert). 
Frank, Andre Gubder (1966), The Development of Underdevelopment (New England 
Free Press). 
Frankel, Jon (2004), The Manipulation of Custom: from uprising to intervention in the 
Solomon Islands (Sydney: Pandanus Books). 
Freud, Sigmund (1933), 'Why war?', in J Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: New Introductory Lectures 
on Psycho-Analysis and Other Works (London: Hogarth), 197-215. 
Friberg, Mats (1993), 'The Need for Unofficial Diplomacy in Identity Conflicts', in 
Tonci Kuzmanic and Arno Truger (eds.), Yugoslavia War (2 edn.; Ljubljana, 
Slovenia: Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution and the 
Schlainng Peace Institute). 
Friedman, Lawrence (1969), 'On Legal Development', Rutgers Law Review, 24, 11-
64. 
Fry, Douglas P (2007), Beyond War: The Human Potential for Peace (New York: 
Oxford University Press). 
246 
 
Fry, Douglas P, Bonta, Bruce D, and Baszarkiewicz, Karolina (2008), 'Learning from 
Extant Cultures of Peace', in Joseph de Rivera (ed.), Handbook on Building 
Cultures of Peace (New York: Springer). 
Fukuyama, Francis (1992), The End of History and the Last Man (London Penguin). 
--- (2004), State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press). 
--- (2005a), 'Building Democracy After Conflict: "Stateness" First', Journal of 
Democracy, 16 (1), 84-88. 
--- (2005b), State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century 
(London: Profile Books). 
--- (2008), 'State building in Solomon Islands', Pacific Economic Bulletin, 23 (3), 18-
34. 
Fullilove, Michael (2006), 'The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI and International 
State-Building', (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy). 
Furly, Oliver and Katalikawe, James (1997), 'Constitutional Reform in Uganda: The 
New Approach', African Affairs, 96 (383), 243-60. 
Galtung, Johan (1969), 'Violence, peace and peace research', Journal of Peace 
Research, 6 (3), 167-91. 
--- (1975), Peace, War and Defence - Essays in Peace Research (2; Copenhagen: 
Christian Eijlers). 
--- (1981), 'The Specific Contribution of Peace Research to the Study of Violence: 
Typologies', in Jean-Marie Domenach, et al. (eds.), Violence and its Causes 
(Paris, France: UNESCO), 83-96. 
--- (1995), 'Conflict Resolution as Conflict Transformation: The First Law of 
Thermodynamics Revisited ', in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict 
Transformation (New York: St Martin's Press). 
--- (1996), Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and 
Civilization (London: Sage). 
--- (2000), 'Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the transcend method). 
Participants Manual. Trainers Manual', (New York: United Nations Disaster 
Management Training Programme). 
Galtung, Johan and Jacobsen, Carl G (2000), Searching for Peace (London: Pluto). 
Gardener, James (1980), Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in 
Latin America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press). 
Garry, John (2009), 'Consociationalism and its critics: Evidence from the historic 
Northern Ireland Assembly election 2007', Electoral Studies, 28, 458-66. 
Gates, Scott, Gleditsch, Nils Petter, and Hegre, Håvard (2004), 'Towards a Global 
Civil Peace', Background note to the United Nations Foundation (Oslo: PRIO 
for United Nations Foundation). 
Gault, Louisa (2003), 'The New Zealand Intervention in the Boungainville Crisis: An 
Integrative Cultural and Legal Rational Approach to Peace-Making in 
Bougainville', (University of Auckland). 
Geertz, Clifford (1963), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in 
Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press of Glencoe). 
George, Tim (2008), 'Submission by Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
Special Coordinator to the Foreign Relations Committee, National Parliament 
of Solomon Islands', (Honiara: RAMSI). 
Ghai, Yash and Galli, Guidi (2007), 'Constitution-building Processes and 
Democratization: Lessons Learned', in Reginald Austin, Najib Azca, and 
247 
 
Feargal Cochrane (eds.), Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Further 
Reading (2; Stockholm: International IDEA), 232-49. 
Ghani, Ashraf and Lockhart, Clare (2008), Fixing Failed States: A Framework for 
Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford: Oxford University Press ). 
Gil-White, Francisco J. (2001), 'Are Ethnic Groups Biological “Species” to the Human 
Brain?', Current Anthropology, 42 (4), 515-54. 
Ginsburg, Tom, Elkins, Zachary, and Blount, Justin (2009), 'Does the Process of 
Constitution-Making Matter?', Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 5, 
201-23. 
Gladwell, Malcolm (2000), The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big 
Difference (Boston: Little Brown). 
Glitman, Marynard (1997), 'US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach', 
Survival, 38 (4 ), 66 - 83. 
Global Business Network (2009), 'The Mont Fleur Scenarios: What will South Africa 
be like in the year 2002?', (7(1); Emeryville, California: Deeper News). 
Gray, John (1995), Liberalism (2 edn.; Buckingham: Open University Press). 
Griffiths, Hugh (1998), 'The Dynamics of Multi-National Intervention: Brcko under 
International Supervision', (University of Amsterdam). 
Gros, Jean-Germain (1996), 'Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World 
Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti', Third World Quarterly, 
17 (3), 455-72. 
Grossman, Dave (1995), On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in 
War and Society (Boston; Little Brown). 
Group, International Crisis (2011), Europe Report No 214 - Bosnia: What Does 
Republika Srpska Want? 
Guetzkow, Harold (1957), 'Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of 
International Relations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1, 46-68. 
Guidance Note of the Secretary-General (2008), 'United Nations Approach to Rule of 
Law Assistance', (New York: United Nations). 
--- (2009), 'United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes', (New York: 
United Nations). 
Gupta, Dipak (2001), Path to collective madness: a study in social order and political 
pathology (New York: Praeger Publishers ). 
Gurr, Ted Robert (1981), 'Historical Trends in Violent Crime: A critical review of the 
evidence', Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 3, 295-353. 
Haas, Jonathan (2001), 'Warfare and the Evolution of Culture', in Gary M Feinman 
and Theron Douglas Price (eds.), Archaeology at the Millennium: A 
Sourcebook (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 329-50. 
Haass, Richard N (1990), Conflicts Unending (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press). 
Habermas, Jürgen (1990), Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 
(Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
--- (1997), 'Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two-Hundred Years' 
Hindsight', in James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), In 
Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press), 113-53. 
--- (1998a), 'Citizenship and National Identity', Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press), 491-516. 
248 
 
--- (1998b), 'The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory', in Ciaron Cronin 
and Pablo De Grieff (eds.), (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Haeri, David and Blanc, Guillaume (2005), 'The 2004 Presidential Elections in 
Afghanistan: Lessons Learned', (United Nations: Peacekeeping Best Practices 
Section). 
Halbrooke, Richard (1998), To End a War (New York: Random House). 
Halpern, Joel and Weinstein, Harvey M. (2004), 'Empathy and Rehumanization after 
Mass Violence', in Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (ed.), My Neighbor, 
My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 303-22. 
Hamill, James (2003), 'A Disguised Surrender? South Africa's Negotiated Settlement 
and the Politics of Conflict Resolution.', Diplomacy & Statecraft, 14 (3), 1-30. 
Hampson, Fen Olser (1996), Nuturing Peace. Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail 
(Washington US Institute of Peace). 
Hand, Learned (1959), 'The Spirit of Liberty', in Irving Dilliard (ed.), The Spirit of 
Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand (3 edn.; New York Vintage 
Books). 
Harland, David (2005), 'UN-Peacekeeping Operations in Post-Conflict Timor-Leste: 
Accomplishments and Lessons Learned', (Dili: Peacekeeping Best Practice 
Unit, DPKO). 
Harris, Nigel (1990), National Liberation (London I B Tauris & CO Ltd). 
Harris, Peter and Reilly, Benjamin (eds.) (1998), Democracy in Deep- Rooted 
Conflict: Options for Negotiations (Stockholm: International IDEA). 
Hart, Donna and Sussman, Robert W. (2005), Man the Hunted: Primates, Predators 
and Human Evolution (New York: Westview). 
Hart, Vivian (2003), 'Special Report: Democratic Constitution Making', (Washington: 
United States Institute for Peace, Report 107). 
Hayner, Priscilla B. (1994), 'Fifteen Truth Commissions  - 1974 to 1994: A 
Comparative Study', Human Rights Quarterly, 16 (4), 597-655. 
Heathershaw, John (2008), 'Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging 
of Peacebuilding Discourses', Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 
36, 597. 
Heder, Stephen (1996), 'The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of 
Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea 'Self-Demobilizes'', in Steven Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (eds.), 
Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition 
under United Nations Peacekeeping (Armonk, New York: M.E Sharpe), 73-
113. 
Hegel, Georg (1967), Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Hegre, Håvard (2004), 'The Limits of the Liberal Peace', (University of Oslo). 
Hegre, Håvard, et al. (2001), 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political 
Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992', American Political Science Review, 95 
(1), 16-33. 
Heininger, Janet (1994), Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in 
Cambodia (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press). 
Helman, Gerald and Ratner, Steven (1993), 'Saving Failed States', Foreign Policy, 89 
(Winter), 3-20. 
Hilker, Lyndsay McLean (2009), 'Everyday ethnicities: identity and reconciliation 
among Rwandan youth', Journal of Genocide Research, 11 (1), 81-100. 
249 
 
Hobbes, Thomas (1651), 'Leviathan', (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Hochschild, Fabrizio (2010), 'In and Above Conflict: A Study on Leadership in the 
Untied Nations', (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue). 
Hodson, Randy, Sekulic, Dusko, and Massey, Garth (1994), 'National tolerance in the 
former Yugoslavia', American Journal of Sociology, 99 (6), 1534-58. 
Holden, Philip (2008), Autobiography and Decolonization: Modernity, Masculinity, 
and the Nation-State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press). 
Holmes, Richard (1985), Acts of War: Behavior of Men in Battle (London Free Press). 
Holsti, Kalevi J (1999), 'The coming chaos? Armed conflict in the world's periphery', 
in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), International Order and the Future of 
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ). 
Holsti, Ole and Rosenau, James (1984), American leadership in world affairs (Boston: 
Allen & Unwin). 
Horowitz, Donald (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press). 
--- (1990), 'Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic 
Management', in Joseph V. Monteville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in 
Multiethnic Societies (Lexington: Lexington Books). 
--- (1997), 'Encouraging electoral accommodation in divided societies', in Brij Lal and 
Peter Larmour (eds.), Electoral Systems in Divided Societies: The Fiji 
Constitutional Review (Canberra: Australian National University), 21-37. 
--- (1998), 'Structure and strategy in ethnic conflict: A few steps toward synthesis', in 
Boris Pleskovic and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Annual World Bank Conference 
on Development Economics (345-369; Washington, DC: World Bank). 
--- (2005), 'Foreward', in Ian O'flynn and David Russell (eds.), Power Sharing: New 
Challenges for Divided Societies (London: Pluto Press). 
Howard, A E Dick (1968), The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and 
Constitutionalism in America (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia). 
--- (1991), 'The Essence of Constitutionalism', in Kenneth W Thompson and Rett R 
Ludwikowshki (eds.), Constitutionalism and Human Rights: America, Poland, 
and France: a bicentennial colloquium at the Miller Center (Lanthan, MD: 
University of America Press ), 3-41. 
Human Rights Watch (2005), 'Human Rights Overview: Cambodia', (New York: 
Human Rights Watch). 
--- (2010), 'World Report ', (New York: Human Rights Watch). 
--- (2012), 'You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living: The Escalation of 
Political Violence in Burundi', (New York: Human Rights Watch ). 
Human Security Centre (2005), Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 
21st Century (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). 
--- (2010), 'Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking 
Costs of War.', (Vancouver: Human Security Report Project). 
--- (2011), Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking 
Costs of War (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Hume, David (2007), 'A Treatise of Human Nature: Volume 1', in David Fate Norton 
and Mary J Norton (eds.), The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume 
(New York: Oxford University Press). 
Huntington, Samuel P (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: 
Yale University Press). 
250 
 
--- (1993), The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century (The Julian 
J. Rothbaum distinguished lecture series ; vol 4 Norman, London: University 
of Oklahoma Press). 
Hurwitz, Agnès (2005), 'Chapter 11: Rule of Law Programs in Multidimensional 
Peace Operations: Legitimacy and Ownership', in Anja H Ebnöther and Philipp 
H. Fluri (eds.), After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-
Conflict Societies (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces ), 333-56. 
Hutchings, Kimberly (1999), International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a 
Global Era (London Sage Publications). 
Ignatieff, Michael (1993), Blood and Belonging: Journey into the New Nationalism 
(New York: Farrar Strauss). 
Independent Monitoring Commission (2010), 'Twenty-Third Report of the 
Independent Monitoring Commission', (Presented to the Houses of Parliament 
by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in accordance with the Northern 
Ireland (Monitoring Commission etc.) Act 2003; Dublin: Independent 
Monitoring Commission). 
International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda 
(1993), 'Report of the International Commission of Investigation on Human 
Rights Violations in Rwanda Since October 1, 1990 ', (Joint Publication: 
Human Rights Watch (New York), the International Federation of Human 
Rights Leagues (Paris), the International Center for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development (Montreal) and the Interafrican Union of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Ouagadougou) ). 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), 'The 
Responsibility to Protect', (Ottawa: International Development Research 
Centre). 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2007), 'ICRC Report on the Treatment of 
Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA Custody', (Washington). 
International Crisis Group (2003a), 'Kosovo’s Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for a Civic 
Contract,' (Pristina & Brussels, Balkans Report no. 143: ICG). 
--- (2003b), 'Europe Report N°144: Bosnia’s Brcko: Getting In, Getting On and 
Getting Out', (Sarajevo and Brussels: International Crisis Group). 
--- (2009), 'Europe Policy Briefing: Bosnia's Dual Crisis', (57; Sarajevo/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group ). 
--- (2010), 'Crisis Watch No.80 - Bosnia and Herzegovina', (Brussels and Washington: 
International Crisis Group). 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2002), 'International 
Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of 
Elections', (Stockholm: International IDEA). 
Issacharoff, Samuel (2004), 'Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies', 
Texas Law Review, 7, 1861-94. 
Jackson, Robert H (1987), 'Quasi-states, Dual Regimes and Neoclassical Theory: 
International Jurisprudence and the Third World', International Organization, 
41 (4), 519-49. 
--- (1990), Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Jackson, Vicki C and Tushnet, Mark (2006), Comparative Constitutional Law (2 edn.; 
New York: Foundation Press). 
251 
 
Jacobs, Lawrence R and Shapiro, Robert Y (1994), 'Studying Substantive Democracy', 
PS: Political Science and Politics, 27 (1), 9-17. 
Jahn, Beate (2007), 'The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, 
Intervention, Statebuilding (Part I)', Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 
1 (1), 87–106. 
Jaintong, Theresa (2001), 'Refugee at Last!', in Rebecca Adams (ed.), Peace on 
Bougainville (Wellington Victoria University Press), 101-05. 
Jeffrey, Alex (2006), 'Building state capacity in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
The case of the Brcko District', Political Geography, 25 (2), 203-27. 
Jeong, Ho-Won (2005), Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner). 
Johnson, D, Stopka, P, and Knights, S (2003), 'The Puzzle of Human Co-operation', 
Nature, 421, 911-12. 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (1999a), 
'Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond', HoR Committee Reports 
(Canbebrra: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia). 
--- (1999b), 'Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond', (Canberra: The Parliament 
of the Commonwealth of Australia). 
Jones, Lloyd (2007), 'Calls to end Solomon Islands assistance', The Australian, 
February 12. 
Jung, Carl (1959), The Collected Works of C.G. Jung (17 volumes) (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul). 
Junne, Gerd and Verkoren, Willemijn (2005), 'The Challenges of Postconflict 
Development', in Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (eds.), Postconflict 
Development: Meeting New Challenges (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner), 
1-18. 
Kabui, Joseph (2001), 'Reconciliation a Priori ', in Rebecca Adams (ed.), Peace on 
Bougainville (Wellington: Victoria University Press), 33-44. 
Kahane, Adam (2004), Solving Tough Problems: An Open Way of Talking, Listening, 
and Creating New Realities (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler). 
Kaldor, Mary (2001), New and Old War: Organzised Violence in a Global Era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Kaldor, Mary and Luckham, Robin (2001), 'Global transformations and new conflicts', 
IDS Bulletin, 32 (2), 48-69. 
Kaminski, John P. (ed.), (1995), A Necessary Evil? Slavery and the Debate Over the 
Constitution (Madison: Madison House Publishers). 
Kandemiiri, Jonga, Zulu, Blelssing, and Nkomo, Ntungamili (2010), 'NGOs urge unity 
government to bring military into line on elections', Voanews, 9 November. 
Kant, Immanuel (1979), 'The Conflict of the Faculties', in Mary J. Gregor (ed.), 
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press). 
--- (1991a), 'Kant: Political Writings', in Hans Reiss (ed.), (New York: Cambridge 
University Press). 
--- (1991b), 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', in Hans Reiss 
(ed.), Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 41-
53. 
--- (1996a), 'On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No 
Use in Practice', in Mary Gregor (ed.), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), 273-309. 
252 
 
--- (1996b), '"The Metaphysics of Morals: I [Rechtslehre]', in Mary Gregor (ed.), In 
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of lmmanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambride Univeristy Press), 353-506. 
Kapeliouk, Amnon (1982), 'Begin and the Beasts', New Statesman, June 25. 
Kaplan, Robert (1993), Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St 
Martin’s Press). 
Kaufman, Stuart (2006), 'Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation 
Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethic Wars', Journal of Peace Research, 
43 (2), 201-18. 
Kaufmann, Chaim (1996), 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', 
International Security 20 (4), 136-75. 
Kauona, Sam (2001), 'Freedom from Fear', in Rebecca Adams (ed.), Peace of 
Boungainville (Wellington: Victoria University Press), 83-94. 
Keeley, Lawrence (1996), War before Civilization (New York: Oxford University 
Press). 
Kelley, Harold H. (1973), 'The Process of Causal Attribution', American Psychologist, 
28 (2), 107-28. 
Kelman, Herbert (1992), 'Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner', in Jacob 
Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.), Mediation in International Relations: 
Multiple Approaches in Conflict Management (New York: St Martin's ), 64-
96. 
Kelman, Herbert and Cohen, Stephen (1976), 'The Problem-Solving Workshop: A 
Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International 
Conflicts', Journal of Peace Research, 2 (13), 79-90. 
Kende, Mark (2002), 'The Fifth Anniversary of the South African Constitutional 
Court: In Defense of Judicial Pragmatism', Vermont Law Review, 26 (4), 753-
68. 
Kennedy, David (1988), 'A New Stream of International Law Scholarship', Wisconsin 
International Law Journal, 7 (1), 1-49. 
King, Iain and Mason, Whit (2006), Peace At Any Price. How the World Failed 
Kosovo. Crises in World Politics (London: Hurst). 
Kirk-Greene, Anthony M (1980), 'The Thin White Line: The Size of the British 
Colonial Service in Africa', African Affairs, 79 (314), 25-44. 
Klaaren, Jonathan (1996), 'Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President 
of the Republic of South Africa', South African Journal of Human Rights, 12, 
158-62. 
Klee, Ernst, Dressen, Willi, and Riess, Volker (eds.) (1988), “The good old days”: the 
Holocaust as seen by its perpetrators and bystanders (New York: Free Press). 
Knauft, Bruce (1991), 'Violence and sociality in human evolution', Current 
Anthropology, 32 (4), 391-428. 
Knight, Mark and Ozerdem, Alpaslan (2004), 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from 
War to Peace', Journal of Peace Research, 41 (4), 499-516. 
Koonings, Kees and Kruijt, Dirk (2002), Political Armies: The Military and Nation 
Building in the Age of Democracy (New York and London: Zed Books). 
Krasner, Stephen D. (2004), 'Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and 
Failing States', International Security, 29 (2), 85-120. 
--- (2005), 'The Case for Shared Sovereignty', Journal of Democracy, 16 (1), 69-83. 
Kriesberg, Louis (1989), 'Transforming Conflicts in the Middle East and Central 
Europe', in Louis Kriesberg, Terrell Northrup, and Stuart Thorson (eds.), 
253 
 
Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press). 
--- (1999), 'Paths to Varieties of Intercommunal Reconciliation', in Ho-Won Jeong 
(ed.), Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate). 
--- (2003a), 'Identity Issues ', Beyond Intractability Conflict Research Consortium, 
University of Colorado, Boulder, 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity_issues/. 
--- (2008), 'Identity Issues', Beyond Intractability November 25. 
--- (2003c), Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (2 edn.; New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield). 
Krippendorf, Ekkehart (1973), 'Peace Research and the Industrial Revolution', Journal 
of Peace Research, 10 (3), 185-201. 
Kumar, Krishna (2006), 'International assistance to promote independent media in 
transition and post-conflict societies', Democratization, 13 (4), 652-67. 
Kymlicka, W (1995), Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press). 
Ladley, Andrew (2005), 'Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for 
Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability on International Peace 
Operations', Politics and Ethics Review, 1 (1), 81-90. 
--- (2010), 'International support for constitution-building since the end of the Cold 
War – what can we learn?', International Partnership for Constitution Building 
(International IDEA, Stockholm: Publication forthcoming). 
Ladley, Andrew and Williams, Jessie (2010), 'Chapter 9 The Collier challenge: how 
can reliable transitional financing systems be created in ‘barely functional’ 
states?', in Manas Chatterji (ed.), Economics of War and Peace: Economic, 
Legal, and Political Perspectives (Contributions to Conflict Management, 
Peace Economics and Development, (14: Emerald Group Publishing Limited), 
147-65  
Lake, David (1992), 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic-States and War', American 
Political Science Review, 86 (1), 24-37. 
Lake, David and Rothchild, Donald (1996), 'Containing Fear: The Origins and 
Management of Ethnic Conflict', International Security, 21 (2), 41-75. 
Langer, Walter C. (1973), The Mind of Adolf Hitler. (London: Secker and Warburg). 
Lattimer, Mark (2008), 'Peoples under Threat: ' in Ishbel Matheson (ed.), State of the 
World's Minorities 2008 (London: Minority Rights Group International), 45-
55. 
Layne, Christopher (1994), 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', 
International Security, 19 (2), 5-49. 
Leader, Nicholas and Colenso, Peter (2005), 'Aid Instruments in Fragile States', 
Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Working Paper 5 (London: UK 
Department of International Development (DFID)). 
Leatherman, Janie, et al. (1999), Breaking Cycles of Violence (West Hartford: 
Kumarian Press ). 
LeBlanc, Steven (2003), Constant Battles: Why We Fight (New York: St Martin's 
Press). 
--- (2007), 'Why warfare? Lessons from the past', Daedalus, 136 (1), 13-21. 
Lederach, John Paul (1995a), Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across 
Cultures (New York: Syracuse University Press). 
254 
 
--- (1995b), 'Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a 
Comprehensive Network', in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict 
Transformation (New York: St. Martin's Press), 201-22. 
--- (1997), Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press). 
--- (1998), 'Beyond Violence: Building Sustainable Peace', in Eugene Weiner (ed.), 
The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence (New York Abraham Fund 
Publication). 
--- (2000), 'Conflict Transformation: A Working Definition', in Carolyn Schrock-
Shenk (ed.), Mediation and Facilitation Training Manual (Akron: Mennonite 
Conciliation Service). 
--- (2003), The Little Books of Conflict Transformation (Intercourse, PA:: Good 
Books). 
Lederach, John Paul and Appelby, R. Scott (2010), 'Strategic Peacebuilding. An 
Overview', in Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers (eds.), Strategies of Peace. 
Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (New York: Oxford University 
Press), 19-44. 
Lerner, Daniel (1958), The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle 
East (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press). 
Lerner, Hanna (2010), 'Constitution-writing in deeply divided societies: the 
incrementalist approach', Nations and Nationalism, 16 (1), 68-88. 
--- (2011), Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Levi, Primo (1987), If This is a Man and The Truce (London: Abacus Books). 
--- (1989), The Drowned and the Saved (New York Vintage). 
Levy, Jack S (1988a), 'Democratic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 18. 
--- (1988b), 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18 (4), 
653-73. 
Leyton, Elliott (1997), Men of Blood:Murder in Modern England (London: Penguin 
Books). 
Lidén, Kristoffer (2006), 'Whose Peace? Which Peace? On the Political Architecture 
of Liberal Peacebuilding', (Oslo University). 
--- (2009), 'Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical 
Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding', International Peacekeeping, 16 (5), 616-34. 
Lidén, Kristoffer, Mac Ginty, Roger, and Richmond, Oliver (2009), 'Introduction: 
Beyond Northern Epistemologies of Peace: Peacebuilding Reconstructed?', 
International Peacekeeping, 16 (5), 587-98. 
Lifton, Robert Jay (1986), The Nazi Doctors: medical killing and the psychology of 
genocide (New York: Basic Books). 
Lijphart, Arend (1977), Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration 
 (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
--- (1985), 'Power-Sharing in South Africa', (Policy Paper in International Affairs No. 
24; Berkley: University of California, Institute of International Studies). 
--- (1990), 'The Power-Sharing Approach', in Joseph V Monteville (ed.), Conflict and 
Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington:: Lexington Books). 
--- (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-
Six Countries (New Haven and London: Yale University Press). 
255 
 
--- (2002), 'The Wave of Power Sharing Democracy', in Andrew Reynold (ed.), The 
Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and 
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 37-54. 
Lineham, Rebecca (2006), 'The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
and democratic accountability', Masters of Strategic Studies (Victoria 
University of Wellington). 
Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred (1996), Problems of Democratic Consolidation 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). 
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959), Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New 
York: Doubleday and Company). 
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Lakin, Jason (2004), The Democratic Century (Norman: 
Oklahoma University Press). 
Liu, James and Hilton, Denis (2005), 'How the past weighs on the present: social 
representations of history and their role in identity politics', British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 44, 1-2. 
Lizee, Pierre (1996), 'Cambodia in 195: From Hope to Despair', Asian Survey, 36 (1), 
83-88. 
Locke, John (1680-1690), Two Treatises of Government (1824 edn.; London: Printed 
for C. and J. Rivington ). 
London Conference (1992), 'Statement on Bosnia', International Conference of the 
Former Yugoslavia (London: Doc. No LC/C5). 
Long, William J and Brecke, Peter (2003), War and Reconciliation: Reason and 
Emotion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: MIT Press). 
Lund, Michael (2001), 'A Toolbox For Responding To Conflicts and Building Peace', 
in Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (eds.), Peacebuilding, A Field Guide 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 16-20. 
--- (2003), 'What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Taking Stock of Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions', Prepared on the occasion of 
the tenth anniversary of Agenda for Peace for the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) (Ottawa, Canada). 
Luttwak, Edward N (1999), 'Give War a Chance', Foreign Affairs, 78 (4), 36-44. 
Lutz, Donald S (1984), 'The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late 
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought ', The American Political 
Science Review 78 (1), 189-97. 
--- (1988), The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University). 
Lyons, Terrence (2009), 'Peacebuilding, democratization, and transforming the 
institutions of war', in Bruce W Dayton and Louis Kriesberg (eds.), Conflict 
Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving from Violence to Sustainable 
Peace (New York: Routledge), 91-106. 
Lyotard, Jean-François (1984), The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press). 
Mac Ginty, Roger (2006a), 'Northern Ireland: A Peace Process Thwarted by 
Accidental Spoiling', in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), 
Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
--- (2006b), 'Northern Ireland: A peace process thwarted by accidental spoiling', 
Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution 
(Tokyo: United Nations University), 153-72. 
256 
 
--- (2006c), No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and 
Peace Accords (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
--- (2008), 'Indigenous Peace-Making versus the Liberal Peace', Cooperation and 
Conflict, 43 (2), 139-63. 
--- (2010), 'No war, no peace: Why so many peace processes fail to deliver peace', 
International Politics, 47 (2), 145-62. 
--- (2011), 'Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace', 
Security Dialogue, 41 (4), 391-412. 
Mac Ginty, Roger, Muldoon, Orla T, and Ferguson, Neil (2007), 'No War, No Peace: 
Northern Ireland after the Agreement', Political Psychology, 28 (1), 1-11. 
MacKay, Susan (2000), Northern Protestants: An Unsettled People (Belfast: 
Blackstaff). 
MacMillan, John (2004), 'Whose Democracy: Which Peace? Contextualizing the 
Democratic Peace', International Politics, 41, 472-93. 
Mai, Nicola (2001), 'The archives of memory: Specific results from research in 
Serbia.', in Natale Losi, Luisa Passerini, and Silvia Salvatici (eds.), Archives 
of Memory: Supporting Traumatized Communities Through Narration and 
Remembrance. (Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM)). 
Malinowski, Tom (2008), 'Restoring Moral Authority: Ending Torture, Secret 
Detention, and the Prison at Guantanamo Bay', The Annals of The American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 618 (1), 148-59. 
Malloch-Brown, Mark (2011), The Unfinished Global Revolution (London: Allan 
Lane). 
Mamdani, Mahmood (2001), When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, 
and the Genocide in Rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
Mandelbaum, Michael (2002), The Ideas that Conquered the World (New York: 
Public Affairs). 
Mansfield, Anna Morawiec (2003), 'Ethnic but Equal: The Quest for a New 
Democratic Order in Bosnia and Herzegovina ', Columbia Law Review, 103, 
2052-93. 
Martin, Ian (2011), 'United Nations Post-Conflict Deployment to Libya', (United 
Nations). 
Masamvu, Syndey and Steinberg, Donald (2009), 'If the World Hesitates, Zimbabwe 
Could Be Lost', The Huffington Post, May 7. 
McAuley, James and Tonge, Jonathan (2007), '“For God and for the Crown”: 
Contemporary political and social attitudes amongst Orange Order members 
in Northern Ireland', Political Psychology., 28 (1), 33-52. 
McGarry, John and O'Leary, Brendan (2004), The Northern Ireland Conflict: 
Consociational Engagements (Oxford Oxford University Press). 
--- (2007), 'Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription', 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 5 (4), 1-29. 
McGrew, Anthony (2000), 'Democracy Beyond Borders?', in David Held and Anthony 
McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the 
Globalization Debate (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
--- (2002), 'Liberal Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism', in 
David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, 
Authority and Global Governance (Cambridge: : Polity Press.). 
McMahon, Patrice C and Western, Jon (2009), 'The Death of Dayton: How to Stop 
Bosnia From Falling Apart', Foreign Affairs, 88 (5), 69-83. 
257 
 
Mearsheimer, John (1990), 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War', International Security, 15 (1), 5-56. 
--- (1995), 'The False Promise of International Institutions', International Security, 19 
(3), 5-49. 
Melvern, Linda (2000), A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's 
Genocide (London: Zed Books). 
Menya, Walter and Namuane, Bernard (2010), 'Commonwealth offers Kenya aid in 
drafting new laws', Saturday Nation, Tuesday 14 September. 
Merryman, John (1977), 'Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, 
Decline and Revivial of the Law and Development Movement', The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 25, 457-83. 
Miall, Hugh (2004), 'Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task', Berghof 
Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research for 
Constructive Conflict Management ). 
Miall, Hugh, Ramsbotham, Oliver, and Woodhouse, Tom (1999), Contemporary 
Conflict Resolution (Malden, MA: Polity Press). 
Miller, Arthur (1952), The Crucible (Oxford: Heinemann Educational Publishers). 
Milosevic, Solbodan (1989), 'Addresses Rally at Gazimestan ', Text of live relay of 
speech delivered at 28th June rally celebrating the 600th anniversary of the 
Battle of Kosovo Polje (BBC Translation: http://emperors-
clothes.com/milo/milosaid2.htm, last accessed19 May 2010). 
Mitchell, Christopher (2002), 'Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict 
Transformation Actually Transform?', Peace and Conflict Studies, 9 (1), 1-23. 
--- (2006), 'Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution. An Enquiry', in David 
Bloomfield, Martina Fischer, and Beatrix Schmezle (eds.), Social Change and 
Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management), 13-38. 
--- (2011), 'Conflict, Change and Conflict Resolution', in B Austin, Markus Fisher, 
and H J Giessmann (eds.), Advancing Conflict Transformation. The Berghof 
Handbook II (USA: Barbara Budrich Publishers), 75-100. 
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Gates, Scott, and Hegre, Håvard (1999), 'Evolution in 
Democracy-War Dynamics', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43 (6), 771-92. 
Moghadam, Valentine M (2005), 'Peacebuilding and Reconstruction with Women: 
Reflections on Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine', Development, 48, 63-72. 
Montagu, Ashley (1976), The Nature of Human Aggression (New York: Oxford 
University Press). 
Montville, Joseph V (1987), 'The Arrow and the Oliver Branch: A Case for Track Two 
Diplomacy', in John W Mc Donald and Diana B Bendahmane (eds.), Conflict 
Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy (Washington, DC: US Department of 
State), 5-20. 
Moore, Clive  (2006), '"Helpem Fren” The Solomon Islands and Ramsi 2003-2006', 
National Presidents Forum 14 July 2006 (Sydney: Australian Institute of 
International Affairs). 
Morales-Gamboa, Albelardo and Baranyi, Stephen (2005), '"Relative Success" in 
Costa Rica', in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur 
(eds.), Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance 
(Tokyo: United Nations University), 234-51. 
Morris, Ian (2011), Why the West rules - for now: the patterns of history and what they 
reveal about the future (London: Profile Books). 
258 
 
Morrison, Fred L (1996), 'The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina', Constitutional 
Commentary, 13 (2), 145-57. 
Mortlock, Roger (2001), 'A Good Thing To Do', in Rebecca Adama (ed.), Peace on 
Bougainville (Wellington: Victoria University Press), 69-82. 
Moser, Caroline O.N. and Clark, Fiona C. (eds.) (2001), Victims, Perpetrators or 
Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence (London: Zed Books). 
Mueller, John (2004), The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
--- (2009), 'War Has Almost Ceased to Exist:An Assessment', Political Science 
Quarterly, 124 (2), 297-321. 
Muggah, Robert (2010), 'Innovations in disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration policy and research: Reflections on the last decade.', (Working 
Paper 774; Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs). 
Muller, Jan-Werner (2007), Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press). 
Muravchik, Joshua (1996), Promoting Peace through Democracy, eds Chester A 
Crocker and Fen Osler Hampsen (Managing Global Chaos: Sources and 
Responses to International Conflict; Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace Press) 573-85. 
--- (2002), 'Democracy’s Quiet Victory', New York Times, 19 August  
Mutua, Makau (1997), 'Hope and Despair for a New South African: The Limits of the 
Rights Discourse', Harvard Human Rights Journal, 10, 63-114. 
--- (2000), 'What is Twail?', A New Stream of International Legal Scholarship 
 (Washington DC: American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 94th 
Annual Meeting), 31-39. 
Nash, Jill (1992), 'Factors Relating to Infrequent Domestic Violence Among the 
Nagovisi', in D Ayers Counts, J Brown, and J Campbell (eds.), Sanctions and 
Sanctuary: Cultural Perspectives on the Beating of Wives (Boulder Colorado: 
Westview Press). 
Newman, Edward (2006), '"New Wars" and Spoilers', in Edward Newman and Oliver 
Richmond (eds.), Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During 
Conflict Resolution (Tokyo: United Nationals University). 
Newman, Edward and Richmond, Oliver (2006), 'The Impact of Spoilers on Peace 
Processes and Peacebuilding', Policy Brief (Tokyo: United Nations University 
). 
Newman, Edward, Paris, Roland, and Richmond, Oliver (2009a), Introduction New 
Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding (Tokyo United Nations University 
Press). 
--- (2009b), 'Introduction', New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press), 3-25. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich (2008), Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern (Virginia: 
Wilder Publications). 
Nightingale, D J and Cromby, J (eds.) (1999), Social Constructionist Psychology: a 
critical analysis of theory and practice (Philadelphia Open University Press). 
Norell, Magnus (2008), 'Islamist Networks in Somalia: FOI Somalia Papers - Report 
2', (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency). 
Notter, James and Diamond, Louise (1996), 'Building Peace and Transforming 
Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice', (Washington: The Institute for 
Multi-Track Diplomacy: Occasional Paper Number 7). 
O'Callaghan, Mary-Louise (1997), 'PNG hires mercenaries to blast rebels', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 22 February  
259 
 
O'Connor, Tim, Chan, Sharni, and Goodman, Dr James (2006), 'Australian Aid: 
Promoting Insecurity', The Reality of Aid 2006: Focus on Conflict, Security 
and Development (London: Zed Books), 172-89. 
Oberschall, Anthony (2000), 'The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation 
to violence and war in Yugoslavia', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28 (4), 982-
1001. 
OECD (2007), 'Principles for good international engagement in fragile states & 
situations', (Paris: Development Assistance Committee, OECD). 
--- (2008), 'State-building in Fragile Situations: How Do Donors Do No Harm and 
Maximise Their Positive Impact', (Paris: OECD). 
--- (2011a), 'Supporting statebuilding in situations of conflict and fragility', (Paris: 
DAC Guidelines and Reference Series). 
--- (2011b), 'A new deal for engagement in fragile states', (Paris: International dialogue 
on peacebuilding and statebuilding). 
OECD/DAC (2010), 'Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities and Challenges: A 
Synthesis of Findings from Seven Multi-Stateholder Consultations', (Paris: 
OECD). 
Ohmae, Kenichi (1993), 'The Rise of the Region State', Foreign Affairs, 72 (2), 78-87. 
Oliver, Douglas (1973), Bougainville: A Personal History (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne 
University Press). 
--- (1991), Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville 1937 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press ). 
Oliver Richmond (2006), 'The Problem of Peace: Understanding the "Liberal Peace"', 
Conflict, Security and Development, 6 (3), 291-314. 
Oliver Richmond and Mitchell, Audra (2012), 'Introduction - Towards a Post-Liberal 
Peace: Exploring Hybridity via Everyday Forms of Resistance, Agency and 
Autonomy', in Oliver  Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds.), Hybrid Forms of 
Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism (London: Palgrave), 1-38. 
Oneal, John R and Russett, Bruce (1997), 'The Classical Liberals Were Right: 
democracy, interdependence and conflict, 1950 - 1985', International Studies 
Quarterly, 41 (2), 267-94. 
--- (1999), 'The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, INterdependence 
and International Organizations 1885 - 1992', World Politics, 52 (1), 1-37. 
Online, Zim (2010), 'New constitution, a damp squib: NGOs', ZimOnline, Monday 25 
October. 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2007), 'Lessons from Education Reform in Brcko', (October: 
OSCE Mission to BiH Education Department). 
Osifelo, Eddie (2009a), 'Gov't-RAMSI pack takes a new stop', Solomon Star, Saturday 
16 May. 
--- (2009b), 'Donor  banks pledge to support our budget', Solomon Star, Saturday 16 
May  
Ottaway, Marina (1998), 'Angola's Failed Elections ', in Krishna Kumar (ed.), 
Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance (Boulder 
and London: Lynne Rienner), 133-52. 
--- (2003), 'Promoting Democracy After Conflict: The Difficult Choices', 
International Studies Perspectives, 3, 314-22. 
Overseas Development Institute (2009), 'State-building for peace: navigating an arena 
of contradictions', (London: Briefing Paper 52). 
260 
 
Owen, John M (1994), 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International 
Security, 19 (2), 87-125. 
Pacific Islands Broadcasting Corporation (2010), 'Rebel group backs Bougainville 
president', Islands Business Monday 17 May  
Pacific Islands Forum of Eminent Persons Group (2005), 'Mission Helpem Fren - A 
Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon ', (Suva: Pacific 
Islands Forum). 
Packenham, Robert (1973), Liberal America and the Third World: Political 
Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press). 
Paffenholz, Thania (2009), 'Understanding Peacebuilding Theory: Management, 
Resolution and Transformation', New Routes, 14 (2), 3-6. 
Palmer, Matthew (2006), 'What is New Zealand's constitution and who interprets it? 
Constitutional realism and the importance of public office-holders ', Public 
Law Review, 17, 133-45. 
Paris, Roland (1997), 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', 
International Security, 22 (2), 54-89. 
--- (2001), 'Wilson's Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding', 
in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), Turbulent 
Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace Press), 765–84. 
--- (2004), At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
--- (2006), 'Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical Versus Contemporary Studies 
of the Liberal Peace ', The International Studies Review, 8 (3), 425-40. 
--- (2010), 'Saving liberal peacebuilding', Review of International Studies, 36 (2), 337-
65. 
Paris, Roland and Sisk, Timothy D (eds.) (2009), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: 
Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: 
Routledge). 
Payne, James (2002), 'Violence in the Twentieth Century: A Closer Look', The 
Independent Review, 6 (3), 447-55. 
--- (2004), A History of Force: Exploring the Worldwide Movement Against Habits of 
Coercion, Bloodshed and Mayhem (Sandpoint, Idaho: Lytton Publishing ). 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (2004), 'Lessons Learned Study on the State-Up 
Phase of the United Nations Mission in Libera', (New York: United Nations). 
Peatling, Gary K (2004), The Failure of the Northern Ireland Peace Process (Dublin: 
Irish Academic Press). 
Peou, Sorpong (2002), 'Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement', in Stephen 
Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (eds.), Ending Civil Wars: 
The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner), 499-530. 
Petrovic, Edit (2000), 'Ethnonationalism and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia', in Joel 
Martin Halpern and David A. Kideckel (eds.), Neighbors at War: 
anthropological perspectives on Yugoslav ethnicity, culture, and history, 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Press). 
Pickering, Paula (2007), Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground 
Floor (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press). 
Pinker, Steven (2007), 'A History of Violence', The New Republic Online 20 March  
Popper, Karl (1961), The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
261 
 
Pouligny, Béatrice (2005), 'Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: 
Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building ‘New’ Societies 
', Security Dialogue, 36 (4), 495-510. 
Pozhidaev, Dmitry (2007), 'What statements do not state', Journal of Language and 
Politics, 6 (3), 327-49. 
Pretorius, Carole, Lokay, Peter, and Arumae, Haggai (2008), 'Solomon Islands: Public 
Financial Management - Performance Report', (Rotterdam: ECORYS 
Nederland BV). 
Prunier, Gerard (1997), The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide (New York: 
Columbia University Press). 
Pugh, Michael (2004), 'Peacekeeping and critical theory', International Peacekeeping, 
11 (1), 39-58. 
--- (2005), 'The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective ', 
International Journal of Peace Studies, 10 (2), 23-42. 
--- (2008), 'The  Political  Economy  of  Peacebuilding', in Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, 
and Mandy Turner (eds.), Whose  Peace?  Critical  Perspectives  on  the  
Political  Economy  of  Peacebuilding  (Basingstoke: MacMillan). 
Pugh, Michael and Cobble, Margaret (2001), 'Non-nationalist Voting in Bosnian 
Municipal Elections: Implications for Democracy and Peacebuilding', Journal 
of Peace Research, 38 (1), 27-47. 
Pugh, Michael, Cooper, Neil, and Turner, Mandy (2008), Whose Peace? Critical 
Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding (London: Palgrave). 
Putnam, Robert (1995), 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital  ', Journal 
of Democracy, 6 (1), 65-78. 
Quentin-Baxter, Alison (1987), 'Independence of Western Samoa: Some Conceptual 
Issues', Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 17 (5), 345-72. 
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom, and Miall, Hugh (2011), Contemporary 
Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of 
deadly conflicts (3 edn.; Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby (2003), The West, Civil Society and the Construction of 
Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Rawls, John (1996), Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press). 
--- (1999), The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
Ray, James Lee (1995), Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the 
Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press). 
Reddy, Peter (2006), 'Peace Operations and Restorative Justice: Groundwork for Post-
conflict Regeneration', (The Australian National University.). 
--- (2008), 'Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative 
justice', Contemporary Justice Review, 11 (2), 117-30. 
Regan, Anthony (1998a), 'Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict'', Journal 
of Pacific History, 33 (3), 269-85. 
--- (1998b), 'Causes and course of the Bougainville conflict', The Journal of Pacific 
History, 33 (3), 269-85. 
--- (2001), 'Why a Neutral Peace Monitoring Force? The Bougainville Conflict and 
the Peace Process', in Monica Wehner and Donald Denoon (eds.), Without a 
Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001 
(Canberra Pandanus Books), 1-18. 
--- (2010), Light Intervention: Lessons from Bougainville (Washington DC: US 
Institute of Peace Press). 
262 
 
Reilly, Benjamin (2001), Democracy in Divided Societies (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press). 
--- (2006), Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Reilly, Jacqueline, Muldoon, Orla, and Bryne, Clara (2004), 'Young Men as Victims 
and Perpetrators of Violence in Northern Ireland: A Qualitative Analysis', 
Journal of Social Issues, 60 (3), 469-84. 
Reimann, Cordula (2004), 'Assessing the State-of-the Art in Conflict Transformation', 
The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research 
for Constructive Conflict Management ). 
Report of Coroner T. Suntheralingam (1996), 'Report and findings regarding the death 
of Theodore Miriung', (Port Morseby). 
Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and 
Change (2004), 'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility ', (New 
York: United Nations, UN Doc A/59/565). 
Report of the Secretary-General (2000), 'Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations 
(Brahimi Report)', (New York: United Nations). 
--- (2001), 'No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure 
or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations', S/2001/394 (United 
Nations). 
--- (2005a), 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights 
for All', (New York: United Nations). 
--- (2005b), 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all ', (New York: United Nations ). 
--- (2006), 'The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security.', 
A/61/326-S/2006/727 (New York: United Nations). 
--- (2012), 'Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict ', A/67/499–S/2012/746 (New 
York: United Nations). 
Richards, David (1989), Foundations of American Constitutionalism (New York: 
Oxford University Press). 
--- (1992), 'Revolution and Constitutionalism in America', Cardozo Law Review, 14 
(3-4), 577-634. 
Richardson, Lewis (1960), Arms and insecurity (Chicago: Quadrangle). 
Richmond, Oliver (2005), The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
--- (2007), The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
--- (2008), Peace in International Relations (London Routledge). 
--- (2009a), 'A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday', Review of 
International Studies, 35, 577-80. 
--- (2009b), 'Beyond the liberal peace? Responses to 'backsliding'', in Edward 
Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (eds.), New Perspectives on 
Liberal Peacebuilding (Tokyo: United Nations University Press), 54-77. 
--- (2010), 'A geneology of peace and conflict theory. ', in Oliver Richmond (ed.), 
Palgrave advances in peacebuilding: Critical develoments and approaches 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan), 14-40. 
Richmond, Oliver and Franks, Jason (2007), 'Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in 
Cambodia', Security Dialogue, 38 (1), 27-48. 
--- (2009a), Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding 
(Edinburgh University Press). 
263 
 
--- (2009b), 'Introduction: a Framework to Access Liberal Peace Transitions', Liberal 
Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press Ltd), 1-17. 
Roberts, David (2011), 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the 
Locus of Legitimacy', International Peacekeeping, 18 (4), 410-24. 
Robertson, Priscilla (1967), Revolutions of 1848: a social history (Princeton 
paperbacks: Princeton University Press). 
Roeder, Phillip G and Rothchild, Donald (eds.) (2005), Sustainable Peace: Power and 
Democracy After Civil wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Rogers, Everett (1995), Diffusion of Innovation (3 edn.; New York: The Free Press). 
Roscoe, Paul (2007), 'Intelligence, Coalitional Killing, and the Antecedents of War', 
American Anthropologist, 109 (3), 485-95. 
Rose, Richard and Mishler, William (1996), 'Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: 
Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives', Journal of Public Policy, 
16 (1), 29-58. 
Rose, Tore (2004), 'Reflections on Peacebuilding and the UN Development Assistance 
Framework', Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 2 (3), 64-77. 
Rosenn, Keith S (1990), 'Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its 
Failure in Latin America: An Explanation', American Law Review 22 (1), 1-
40. 
Ross, Michael (2001), 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy', World Politics, 53 (3), 325-61. 
Rostow, Walt Whitman (1971), The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Rotberg, Robert (2004a), 'The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: breakdown, 
prevention and repair', in Robert Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and 
Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
--- (ed.), (2004b), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
Rotberg, Robert I (2005), 'The failure and collapse of nation-states: breakdown, 
prevention and repair', in Robert I Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: causes and 
consequences (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1-49. 
Rothermund, Dietmar (2006), The Routledge Companion to Decolonisation (New 
York: Routledge ). 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1754), Discourse on the Origins of Inequality Among Men. 
--- (1762), 'The Social Contract (Du Contract Social)', (1953 edn.; London: Penguin). 
Rowstow, Walt (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Roxborough, Ian (1988), 'Review: Modernization Theory Revisited. A Review 
Article', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 30 (4), 753-61. 
Rubin, Barnett (2006), 'Peace building and state-building in Afghanistan: Constructing 
sovereignty for whose security? ', Third World Quarterly, 27 (1), 175-85. 
Rummel, Rudolph (1997), Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence. 
(New Brunswick:: Transaction Publishers). 
Rupesinghe, Kumar (1995), Conflict Transformation (London: Macmillan). 
--- (1998), Civil Wars, Civil Peace (London Pluto). 
Russett, Bruce and Oneal, John (2001), Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W.W Norton). 
Russett, Bruce, et al. (1995), 'The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19 (4), 
164-84. 
264 
 
Russett, Bruce, et al. (1993), Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-
Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Ryan, Stephen (2007), The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict 
(Hampershire: Ashgate ). 
Sabaratnam, Meera (2011), 'The Liberal Peace? An Intellectual History of 
International Conflict Management, 1990-2010', in Susanna Campbell, David 
Chandler, and Meera Sabaratam (eds.), A Liberal Peace? The Problems and 
Practices of Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books ), 13-30. 
Said, Edward (2002), The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (2 edn.; London 
Granta). 
Samuels, Kirsti (2007 ), 'Constitution-Building During the War on Terror: The 
Challenge of Somalia', New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 40 (2), 597-614. 
Samuels, Kristi and Wyeth, Vanessa Hawkins (2006), 'State-building and 
Constitutional Design After Conflict', (New York International Peace 
Academy). 
Sanderson, Lt General John (1994), 'UNTAC: Successes and Failure', in Hugh Smith 
(ed.), International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience 
(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre). 
Sands, Philippe (2005), Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of 
Global Rules (London Penguin Books). 
--- (2008a), Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and The Betrayal of American Values 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
--- (2008b), The Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Santayana, George (1905), Reason in Common Sense: The Life of Reason (1: 
Scribner's). 
Saovana-Spriggs, Ruth (2010), 'Bougainville Women's Role in Conflict Resolution in 
the Bougainville Peace Process', in Sinclair Dinnen, Anita Jowitt, and Tess 
Newton (eds.), A Kind of Mending: Restorative Justice in the Pacific Islands 
(2 edn.; Canberra: ANU Press), 195-214. 
Scales, Ian (2007), 'The Coup Nobody Noticed: The Solomon Islands Western State 
Movement in 2000', The Journal of Pacific History, 42 (2), 187-209. 
Scheppele, Kim Lane (2008), 'A Constitution Between Past and Future', William and 
Mary Law Review, 49 (4), 1377-407. 
Schrodt, Philip A., Yilmaz, Ömür, and Gerner, Deborah J. (2003), 'Evaluating 
"Ripeness" and "Hurting Stalemate" in Mediated International Conflicts: An 
Event Data Study of the Middle East, Balkans and West Africa', Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association (Portland, Oregon, USA). 
Schumpeter, Joseph (1950), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: 
Harper Torchbooks). 
--- (1955), 'The Sociology of Imperialism', Imperialism and Social Classes (Cleveland 
World Publishing), 3-98. 
Schwerin, Edward (1995), Mediation, Citizen Empowerment, and Transformational 
Politics (Westport, CT: Praeger). 
Scimecca, Joseph (1987), 'Conflict Resolution: The Basis for Social Control or Social 
Change', in Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), Conflict 
Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International 
Applications (New York New York University Press), 30-33. 
Searle-White, Joshua (2001), The Psychology of Nationalism (New York: Palgrave). 
265 
 
Security Council (1999), 'Letter Dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council', S/1999/1257 (New York: 
United Nations). 
Seidman, Robert (1972), 'Law and Development: A General Model', Law and Society 
Review, 6 (3), 311-42. 
Sekulic, Dusko, Massey, Garth, and Hodson, Randy (2006), 'Ethnic intolerance and 
ethnic conflict in the dissolution of Yugoslavia', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29 
(5), 797-827. 
Selby, Jan (2009), 'The political economy of peace processes', in Michael Pugh, Neil 
Cooper, and Mandy Turner (eds.), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the 
Political Economy of Peacebuilding (Palgrave Macmillan), 11-29. 
--- (2013), 'The Myth of Liberal Peace-Building', Conflict, Security & Development, 
13 (1), 57-86. 
Sen, Amartya (2006), Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W.W 
Norton & Company Inc). 
--- (2009), The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane). 
Senghaas, Dieter (1973), 'Conflict Formations in Contemporary International Society', 
Journal of Peace Research, 10 (3), 163 -84. 
Sharp, Gene (1973), The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 3 vols. (Boston: Porter 
Sargent). 
Silber, Laura and Little, Alan (1996), The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin 
Books ). 
Simonsen, Sven (2004), 'Nationbuilding as Peacebuilding: Racing To Define the 
Kosovar', International Peacekeeping 11 (2), 289-311. 
--- (2005), 'Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons 
from Recent Cases', Security Dialogue, 36 (3), 297-318. 
Simpson, J A, Weiner, E S C, and Press., Oxford University (1989), Oxford English 
Dictionary (2 edn.; Oxford Clarendon Press). 
Singer, Peter (1981), The Expanding Circle: Ethic and Sociobiology (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press). 
--- (2002), One World: The Ethnics of Globalisation (New Haven: Yale University 
Press). 
Sirivi, Josephine and Havini, Marilyn (eds.) (2004), As Mothers of the Land - the birth 
of the Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom (Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University: Pandanus Books). 
Sirivi, Jossie (2001), 'Finding a Voice', in Rebecca Adams (ed.), Peace on 
Bougainville (Wellington: Victoria University Press ), 118-24. 
Sisk, Timothy (1996), Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace). 
Sluka, Jeffrey (1992), 'An Anthropology of Conflict', in C Nordstrom and J Martin 
(eds.), The Paths to Domination, Resistance and Terror (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press). 
Smith, David Livingstone (2007), The Most Dangerous Animal: Human Nature and 
the Origins of War (New York: St Martin's Press). 
Smith, Peter H (1999), Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Smith, Tony (1979), 'The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of 
Dependency Theory', World Politics, 31 (2), 247-88. 
Smits, Jeroen (2010), 'Ethnic intermarriage and Social Cohesion. What Can We Learn 
from Yugoslavia?', Social Indicators Research, 96 (3), 417-32. 
266 
 
Snow, David, et al. (1986), 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation', American Sociologist Review, 51 (4), 464-81. 
So'o, Asofou and Fraenkel, Jon (2005), 'The Role of Ballot Chiefs (Matai Palota) and 
Political Parties in Samoa’s Shift to Universal Suffrage', Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics, 43 (3), 333-61. 
Sogavare, Manasseh (2006), 'Address to the Nation by the Prime Minister', 18 
February 2007. 
Sohn, Louis B (1994), Rights in Conflict: The United Nations and South Africa (New 
York: Transnational Publishers Inc) 63-170. 
Solana, Javier (2003), 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy', (Brussels: Council of the European Union). 
Solarz, Stephan (1990), 'Cambodia and the International Community', Foreign Affairs, 
69 (2), 33. 
Solomon, Benjamin (2003), 'Kant's Perpetual Peace: A New Look at this Centuries-
Old Quest', The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 5 (1), 106-
26. 
Solomon Islands Government (2003), 'Framework for Strengthened Assistance to the 
Solomon Islands'. 
Sørensen, Birgitte (1998), Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and 
Sources (The War-Torn Societies Project; Geneva: The United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development and The Programme for Strategic 
and International Security Studies ). 
South African Law Commission (1989), 'Working Paper 25 Project 58 Group and 
Human Rights ', (South African Law Commission). 
Spies, Chris (2006), 'Resolutionary Change: The Art of Awakening Dormant Faculties 
in Others', The Berghof Centre Handbook Series No.5: Social Change and 
Conflict Transformation. (Berlin: Berghof Foundation). 
Stacy, Helen (2009), Human Rights for the 21st Century (Standford: Standford 
University Press). 
Staub, Ervin (1992), The Roots of Evil, The Origins of Genocide and Other Group 
Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.). 
Stedman, Stephen (1991), Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in 
Zimbabwe,1974-1980 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). 
--- (1997), 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', International Security, 22, 5-53. 
--- (2000), 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', in Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman 
(eds.), International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington: 
National Academies Press), 178-224. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2008), Summary: SIPRI Yearbook 
2008 - Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security (39 edn.; 
Sweden: Elanders). 
Svensson, Isaak and Wallensteen, Peter (2010), The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and 
the Styles of Mediation (United States Institute of Peace; Washington). 
Synder, Jack (2000), From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist 
Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton ). 
Szasz, Paul C. (1997), 'The Dayton Accord: The Balkan Peace Agreement', Cornell 
International Law Journal 90 (3), 759-68. 
--- (2000), 'Comparative Peace: A Look at Recent Peace Agreements', American 
Society of International Law Proceeding, 94, 298. 
267 
 
Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Schoistwohl, Michael (2008), 'Playing with Fire? The 
International Community’s Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan', 
International Peacekeeping, 15 (2), 252-67. 
Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Richmond, Oliver (2011), 'Conclusion: typologies and 
modifications proposed by critical approaches', in Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh 
(ed.), Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives 
(Oxon: Routledge), 221-41. 
Tangri, Roger and Mwenda, Andrew M (2010), 'President Museveni and the Politics 
of Presidential Tenure in Uganda', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 
28 (1), 31-49. 
Tapi, Robert (2002), 'From Burnham to Buin: Sowing the seeds of peace in the land 
of the snow-capped mountains', in Andy Carl and Sr. Lorraine Garsu CSN 
(eds.), Weaving consensus: the Papua New Guinea - Bougainville peace 
process (12; London: Conciliation Resources), 24-27. 
Teitel, Ruti (1997), 'Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political 
Transformation', Yale Law Journal, 1997 (106). 
Teson, Fernando R (1998), A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press). 
Thakur, Ramesh (2006), The United Nations, peace and security: from collective 
security to the responsibility to protect (Cambridge University Press). 
Thayer, Nate (1997), 'The Deal That Died: negotiators thought they'd succeeded in 
ending the Khmer Rouge's long guerrilla war', Far Eastern Economic Review, 
160 (34), 14-17. 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2007), 'Election 
Observation Handbook', (5 edn.; Poland: OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights). 
The President of the United States (2005), 'United States National Security 
Presidential Directive', NSPD-44 (Washington: The White House). 
The United Nations (2005), 'Women & Elections: Guide to Promoting the 
Participation of Women in Elections', (New York: United Nations). 
Tinbergen, Nikolaas (1968), 'On War and Peace in Animals and Man', Science, 160 
(1411-1418). 
Toft, Monica Duffy (2009), Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
Tohiana, Brenda (2006), 'Weaving Bougainville Together. Re-building Broken 
Communities: Restoring a Shattered Society', in Arlene Griffen (ed.), Lalanga 
Pasifika: weaving the Pacific - stories of empowerment from the South Pacific 
(Suva: University of the South Pacific), 164-238. 
Trubek, David M and Galanter, Marc (1974), 'Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United 
States', Wisconsin Law Review, 4, 1062. 
Tushnet, Mark (1999), 'The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law', Yale 
Law Journal, 108 (6), 1473-95. 
United Nations (2003), 'Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping 
Experiences in Sierra Leone', (New York: Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit, 
DPKO). 
--- (2004), 'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility', (Report of the 
Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
A/59/565; New York: United Nations ). 
268 
 
--- (2009), 'United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income 
Generation and Reintegration', (Geneva: United Nations). 
United Nations Development Programme (2005), 'Justice and Truth in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Public Perceptions - Early Warning', (Sarajevo: UNDP). 
--- (2012), 'Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract ', (New York: United 
Nations). 
United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women of the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (2009), 'Inventory of United Nations system 
activities to prevent and eliminate violence against women', 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw.htm (New York: United Nations). 
United Nations Expert Panel (2002), 'Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ', 
(S/2002/1146; New York: United Nations Security Council). 
United Nations General Assembly (1999), 'Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant 
to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica', (New York: 
United Nations). 
--- (2005a), 'The Peacebuilding commission: resolution/adopted by the General 
Assembly', (New York: United Nations, 30 December, A/RES/60/180). 
--- (2005b), '2005 World Summit Outcome. Referred by the High-level Plenary 
Meeting of the General Assembly by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth 
session', (A/60/L.1). 
--- (2010), 'Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture', S/2010/393 
(New York United Nations). 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Representation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2009), 'Statistics Package', (UNHCR). 
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (2007), 'Strategic Framework for 
Peacebuilding in Burundi', (PBC/1/BDI/4 New York: UNPBC). 
--- (2010), 'Emerging Lessons and Practices in Peacebuilding , 2007-2009', (New 
York: PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned). 
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (2010), 'UN Peacebuilding: An 
Orientation', (New York: United Nations). 
--- (2013), 'Peacebuilding & The United Nations', 5 /7/2013. 
United Nations Security Council (1993), 'Resolution 880 (1993) Adopted by the 
Security Council at its 3303rd meeting, on 4 November 1993', S/RES/880 
(1993) (available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f166c.html 
(accessed 2010)). 
--- (1994a), 'Resolution 940 (1994) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3413th 
meeting ', (UN Security Countil S/RES/940 (1994) ). 
--- (1994b), 'Final Report Of The Commission Of Experts Established Pursuant To 
Security Council Resolution 780', (New York: United Nations S/1994/674). 
--- (1999), 'Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th 
meeting, on 10 June 1993', (United Nations, S/Res/1244 ). 
USA (2002), 'National Security Strategy', (Department for International Development 
). 
van de Vyver, Johan D (1991), 'The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, Comparative 
Constitutionalism: Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid South Africa', 
Emory Law Journal 40, 745-834. 
Van der Dennen, J MG (1986), 'Four fatal fallacies in defense of a myth: The 
aggression-warfare linkage', in J Wind and V Reynolds (eds.), Essays in 
Human Sociobiology, Vol. 2 (Brussels: V.U.B. Study Series), 43-68. 
269 
 
van Evera, Stephan (1994), 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War', International 
Security, 18 (4), 5-39. 
van Tongeren, Paul, et al. (eds.) (2005), People Building Peace II: Successful Stories 
of Civil Society (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
Väyrynen, Raimo (1991), 'To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution 
of National and International Conflicts', in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), New 
Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict 
Transformation (London: Sage), 1-25. 
--- (1999), 'From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Transformation: A Critical View', in 
Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), The New Agenda for Peace Research (Brookfield: 
Ashgate Publishing). 
Vetlesen, Arne Johan (2005), Evil and human agency: understanding collective 
evildoing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Volkan, Vamik (1997), Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (Boulder: 
Westview Press). 
--- (2004), Blind Trust: Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror 
(Charlottesville, Virginia: Pitchstone Publishing). 
von Bogdandy, Armin, et al. (2005), 'State-Building, Nation-Building, and 
Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications 
and an Appraisal of Different Approaches', Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law, 9, 579-613. 
Wainwright, Elsina (2003), 'Responding to state failure - the case of Australia and 
Solomon Island', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57 (3), 485-98. 
--- (2006), 'Australia's Solomon Island Commitment: How is it progressing?', The 
Sydney Papers 18 (1), 181- 91. 
Waliggo, John Mary (1994), 'Constitution-making and the Politics of Democratisation 
in Uganda', in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds.), From Chaos 
to Order (Kampala: Foundation Publishers Ltd). 
Wallensteen, Peter (2007), Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the 
Global System (London: Sage). 
Wallerstein, Immanuel M (1976), The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture 
and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century 
(New York Academic Press). 
--- (1984), The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the 
Civilizations. (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge). 
Waltz, Kenneth (1993), 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', 
International Security, 18 (2), 44-79. 
--- (2002), 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', in G John Ikenberry (ed.), America 
Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press), 29-67. 
Walzer, Michael (1996), 'The Hard Questions: Vote Early', New Republic, 215 (18), 
29. 
Warner, Daniel (2003), 'The Responsibility to Protect and Irresponsible, Cynical 
Engagement', Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 32 (1), 109-21. 
Watson, James (2005), 'A model Pacific solution? A study of the deployment of the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands', (Canberra: Land Warfare 
Studies Centre, Department of Defence. Working Paper No. 126). 
Weart, Spencer R. (1998), Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One 
Another (New Haven: Yale University Press ). 
270 
 
Weber, Max (1947), 'The Theory of Social and Economic Organization', (1964 edn.; 
New York: The Free Press). 
Wehr, Paul, Burgess, Heidi, and Burgess, Guy (eds.) (1994), Justice Without Violence 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner). 
Welsh, David (1994), 'Negotiating a Democratic Constitution', in J.E.Spence (ed.), 
Changes in South Africa (London Royal Institute of International Affairs), 25. 
Wheare, Kenneth (1966), Modern Constitutions (New York: Oxford University 
Press). 
Whipps, Heather (2006), 'Anthropologists: Early Humans Probably Peaceful', 
LiveScience, Fox News. 
Widner, Jennifer (2008), 'Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An 
Overview', William and Mary Law Review, 49 (4), 1513-41. 
Wiesel, Elie (1982), Night (25 edn.; New York: Bantam Books). 
--- (1994), All Rivers Run to the Sea (London: Harper Collins Publishers). 
Willett, Susan (2006), 'Global Security, the Liberal Peace, and Human Security. ', 
Economists for Peace and Security Quarterly, 18 (4), 1-5. 
Williams, Phil and Picarelli, John (2005), 'Combating Organized Crime in Armed 
Conflict', in Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke (eds.), Profiting from 
Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner), 123-52. 
Wilson-Roberts, Guy (2001), 'The Boungainville Conflict, An Historical Overview', 
in Rebecca Adams (ed.), Peace on Bougainville (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press). 
Winter, John, Schofield, Kaye, and Duituturaga, Emele (2008), 'Annual Performance 
Report 2007/2008: A Report on the Performance of the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands', (Honiara: RAMSI). 
Woods, Emira (1997), 'Somalia', (Washington: Foreign Policy In Focus). 
Woodward, Bob (2006), State of Denial (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperback). 
Woodward, Susan (2002), 'Economic priorities for successful peace implementation', 
in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (eds.), Ending 
Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner), 183-214. 
Woolf, Leonard (1916), International Government (London: G Allen & Unwin 
Limited). 
World Bank (2003), 'The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An 
Evolving Agenda', (Washington: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction 
Unit). 
--- (2011), 'World development report 2011: Conflict, security, and development', 
(Washington, DC). 
Wrangham, Richard (1999), 'Evolution of Coalitionary Killing', Yearbook of Physical 
Anthropology, 42, 1-30. 
Wrangham, Richard and Peterson, Dale (1996), Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins 
of Human Violence (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt). 
Wright, Robert (2001), Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Random 
House). 
Zartman, William (1985), Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa 
(New York: Oxford University Press). 
--- (1995), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution). 
271 
 
--- (2000), 'Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond', in Paul Stern and Daniel 
Druckman (eds.), International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 
(Washington: National Academy Press). 
--- (2001), 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments', 
The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1 (1), 8-18. 
Zurcher, Christoph (2011), 'The Liberal Peace: A Tough Sell?', in S.P Campbell and 
D Chandler (eds.), The Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of 
Peacebuilding (London Zed Books), 69-88. 
 
 
 
